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Parker Bosses Rosse

PROCEDURE, EXTENT.

AND

LIMITS

OF

Human Understanding.

ISAIAH lv. 9.

As the Heavens are higher than the Earth, so are my Ways higher than your Ways; and my Thoughts than your Thoughts.

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TO THE

WHOLE DESIGN.

OME years past a small Treatise was publish'd with this Title, A Letter in answer to a Book, entitled, Christianity not mysterious; as also to all those who set up for Reason and Evidence, in opposition to Revelation and Mysteries. It plainly appears to have been written in haste, and with the incorrectness of a youthful and as yet unformed stile; but the Foundation the Author all along proceeds upon, for the confutation of his Adversary; and for laying open the fallacy of mens Arguments against Divine Revelation and our Christian Mysteries, drawn from the Topics of strict Reason, Certainty, and Evidence seems to be solid and just; B and

and indeed the only one upon which fuch a firm and unshaken Superstructure can be rais'd, as may be Proof against all the Arguments and Objections of Unbelievers.

THAT Letter proceeds intirely upon a Distinction at first laid down between a Proper and Immediate Idea or Conception of a Thing; fuch as we have of the things of this world, which are the proper and immediate Objects of our Senses and our Reason; and that Idea or Conception which is Mediate only and Improper, fuch as we necessarily form of the things of another world. It is there afferted as a fure and incontestable Truth, that we have no immediate proper Idea at all of God, or any of his Attributes as they are in themselves; or of any thing else in another world: and consequently, that we are under a necessity of conceiving all things supernatural by Analogy; that is, by the Mediation and Substitution of those Ideas we have of our felves, and of all other things of Nature.

This Distinction is there affirmed to be absolutely necessary, for the ascertaining and fettling the Bounds and Measure of our Knowledge; for shewing the true Limits, and utmost Extent of human Understanding, that we may clearly and distinctly apprehend where mere Knowledge ends, and Faith begins: where it is they meet again, and inseparably combine together for the inlargement of our Understanding vastly beyond its native sphere; for opening to the Mind a new and immense scene of things otherwife imperceptible; and for a rational well-grounded Affent to fuch Truths concerning them, as are a folid Foundation for all Religion Natural and Revealed.

THE nature of this Analogy the Author explains by a fimilitude in this following Paragraph.

" And thus it is plain, that the we may be faid to have Ideas of God and

" Divine things, yet they are not imme-

" diate or proper ones, but a fort of Com-" position we make up from our Ideas of

B 2 " worldly

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worldly Objects; which at the utmost amounts to no more than a Type or Figure, by which fomething in another world is fignified, of which we have no more notion than a blind man hath of Light. And now that I am fallen into this Similitude, which feems well to explain the nature of the thing, let us pursue it a little; and suppose, that to a Man who had never feen or heard any thing of it, it were to be reveal'd that there was fuch a thing as Light. This Man as yet hath neither " a Name nor a Notion for it, nor any Capacity of conceiving what it is in it felf. 'Tis plain therefore God would " not reveal this to him by the name of Light, a word wholly unknown to him; nor by flamping on his Mind any immediate Idea of the thing it felf: for then it were utterly impoffible for him to communicate this Re-" velation to others as blind as himself; fince nothing but the fame Almighty Impression cou'd do that; so that this " Revelation must be made by Words

" and Notions which are already in him. " And accordingly when he is told, that " it is a thing which can diffuse it self in " an instant many thousands of miles round; and enable him to know in " a moment in what Order all things lay " at a great distance from him, and " what Proportion they bore one to ano-"ther; nay, that it could make him " know where the Heavens lay; and " that by the help of this he shou'd there " discern at once, a vast and almost in-" finite number of very pleasant Bodies; " and, in short, that without the help of his Stick or his Hand he shou'd know every thing that lay before him: " After all, 'tis plain this Man wou'd " form to himself an Idea of Light from " his Touch; he wou'd think it very " like Feeling, and perhaps call it by " that name; because this was the best way he had of distinguishing one thing from another; and therefore " wou'd conclude, that those Bodies he " heard of must needs be wondrous soft " and smooth. Just thus do we con-" ceive B 3

" ceive the things of another World; fo "that we may rack our Invention, and "turn and wind all those Ideas we have "into ten thousand different shapes, and yet never make up any true likeness or similitude of the *Real* Nature of "those Objects of another World.

From hence the Author proceeds to the application of this Distinction to the Points in controversy between him and that famed Unbeliever he had to deal with; and particularly to the explaining the true manner of our conceiving the Mysteries of Christianity, and that of the ever blessed Trinity in particular.

Now tho' the proceeding upon this foot of Analogy may feem fomething strange and new, yet it is as old as the earliest Fathers of the Church; who did not indeed expressly lay down this Distinction, and pursue it Logically thro' all the particulars of our knowledge human and divine; or apply it to the exact stating the Limits and Extent of human understanding in general. But however the sum and substance of all their Answers

fwers to the Arguments and Objections of Heretics and Unbelievers might be refolved into this, That the true and real Nature of God and his Attributes, and of all things in another World were utterly incomprehensible and ineffable; and consequently that all mens Reasonings from the Real Nature of things in this world, to the Real true state and condition of things Supernatural, were precarious and inconclusive.

IT is now upwards of twenty-five years fince that Treatife was published; and confidering it underwent feveral Editions; that it met with the approbation of some men of greatest note, and highest station in the Church; and never was answered any otherwise than by fome personal Reflections in a Pamphlet against the Author; but chiefly considering of what universal use and application the above-mentioned Distinction is in all our Controversies with Arians, and Socinians, and Deifts; how necessary it is for reducing all matters in debate between them and us, to a Point under

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every

every head, so that they may admit of a clear and eafy folution. It cannot be fufficiently admired, that in this interval (wherein so much hath been written on all fides concerning Revelation and Mystery, and the Doctrine of the Holy Trinity) the many pious and learned Defenders of our Faith have either intirely declined proceeding upon the foundation there laid; or have given only fome general, short, and imperfect Hints of this Analogy. Infomuch that our Adversaries have not yet found themfelves under a necessity of joining issue upon that foot; and confequently obliged either flatly to deny and difprove our Conceptions of God, and his Attributes, and of all things in another World to be Analogous; or to acknowledge that all their Inferences and Conclusions drawn from the Nature of Man and Things material, to the Real internal Nature of God and Things supernatural, are false and deceitful.

But our wonder will cease, when we confider the no small difficulty of applying 2.

plying this Distinction between proper and improper Ideas to the Mysteries of Christianity; and to the several distinculties and objections which have been raised concerning them, even after it is allowed and throughly digested; besides the great danger of pursuing it thro' all the instances which will every where occur: For without a judicious and cautious application of Analogy, men will be apt to mistake it for pure Metaphor, and by that means resolve all Religion into nothing more than mere Figure and Allusion.

THAT which makes the Danger of infifting upon this manner of conceiving God and his Attributes by Analogy yet greater, is the general prevailing prejudice against it, from the express Declarations of some late Writers of great note; who have rejected utterly, and even exploded it by such positive Assertions as these, which will be throughly considered in their due place. If the Reasons of Just and Good are the same in respect of God and Man; then must the Actions proceeding

ing from them be of the same Kind. Again, If the moral Attributes in God were not the same in Kind with those in Man, we cou'd have no knowledge at all of them; nor could we reason at all about them. And again, It is foolish for any man to pretend, that he cannot know what Goodness, and Justice, and Truth in God are; for on that supposition God would be an unintelligible Being; and Religion, which consists in the Imitation of Him, wou'd be utterly loft. Again, That Cogitation or Thought, Self-motion, Free-will, and Reflection which is implied in Self-consciousness, are in God Almighty the same in Kind [with what they are in us] tho' infinitely superior in Degree, is as demonstrable as either his Existence, or any other of either his. moral or natural Attributes; these being primary Attributes common to all Intelligences. Others argue strenuously against this Analogy from that very Topic in the other extreme which makes it absolutely necessary, namely, the Infinite Nature of God; by faying, There can he

be no Proportion or Similitude between Finite and Infinite, and consequently no Analogy. The weight and authority of these great Writers hath probably deterred others from publicly attempting any thing this way; otherwise than by some general Hints, purfued perhaps only thro' one or two Paragraphs; and hath occafioned their running rather into any other way of accounting for themanner of our conceiving God and Things immaterial; fuch as by the common Deduction of Reason; by their Effects only; by the Relation they bear to us; or by Intellectual Ideas, and Metapyfical Abstractions.

ABOUT ten years after that Letter had appeared in Print, an eminent and truly learned Prelate ventured (in a Sermon preached and published in 1709) to shew the Consistency of Predestination and Foreknowledge with the Freedom of Man's Will, upon the same foundation of Analogy (as his Grace intended) upon which the Letter had proceeded for the defence of our Christian Mysteries; which is the only Discourse upon

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that foot deserving the Reader's particular notice. In that Sermon his Grace very justly and truly afferts, with the Author of the Letter, That we have no direct or proper Notion or Conception of God and his Attributes, or of any other Things of another World; That they are all described and spoke of in the language of Revelation by way of Analogy and Accommodation to our capacities; That we want faculties to discern them; That the Words and Names by which we express them are not to be taken literaly. He observes, that our Conceptions of God and his Attributes, as far as they can go, may be faid to correspond to the Wifdom, Goodness, Holiness, Justice, Will, and Foreknowledge of God. And hath this excellent Paragraph to that purpose, which I shall here transcribe, only leaving out a few words, which have given an handle for exception.

"IF we wou'd speak the truth, those "Powers, Properties, and Operations, "the names of which we transfer to God, are but faint Shadows and Re-

femblances

semblances of the Divine Attributes. Whereas his Attributes are the Originals, the true real Things; of a nature fo infinitely superior, and dif-" " ferent from any thing we discern in his Creatures, or that can be conceived by finite Understandings, that we can't with reason pretend to make any other Deductions, from the Nature of one to that of the others, than those 66 " he hath allowed us to make; or ex-

" tend the Parallel any farther than that very Instance which the Resemblance

" was defigned to teach us.

Тно' his Grace thus rightly lays down Analogy for the foundation of his Difcourse; yet for want of having throughly weighed and digefted it, and by wording himself incautiously, he seems intirely to destroy the nature of it; infomuch that whilst he rejects the strict Propriety of our Conceptions and Words, on the one hand; he appears to his Antagonists to run into an extreme even below Metaphor, on the other. His greatest mistake is, that thro' his Discourse

course he supposes the Members and Actions of an human Body, which we attribute to God in a pure Metaphor, to be equaly upon the same foot of Analogy with the Passions of an human Soul, which are attributed to him in a lower and more imperfect degree of Analogy; and even with the Operations and Perfections of the pure Mind or Intellect, which are attributed to him in a yet higher and more complete degree. In pursuance of this overfight, he expressly afferts Love, and Anger, Wildom, and Goodness, and Knowledge, and Foreknowledge, and all the other Divine Attributes to be spoke of God as improperly as Eyes or Ears; That there is no more likeness between these things in the Divine Nature and in ours, than there is between our Hand and God's Power; and that they are not to be taken in the same Sense. That because we do not know what his Faculties are in themselves, we give them the names of those Powers that we find would be necessary to us in order to produce such Effects,

Effects, (as we observe in the world) and call them Wisdom, Understanding, Foreknowledge, &c. Because he hath all the Advantages these Powers or Faculties can give him if he had them. And again, That he acts as if he had them. That we speak of him as if he had the like; as if there were some such things in God; and because we must resemble him to something we do know and are ac-

quainted with.

AGREEABLY to this incautious and indistinct manner of treating a Subject curious and difficult, he hath unwarily drop'd fome fuch shocking Expressions as these, The best Representations we can make of God are infinitely short of TRUTH. Which God forbid, in the Sense his Adversaries take it; for then all our Reasonings concerning him wou'd be groundless and false: But the Saying is evidently true in a favourable and qualified fense and meaning; namely, that they are infinitely short of the real, true, internal Nature of God as he is in himself. Again, That they are Emhlems

blems indeed and Parabolical Figures of the Divine Attributes, which they are design'd to signify; as if they were Signs or Figures of our own, altogether precarious and arbitrary; and without any real and true foundation of Analogy between them in the Nature of either God or Man; and accordingly he unhappily describes the Knowledge we have of God and his Attributes by the Notion we form of a strange Country by a Map, which is only Paper and Ink, Strokes and Lines.

NOTWITHSTANDING the main scope and design of his Grace's Sermon is just; and that by any candid Reader he must be however allowed to suppose that Goodness, and Mercy, and Justice, and Wisdom, and Knowledge do express some real Perfections in God Answerable and Correspondent (as he himself expressed hit) to what they signify in human Nature: And notwithstanding that the foundation of Analogy, upon which he builds, (if rightly explained and duly applied,) is solid and firm; yet his

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Antagonists overlook all this, and lay the whole stress of their Answers upon those Errors he hath committed in the Superstructure. They take advantage only of his mistaken way of treating the Subject, and inadvertent manner of expressing himself. They do not answer him, by directly shewing the Foundation of Analogy upon which he argues to be false and groundless; and that our Ideas and Conceptions of God and his Attributes, obscure and imperfect as they are, must be however direct and immediate; and our Words as literal and proper in that case, as when we apply them to Things natural and human. No, they have not attempted this; but they do most injuriously represent his Grace's Opinion and Doctrine to be, That those Operations and Perfections of a human Mind, which we attribute to God, do fignify nothing true and real in the Divine Nature: Whereas that great Prelate in some places expressly asferts the contrary, that they fignify more valuable Perfections and infinitely supe-8108°

rior to what they are in us; and again, that his Attributes are the Originals and true real Things. And his Opposers take this for granted; that if those Attributes are in any sence Analogous, they can mean nothing true and real in the Divine Nature.

From thence they draw many formidable confequences, all which must be allowed to be true, upon those false fuppositions of their own. As, that his Grace's Principle of Analogy, which is call'd a Paradox, renders the Gospel Patchwork; and all the Divine Attributes, together with all the great Doctrines of Christianity insignificant, useless, and precarious; and that thereby all Virtue and moral Practice falls to the ground. That by it his Grace hath banish'd Truth quite out of the world; and that it is all lost by his unexampled Theology. That by this the Scriptures are represented obscure, ambiguous, dark, perplexed, entangled; and contradictions rais'd in the Divine Nature and Attributes. That it makes way for all the er-

roneous Suggestions of Enthusiastick Spirits; for subverting all Christianity; for Sapping its Foundations; and that it turns all its Doctrines into Banter, Ridicule, and Contradiction. That upon his Principle of Analogy, they are all groundless, wild, and erroneous Notions; Dreams, Whimsies, Improprieties, calculated for people's Fancies; mere Fictions, Chimeras, and chimerical Conceits, and Compliances with false Images in the heads of the Vulgar. That his Grace hath outdone the Rehearser, who in effect impiously says, St. Paul and the other Apostles confound all with their improper way of talking; that his Sermon hath done a great deal of Hurt and Differvice to the Church of Christ; That a man might as well have performed what his Grace bath done by the Subterraneous World, by the Philosopher's Stone, by Magic, and occult Qualities; and that upon his Principle Ministers are not to trouble themselves, whether the Doctrine they preach be true or false.

Out of a Pamphlet, the Author of which stiles himself a Proselyte to plain Dealing, I have collected these sew from many such like expressions of a severish burning Zeal, and not according to knowledge for the Doctrines of the Gospel; which are all however safe upon his Grace's main Principle rightly understood and candidly interpreted.

Another anonymous and much closer Antagonist, who writes with less shew of Zeal indeed for the Cause of Christianity, but with better colour of Reason; is no less severe and injurious in his Censures of the main Principle upon which his Grace proceeds. He afferts with an air of great Positiveness, that upon his Principle, God is a Being without Wisdom, Goodness, Justice, and Mercy, Knowledge and Holiness. That all the moral and natural Attributes of God are indefensible. That all the Arguments for God's Government of the World; and for rewarding and punishing Men in a future State, which are drawn from the Divine Attributes taken

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in a strict and literal Sense, are given up; and that we can never from thence infer any Obligation to Duty. That thus it is a Matter of no great consequence, what Notions Men have of God. That by consequence from his Principles God must be without Distinction of Persons, as well as without Parts and Passions; and that his Grace bath given up the Cause to the Unitarians. That his Grace owns, that God is neither Good nor Wise; and that according to him, the Scripture Text, Be ye holy as I am holy, is as unintelligible, as Be ye holy as I am Rabba. That if his Grace meant to make all our Notions of God pass for Riddles in Divinity not to be understood, little Credit will be gain'd by it to Religion. That thus the Unity of God would be only something As GOOD as but one God. The Author asks, How can Men know God's Will, when he hath no Will? And, How can we imitate the Holiness of God, unless it be of the same nature with that Quality in us? And again, Whither will Matters run? Whither indeed! C 3

deed! when one may not so much as say, God knows whither. And he makes this Remark upon the whole, That the World had been as wise and as quiet, if their ordinary Notions of God's Attri-

butes had never been disturbed.

I HAVE troubled the Reader with these empty Outcries and Sarcasms here, in order to prevent this loofe and unreasoning way of speaking upon this Subject for the future; and that I may prevail upon those Authors to think the Matter over again in cool Blood: And to confider, that they are the very Men who are justly liable and obnoxious to all those hard Speeches and frightful Imputations of sapping and subverting Christianity, which they so wrongfully charge upon the great and learned Prelate. Because they all along so strenuously maintain, That if the Doctrines of the Gospel, God, and his Attributes, are by us conceived Analogicaly, there can be nothing of Truth and Reality in them. And that upon the Supposition of such Analogy, we could have no Knowledge at all of

of them, but what is purely Figurative and Metaphorical. Two of the most desperate and universaly pernicious Pofitions, that were ever openly and publickly maintain'd; being by direct and immediate consequence utterly destructive of all Religion Natural and Revealed: And which, if they were true, wou'd support and confirm all the Arguments of Arians, Socinians, and Deifts against the Christian Revelation and Mysteries. To convince them effectualy that they are fundamentaly wrong, let them but fingle out any one Idea or Conception, together with the Word by which we express it; and revolve it in their mind, and try whether they can transfer it to the Divine Being and the Things of another World, in the fame strict and literal Propriety with which they apply it to Man: And if they find this in fact not practicable, then let them suspend all further Opposition to the Doctrine of Analogy, till the Nature of it is more fully and rightly explained, and the true Use of C 4

it in Religion shewn; together with the application of it to the Desence of the Truths and Mysteries of the Gospel; and to the Consutation of Heresy and

Infidelity.

Such Objections as have any weight or colour of Reason in them may, God willing, be throughly confidered hereafter. But by the way, it is convenient to obviate and remove one popular Prejudice against the enlarging upon this Subject of Analogy. What occasion or necessity is there for it at this time, more than ever? Wou'd not the world have been as wife, and as good, and as holy, if Men's ordinary Notions of God and his Attributes, and of all things else supernatural had never been disturbed? Yes it wou'd; and it cannot be fufficiently lamented, that they have been fo disturbed. But who are the Disturbers? The Arians, Socinians, and Deifts; who, by turning all the Words and Language of the Gospel either into mere Figure and Metaphor on one hand, have argued away the whole Substance of our Faith:

Faith; and resolved all Christian Mysteries into nothing: Or by wresting all the Terms and Expressions we have for them to strictly literal and proper Acceptations on the other hand, have from thence charged our Faith of the Gospel and its Mysteries with Inconsistencies, Absurdities, and Contradictions? Or are they the Disturbers, who undertake to shew, that those Gospel Terms are to be understood neither in a sence purely Figurative and Metaphorical, nor yet in their strict and literal Propriety; and who by that means lay open the Fallacy of all those men's Reasonings from the Nature of Things known, to the real internal Nature of Things unknown?

THE design of the Scriptures indeed is, that we should take both the moral and natural Attributes of God, and all things spoke in them of another World so far literaly, as to give our Assent to them all as to things true and real, upon the Testimony of God; without meddling with their Nature as they are in themselves, which is incomprehensible.

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But when Men will deviate from that Defign, and pervert this common, and familiar, and literal Acceptation, which would fully have answered all the Ends of Religion; and will raise their Objections from thence against the Scriptures themselves, and the Mysteries revealed in them: Then, when the Enemies of Revelation and Mystery make a bad use of it, by misrepresenting and misapplying this Analogy; it becomes absolutely necessary for the Orthodox to make a good use of it; to explain it truly, and apply it rightly; to distinguish the Nature of it with greater nicety, and fhew how it differs from Figure and bare Allufion.

THE fundamental Doctrine revealed in Scripture, and ever maintained by the Church, but denied by the Arians is, that God is Truly a Father; that Christ is his True and Genuine Son, and Actualy begotten of the Father in his own Divine Nature and Perfections. The Ground of the Arian Scheme is, that the words Father, and Son, and Begotten

Begotten cannot be understood literaly and properly of God; therefore they are to be taken Improperly and figuratively; namely, that Christ was Made or Created, or some way Produced by the Will and Power of God; and confequently cou'd not be equal in Nature and Perfections, nor co-eternal with him. From hence they branch out into a large Hypothesis full of Blasphemy against God as a True Father; and against Christ as Truly a Son, in the received sence of the words as they are commonly applied to God and to Christ. For us to undertake to prove in the other extreme, that those Terms are to be understood literaly and in their strict Propriety of God and Christ, is an impossible task; and thus they will be furely too hard for us in every point of Controversy. But if we take the middle way, and shew those Terms not to be taken in their First, and Strict, and literal Propriety; nor in a mere and empty Figure, but Analogicaly thus: That Christ, in his Divine pre-existent Nature, is as Truly, and Realy,

aly, and Actualy the Son of God in a fupernatural incomprehensible manner, begotten in his own Nature and full Perfections, as if he were literaly so; and as Truly as a human Child is the Son of his Father in the way of Nature; then we bring the Controversy upon the right foot; and they must stumble at every step they take to confute us.

THE Dilemma the Socinians reduce us to, and push us with at every turn is this. All the words of Scripture, in which the Mysteries of Christianity are revealed, are to be understood either literaly or metaphoricaly. But you must grant, fay they to us, that they cannot be taken properly and literaly; therefore they are to be taken Metaphoricaly; and consequently they are all nothing more than mere Figure and bare Allusion: And accordingly they are so full of this, that Socious himself, speaking of the Gospel, hath this saying, Tota Redemptionis nostræ per Christum Metaphora. The true Answer to them is, that those words are to be understood

neither

neither in a strictly proper sence, nor in a sence purely Metaphorical, but Analogicaly; in which acceptation they contain and exhibit to us as much Truth and Reality, as they do when taken in their most strict and literal

Propriety.

THE whole fum and substance of the Deift's and Freethinker's reasoning may be resolved into this. You must grant, fay they, that we can neither know nor believe any thing but what we have some Idea of: And you must grant likewise, that the Christian Mysteries are incomprehenfible, that is, that we have no Idea at all of them; therefore we can neither know nor believe them. And purfuant to this, they every where oppose the Certainty and Evidence of Sense and Reason, and the clear and distinct knowledge we have of Their proper Objects; to the Uncertainty, and Obscurity, and Unconceivableness of Revelation and Mystery. Now we are under a necessity of making them both those Concessions thus Separated by them,

them, and yet their consequence is abfolutely false: But if you put them both
together, they will make one Position
absolutely true; namely, that Propositions, made up of Terms and Ideas
strictly literal and proper; first understood and apprehended thus literaly, and
then transferred by Analogy to things
Divine and Incomprehensible, do contain and express as much solid and substantial Truth and Reality, as when they
are applied only to things corporeal and
human.

NAY, the Atheists themselves find their account in laying aside and confounding this Analogy; for thus they argue. If God is Infinite, no finite human Understanding can have any Knowledge at all of him. It can't know him in the Whole, because nothing finite can comprehend Infinity; nor can it know any Part of him, there being no part of Infinity. To which I return the Apostle's Answer, that tho' we can't be said to know any Part of him; yet we are truly said to know him in part, as

we see the reflection of a substance in a looking-glass; that is, by Analogy with those Perfections we observe in our felves, and in the things of Nature; the brightest Mirrour in which we now behold him. But they urge, there can be no Proportion or Similitude between Finite and Infinite, and consequently there can be no Analogy. That there can be no fuch Proportion or Similitude as there is between finite created Beings is granted; or as there is between any material substance and its Resemblance in the glass: and therefore wherein the Real Ground of this Analogy confifts, and what the Degrees of it are, is as incomprehensible as the real Nature of God. But it is fuch an Analogy as he himself hath adapted to our Intellect, and made use of in his Revelations; and therefore we are fure it hath fuch a foundation in the Nature both of God and Man, as renders our Moral Reasonings concerning him and his Attributes folid, and just, and true.

I MUST not now stay to enlarge upon these things, and shall here only give some account of my Design and Method in the further prosecution of this

Subject.

THE great Genius of the last Century, under the head of Revelation and the Mysteries of Religion, observes how God hath vouchsafed to let himself down to our Capacities; so unfolding his Mysteries as that they may be best or most aptly perceived by us; and, as it were, grafting or inoculating his Revelations into those Notions and Conceptions of Reason which are already in us. After which, he reckons a Treatife of Logic calculated for this very purpose, among his Desiderata. Itaque nobis res salubris videtur & imprimis utilis, si Tractatus instituatur sobrius & diligens, qui de usu Rationis humanæ in Theologicis utiliter præcipiat, tanguam Divina quædam Diale-Etica. Utpote quæ futura sit instar opiatæ cujusdam medicinæ; quæ non modo speculationum, quibus schola interdum laborat, inania consopiat; verum etiam controcontrovers: arum Furores, quæ in Ecclesià tumultus cient, nonnihil mitiget. Ejusmodi Tractatum inter Desiderata ponimus; Sophronem, sive de legitimo usu Rationis humanæ in Divinis nominamus.

Now this is the very thing I aim at, and what I endeavour by this first Treatise to perform in some degree. In which I propose rightly to state the whole Extent and Limits of human Understanding; to trace out the several steps and degrees of its Procedure from our first and fimple Perception of fenfible Objects, thro' the several operations of the pure Intellect upon them, till i grows up to its full Proportion of Nature: And to shew, how all our Conceptions of things fupernatural are then grafted on it by Analogy; and how from thence it extends it felf immenfely into all the Branches of Divine and Heavenly Knowledge.

Some Treatise of this kind I foresaw was necessary to be premised, before I cou'd proceed to the application of this Analogy to any of our Controversies in Religion; because of that strong Preju-

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dice against it, from an opinion that it ultimately refolves all Religion into mere Figure and Allusion, and consequently brings it to nothing; and because of the many Errors and Prepossessions in the generality of young Students, taken up from false and pernicious Principles in fome of our modern Writers of Logic and Metaphysics. In order to obviate and remove these, I was to begin with the first Rudiments of our Knowledge; to explain the feveral Properties of those Ideas of Sensation, which are the only Materials the Mind of Man hath to work upon; to lay open the true nature of Divine Analogy, how it differs from human Analogy, and how both differ from pure Metaphor: To shew, how we necessarily apply it to the conceiving the Divine Being and his Attributes; of what universal advantage it is in directing us to the right use of Reason in Religion; in enabling us to state the true manner of apprehending the Mysteries of Christianity; and to judge, when it is that our Reasonings upon them are just,

just, and folid, and clear; and when they are confused, precarious, and false.

I HOPE the ingenuous Reader will fuspend any Indignation and Censure, which may arise from his Zeal for the Truth and Safety of Religion, till he can fee the whole Design together in one view. For my Intention is (if God permit) in some of the following Tracts to proceed to our Controverly with fuch as are declared and professed Arians, whether ancient or modern. When the way is thus far prepared, I purpose to lay open the deep Dissimulation of all those who have no other colour or pretence to renounce that name and Character, unless it be because they rigorously maintain the rankest of their Heretical Opinions not expressly; but by direct, immediate, and necessary consequence. The confideration of the Socinian Postulata, and that gross and complicated Scheme of Herefy deduced from them with much Subtilty and Artifice, I leave to the laft.

THE Sabellians began early in the Church to destroy the very Substance

of Christianity, and give an intire turn to the whole Tenor of the Gospel, and the Reality of our Salvation by the Merits and Mediation of a Saviour: And that, by arguing the words Father and Son to be purely figurative, and confequently to denote only one and the same Divine Person; and thus they formed their Heresy upon the soot of Meta-

phor.

THE Arians afterwards, tho' they ran into the quite contrary Extreme, yet argued from the very fame Topic of Figure and Metaphor; concluding just as the Sabellians did, that Father and Son were Terms altogether improper, and utterly unworthy the Divine Nature in their literal and proper acceptation. But they made a quite contrary use of this; not only to prove them two distinct and different Persons; but to prove the Son to be of a different and subordinate Nature, neither coeternal nor coequal with the Father: and it was by this Artifice, they endeavoured to obviate and invalidate all the Arguments of the Ortho-

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dox, drawn from the real import and true acceptation of those words in the

Gospel.

THE Socinians agree with the Arians in allowing Christ to be God in the most elevated fence, and to all intents and purposes that a made or created Person can be fuch; but that it is still in a figurative only, and not in the same strictly proper acceptation in which it is attributed to the Father. And they differ from them in these two material Points, That whereas the Arians allow Christ a pre-existent, tho' a made or created Nature; the Socinians will have him originaly a mere Man, and not in being till born of the Virgin Mary. And fecondly, Whereas the Arians, by holding Christ to be God in a Figure only, do intirely take away all the real and truly divine virtue and efficacy of his Merits and whole Mediation for us; yet they do this by direct and immediate confequence only; and leave the Mysteries of Christianity in their full force and efficacy with fuch as do not difcern this neceffary D 3

cessary consequence. But the Socinians do expressly and professedly turn them all into pure Metaphor, and bare Allusion only to what was enjoined and practised under the legal Dispensation. So that they hold Christ to be a Figurative Saviour, a figurative Priest, a figurative Mediator; they resolve his Merits and Satisfaction, with the words Price, Purchase, Redemption, Washing and Cleansing of his Blood, all into mere Figure; and in short, turn our whole Christianity into

a Metaphorical Religion.

THE Deifts and Freethinkers of all ranks and degrees, who build upon their Principles, have but one step farther to go, and do make this Inference, which is obvious and rational upon the Socinian Hypothesis; That if all those things are to be understood in Figure and Metaphor only, then they can have nothing of Reality and solid Truth at the bottom. By the same satal Delusion with the Socinians, they utterly reject all Analogy in Religion as well as Metaphor; and therefore set up for the belief of one only

Divine Person; and for such Principles of Morality as are deduceable only from the Light of Reason, as they imagine, without the help of that Revelation, to which even they themselves owe their best and most exalted Notions of it. They rigorously confine the Understanding within the narrow bounds of direct and immediate objects of Sense and Reason; and will not fuffer the Mind of Man in any one Instance to reach above the frictly literal and immediate acceptation of Words; so as to transfer them and their Ideas Analogicaly with the least Truth and Reality to things incorporeal, and otherwise inconceivable and ineffable.

THE Progress from thence into speculative Atheism is short and easy. For if all Revealed Religion is to be rejected as merely figurative, and metaphorical; then all Natural Religion is to be likewise rejected; because all the Ideas and Conceptions we can have of God and his Attributes from the light of Reason must be equaly figurative and metaphorical; and therefore we have no Real true

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Knowledge at all of them; and confequently can never prove the Existence of a Being whereof we have no true

Conception or Knowledge.

I LOOK upon Socinianism, together with the modern Clandestine Arianism which is mostly built upon it, to be in all probability the last great Effort of the Devil against Christianity; which will then shine out to the world in its full Lustre and Glory, whenever this thick Cloud is fully removed and diffipated, which he hath interposed to obscure and darken its Rays. Our modern Deists, and Freethinkers, and Atheists of all forts and fizes are likewife the natural Growth and Offspring of Socinianism: They are as fo many Heads daily sprouting up from that figurative Metaphorical Monster; each of which multiplies by being cut off, and they increase their number by being as daily confuted. Nor can they ever be totaly destroyed, till they are all struck off together at one Blow, skilfully levelled at the common Neck from whence they rife; which I am persuaded can never be otherwise performed, than by a dexterous application of that true Analogy (which hath a folid Foundation in the Nature of things, and ever carries in it a fure, and certain, and confistent Parity of Reason) to all those Arguments and Objections raised against Revelation, from men's blending and confounding it with pure Metaphor, a Creature only of the Imagination.

THE absolute necessity of answering the Enemies of Revelation and Mystery upon fome other than the common footing, is apparent; not only from the daily increasing number of their Proselytes, but from their boasted Triumphs over the Orthodox; whom they pretend to have greatly distressed and ftreightened, by reducing them to a necessity of proving all the Scripture Terms, wherein our Christian Mysteries are revealed, to be taken in their strictly literal and proper acceptation. This they plainly discern to be an impossible task to us; and therefore whilst the Champions

pions for the Cause of God and Religion are labouring and toiling up this Precipice; and ever bend all their force and strength to attack them in that part of their Hypothesis, in which alone they are impregnable; they, from the oppofite fide, never fail to ply them at every turn with Figure, and Metaphor, and Allusion. From hence it is, that their greatest Advantages are gained; and tho' they can never hope to obtain any intire Victory from thence, yet this serves to raise a Mist before men's eyes; to perplex and darken the whole controverfy; and to render every material point of it confused and indistinct, so that it cannot be brought to a certain and determinate Conclusion. All this difficulty and obscurity, as I conceive, may be effectually removed by rightly stating the true nature of that Analogy which runs thro' our Conceptions of Things divine. For then the only Objection left to the Adversaries of Revelation will be; that Granting all we contend for, yet Analogy

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Analogy at best is still but Figure; and therefore that by this method of proceeding, we make that very Concession which gives up the Substance and Reality of Mystery. To which the Answer is obvious, That if they will take the word Figure in General, and in a great latitude, as it is opposed to the strictly Literal Propriety of those Scripture Terms, in which our Christian Mysteries are delivered; and must and will call them fuch; there is no danger in a Word, fo they allow the Thing: And will afterwards fairly distinguish between that which is Purely Figure, and ferves only for a mere Elegance and Ornament of Speech; and that which hath as folid a Meaning and as substantial a Ground in the very Nature of things, as if it cou'd be express'd in Terms strictly literal and proper.

THIS I apprehend is to be no otherwise performed, than by rightly explaining the Nature of that true and Necessary Analogy, which runs thro' all our

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Conceptions and Language of Things divine. And furely there cannot be a better Test, that this is the true Measure and certain Rule in thinking and speaking of things otherwise imperceptible and inestable, than its being universaly applicable to so many different Subjects and Controversies; and yet never once giving just occasion for a Suspicion of its failing in the Trial: especially if it is all along found consistent with it self under so many various uses; beginning in our most natural Conceptions of the Attributes of God, and ending in the most sublime Mysteries of Christianity.

My Design in each of the following Tracts is, not to calculate them for an Answer to any particular Book or Author, but to the whole Cause in controversy with Arians and Socinians; and other Unbelievers who build upon them, and do from their Hypotheses argue against all Revealed Religion, with better colour of Reason, than those Hereticks do against the Truth and Reality

of our Christian Mysteries. My Purpose is to lay a Foundation for answering, not only what hath been already offered by them; but what may be advanced upon the like erroneous Principles for the future. In order to which, I am not to expatiate into any great variety of Matters fubordinate, and of less moment; or to apply Arguments or Solutions to each man's peculiar way of Reasoning: But to make a just and impartial Representation of their Doctrine and Principles; to state rightly the fundamental Questions in debate; that the whole Controversy may be brought upon the right foot, and the material Branches of it reduced to the utmost point of Decision. To single out such of their Arguments as are the main Pillars and Support of their whole Scheme of Religion; none of which I think to pass over or conceal; but to propose them in their full Strength and Force, and in the shortest and clearest Light, as I have collected them out of their best and most valua-

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ble Authors. And laftly, so to adapt my Answers to them, that in reading any of their Works, with a continual eye to the distinction between Metaphor and the true Divine Analogy, the main Delusion and Fallacy which runs thro' them all, may lie open to every discerning and

unprejudiced Person.

I HAVE endeavoured to be very exact and just in my Quotations, tho' I name none but the Antients; and even out of these I decline, as much as may be, citing either the Place or Page from whence the Quotations are taken. The few Passages cited for their Authority only, are to be met with in most Books upon the Subject; and as for the rest, whether from the Antients or Moderns, I leave them to pass according to their own intrinsick worth and value, without the additional weight of great Names. The world is already filled with that kind of Learning, which confifts in tedious Differtations concerning what fuch and fuch men's thoughts and opinions were,

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in Matters plainly to be decided by Reafon and Scripture; when the main Queftion is, what Opinions they Ought to be of; and who gives the best and most convincing Reasons for what he says? Truth will ever stand upright alone; but Error is tottering, and falls to the ground when its Props are removed; and every thing merely human is to be esteemed, not according to the Person who said it, but according to the intrinsic weight of what is said.

Tho' I may commit many mistakes and oversights in the course of my Performance; (and who is intirely free from them?) yet that ought to be no Prejudice against the main Foundation I have laid, and do all along proceed upon. If it is false and imaginary, and a groundless Invention of Man, it will come to nought; and I pray God it may do so speedily, that the Fallacy may be laid open to his Glory, and to my own Shame; who have been so deeply engaged in dangerous Error and Mistake: But if the Foundation

is good, and agreeable to the Light both of Nature and Revelation, as I trust it will be found, then it is of God; it will stand sure; and all Contradiction and Opposition given to it, will tend only to its farther Establishment; and to the Strength and Confirmation of that whole Superstructure which is raised upon it.



PROCEDURE, EXTENT

AND

LIMITS

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Human Understanding.

BOOK I.

CHAP. I.

Affertion whatfoever feems more agreeable to Reason, than that Things Human and Divine, Natural and Supernatural, are not perceived by the Mind of Man after the same manner. Every one at first Hearing will be apt to think this a true Proposition; and on second Thoughts will look upon it as Matter of greatest Consequence in Religion, that it be throughly weighed and considered: And yet by some E

ftrange unaccountable Unhappiness, it hath so fallen out, that nothing hath been more overlooked than this signal and important Difference; and less attended to in most of those Controversies, which have all along disturbed the quiet and peaceable Course of the Gospel.

This Overfight hath been equaly the Cause of all the Errors of Enthusiasts on the one hand; and of the pretended Votaries to strictest Reason and Evidence on the other. For tho' these two seem to be in contrary Extremes, and to run as far from one another as they can; yet they both set out at first with the same satal Delusion; they meet again at length in one common Error, and proceed in all their Notions and Arguments upon the same gross Supposition, That Human and Divine Things are alike the Direct and Immediate Objects of our Understanding.

Upon this very Mistake it is, that on one side Men will not stoop so Low as Reason; and that on the other, they will not venture to rise Above it. While Enthusiasts aspire to a more direct and immediate View of Things, which are not in such a Degree discernible either by Sense or Reason, their Notions must of Necessity be all senceless and irrational: And while the Boasters of Reason and Evidence acquiesce intirely in the immediate Objects of our understanding Faculties, and will not suffer the Mind

Mind to launch out beyond them, they by direct Confequence deftroy all Religion, as well Natural as Revealed.

My Defign being to lay a Foundation for the clear and effectual Confutation of most Errors of both kinds, but especially those of the Arians, and Socinians, and Deifts, and Freethinkers of all Sorts; against whom the following Discourses are more directly levelled; I foresee it necessary, that the First of them should be taken up in tracing out the Bounds and Limits of Human Understanding. The exact Description of these, with such Plainness and Perspicuity, that Men may know how to Stop when they come to the full Extent and Natural Compass of it; and then to Pause a while, 'till they are fensible how the Mind must Begin a-new for the Apprehension of Things Supernatural, and intirely immaterial; feems to me the greatest Service which can be done to all Religion in general, in this notional and sceptical Age. For as the mistaking of these Bounds hath been the Cause and Occasion of most Delusion and Error; so the having a proper Recourse to them, is become the only effectual Way of forming distinct and fatisfactory Answers, to most of those Difficul-ties and Objections which have been raised against the Truths of Religion.

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The Bounds set out to our Understanding by nature, are not very extensive; for the Mind hath originaly no larger a Sphere of its Activity than this visible Frame of material Objects, that seems to be shut in by the fix'd Stars; which intire Space we may conceive to be but as a Point to the Universe; and yet all Things beyond them, with respect to any Direct or Immediate Perception of our Faculties, are as if they had no Being: Insomuch, that if Men were resolved never to concern themselves with any Exercise and Application of their Knowledge and Assent, farther than the direct and immediate Objects of their Senses and their Reason, they must necessarily cut off all Intercourse and Commerce with Heaven; and there could be no such Thing as any true Religion in the World.

And therefore now we are to confider after what manner it is, that the Mind of Man dilates and extends itself beyond its native Bounds; how it supplies the want of Direct and Proper Ideas of the things of another World; raising up Within it self Secondary Images of them, where it receives no Immediate Impression or Idea from Without. How the vast and boundless extent of the Universe, with the great and glorious Variety of heavenly things, the World of Spirits, and even God himself and his Attributes; together with all the Sacred Mysseries of Christianity become the Objects of our Reason

Reason and Understanding: Insomuch, that Things Otherwise imperceptible grow Familiar and Easy; and how we are able to meditate and discourse, to debate and argue, to inser and conclude concerning the nature of those things, whereof we have not the least direct Perception or Idea.

Before I proceed to this, I shall premise it as a sure and uncontested Truth; That we have no other Faculties of perceiving or knowing any thing divine or human but our Five Senses, and our Reason. The Contexture of our Frame is so various and complicated, that it is no easy matter nicely to distinguish our understanding Faculties from one another; and Men who would appear more sharp-sighted than others, and pry farther into this matter than there is occasion, may increase the number of those Faculties: But they will be all comprehended under Sense, by which the Ideas of external sensible Objects are first conveyed into the Imagination; and Reason or the pure Intellect, which operates upon those Ideas, and upon them, Only after they are so lodged in that common Receptacle.

As this first Volume relates to Knowledge in general, and is chiefly Logical, and preparatory only to what is intended should follow; so I have been more large and particular in those parts of it which especially regard my

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main Defign. But the touching upon fome collateral Points that fell in my way, was almost unavoidable; the placing of which in a true Light might prove of confiderable Service to those who have been misled by some late Authors of Vogue and Authority. Whether these incidental Subjects are truly determined here, or not; I desire it may be observed, that this will not any way affect the main Doctrine, nor alter the principal Foundation laid, in relation to our manner of conceiving the things of another World.

I LAY no greater a stress upon any of those Points, than as being matter of highly probable Conjecture only, and as what appears to me to be Truth; and do accordingly leave them to stand or fall, as they shall be found more or less agreeable to the natural Sentiments of any Reader who is yet free to judge for himself, and unbiaffed from the Weight of great Names. This previous Caution I would have extended particularly to what is faid concerning the Souls of Brutes; the degree of our Knowledge in natural Causes and Effects; the Nature and Usefulness of Syllogism; to my conjectural Observations, at the latter End of the second Book, upon that Scripture Dislinction of Spirit, and Soul, and Body; as well as to all other matters which have not a direct tendency to establish the main Doctrine of Divine Analogy.

C H A P. II.

Of Sense, and the Ideas of Sensation.

UR five Senses, tho' common to us with Brutes, are however the only Source and Inlets of those Ideas, which are the intire Groundwork of all our Knowledge both Human and Divine. Without Ideas of some fort or other, we could have no Knowledge at all; for to know a thing, is to have some Reprefentation of it in the Mind; but we cannot think, or be conscious of thinking, 'till we have fome Idea or Semblance of an Object to think upon; and without our Senses, we could not have one internal Idea or Semblance of any thing without us. Infomuch that in our very Entrance into the large and capacious Field of Argument which is before us, we must lay down that Maxim of the Schools as universaly true without any Restriction or Limitation, Nibil est in Intellectu quod non prius fuit in Sensu; or, as a certain Philosopher expresseth it with more Softness, Nescio an quicquam Intellectus moliri possit, nisi ab Imaginatione lacessitus.

THE Imagination is the common Store-house and Receptacle of all those Images, which are transmitted thro' the Senses; and till this is furnished in some degree, the Soul, while it is in the Body, is a still, unactive Prin-E 4 ciple; ciple; and then only begins to operate and first exert itself, when it is supplied by Sensation with Materials to work upon: So that the most abstracted spiritual Knowledge we have, as will hereaster abundantly appear, takes its first Rise from those Sensations; and hath all along a necessary dependence upon them.

I AM not unaware, how much this positive Assertion will at first startle and surprize all those, who have hitherto fancied they could abstract intirely from all Ideas of Sensation; and that by the help of such as are Purely Intellectual they could think altogether independently of them. And the thought which naturally arises in their Mind on this occasion is this; That if this kind of Abstraction is utterly impracticable, what then will become of all our Knowledge of the Things of another World? Of all Reveald Religion, and the Truths of Morality, and the Mysteries of Christianity? They are all, I trust in God, very safe; and will become the more so when this Assertion is fully laid open, rightly explain'd, and universaly acknowledged to be true.

THE Question is not, what the Consequences may be of enlarging upon this Principle, and pursuing that Analogy, by which alone our natural Ideas and Conceptions become subservient to the conceiving and apprehending things supernatural? But whether the Principle is true?

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For there is a mutual Sympathy and fast Connection between the Truths of Nature, and those of Religion; they fall in together, and close whenever they meet, fo as to communicate Light and Strength to each other. This Opinion, as every thing else which is agreeable to Reason, will I hope be of no small Advantage to true Religion; for I doubt not but the Effect of putting it in a right Light will be, that Enthusiasm, in all the great Variety of Shape in which it shews itself, will fall to the Ground at once; and all those Objections against Revelation and Mystery will be removed, which proceed upon their being Ab-firuse, Unintelligible, and Contradictory; and those who expose our Christian Mysteries, or explain them away under Pretence and Colour of adhering to strict Reason and Evidence, will be under a necessity of finding out new Topicks. So that, tho' we thus stoop as Low as the Earth, yet it is that from thence we may with more Vigour take our Flight even to Heaven itself. for the Contemplation of all the glorious Objects of another World.

BEFORE I speak of the particular Properties of these Ideas of Sensation, it will be convenient to observe these three things in general concerning them.

1. THAT it is no way to the Purpose of the following Discourse to decide here, whether all

all fensitive Perception be performed by any Actual Impression of the Thing itself upon our Senses? Or by any Operation of the Sense upon the Object? Whatever the Quality in sensible Objects is, which enables them to imprint some Representation or Character of themselves upon us; or whatever that Frame and Contexture of the Organs is, which disposeth them either to receive that Impression, or to take the Likeness of those external Objects by any intrinsick Virtue and Power of their own; it is certain that all fuch Perception necessarily requires the Presence of the Object; with an immediate actual Operation either of the Object upon our Organs, or of our Organs upon the Object. The Effect and Consequence is the same, as when we apply the Wax to the Seal, or the Seal to the Wax; there follows fome fort of Representation of the Object and its Qualities. This is the Case of all those material external Objects, which by their Presence have lest any Footstep or Character of themselves upon our Senses; and this Representation or Likeness of the Object being transmitted from thence to the Imagination, and lodged there for the View and Observation of the pure Intellect, is aptly and properly called its Idea.

IF any one, not yet satisfied, shall ask farther what an Idea is? I shall defire him to look upon a Tree, and then immediately to shut his Eyes, and try whether he retains any Similizude

tude or Resemblance of what he saw; and if he finds any such within him, let him call that an Idea, till a better Word can be found; and thus he will have a more exact Knowledge of what an Idea is, than he could attain to by any Description or Desinition of it. Thus it is that all the great Variety of Objects in the visible Creation is let in upon the Mind thro' the Senses; as all the Parts of a delightful and spacious Landschape are contracted, and conveyed into a dark Chamber by a little artissical Eye in the Wall; and so become conspicuous and distinguishable in Miniature.

a paintenant style Supervisor a I KNOW there are some who will allow nothing to be called an Idea but what we have from our Sense of Seeing; tho' at the same time they give us no other Word for the Senfations of the other four Senses: But the Perceptions of the other four are truly and properly Ideas; for otherwise a blind Man, tho' he was born with all his other Senses, could have no Impression of any Object conveyed to his Imagination which might be an Idea or Representation of it; and consequently he could have no Knowledge, no not so much as any irrational Animal. It is eafily owned that the Ideas of Sight are more numerous, and more vivid, and distinct than those of the other Senses; and more clear and lasting Representations of external Objects: And therefore because the Sight is the noblest and most extensive of them, I geneI generaly take my Instances and Similitudes from thence; not but that I comprehend all other Sensations under it.

2. Nor Secondly, doth it make any alteration in the Foundation upon which I build, whether the Ideas of sensible Objects exhibit to us a true Image of their Real Nature, as they are in themselves; or whether the Objects be only the Occasions of producing them; or whether we perceive them only by their Effects, or Adjuncts, or Circumstances, or Qualities: As Heat may be no true Image of Fire; nor Light of the Sun; nor Colour of the Superficies; nor Sweetness of Sugar. For whatever Impression external fensible Objects make upon us, this we call their Idea; because it is the only Perception of them we are capable of, and the only way we have of knowing them. Which Idea, tho' it should be supposed to exhibit to us no more of the true and intrinsick Nature of the Object, than the Impression on the Wax doth of the real true Nature of the Stone or the Steel which made it: Yet the Object leaves behind it such a Similitude and Resemblance of it felf upon the Senses, as answers all the Ends of Knowledge in this Life; and lays a Groundwork fufficient to build all that Knowledge upon, which is necessary in order to another, whether in respect of natural or revealed Religion.

That our Ideas or Perceptions of sensible Objects do not exhibit to us their whole intrinsick Nature, so as to afford us a complete and Adequate Knowledge of their intire Essence; together with the inward Configuration and Disposition of all their Parts, is easily granted: But that they are agreeable to the true Nature of the Things perceived, as far as they go; that there is such an exact Correspondence between these and their Ideas, that what Knowledge we have of the Objects is True and Real, and not seign'd or Imaginary, is more than probable: Our Knowledge salls short indeed, but it fails in Degree only; and tho' it is Impersect, yet it is not False or delusive.

Now that the Nature, and Attributes, and intrinsick Qualities of sensible Objects are thus far intirely agreeable to that external Appearance they make to us by the Mediation of our Ideas, is sufficiently evident from this plain Reason: Because it was as easy to the Power and Wisdom of God, to have contrived all our Organs of Sensation for a just and exact Perception of their real true Nature; as for what is Feign'd only and Delusive, which is in truth no real Perception of them at all. He could as well have adapted all our Faculties to the real Nature of Things as they Are in themselves, as to what they are Not; and we may reasonably conclude, that this is more agreeable

able to the *Truth* and Veracity of the Divine Nature, than to have made us altogether for Delufion; and put such an invincible *Deceit* upon all the Powers and Faculties of Perception which he gave us, that we should have no *Real true* Knowledge of any of their proper Objects, but be deceived in every thing about us.

Nothing can be more abfurd than this Opinion, according to which external Objects are only the Occasional Causes of such Affections in us as the Objects themselves have no Similitude of, nor any natural Relation to. For no Thought is more obvious than that every thing should act according to its respective Nature; and if fo, then they must operate upon our Senses according to their own intrin-fick Qualities; and our Sensations of them, as far as they reach, must be just, and agreeable to what the Objects are in themselves. But this Opinion must suppose that God Suspends the real Nature and intrinsick Powers of every Agent, and miraculoufly interpofes in every act of theirs, to alter those Effects which they are naturaly disposed to produce, into some others quite different from them, or above their Power of Acting. Thus all Objects without us must operate upon us by Qualities and Attributes quite different from what they are realy endued with; they must affect us in a manner beyond or beside any Power of Acting

ing that is in them; and we may as well suppose that nothing may act upon something.

However Persons may for Argument sake, or out of any Affectation of Singularity, abet this Error; yet they can't sorbear suspecting it to be such when they consider, that all external sensible Objects have universaly the same uniform Effects upon all Men's Senses, and at all times, when they are equaly disposed: This must incline them to believe, that as far as external Objects do affect us, they do it truly according to their own intrinsick Nature and our's; and that if our Organs were more nicely disposed, and our Faculties more curious and persect, all farther Impressions of external Objects upon us, would be just and real; and still more exact and complete Representations of their true Nature and Essence.

3. A THIRD thing necessary to be premised, and of no small Consequence towards removing infinite Consusion out of our way of Thinking; and towards a clear and distinct Procedure of our Understanding in the attainment of true Knowledge is; that the Word Idea, according to its genuine and proper Signification, should be limited and confined to our simple Sensations only, and to the various Alterations and Combinations of them by the pure Intellect. Whenever the Word is apply'd to the Operations of our Mind; or to these considered

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in Conjunction with any of those Ideas of Senfation on which they operate, it is used in a very Loose and Improper Manner; and the calling them all Ideas indifferently, and in the same propriety and strictness of Speech without distinction, hath evidently tended to the amusing and perplexing the Understanding; and no way contributed to the improvement and enlargement of our Knowledge.

THUS the laying down the Ideas of Sensation and Reflection to be Alike the Original Sources and Foundation of all our Knowledge, is one great and fundamental Error which runs thro' most of the Discourses and Essays of our modern Writers of Logicks and Metaphylicks. Nothing is more true in Fact, than that we have no Ideas but of sensible Objects; upon these it is that the Mind begins to exert all its Opera-tions; of which we have a Consciousness indeed; but cannot frame to our selves the least Idea or Resemblance of them, abstractedly from those Objects upon which they operate. We are Conscious to our selves of the two chief Operations of the Mind, Thinking and Willing; as also of the several Modes of them, Remembrance, Discerning, Reasoning, Judging, Knowledge, Faith, &c. But let any Man look into himself, and try whether he can find there any Idea of Thinking or Willing intirely separate and abstracted from any thing to be thought of or willed; or fuch as he doth of a Tree or an Horse; and

and he will foon be convinced of the mistake of expressing all these Operations by the Word Idea.

IT is plain that Thinking and Willing, with all the various Modes of them, are not Ideas; but the Actions and Workings of the Intellect upon Ideas, first lodged in the Imagination for that purpose; and necessarily to be considered as antecedent to any fuch Operations. When these are first laid down as the only Groundwork and Materials of all our Knowledge, then the various Operations of the Mind upon them come naturaly to be confidered; but not as a new Set of Ideas, as if the Operations of the Mind were to be their own Ideas, and exercised upon Themselves: And that likewise not immediately, but by the Mediation of Ideas, as it is in fensible Objects, which is grosly absurd. Nothing is properly an Idea but what stands in the Mind for an Image or Representation of fomething which is not in it; the thing must be without us; and because it cannot itself enter, the Likeness of it only is conveyed thro' the Senses into the Imagination; which is by Nature disposed for receiving and retaining the Impression. But it is not so with the Operations of the Mind, which are themselves within us originaly; and are not known merely by any Similitude or Representation of them in the Imagination.

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This is instead of many Arguments to shew the great mistake and absurdity of that Expression Ideas of Reflection; since we neither have nor can have Ideas, pertinently speaking, of any thing but what is external to the Mind; and which can enter into it no other way than by Similitude only, or Representation of itself. So that nothing is plainer than that we do not conceive the Operations of our Minds by the Help or Mediation of any Ideas which are substituted in their stead; but that we have an immediate Consciousness of the Operations themselves; as being already within us, and essentially belonging to our very Make and Frame.

But if Men must have all the Operations of our Minds to be Ideas, and will right or wrong call them by that Name; yet 'tis plain they would be neither Direct, nor Simple, nor Immediate, nor Original. The very Word Reflection would even thus speak them to be only Secondary Ideas; for the Truth is this: First there is a direct and immediate View of the Intellect upon the Ideas of Sensation; from thence, by an immediate Consciousness, it observes its own Motions and Actions and Manner of operating upon those Ideas; then forms to itself the best Conceptions it can of those Operations; not Abstractedly, but in Conjunction with those Objects,

Objects, or rather Ideas of them, which its Operations were exercised upon.

So that all the Operations of the Mind necessarily presuppose Ideas of Sensation as prior Materials for them to work upon; and without which the Mind could not have operated at all; no, nor have had even a Consciousness of itsfelf, or of its own Being: Infomuch that it never could have exerted one Act of Thinking, if it had not been first provided with some of these to think upon; and this the compound Word Consciousness plainly imports. As we could have had no Notion of Sight, without some outward Object to exercise the Eye upon; fo the pure Intellect could have no Notion or Consciousness of any one of its Operations, without some precedent Idea in the Imagination for it to work upon. And again, as the Eye can furvey the whole beautiful Range of visible Beings, but hath no Power to cast one direct Glance upon itself; so the Soul of Man can take a View of all the inexhaustible Store of Ideas treasured up in the Imagination, by a Direct Act; but cannot have the least direct or reflex Idea of itself, or any of its Operations. I might add to this, that we are so far from having any Immediate, Simple, or Original Ideas of the Operations of our Mind, that all the Ideas we attempt to form of the Manner of its Acting, and the Expressions we use for it are borrowed from F 2 Sensation;

Sensation; as will more fully appear hereafter.

As the Mind can have no Direct and Immediate View of its own Operations, so neither can it have any True and Proper Ideas of them; and the Affectation of calling these by the name Ideas, and holding them to be equaly simple and original with those of Sensation, is the first fatal Step which is usually made out of the way, to mislead the Understanding in its search after Truth; and from that time forward Men wander up and down in a Labyrinth of Ideas without the least Progress towards the Attainment of any solid and substantial Knowledge.

WHEN the Ideas of Sensation and Reflection are first laid down indifferently for the Groundwork, then Men run endless Divisions upon them; then come on Compound Ideas of both together; Ideas of Simple Modes; Ideas of Mix'd Modes; Ideas of Primary and Secondary Qualities; Ideas of Relations; Ideas of Passions; Ideas of Power; Ideas of Causes and Effects; Ideas of Virtues and Vices; in short every thing must be ranged under some Head or other of Ideas: Tho' it be a Scheme as precarious and as void of any Foundation in Nature as Aristotle's Predicaments, but much more perplexed and consounding; and thus they go on till their Heads are so fill'd and impregnated with them, that they turn every thing into Ideas that

comes in their way, infomuch that they can neither think nor fpeak without them.

TAKE a Sample of this profound Ideal Wifdom out of one of the most celebrated Authors of this Strain; Would you know what Power is? The Answer is, That it is a compound Idea in the Mind which it hath received both from Sensation and Reflection; that is to say in plain Language, it is something we know by our Senses and our Reason. But how comes any thing like it into the Mind at all? Thus; The Mind being every Day informed, by the Senses, of the Alterations of those simple Ideas it observes in things without; and taking notice how one comes to an end, and ceases to be, and another begins to exist, which was not before; reflecting also on what passes within itself, and observing a constant Change of its Ideas, sometimes by the Impression of outward Objects on the Senses, and sometimes by the Determination of its own Choice; and concluding from what it hath so constantly observed to have been, that the like Changes will for the future be made, in the same things, by like Agents, and by the like Ways; considers in one thing the Possibility of having any of its simple Ideas changed, and in another the Possibility of making that Change; and so comes by that Idea we call Power.

WHAT a Treasure of Wisdom is here unlocked, and laid open to the View of ignorant F 3 Novices!

Novices! After reading that long Description, let any Man look into his own Mind and obferve whether he doth not know as little of the true Nature of Power as he did before; besides that it all along grosly supposes Ideas to be in the Things Without us, which are only in our felves, and not in the Objects. There is no more in it all than this in plain Language; because we observe the things without us change, and we find the Mind changes; therefore we infer, there must be something able to make and to fuffer that Change; and thus, fays he, we conceive Power, which is an Idea of Sensation and Reflection. Whereas realy nothing can carry the Mind farther from a true Notion of Power, and particularly from the infinite Power of God, with whom there is no Variableness or Shadow of Change.

IF it be replied, that we form an Idea even of the Power of God, as is above described; then I ask, what becomes of the greatest Instance of his Power, that of *Creation*, which is no *Change* but a Production out of Nothing? Upon that refined and abstracted Notion of Power we must ridiculously suppose, that there was a *Passive* Power in the Creature to be made before it had a Being; and an Active Power in the Creator to make it: And in short that God hath no Power at all of *Creation*, and can only change all which Before had a Being, and a passive

passive Power in them to be changed. It is not strange that young Students should be amused and dazzled with such paint and glittering outside of Knowledge; but it may justly be wondered at, that Men of Progress in Years and Learning should be so pleas'd and delighted with this empty Noise and gingling of Ideas; that they cannot be too lavish in their Admiration, and Praises, and Recommendation of such Systems as draw them out into great lengths, without any real and solid Improvement of human Understanding at the bottom.

Nor lastly have we, properly speaking, any Idea of Pain as our most celebrated Idealists affert we have; for if we had, we should not discern the Pain Itself either of Body or Mind, but the Idea of it: It is enough and too much that we have an immediate internal Sensation or Feeling of bodily Pain, and a Consciousness of Anguish or Pain in the Mind; and confequently the most apt way of expresfing it is that by which we find it affect us. The very same may be said of Pleasure both of Body and Mind; for if we had the Idea only of Pleasure within us, we could not have the Substance or Reality of it; because Both could not be within us at the same time (as I have before observed concerning the Operations of the Mind) and thus our Happiness would not be true and real, but salse and delusive. Therefore it is better to lay aside F 4 that

that affected way of expressing these by the Word Idea, and speak of them as of internal Sensations or Affections of the Body or Mind, which we perceive and are Conscious of without the Mediation of any Ideas.

I MIGHT thus run thro' all those things which Men affect to express by Ideas, beyond those of Sensation, and shew how very unaptly and improperly the Word is apply'd to them; not without great Confusion and Detriment to the Progress of our Understanding in the Pur-suit of Knowledge. After all, we have no Idea of any thing but of external fenfible Objects; and when once we pass the Ideas of Senfation, the Word is ever after Equivocal, and of an uncertain Meaning. And therefore it were well that we could fix it here once for all; and never apply it to other things, but rather express them by those Words which obtained in the World, before the Word Idea usurped upon them, and thrust them out of use; such as Notion, or Conception, or Apprehension, or Consciousness, or by some other Term of this Sort, which may diffinguish this Kind of Knowledge from that which we have of external Objects by their internal Ideas.

CHAP. III.

Of our Idea of Spirit, and of God in particular.

AM now come to what is a yet greater Refinement of this Ideal Knowledge; namely, That we have the clearest Idea of active Power from our Idea of Spirit, and not from Matter; because Matter hath only a Pasfive Power, that is a Power not of Acting itself, but of suffering the active Power. This Spirit, according to the Standard and Oracle of Ideas in our Age, is a Thinking Substance; which he labours to thew may be Matter for ought we know; fo that according to him we have our Idea of active Power from spiritual Matter, or from a Material Spirit: Thus hath he confounded the Use of Words and the received Way of Thinking and Speaking; fince by Spirit is ever understood something that is not Matter.

As shameful an Absurdity, and palpable Contradiction as this appears at first Sight, yet it is plain to be seen in that Author, and open to every considering Reader. It is impossible for us to have an *Idea* of Active Power in any Degree, if we must have it only from an *Immaterial* Substance, of which we have no *Idea*

at all; nor indeed a Conception of any one Operation of it independent of Matter or material Organs; in Conjunction with which the Spirit of Man exerts all its Operations. The truth is thus; we observe such Essects with regard to things material and sensible, as we conclude cannot proceed from any inherent Power in themselves; and therefore we rightly infer there must be some other Beings Not material which have the Power of producing such Essects; tho' such Beings are utterly imperceptible to us, and we have no Idea of them properly speaking. So that we come to our Knowledge of Power, not from any Direct Knowledge or Idea we have of Spirit; but intirely from our Reasoning upon sensible Objects.

In pursuance of a long Chain of Ideas, Men have presumed in the Face of common Sense and Reason, to lay down this monstrous Position magisterialy and with great Positiveness. That we have as clear and distinct an Idea of Spirit, as we have of Body. The shortest way to consute this Absurdity is, what the Philosopher took, with him who denied there was any such thing as Motion; by rising up and walking before him. So I would place a human Body before the Eyes of any one who maintains this Assertion, and then require him to place a Spirit before my Eyes.

Bur instead of this, by the magical Virtue of Ideas, he will cast a Mist before you, and fay, That you can conceive Thinking and Willing as easily as you do Extension and the Cohe fion of the folid Parts in Matter. Suppose this true, which is absolutely false, That we have as clear and diftinct Ideas of Thinking or Willing (which are each of them in Man, one and the same united Act of a material and immaterial Substance in Conjunction) as we have of Extension and Cohesion: Yet how doth this give us any Idea of the Operations of a Pure Spirit, acting intirely independent of and separate from Matter? No doubt a pure Spirit hath Perfections answerable to that Thinking and Willing in us, which are performed by the Help of material Organs; but we can no way difcern of what kind they are in themfelves.

GRANT it to be true, That we perceive not the Nature of EXTENSION clearer than we do that of THINKING; yet we do not perceive the Knowledge of a Spirit so clearly as we do that of Thinking, which is Our way of Knowledge: Nay we do not Perceive it at all, and that is the Reason why we Conceive it and speak of it by that Thinking and Willing we find in our selves.

THE Ground of the Fallacy which deceives in all this reasoning is, that Thinking, which expresses what we know by a consciousness of it in our felves, is every where confounded with the Knowledge of a pure Spirit, of which we have no direct immediate Idea or consciousness at all: And the Inference made is this; Because we perceive Thinking as clearly as we do Extension, therefore we conceive what Knowledge is in a pure Spirit, as clearly as we do Extension. Whereas, we are sure that whatever the manner of knowing is in pure Spirits, it is no more performed by Thinking, than their Motion is by Walking, or Running, or Flying. Their way of Knowledge cannot be of the same kind with our Thinking, which is fucceifive, and by the concurrence of material Organs; and is accordingly ever performed to more or less Advantage, as these Organs are better or worse disposed: They are soon relaxed and tired by the labour of Thought and Attention, and must be constantly wound up a-new by Rest or Sleep; a Distemper puts the whole Machine out of frame, and so ruffles, and even overturns it, as to spoil all our sober Thinking, and change it into Raving and Madness; and if the fibres and vessels of the Brain are intirely obstructed, as in an apoplectick Fit, we cannot think at all.

W нат an extravagant Thought is it then to imagine that a pure Spirit Thinks? It Knows

Knows indeed, but we know not How; to be fure not by playing upon a fet of material Strings, exquisitely contrived and wrought up into a curious Contexture of bodily Parts for that purpose; according to the prevailing mi-staken conception of the manner of our Spirit's Thinking within us; that is, only In the Body, and not by a necessary Co-operation with it; as if Matter were not as Effential to our manner of Knowledge by Thinking, as Spirit.

THE same Argument for the proof of that ridiculous Position, That we have as clear and distinct an Idea of Spirit as we have of Body, is varied thus; A solid extended Substance is as hard to be conceived, as a thinking immaterial Substance, fay the Afferters of it. How great a Solecism and Contradiction a Thinking Immaterial Substance is, we have already seen; but letting that país, sure we know more of bodily Substance, than we do of spiritual. For we know by a Direct and proper Idea, that Extension is a Quality effential to Body; but we are so far from knowing whether a pure Spirit be Extended or no, that there is no one effential Quality of it which we do know by any Direct and Proper Idea at all, or by any Conception whatfoever, as it is In its own Nature. There is an ambiguity in the Word Subfrance, which they overlook; the Word is applied to a pure Spirit Indirectly only; and if we would express ourselves in strict propriety when we speak of Spirit,

Spirit, we must lay aside that Word, and sub-stitute the Word Being instead of it.

It is granted that we have no clear Idea of bodily Substance; but surely there is a great difference between having no Clear Idea of a thing, and having no direct proper Idea At all of it, in any degree. We have no clear Idea of Spirit, say they; but have they any Idea at all of it but what is borrow'd, and what we are compell'd to place Instead of it? When we attempt to frame to our selves any Positive Idea of Spirit, we do it from matter refin'd and exalted to the greatest degree that salls within the compass of our Observation; which yet hath no more in it of the Real Nature of a pure Spirit, than a lump of Led, or than Thinking hath of its way and manner of Knowing.

Common Sense and Reason, to those who will use them in a plain way, make it evident, that we have no Immediate or Direct Idea or Perception of Spirit, or any of its Operations, as we have of Body and its Qualities. And because we are sure we can have no such Idea of it in this Life; therefore we are naturally led to express it by a Negative, and call it an Immaterial Substance; that is, something which hath a Being, but is not Matter; something that Is, but is not any thing we directly know; and for want of any direct and positive Idea of it, we conceive and express it after the

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which Thinks and Wills, because we observe these to be the Operations of an united Body and Spirit in our selves, and the greatest Perfections of our reasonable Nature; and consequently, the fittest to represent the inconceivable Operations of a Being which is all Spirit: Tho' nothing is plainer, than that it neither thinks or wills as we'do; and that these are in themselves as unapt to exhibit to us the Real Manner of Knowledge in a pure Spirit, as an human Body is to represent its Substance.

Could any one have imagined, that by a dextrous jumble of Ideas, Men should go about to make us believe, that We have as clear and distinct an Idea of God, as we have of Man; and that We are as ignorant of the Essence of a Pebble or a Fly, as we are of the Essence of God? Do we not know by direct and proper Ideas, that it is of the Essence of a Pebble, to be Extended, Hard, and Heavy? And of a Fly, to have a fort of animal Life and Motion by the fluttering of its Wings? And do we know so much of the Essence of God by any direct Idea or Knowledge whatever? And will any Man affert we are as ignorant of the Essence of a Thing, of which we know many effential Properties by Direct Ideas; as we are of the Essence of a Being, none of whose effential Properties we are able to obtain any Idea of, as they are in their own Nature; and of which we can form Anslo-

Analogical Conceptions only? Again, Do we not know it to be of the Essence of a Man to be composed of Soul and Body, and to Think by the operation of these two essential Parts in conjunction? And have we any direct Notion or Idea of the Essence of God, how it differs from Matter; and after what manner his Knowledge is performed? Do we not know that it is effential to a Man, a Fly, and a Pebble to be Finite; and have we not a direct. and immediate, and clear Idea of this Finiteness? But have we any Actual Idea of Infinity at all? We have no positive Idea of Infinity, and therefore we express it by a negative, Without End; tho' what it is to be without Beginning and End we know not: We never can enlarge our Thoughts so far, but we may carry them farther; and therefore can never reach Infinity, which hath no bounds; when we have enlarged our Thoughts to the utmost of our Capacity, we are as far from any Actual Positive Idea of Infinity, as when we first began.

If it is here objected, That in the above Affertion by Effence is not meant the Effential Properties, but the Intima Subftantia or Subftratum of those Properties; I answer, that as far as we directly know the essential Properties of any Substance, so far we have a direct knowledge of the Substance Itself: And if we had a direct knowledge of All the essential Properties of any Substance, we should have an Adequate knowledge

ledge of that Substance; for surely if there be any meaning in Words, the knowing any of the essential Properties of a Thing, is knowing So much of its very Substance or Essence.

ALL that I observed of Spirit in general, must be true of the Divine Nature in a more eminent degree. Those Attributes and Perfections in God which we are now under a necessity of conceiving by that Thinking and Willing in us, and by the various modes of them, which are all performed by help of material Organs, do vastly more transcend the greatest Perfections in the highest Order of created Beings; than theirs do those that are in Man. And if we do but consider how far even those Angelic Perfections are probably removed from all communication with Matter, or dependence upon it; we shall then perceive that our Thinking and Willing, performed in effential Conjunction with Matter, are but a very feint and distant Analogy, for conceiving the Otherwise utterly inconceivable and Correspondent Persections of God.

PROPERLY speaking, we have no Idea of God; infomuch that we come to the knowledge of his very Existence, not from any Idea we have of him, or from any direct Intuition of the Intellect; but from the observation and reasoning of the Mind upon the Ideas of Sensation; that is, from our reasoning upon

the works of this visible Creation; and for want of any Simple and Direct Idea of him, we from thence form to our selves an indirect, Analogous, and very complex Notion of Him.

God is in himself Simple and Uncompounded, and if we had any direct and positive Idea of him, this would be so likewise; and therefore when Men Attempt to form any Simple Idea of him, they do it by a figurative one of transcendent Light, or visible Glory of the Sun: But because we have no Idea of him, as he is in his own uncompounded Essence, we con-ceive him the best we can by a very complex Notion; by removing from him all the Imperfections of the Creatures; and attributing to him all their Perfections, and more especialy those of our own Minds. Not by adding Infinity to each of them, as some affert, which is itself a Negative, and therefore can make up no Positive Idea of the supreme incompre-hensible Being; and if it could, yet would be far from exhibiting to us any thing of his true Nature and Essence, as he is In Himself. For the greatest Perfections of those Creatures which fall within our observation, and those we find in our felves particularly, are realy but fo many Imperfections when referr'd or attributed to the Divine Nature as it is in itself; even with the most exalted meaning we can annex to them in their Literal and proper Acceptation.

As for instance, the knowledge or consciousness we have of our own Existence may convince us, that it is a manner of Existence altogether unworthy of an Immaterial Substance, and much more of the Divine Being: Let the nature and manner of his Existence be what it will, to be fure he doth not exist according to any fuch gross Idea at all as we have of Exiftence; so that when we attribute to God In-finite Existence, we speak without Ideas; for we have no actual Idea of existing infinitely. So when we attribute Duration to God, which in our notion of it necessarily includes Succesfion, we attribute another Imperfection of the Creature to him; and when we Enlarge that Duration in our Thoughts as far as we are able, by *Infinity* added to it, we are in truth but multiplying and increasing so many Minutes, and Hours, and Months, and Years for the Divine Being to last. Again, All the Direct Idea or Conception we have of Power is that which one Body hath over another, or at best that of a Spirit and Body United and acting in Conjunction; the greatest and most exalted Operations of which are nothing but Weakness and Impersection when Literaly attributed to God.

AND thus it is with Pleasure and Happiness; the greatest and most refined Pleasure we are capable of in this Life, either in Body or Mind, and which we can have any Proper and Direct

Conception of, is altogether unworthy of God's Real Nature: And when we add Infinity to any of our Pleasures; or to speak with a plain meaning, when we magnify them as far as our Imagination can reach; we are but enlarging and extending the Impersections of a Creature to a monstrous and boundless Size, in order to work them up into an Idea of him, who is the inconceivable Fountain of all Persection. If it is said here that we attribute all these to God in the Abstract only, and not as they are in Us, the Observation is very just; but then it is saying in other Words, That they are all of a quite different Kind and in a different Manner in God, from what they are in the Creature; and In Him, such as we have no Proper Conception or Idea of.

THAT there are Incomprehensible Persections in the Divine Nature Answerable to what Power, and Wisdom, and Goodness are in us; and whereof these things in us are but the distant only, and seint, tho' True Resemblances, is natural and easy to conceive; and no way unbecoming the Divine Nature, or any way injurious to it. But that his Power should be conceived as an ability to Change things infinitely, or by any other direct Idea we have of Power; That his Wisdom should be Infinite Thinking, which is persorm'd not without the labour and working of our Brain; that his Goodness should be conceived by adding Infinity

to our most commendable Passions or Affections; which are all of them fo many different movements only of our bodily Organs in conjunction with the Soul; or by infinite Regulation of like Passions with ours. I say, the adding Infinity to these, or to any other Terms which express Perfections of ours, natural or moral, in their Literal Sence; or the multiplying or Enlarging of those Perfections of ours in number, or Degree only to the utmost stretch of our Capacity and Understanding, and the attributing them So enlarged to God; is in truth and strictness no more than raising up to our felves an immense and Unwieldy Idol of our own Imagination, which has no Foundation in Reason or the Nature of Things.

Nothing is more evident, than that we have no Idea of God, as he is in himself; and it is for want of fuch an Idea, that we frame to our felves the most excellent Conception of him we can, by putting together into one, the greatest Persections we observe in the Creatures, and particularly in our own reasonable Nature, to stand for his Perfections. Not most grosly arguing and inferring, that God is (in Effect and Consequence) such an one as our selves, only infinitely enlarged and Improved in all our natural Powers and Faculties; but concluding, That our greatest Excellencies are the best, and aptest, and most correspondent Representations only of his incomprehensible Perfections; G 3

fections; which infinitely transcend the most exalted of what are in any *Created* Beings, and are far above out of the reach of all human Imagination.

I HAD not been so express and particular upon this head, were it not for the mischievous consequences of that vain affectation both to Religion and Learning in general, of confining all our Knowledge to Direct and Immediate Ideas only. For the Men of this strain ever lay it down for a fure Principle they never recede from, That we can have no Knowledge without Ideas, which is certainly true; and even without Ideas of Sensation, which are indeed the groundwork and rough materials of all the most refin'd and abstracted Knowledge we are capable of. But then the Inference they make from hence at every turn, when they venture to speak plain is, That therefore we can have no Knowledge of any thing BEYOND them; or that we have no Knowledge of any thing But what we have an Immediate and Proper Idea of; and fince we can have no immediate and proper Idea but of fenfibleObjects, that Confequence of theirs is directly destructive of all Religion as well Natural as Reveal'd. Thus do these Idealists, first make the Word too General and indeterminate, comprehending under it All forts of Perceptions, and all kinds of Knowledge whatfoever; and then to ferve a Turn, Confine it to that Know-ledge which we have only by Proper and Immediate Ideas.

Nor is this Affectation less injurious to the Understanding in general; for it comprehends things of All Kinds under one and the Same Word, by that means blending and confounding their true Distinctions. Insomuch that after ringing the Changes upon Ideas thro' whole Volumes together, the Authors leave the Reader in a fort of a Maze, with a long Chain of them Ratling in his Head; and without any other real and substantial Knowledge than what he got from that part of them which treats of Ideas of Sensation. Thus far it must be confessed they have treated of them usefully and commendably; but all beyond this is specious Trifling, and nothing more than an empty Shew of great Exactness and Accuracy.

CHAP. IV.

The several Properties of Ideas of Sensation.

SINCE then it appears the Ideas of Sensation are the only subject matter which the Mind hath to work upon, provided by God and Nature for the exercise of all its Powers and Faculties; and since they are the soundation and rough materials of all our most Abstracted Knowledge; out of which each Man raises a superstructure according to the different

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Turn of those Organs which are more immediately subservient to the Operations of the pure Intellect; and according to the various ways and methods he takes of exercising those Operations upon them, it will be convenient to say something concerning the several *Properties* of those Ideas.

I. ACCORDINGLY the first Property of them is, that they are Original. By which is meant, not only that they are the First Ideas the Mind receives; as if it afterwards received Ideas of a Different Nature, and Equaly Original in their Kind; or as if the Imagination was first stock'd with Ideas of Sensation, and the Mind was afterwards fome other way fupplied with a New Sett of Ideas Independent of them: But they are so call'd because we receive them, from our first coming into the World, without any Immediate concurrence of the pure Intellect; being altogether antecedent to any of its Operations; infomuch that the Soul, before there is some Impression of outward Objects upon the Senses, is a Still unactive Principle, unable to exert itself in any degree; it cannot form one Thought, nor have the least consciousness even of its own Being. These Ideas are, in respect of all our Notions, and Conceptions, and Reasonings, in this one in-stance like the first particles of Matter in refpect to all the Substances that are compounded out of them; namely, that they run thro' an infinite infinite variety of Changes from the Operations of the Mind upon them; but do in themselves remain the same and unchangeable. As all our Compounded Ideas are made out of These alone, and as even our most abstract Complex Notions take their first Rise from them; so is our Knowledge of all Things, whereof we have complex Notions or Conceptions, Ultimately resolvable into these Ideas only; and not indifferently and promiscuously into simple Ideas of Sensation and Reselvation as Equaly original. By this Property they are distinguished,

If. FROM fuch Ideas as are supposed to be Innate, fuch as we are by some imagined to be born with, and are fo interwoven with our frame, that they necessarily grow up within us; and would be in our Mind, if there were no impression from outward Objects upon the Senses. That which gave Rise to this Opinion of Innate Ideas was, the loss Men found themfelves at in folving the Manner of our conceiving Immaterial and heavenly Things; they would not give way to fuch a Thought, as that we should conceive them by the help and Intervention of any things in This World, there appearing no Congruity or Proportion between them; and therefore they had recourse to innate Ideas for that purpose, which should be the Objects of the Pure Intellect independent of all Sensation. But let any Man, if he is able, abstract from all Sensation or Impression of material terial Objects, and look inward, and try whether he can find one Simple Idea independent of it for the Mind to exercise any of its Operations upon; and if any such instance is pretended to be offer'd, it will be easy to shew the necessary connexion it hath with Sensation, and the Dependence it hath upon it.

THAT we have no Innate Ideas is sufficiently evident from hence (which is the Common Argument against that Opinion) that there is no Occasion at all for them; and that they are altogether fuperfluous and unnecessary. There is no occasion for innate Ideas of Sensible Objects, because there is an easy obvious way of attaining them by the Senses; and if Some Ideas of them are innate, it is hard to give a reason why they should not All be so. So that if there be any Ideas innate, it must be of Immaterial Objects; but with regard to the Knowledge we have of spiritual Things, as it cannot be accounted for from any innate Ideas of them, fo our Conceptions of them are easily explain'd by the mediation of Ideas of Sensation, consider'd together with the Operations of the Mind upon them. The Rife and whole extent of all our Knowledge of them is plainly accounted for from the Ideas of Senfible Objects; the necessary Consequence we draw from Their Existence to the Existence of things Not Sensible; and from that Manner of conceiving these, which we afterwards naturaly fall into, by the help

help and Mediation of fuch Things as are within the compass of our present Sphere.

Thus for instance, we conceive the Know-ledge of a Spirit by the mediation of our Thinking, and the various modes of it exercised on Ideas of Sensation; its Moral Perfections by our Willing, and Passions, and Affections. So we make up the best Conception we can of the Divine Nature and Attributes, by putting together the greatest Perfections we find in our own, to stand for and represent them. If we had any Innate Ideas of those spiritual Things, they would be as Direct and Îmmediate as the Ideas of sensible Objects are; they would be True and Proper Representations of those Things as they are In Themselves, and no way Analogical as they now are: We should think of them as directly, and speak of them as properly as we do of the most familiar Objects of Sense; and not by any Words or Ideas or Conceptions First apply'd to the Things of This World, and then transferred by Analogy to the Things of Another; as it is evident we always do, whenever we think or speak of them.

2dly. THAT property of Ideas of Sensation that they are Original, distinguisheth them from such Ideas as, tho' they may not be Innate and born with us like the former; yet, according to a very common and most erroneous Opinion,

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are acquired by, and feated in the pure Intellect Alone; and are answerable to the Ideas of sensible Objects lodged in the Imagination; in order to be the materials of our Knowledge of Spiritual Things, as those in the Imagination are of Things Material. But if there are any such purely Intellectual Spiritual Ideas, we must come by them one of these three ways; either

1. By the *Presence* of the Object, and an immediate Impression of it upon some Faculty in the Mind which is disposed to receive that Impression, and to retain it. But every one that considers impartialy will be sufficiently conscious to himself, that no immaterial Object. ject was ever present to any Faculty of his Mind; or ever made any Impression upon it, fo as to leave behind it any Just and real Si-militude or Resemblance of itself. If it were fo, we should distinguish Immaterial Objects, by their *Ideas*, not only from *Material* ones and their Ideas; but also with as great *Exact*ness from Each Other as we now do material Objects: The Ideas of them would be as clear and Distinct, as those we have of sensible Objects; we should as readily conceive and describe them; and we should have as few doubtful Disputations about the Idea of a Spirit, as about that of a Tree or an Horse. We should then have as clear and distinct an Idea of spiritual, as we have of bodily Substance (which,

as I have shewn, we have not) and of its Way of Knowing, as we have of Thinking; of its Way of Communicating its Knowledge, as we have of Speaking; we should have Proper Words for all these, and think of them and express them in a Manner and Language quite different from what we now do.

2. OR Secondly, These supposed Ideas of the pure Intellect must proceed from the Immediate Power of God, who may, according to this Opinion, impregnate the Mind with true and Direct Ideas of Spiritual Things, which were never present to any of our Faculties, and therefore could make no Impression upon them. The Power of God is never to be disputed, but the Question is, Whether he actualy Doth fo? If ever he doth fo, it is by some Miraculous Supernatural Act; whereas we are now speaking of what our Perceptions are in the Ordinary way of Nature and Grace. God may communicate to the Mind of Man who never had his Eyes open an Idea of Light; but it is not probable he ever did so. He hath indeed Opened the Eyes of those who were born blind, that they might see the Light; and he will open the Eyes of our Understanding in the next World for the Contemplation of immaterial Objects, with the same ease that we now behold material; but whenever that is done, we shall have the same manifest, and perspicuous, and Direct view of them, that we now have of

the Objects of Sensation. If God did imprint upon our mind any Direct Idea of himself, tho' it were not very Clear and Distinct; all Arguments for the Proof of his Existence would be as needless, as those we should use to prove the Existence of a Man who stood before our Eyes: We should then think and speak of him according to that Proper Idea; and not as having Reason, and the Operations and Affections of an human Soul.

3. OR lastly, The Mind must have an Inherent Power of raising up to Itself simple Ideas of things whereof it can have no actual View or Intuition; of Objects which in themselves have no such Intercourse or Communication with any of our Faculties. But if the Mind could not frame to itself one Idea of any sen-sible Material Object without its immediate Presence, or the actual Impression of it; much less can we suppose this possible to us with respect to purely Spiritual and Immaterial Objects; which can have no conceivable way of leaving any Characters or Ideas of themselves upon the human Soul, in its present state, but by supposing some Impression upon those bodily Organs by which it performs all its Operations. There can be no direct Perception but by the application of the Object to our Faculties, or of some of our Faculties to the Object; where neither of these is done, it is as absurd to say the pure Intellect can supply Itself with Ideas,

Ideas, as to fay it can think, when it hath nothing to think of.

PERHAPS this Power of raising up to itself Ideas, without the presence or impression of Any Object whatsoever, is a Privilege of the Di-vine Intellect alone; and answerable to the Almighty Power of Creation, or producing a Thing out of Nothing. But the power of the Mind in our little World, is much the same with that of the whole Man in the greater; it is as impossible for it to raise up to itself any fimple Idea intirely New and independent of all Sensation, as it is for a Man to add one Particle to the common Mass of Matter; tho' it must be confessed to have a wonderful Sagacity in working upon what it finds already flored up in the Imagination. So that the five Senses are as fo many Windows thro' which the Mind takes in a prospect of the whole visible Creation; and if these were from the first stopped up and closed, it would be always involved in thick Darkness: And even now, with all our Senses, we have no more Direct Perception of any thing beyond the fix'd Stars by the Eye of the Intellect, than by that of the Body.

MENS endeavouring to abstract the Intellect from all Objects of Sense, so as to take a Direct View of spiritual things; and working up their Minds to an opinion and belief that they have some degree of Intuitive Direct know-

knowledge of them tho' Imperfect and obscure, hath proved a fatal Delusion, and never served any real and substantial End of Religion. I believe I may safely appeal to the Experience of the best of Men, whether they ever sound any the least Glimmerings of such celestial Light in their most exalted Contemplations? Many who never aspired to this Immediate and samiliar Intercourse with heavenly Objects, have arrived to great degrees of habitual Virtue and Holiness; whereas the contrary Opinion doth but pust Men up with spiritual Pride; and too often ends in rank Enthusasm.

3. THIRDLY, by that property of Ideas of Sensation, their being Original, they are diflinguished from such as are called Ideas of Reflection, or fuch as we are supposed to have of the Operations of our own Minds. But these Operations cannot be discerned by the means and intervention of any Ideas; for then we should have no Perception or even Consciousness of the Operations Themselves; but of those Characters only and Representations of them, which would stand in the Mind instead of the Operations; as the Idea of a Tree stands in the Mind for the Tree itself, and is the immediate Object of Thought. And fince there neither is nor can be an Idea of what is It felf actualy in the Mind already, those Operations can be perceived no other way than by a Self-consciousness. The Eye of the Mind, as I said before, cannot take a view either of its own Substance or Essence, or of its own Properties or Qualities by any Reflex Act: It doth not come to the knowledge of its own Faculties by any such unnatural Squint, or distorted Turn upon itself; but by an immediate Consciousness of the several different ways of its own working upon those Ideas of Sensation lodged in the Imagination.

We have not even the least Direct Idea or Perception of the purely spiritual Part of us; nor do we discern any more of its Real Substance than we do that of an Angel. We are fo far from an exact view or intuitive knowledge of it, that we are forced to argue and infer its very Existence from our Observation only of fuch Operations as we conclude could not proceed from mere Matter; and because we have no direct Idea of it, we express the Nature of it, as we do that of Spirit in general, by the negative Word Immaterial. And as we cannot form one Thought of our Spirit, otherwise than as it is in conjunction with the Body; fo neither can we conceive any of its Operations but as performed together with bodily Organs: And therefore it is that we are under a necessity of expressing the Modus of them all in Words borrowed from Sensation and bodily Actions. Thus we say the Mind Discerns, Apprehends, Distinguisheth, or Separates one thing from another; it Draws one H thing

thing out of another, which is a Consequence or one thing Following from another. Nay, when we would Attempt to form Ideas of Thinking and all the various Modes of it, they are imagin'd to be so many Motions or Agitations of the Soul, in conjunction with the most resin'd and spirituous Parts of the Body, about the Ideas of sensible Objects, and the Notions formed partly out of them: And when from the Existence of these sensible things it infers the Being or Existence of things spiritual and imperceptible, and exercises those Motions or Operations upon them, as Represented by their Substitutes; that is properly meditating upon the things of another World.

AND thus it is with all the Passions of the Mind, Love, Defire, Joy, Sorrow, Hope, Fear, Anger; when we attempt to form Ideas of them, we do it by conceiving them as fo many Motions or Agitations of the finest and most curious Parts in the frame of an Human Body, in conjunction with the purely spiritual Part of us, about Objects of Sensation or their Ideas, or about our complex Conceptions: And when those Motions are, by the Mediation of these Ideas and Conceptions exercised upon Objects out of the reach of all our Perception, such as God and Heavenly Things, and upon fuch Things of this World as have a more immediate relation to them, that is Religion. This is drawing the Mind off from the things of this World, and fetting our Affections on things above; and the more habitualy all

all those *Motions* of the Soul are imployed that way, to the greater degrees of true Devotion, and Piety, and Holiness do Men arrive.

CHAP. V.

A second Property of Ideas of Sensation, that they are Simple.

SECOND Property of an Idea of Sen-A fation is that it is Simple; that is, an Uniform Uncompounded Appearance, which cannot be refolved into more Ideas than one of the Same Kind; and is the Effect and Confequence of one fingle individual Sensation. So that this Property is applicable only to our First Sensations or Perceptions of Things, confider'd antecedently to any Act or Operation of the Intellect; excepting only that of a bare View and merely intuitive Knowledge of them, in the same Order and Figure they lie ranged in the Imagination; before it makes any Composition, or Alteration, or Comparifon; and before it forms any Judgment upon them; or draws any Consequences whatsoever in relation to them.

THE Notion of Simple Ideas I think ought not to be reduced to fuch a narrow compass as they generally are by Logicians; as if the Ideas of Sounds, and Tastes, and Smells, and Colours, and Tangible Qualities only were Simple; and as if the Ideas of single separate Bodies were all Compound-

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ed. Surely we should include into our Notion of Simple Ideas all that strikes the Sense at once; as when we fee the Sun or Moon, an human Body or an Horse; these and all such like are properly Simple Ideas; for it is the Intellect, and not the Senses, which sub-divides them into more Ideas than one, by directing the Sense or Imagination to survey the Parts, or Qualities, or Accidents successively: The Sensation is One only at first; it is but one Single Act of Perception; for you cannot divide the Idea of an human Body into the Ideas of More Bodies, nor that of an House into Ideas of more Houses. And therefore once for all, by a Simple Idea I mean, all that Resemblance or Similitude of the external Object, which the Organ of Sensation is capable of receiving in one distinct Perception; as the Idea of an Human Body: Tho' it may be subdivided into many other Ideas; as into the Ideas of all the different Parts of that Body; and tho' these again may be divided into Ideas of still lesser Parts; so that simple Ideas may be thus multiplied, as far as it is within the Power of Sense to distinguish.

1. By this Property, Ideas of Sensation are distinguished, First from the various Alterations and Combinations made of them by the Mind. As these simple Ideas came into the Imagination without the Concurrence of the Intellect, so neither can it destroy any one of them; but all beyond these are the Creatures

of the Intellect, which hath a fovereign Sway and arbitrary Power over those Ideas: It alters, and Enlargeth, or Diminisheth them in any Proportion; it Separates and Transposes; it turns and winds them at pleasure; and thus raiseth up to itself a new Set of Compounded Ideas with which the Imagination is furnished by it from Within, as those which were Simple and Original enter thither from Without. Thus the Ideas of many Men may be put together into one Idea of a Flock; many Houses into one Idea of a City; and thus also the Idea of One Man is by the Intellect made to stand for all Mankind, which is then called an Universal Idea.

2. The Ideas of Sensation are by this Property distinguished from all those Notions or Conceptions which are Compositions only of the Intellect out of our simple and compound Ideas of Sensation, consider'd together with the various Operations of the Mind upon them. Such is the Notion we form of Charity, which is made up of the Ideas of a Man in Misery, of the Money or other Relief that is given him; and also by adjoining the several Operations of the Mind upon them, such as Pain of Mind for his Misery, a Sence of Duty to God, and Compassion for a fellow Creature. And thus it is with all Virtues and Vices, of which properly speaking we have no Ideas Simple or Compounded;

ed; but each of them is apprehended by Ideas of Sensation, and the Motions or Operations of the Intellect upon them, put together into one complex Notion or Conception; and comprehended under one Name or Term, which is of a Signification so complex or general, that it always imports a Combination of several different Conceptions and Ideas.

AFTER the same manner the Intellect raises up to itself a Conception of Spirit; be-cause it finds neither a simple nor a compound Idea thereof within itself, it makes up a sort of complex notion or Conception of it, by first adding together the Operations of our Mind, fisch as Thinking and Willing and the several Modes of them; and then Substituting them fo combined, to represent the Perfections of a Being or Substance of which we have no Proper Idea; and of which we form the best Idea we Can from that of the most spirituous part of material Substance. And this is the way the Mind supplies the intire want of Simple Ideas for the Things of another World, whereof it hath not any, even in the most obscure and impersect degree; fo that it may be truly faid, our Simple and Compound Ideas of Sensation, together with the various Operations of the Mind upon them, do comprehend the full extent of all our Knowledge: But to lay down Ideas of Réflection together with those of Senfation as Equaly the Ground-work of our Knowledge,

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ledge, is confounding the Workman with his Materials; and the Skill and Manner of exercifing his Art, with the Stuff he works upon.

CHAP. VI.

A Third Property that they are Immediate.

A Nother thing peculiar to Ideas of Sensation is that they are Immediate. The original and fimple Ideas of Sensation when they are First obtained, necessarily presuppose the Presence of the Object, and some real actual Impression of it upon the Organs of Sense; there is an Immediate and direct Representation of the Object, and it is perceived without the mediation or Intervention of any other Object or Idea whatsoever. Thus the Ideas of a Man, and a Tree, could never have come into the Mind, if they had never been present to the Sense, and the Eye had not actualy feen them. Nor was it possible for us to have had an Idea of a Trumpet's Sound, unless the Collision of the Air had been once so near that some of the Undulations of it could strike upon the Sense of Hearing. So that by this Property they are distinguished,

jects of the fame kind, but fuch as were never

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Actualy

Actualy perceived; thus the Idea of a Man we Have teen, stands for the Idea of any other Man we Never saw. The Mind hath no other way of conceiving a Man or an Horse which was never present to the Senses nor actually perceived, but by substituting the Idea of a Man or an Horse which was so.

IF the Intellect could dilate itself no farther than the very particular or individual Objects which have been *Present* to the Senses and actualy perceived, its Sphere of Activity would be very scanty, and all our Knowledge confin'd within a very narrow Compass: And yet this must be so, if Men resolved neither to Know or Believe the Existence of any thing but what is or hath been present to some of their Faculties, and thus actualy perceived by them; they must not believe that there is a Man, or a City, or a Country in the World they never faw. We readily yield our firm affent to the Being even of fenfible Things which we never perceived, and do reason and discourse of them under borrowed and Substituted Ideas; and we esteem our Knowledge of them to be Real, and True, and Solid, tho' we never had any actual Perception of them. And yet that Knowledge must be owned to be in some Meafure imperfect, because no two Individuals of a like kind are intirely and Exactly the same in all particular Respects; and therefore the Idea of one must represent the other but imperfectly,

perfectly. All the Men and all the Cities we have not feen, fomewhat differ from any we have feen; the Men have different Features, and Shapes, and Colours perhaps, and the Cities differently-difpos'd Streets and Houses; and yet notwithstanding their many Unlikemesses to that Idea by which we conceive them, we cannot say they are altogether Unknown to us.

2dly: I DE As of Sensation are by this Property distinguished from all Ideas or Conceptions of things which are purely Figurative and Metaphorical. Of these there are two Sorts; one of which may be distinguished by the Name of Human, and the other of Divine Metaphor: But the latter being chiefly to my purpose, I shall take more particular Notice of that only here.

DIVINE Metaphor is the substituting our Ideas of Sensation (which are Direct and Immediate) as well as the Words belonging to them, to express the invisible and immaterial Things of Heaven, of which we can have no direct Ideas, nor any Immediate Knowledge or Conception; as when God's Knowledge is express'd by his Eyes being in Every Place; his Goodness in granting our Petitions, by his Ear not being Heavy; his Power by a Strong Hand; and many others of this kind used in Scripture to express his Attributes, and other heavenly Things with

with an Emphasis, and in a Figure and Allufion only, Without any correspondent Reality or Resemblance between the Things compared.

Вотн Human and Divine Metaphor agree in this, That the figurative Words, and Ideas, and Conceptions, are us'd without any Real Similitude or Proportion, or Correspondent Resemblance in the things compared. The Comparifon is not founded in the Real Nature of the Things, but is a pure Invention of the Mind and intirely Arbitrary. There is for Instance no Similitude or real Correspondence in the Nature of Things between the Verdure of a Field and Smileing; between a Faculty of our Soul in distinguishing Beauties and Desects in Writing, and Painting, and Musick, and the Taste of the Palate; between the Roughness of the Sea, and the Anger of a Man; and so likewise between Hands, and Eyes, and Ears, and God's inconceivable, tho' Real supernatural Perfections.

2. THEY agree in this likewise, That neither of them are absolutely Necessary to a True and Real Knowledge of the Things designed to be expressed or conceived by the substituted Ideas. They would both be intirely useless, were not those Things known otherwise more Immediately and Directly, or at least more Exactly Before, after another manner.

AND they differ in this, That in Human Metaphor, the Ideas or Conceptions Designed

to be express'd, are or may be as Directly known and as Immediate, as the Ideas and Conceptions placed in their Stead. But in Divine Metaphor the Substituted Ideas are Immediately and Directly known, but what is defigned to be express'd and convey'd to us thus, is no way conceivable by any Direct and Immediate Idea, Conception, or Notion.

3dly. The Ideas of Sensation are by this Property diftinguish'd from all Ideas or rather Conceptions and Notions which are purely A-nalogical. That is, when the Conceptions and Complex Notions we already have of Things Directly or Immediately known, are made use of and substituted to represent, With some Resemblance, or correspondent Reality and Proportion, Divine things whereof we can have no Direct and Proper Idea, or Immediate Conception or Notion at all. As when our Conception of Human Wisdom, which confists in Thinking and Reason, is substituted to represent an Inconceivable but Correspondent Persection of the Divine Nature. This I call Divine Analogy, to diffinguish it from that Human Analogy which is used to conceive things in this World; as when we conceive the various Operations of Instinct in Brutes, by Analogy with those of Reason in Men.

THIS Divine Analogy is universaly us'd with respect to all Immaterial or purely spiritual Things of another World, when we wou'd apprehend them with any degree of Real, or True, or Useful Knowledge. For fince there can be no actual Idea or immediate Conception or Consciousness of what is purely spiritual, by any of our Faculties of Body or Mind, or of both together; confequently there is a necessity for thus making other Conceptions and Notions which are familiar to us, and direct, and immediate, to Stand for them in the Mind; that by their Mediation we may think and speak of what is otherwife inconceivable and unutterable with any Degree of correspondent Exactness and Proportion. Thus we conceive the Knowledge of purely spiritual Beings by our Thinking, and apply the various Modes of it to them; nay, we thus conceive God himself and all his Attributes, and speak of them by the mediation of the Operations of our own Mind, and of the more commendable Passions and Affections of an Human Soul.

C H A P. VII. That they are Direct.

FOURTH Property of Ideas of Sensation, which I shall assign, is that they are Direct; by which they are not opposed to such as arise from any Reflex Act of the Mind upon itself. The Mind or spiritual Part of us cannot look upon or into itself, by either a direct

rect or reflex Act, any more than it can discern a Soul in its State of Separation from the Body: We have no Knowledge of our own Spirit, or of any of its Faculties, but from a conscious Experience of its several Ways of Acting upon the Ideas of Sensation, or the Objects of the visible Creation; which tho' it be neither a direct nor reflex View, yet is a Knowledge of the Operations of our Mind, as Immediate as the View it hath of those Ideas of external Objects upon which it operates. But they are by this Property oppos'd not only to all Indirect Ideas, but to our indirect Conceptions and Notions also; which Opposition may be illustrated in general by this Similitude. When we look strait in a Man's Face, this gives us a Direct Idea of it; but if we had never feen that Face but in a Glass, it would have given us an Indirect Idea, or bare Resemblance of it: So that an indirect Idea or Conception is when we have never discerned the thing Itself, but either a mere Shadow; or else a more perfect Similitude or Resemblance of it in something elfe.

1. Thus then they are by this Property opposed First, to those Metaphorical Ideas, or mere Shadows only and Allufions, made use of to conceive the Objects of another World. For instance, the Idea of the Sun or a resplendent material Light is Direct; I do not differn it by the Intervention of any other Idea: But when this

this Idea is put for the Glory of God or of Heaven, it becomes Indirect. I can have no Direct Intuition or Idea of the Glory of Heaven in any degree, and therefore I view it as well as I can Indirectly in that of Light. And thus I conceive God's Power by a Mighty Arm; and the Motion of Angels by Flying.

WHAT Idea I have of Material Substance is in every Respect a Direct one. My Senses have a direct Perception of its Bulk, Extension, Figure, and Solidity. But when this Idea of Substance is applied to conceive the Substance or Essence of Matter and Spirit in strict Conjunction, it is Indirect; and much more so when 'tis used for purely immaterial Substance; for then it can import nothing but Being in general.

2dly. THEY are by this Property oppos'd to those Types only, or bare Resemblances of God and the Things of another World, which for want of any Direct View or Knowledge of them, are in a good Measure render'd intelligible, and become conspicuous by a kind of Reflection only from our direct Conceptions of Things in this World; as the Likeness of a Body is from a Mirrour or Looking-Glass. For our Conceptions and Notions may be Direct or Indirect, as well as our Ideas. When they stand in the Mind for their proper and Original Objects, and when the Words that express them

them are taken Literaly for fuch Objects, they are Direct; we have a direct Knowledge of the things they stand for. But when they are Substituted to conceive, and do Stand for Divine Immaterial Things, then they become Indirect and Analogical. Thus the Conception I have of Thinking in its most perfect Degree, is from an Immediate Consciousness within me; and may be called so far a Direct Conception, because it needs not the Intervention of any other Conception by which to know it. But when I place this to Represent and Stand for the Knowledge of a pure Spirit, it becomes an Indirect and Analogical Conception.

AND thus it is with God and his Attributes; I can have no Direct View or Intuition by the Eye either of Body or Mind, of any thing in the divine Nature; therefore there is no other way of beholding him but in the Mirrour of the vifible Creation, and particularly in our felves: So we behold his Wisdom in our Thinking and Reasoning; his Power in our worldly Dominion and Power; his Goodness in the Rectitude of our most commendable Passions and Affections. Not by adding Infinity to each of these, as some have grosly mistaken, so as to stretch our Imagination as far as we can to Infinite Thinking; Infinite Strength; Infinite Rectitude of Passions and Affections: But by adding Infinity to those Incomprehensible Perfections in the divine Nature of which we have not the leaft

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least Direct Glimpse or Knowledge; and therefore do conceive them Indirectly in those Refemblances of them which are discernible in the most perfect Works of the visible Creation. Thus, as in a Mirrour, we See him who is invisible; and instead of Seeing all things in God, as some have Enthusiasticaly fancied, we see God in his Creatures; and the Invisible things of him are known, by the things that are made.

THE true Nature and Manner of the Prefent Knowledge we have of the things of another World, is, by the Apostle, very aptly described by our Seeing thro', or rather In a Glass darkly; and our Future Knowledge of them by our feeing Face to Face; that is Directly, and not by any Reflection either of mere Shadows only, or Refemblances, as it is now with us. The Word Εσόπτες in the Original of that Passage is not a Perspective, but a Mirrour or Looking-Glass; and the true rendering of it is In a Mirrour or Looking-Glass, as the Words join'd with it are Έν ἀινίγματι, In an obscure Reprefentation; this is evident from the Oppolition in the following Words, Then Face to Face. To shew the great Aptitude and Significancy of that Similitude of our Seeing in a Glass darkly, I shall observe these two things.

1. That a Glass or Mirrour exhibits to us nothing of the Reality and Subfrance of the thing represented in it; the Similitude form'd by the Reslection

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Reflection of the Object hath no more of the true Espence and Properties of the thing itself, which it exhibits, than a mere Shadow; and is nothing more than an Appearance which perisheth with the Removal of the Object. And yet we cannot say but that there is a Representation, and a true one; but that there is a Real Likeness of the Substance in that airy Form; and that there is however such a Proportion between them, that the Idea of a Face we never saw but in a Glass is a just one, and may be well Substituted in the Mind for the Face itself, and that it gives us some Real and true Knowledge of it.

Thus it is with those Conceptions which fland in our Minds to represent God and Spiritual Things. Tho' the things they are substituted for, are of a quite different Kind, and tho' these Substitutes are no more in respect of them, than a fleeting transient Appearance only in the Glass, is to the Man himself whom we see in it; yet there may be such a Likeness or Proportion and Analogy between them, as may render our natural and familiar Conceptions of worldly Things apt and just Reprefentations of things Supernatural, and particularly of the Divine Nature: Infomuch that the Knowledge we have of them by that Analogy, tho' Imperfect, shall be however True and Real; and all our just Thoughts and Reasonings upon them shall be solid and substantial; that is, T while

while they are kept within the due Compass of those Similitudes and Representations of them. For then it is that Men run into Solecifm and Abfurdity, into Error and Confusion concerning God and spiritual Things; when they, not contented with this imperfect degree of Knowledge by Representation only and Analogy, will argue from Things merely Natural, to the Real Intrinsic Nature of those Things which now we can know no other way but by that Similitude, or Correspondency, or Proportion they bear to our natural Ideas and Conceptions: And when they proceed upon this falle Supposition, that what can be affirmed of these Representations only, must be strictly and literaly true with respect to the Real Nature and Substance of the Things they represent.

UPON this very mistake it is that our modern clandestine Arians argue Christ to be a Separate, Inferior Divine Person; Subject and Sent, and doing the Will of another, in as strict and Literal a Sence as one Man can be faid to be the Messenger of another, and to perform his Will, and to be separate from him: Tho' this be as absurd as to argue that the Reflection and Image of a Man in the Glass, is a true and Real human Body and Person, in all respects like one of our felves. Again, These very Men at another time run into a quite Contrary Extreme and Abfurdity; and, like the Socinians, turn this Analogy into mere

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mere Metaphor and Allusion only. Thus they argue that Son and Begotten when spoke of Christ, are only a Figure for a more transcendent Act of Creation; which is as groundless as afferting the Image in the Glass to be no more than a metaphorical Allusion only, without any correspondent Resemblance or Analogy at all to the Man reslected from it. And thus the Socinians will have the Blood of Christ to be no Price, Purchase or Redemption, because there can be no proper and literal Price, Purchase or Redemption in the Case.

In short, most of the Arguments by which the Socinians bring all the Mysteries of Christianity to Nothing; as well as those of all the Deists and Freethinkers of this unbelieving Age who owe all their Infidelity to the Socinian Hypothesis, are built upon this sandy Foundation. Accordingly when we come to confider them more particularly, we shall find that their Reasonings and Inferences are as absurd, as those would be which we should make from the Likeness of a Man in the Glass, to his Real Nature: As if we should from thence argue with great acuteness, that a Man himself could have neither a Body nor Solidity, nor Spirit, nor Life, nor Reason; that he had neither Sen-Sation nor Speech; nay, that he was nothing but a mere Shadow or Appearance, and had no Being but in our Imagination alone.

2. THE fecond thing I shall observe concerning that Similitude of the Apostle's is, that in all Instances universaly we use the Same Words and Expressions for the Similitudes and Appearances of Things in the Glass, by which we express the Things Themselves; and indeed this is the most just and proper way we have of speaking of them: For tho' there is nothing of the Real Nature of the Objects represented, in those Appearances; yet there is such a Correspondency and *Proportion* between them, that the same Words aptly serve for both. Thus we say we see a Man in a Glass, when we see no such thing; for the Appearance hath nothing of the real Nature of Man in it: And thus we fay we fee the Sun, Moon, and Stars in the Water, when there is no fuch thing there. And yet it would be absolutely false to fay we do Not fee any thing at all of them in the Glass, or in the Water; because there is fuch a Similitude and Proportion between the Objects and those Representations of them, as would give us some impersect Idea or Notion of the Things themselves, tho' we had never feen them but in a Glass, or in the Water.

ACCORDINGLY then if we could but make the Supposition that there were a Person who never saw the Face of any other Man but in a Glass, nor Sun, Moon, or Stars but in the Water; how imperfectly would he think and speak

speak of the Things themselves represented to him by those Adumbrations and faint Appearances? I shall only observe in short that he would not be able from thence to know exactly any one particular with respect to their Real Nature; and every Inference he made from those Images to the Intrinsick Substance or Es-sence and True Properties of the things signified, would be full of Abfurdity and Solecism. One of the last things he could infer would be, that any of them had Solidity and a Body; or that the human Appearance could have Sense, and Reason, and Understanding, and Will: And in fuch a Case as this, all the Names, and Words, and Expressions he used for those Similitudes only, he would substitute for speaking of the Things themselves; and would not invent New Terms and a New Language, for Things whereof he had no Idea or Conception as they were in their own Nature.

It is this kind of Analogy which runs thro' all our Expressions of spiritual and immaterial Objects. As we have no Idea or Conception of their real and true Nature, so neither can we invent any Words or Expressions which shall be peculiar and proper to them; nor indeed can any Words Express what is Inexpressible: Therefore we are under a necessity to Speak of them after the same manner we Conceive them; and apply those Words and Phrases to them by which, in their first Propriety, we

express the Ideas or Conceptions which stand for them in our Minds. Thus the Word Spirit in its first Propriety is used to signify the most volatile and exalted Parts of Matter; and is from thence taken to express an human Soul in Conjunction with Matter; and from thence again transferr'd to represent a purely Immaterial Substance by Analogy. The Word Wisdom signifies primarily the most advantageous and dextrous management of our Thinking or Reason, to obtain a commendable end; and is from thence apply'd to an Inconceivable Perfection in the Divine Nature: So Goodness which is first apply'd to the regulating our Passions and Affections with regard to other rational Creatures, is attributed to God; and ferves to express some incomprehensible Perfection in him, for which we have neither a Proper Word, Idea, or Conception; and so it is in all other Instances. Thus the same Words and Phrases serve to express the things whereof we have Direct and Immediate Ideas and Conceptions, and those things whereof we have None fuch; they equaly fignify fomething Real and fubstantial, whether they are apply'd to one or the other: Only when they are apply'd to the latter, they are always taken in a more Elevated and Exalted Sence; to denote Things which fo far transcend all our Capacities, that we have no other way of thinking or speaking of them, but by fuch Words and Conceptions as are common and familiar to us.

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CHAP. VIII.

A fifth Property, that they are Clear and Distinct.

HE last Property of Ideas of Sensation is, That of their being Clear and Distinct; which is meant only of those that are Simple and Original; the Impressions made by particular sensible Objects upon any of our Organs of Sensation; which have ever a greater or less Degree of Perspicuity in Proportion to that Strength, and Firmness, and Frequency with which the Object strikes upon the Sense; and to the Vigour of the Imagination in receiving and retaining them. Then an Idea is at the Height of Perspicuity when it is so evidently and plainly difcerned by the Mind, that it can be diffinguished from all other Ideas at one View of the Intellect; without farther Obfervation or Reasoning, to separate it from others that have any Likeness or Resemblance of it; and then it is that it removes all Doubt, and compels our Affent to the Truth and Existence of the Object it represents. Now by this Property these Ideas are distinguished,

I. FROM all Delusions of the Senses. There is ever more or less Obscurity and Consussion in our Ideas according to the present Temper I 4

of the Organ of Sensation, the Distance of the Object, and the Quality of the Medium which interpofes: These being rightly and duly disposed, every original Idea which is made by one and the same Object, and at the same time is not only Distinct, and Clear, and Adequate, but Simple too; as the Impression of a Seal is but one Figure and Similitude, tho' it consists of several different Parts. Thus the Idea caused in the Mind by our looking on a Man, or an Horse, or a Tree is a simple Idea; and is diffinct, and clear, and adequate; and the Reason is plain, because such an Idea contains all that the Object is naturaly disposed to imprint upon the Sense At once, and all that the Sense is framed and contrived by the Author of Nature to take in or receive at One Act of Sensation.

OF this Kind are all our Ideas of every fingle and particular Substance; for tho' when I look upon it, I do not see into the inward Essence and Configuration of all its Parts; nor difcern all its primary and fecundary Qualities; nor How they subsist in it; nor can view it so as to take in all its Powers active and paffive: Yet the Idea comprehends all that the Object is naturaly disposed to Impress upon the Sense at once; and all that either the Sense or the Imagination is capable of receiving from one fingle View. Whatfoever is beyond this is the Object of more Particular Sensations, or rather of Reason and Observation; and not of one

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fingle Act of Sensation. And sure it must be absurd to say, that an Idea of Sensation is either Obscure and Indistinct, or Inadequate because it doth not contain what the Object cannot communicate to the Sense, nor the Sense is any way capable of perceiving.

FROM hence we fee how fanciful and precarious that Opinion is, which afferts our Ideas of all, even fingle and particular Substances, to be Complex, and Indistinct, and obscure, or Inadequate; because we do not discern the inward Configuration of all their Parts, together with all their effential Qualities and Powers by any Act of Sensation; whereas for the same Reafon there could be no fuch thing as a clear and distinct Idea of Any Object what soever. Thus you shall have no clear and distinct Idea of Sound, because in one and the same Sensation we do not perrceive that Commotion or Concussion of the Air which causes it; and those Undulations which gradualy flowing from thence do at length strike upon the Organ of Hearing: Nor can the Ideas of Taste be Simple or Clear, because we have no Gust or Sensation of the exact Figure and Conformation of those minute Particles of Matter which affect the Tongue or Palate; neither thus are our Ideas of Colours Simple, or Clear, or Distinct, or Adequate; because the Eye doth not discern that peculiar Texture of those Particles in the Superficies of Bodies, which Reflects the Light so as to give it that Appearance,

ance, rather than any other. This abfurd Opinion was invented and tediously pursued, only for the Support of that bold and irrational Position, That we have as clear and distinct an Idea of the Substance of a Spirit, as we have of bodily Substance: Whereas, were this true, we should from thence have as Direct, and Clear and distinct, and Adequate a Knowledge of all created Spirits, and as clear and direct Evidence of their Existence and true Properties, as we have of Body.

2. By this Property the Simple, original Ideas of Sensation are distinguished from all the Alterations made in them afterwards by enlarging or diminishing; and by the various Combinations they undergo at the Will and Pleasure of the pure Intellect. Thus the Mind may alter the whole Face of Nature, and some way or other change every Object from what it realy appears to the Senses; and raise up to itself such new Ideas out of those which are fimple and original, as have no Being but in the Intellect alone; fuch as those of Pigmies, Fairies, and Centaurs. These do all go under the Denomination of Ideas of Sensation, tho' not occasioned by the Presence or Impression of any external Object: Because as they are formed by the Intellect in the Imagination out of our fimple Ideas, so they remain there and become new and further Materials for the Mind to exercife its Operations upon; and they have greater

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greater or less Degrees of Distinctness and Perspicuity, as they are more or less alter'd and compounded.

I would observe here that when any particular simple Idea is rendered Specific, then from being Clear and diffinct it becomes more Obscure and confus'd. In order to understand which it must be consider'd, that we do not form specific or universal Ideas, or Notions, by collecting all the Powers and Qualities observed in the Particulars of every kind; and then putting them together to make up one Idea or Notion to stand for them all, and which is supposed to be formed by Abstracting from all the Individuals. But what is quite the reverse, all our specific or universal Ideas and Conceptions are formed thus; the Mind substitutes the Idea or Conception it has already obtained of some one Individual, to stand for and represent all the Individuals of the same Kind. As for instance, when I would form an Universal Notion of Mankind, I do not first collect all the Powers and Qualities I observe common to all particular Men, and then put them together into one abstract Notion of Mankind, to include all the Individuals: But on the quite contrary, having obtained the clearest Complex Notion I can of one individual Man, the Intellect makes that a Representative of all the Men in the World; and thus renders it General in its Signification, and consequently more

more obscure. Whereas were all the Individuals of each Kind exactly the fame in all re-fpects, as they differ in many; the Idea or Notion when it became thus Specific or Ge-neral, would be as clear and diffinct as when it stood for one Individual.

3. Bur lastly, the simple Ideas of Sensation, together with those compounded out of them, are by this Property diffinguished, as I may so say, even from Themselves in a Secondary Acceptation and Application of them; that is when they are taken in Conjunction with the Operations of the Intellect, and thus are Substituted for the Representation of things of the Real True Nature of which we can have no Notion or Idea at all, that is for the things of another World; which for greater Clearness and Brevity it will be convenient hereaster to denote by the Name of the Antitypes, and those Ideas or Notions which represent them by that of the Types. As when Begetting is put for the Supernatural Generation of the Son from the Father; Father and Son, for the Relation between the two first Persons in the Trinity; our human Spirit, or rather Soul, for a Being purely Immaterial, and particularly for the Third Person in the divine Nature; Price, Purchase, Ransom, for the Merits of Christ's Death, and the Value and Power of his Sacrifice with God; Mediation and Interression among Men, for the Inconceivable Man-

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ner of his Reconciling us to God. I might thus run thro' all our Conceptions and Words for the things of another World, which in their first and strictly Proper Signification are distinct and Clear; but then are commonly supposed to become more consused and Obscure, when they are transferred from their natural Import and Signification to things Supernatural, and therefore otherwise utterly inconceivable.

AND thus it is likewise with all those Complex Notions and Conceptions which are made up of our Simple and Compounded Ideas of Senfation, in Conjunction with the Operations of our Mind upon them. The more of these are accumulated to make up one Conception or Representation, the more confused and indistinct it is. As when we put together the Ideas of a Man, of Want or Misery, of an Alms, the Notion in general of our Duty to God, of Humanity towards our fellow Creatures, and of the Reward of another World to make up a complex Notion of Charity. And thus it is also in the complex Notions we form to our felves of Immaterial Beings, and of all things Relating to them; as when to the Word Substance and our Idea of it we add Thinking and Willing, together with the various Modes of them, to make up an Analogical complex Notion of Spiritual Being in general: And when again we carry on that very Conception and render it yet more

complex by adding to it all other the greatest Persections natural or Moral we are capable of observing in rational Agents; which Conception becomes yet less clear and distinct by removing from it all the Impersections of the Creatures within our view, for a Representation of the divine Nature. All those Ideas and Notions which go to make up these Compositions, are, when considered singly and separately, plain and obvious, clear and distinct, both in their First and Analogical Acceptation; but when they are united into One Complex Conception which stands in the Mind to supply the Place of one Simple uncompounded Idea, which we should have of that Thing is we had Capacities or Faculties for a Direct or immediate Perception of it; then they become more confus'd and obscure.

But then it ought to be well confidered, that whatever there is of supposed Obscurity and Consussion in those Analogical complex Notions so form'd, and then substituted for the Representation of heavenly Things; it does not proceed merely from their being So Complicated, (in which instance they are only on an equal Foot with all other very complex Notions) nor does it proceed from the nature of the Things thus Represented, they being in their Own Nature very clearly intelligible had we Capacities so to apprehend them: But from a prevailing erroneous Opinion, that we have Direst and Pro-

per, tho' indiffinct and confused *Ideas* of those things, whereof in Reality we have no other than *Indirect* and *Analogical* Conceptions; and from a mistaken Imagination that these Analogical Conceptions give us some impersect Degrees of *Direct Perception* where we have none at all. In order to the right apprehending of which I shall propose these two things to be considered.

- 1. THAT in Respect of Immaterial Beings, and of all things relating to the Real True Nature of them as they are in themselves, we are as a Man born Blind in Respect of Light or Colours; and not as a Man who hath a very Dim Sight, or who can difcern Direct, tho' Faint Glimmerings of Light; and hath some Immediate, tho' no more than Confused and imper-fect Views of visible Objects. We can have no Ideas of immaterial Beings from our Senses; nor have we any Ideas of them that are purely Intellectual and intirely independent of Ideas of Sensation; we have not the least Spark of Light, or smallest Glimpse, whereby to discern their Real Nature or Essence, or any Part of it; fo that thus far it is not an indistinct or Obscure Perception, but No Perception at all. When Men are fully apprifed of this they will find,
- 2. THAT all those Conceptions which Stand in the mind for spiritual Things, and those Words

Words and Expressions which we use for them. are in themselves, at least As clear and distinct when they are apply'd to this secondary and Analogical Sence, as when they are apply'd to what they import in their first and Proper Signification; that is, As far as we can have any Knowledge at all of those Things of another World, or are obliged to give any Affent to them. As for Instance, The Conceptions of Father, Son, and Spirit are clear and distinct enough in their first and proper Acceptation; the Relation between Father and Son among us is clear and diffinct; and fo are those Properties of a Human Spirit, which we have from Self-consciousness. Now when these are Transferred from their first and proper Signification to the Persons in the Blessed Trinity, they are no less distinct and Clear than before, as far as we are Obliged to Understand that Distinction in the Divine Nature, or to Believe it. For the True and Real Nature of the Father, Son, or Holy Spirit is no Object either of our Understanding or Faith; any farther than to understand and believe that the Distinction is Real, as it is Incomprehensible. How and after what exact manner the first is a Father, How the fecond a Son, and How the third a Spirit differing from either, is likewise no Object of our Christian Faith, because it is no Object of our *Understanding*; and because we can Believe nothing but What we first Underfland distinctly and clearly, and as Far only as we understand it.

IF we understood the real manner of Distinction in the Divine Nature Confusedly and Indistinctly, our Assent would be so likewise: No, what we are to believe is, that we conceive nothing of the Real Nature of Father, Son, and Spirit, nor of the Manner of that Distinction. But we are bound to believe what we Do understand, namely that there Is a Real and true Distinction, and a Personal one likewife in the Divine Nature; as there is a real and personal Distinction between the Father and the Son among Men, and as there is a real and personal Distinction between one Human Spirit and another; but What they are in Themselves, and How they are One or how they are Three, we have not fo much as a Confused and Obscure Perception of.

So again, the Idea and Word Begotten, when apply'd to the Communication of the Divine Nature to the Son, is as clear and diffinct as when apply'd to Human Generation. As for the true and Real Manner and Nature of the Divine Generation, it is true we cannot have the least Idea or Conception of it; and accordingly we cannot give our Assent to what we do Not at all apprehend. But we know clearly and distinctly that the Son is said to have been begotten of the Father; and whatsoever Incomprehensible Manner of Production is meant by the Word, we are to understand

derstand and believe what is clearly and distinctly expressed by that Term; that Christ is the Son of God by a supernatural Generation in as True and Real a Sence, as one Man is the Son of another in the way of Nature: And that the Divine Generation differs as Effentialy from all manner of Creation, as a Man's begetting a Son differs from his making a Statue; and the not giving our Assent to what Is fo clearly and distinctly revealed is Infidelity.

THUS it is with the Conceptions and Terms, Price, and Purchase, and Ransom. As far as we are obliged either to know or believe that the Blood of Christ is such, we have as clear and diffinct Ideas of them when apply'd to it, as when they are used in the common Affairs of Life; infomuch that we can know clearly and distinctly, and give a firm unshaken As-fent to this Proposition, That the Blood of Christ was a Real and True Price, Purchase, or Ransom for us; tho' we are utterly ignorant of the Nature and Degrees, of the Virtue and Merit of his Sacrifice with God, which are no Objects either of our Understanding or Affent: As we might know and believe that a Price and Ranfom was paid for the Redemption of a Captive, tho' we know nei-ther the Kind nor the Value of the Price by which he was redeemed.

AND lastly, thus it is with the Conception and the Word Intercession. How and after what real Manner Christ intercedes for us, so as to prevail with God in our behalf; and how he pleads the Virtue and Merit of his Sacrifice, can't be faid to be Obscurely and Indistinctly known, but totaly and intirely Unknown; as it is not at all revealed, fo it is no Article or Part of our Christian Faith: But that he doth make a Real and true Intercession for us, is revealed; and this is clear and distinct, and accordingly the proper Object of our Knowledge and Affent; and all that we are to believe of the Real Nature of that Intercession is, that we neither Have nor Can have any Knowledge of it in this World, and therefore ought to acquiesce therein till we come to another. In the mean time we are to Believe as Far as we can Know clearly and perfectly; that Christ intercedes for us; as we might believe that the Son of a Prince intercedes to his Father in behalf of a Captive; tho' we may be utterly ignorant after what manner he performs it, and what Motives or Arguments he makes use of to obtain that Pardon and Redemption.

I MIGHT here run thro' all the Attributes of God, and Mysteries of the Gospel, and shew how the Ideas and Conceptions which are substituted for them in the Mind, and the Terms by which we express them, are as Clear and Diego.

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finct when attributed or apply'd to those Heavenly things (as far as we are obliged to believe them) as when they are taken in their First and strictly proper Signification; and how what is Unknown of them is no direct or immediate Object either of Reason or Faith. As also how all our Moral Reasonings upon the Types hold true in respect of the Antitypes; and then only are dubious or salse when we attempt to reason from the Real Nature and Substance of the Types, to the real true Nature of the Antitypes whereof we are utterly ignorant. But all this will be fully confider'd when I come to lay open the Nature of Analogy in a following Treatife, together with the manifold Use of it in Religion.

CHAP. IX.

The Difference between Divine Metaphor and Divine Analogy.

Rom what I have already faid in Chapter the Sixth, Metaphor in General may be easily and widely distinguished from all Analogy: But because the Distinction is of great and important Moment, I shall more particularly place the difference between Divine Metaphor and Divine Analogy in a clear and oppo-fite Light here; these two being most liable to be confounded and mistaken. But before

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I enter upon the Explication of this material Difference, I must desire the Reader to recollect what I have already faid of the proper Use of the Word Idea, and that I think it ought to be confined intirely to our simple and com-pound Ideas of Sensation, in Distinction from all the Operations and Affections of the Mind, of which we have an immediate Consciousness without the Intervention of any Idea; and from all those complex Notions or Conceptions form'd by the Mind out of its own Operations and the Ideas of Sensation. Thus we have an *Idea* of an House, a *Consciousness* of Thinking or Grief, and a *Complex Notion* of Justice, Mercy, and Charity. If this be obferved, the following Distinctions will be clearly and fully apprehended.

1. FIRST then, Divine Metaphor is intirely Arbitrary; and no way absolutely Necessary towards our conceiving or expressing the Nature of purely spiritual Things or their Properties. But Divine Analogy is, in our present Circumstances, absolutely necessary both to our conceiving and speaking of immaterial Things; when we would think of them with any degree of Exact Knowledge at all, or express any Correspondent Reality in those Things: Because, as I said, we can neither know them by immediate Ideas, or by Consciousness, or by any Direct Perception or Notion. In short, we can neither conceive them K 2

Of our Selves; nor can any thing intirely New concerning them be Reveal'd to us, as our Faculties now are, without the Mediation of this Analogy. But 'tis quite otherwise with Divine Metaphor; This is never us'd but to express something Already known and conceived by the Light of Nature, or revealed by God with more Exactness thro' the Mediation of Analogy.

WERE we capable of forming no other than Merely Metaphorical Ideas or Conceptions of God and heavenly Things; and were no other also made use of in a Revelation of Doctrines intirely new concerning them; fuch merely figurative Ideas or Conceptions could never have answered the necessary Ends either of natural or revealed Religion. For as they would then be mere Figure and Allusion only, without conveying a Notion or Conception of any thing Correspondent or Answerable in the very intrinsick Nature of the Divine Things; we never cou'd have Argued from them with Justiness and Certainty, or without perpetual Mistake and satal Error: All our Reasonings upon them would be precarious, and without any solid Foundation in the Nature of the Things; and in short we should have nothing more than a Merely Figurative, that is, no Real, and True, and Exact Knowledge of them at all.

Now this Observation can no way depreciate the Excellency of Scripture Metaphor; because this always supposes us furnished beforehand with more exact, and complete, and Cor-respondent Notions of God, and other heavenly Things from natural Reason or Revelation, by Analogy. And therefore 'tis that the Holy Spirit has given us, not merely figurative and Metaphorical Ideas Only but Analogical Conceptions and Terms for all the things of another World which were necessary for us to have any true and undoubted Knowledge of; particularly of God and his Attributes, the Mysteries of Christianity, and the suture State of Rewards and Punishments. And tho' we read of the Hand, and Eye, and Face, and Arm of God, yet we are supposed to have had Notions of his Power, and Wisdom, and Goodness before; or this Metaphorical Manner Alone could never have given us any useful Notice or real Knowledge of those his inconceivable Perfections.

It no way debases Scripture Metaphor to say, that it answers not an End for which common Sense will tell us it was never Intended by the Holy Spirit. When it is used in Scripture to express heavenly Beings, it is not designed to describe any thing really Correspondent and Truly Answerable in those Beings, as Analogy is: But rather to Express more Emphatically, what we Know already more K 4

Exactly by Analogy. Then indeed the Metaphorical Images in Scripture ferve to excellent Purposes; namely to illustrate what was Otherwife known and conceived; to awaken and exalt the Mind; to strike it with greater Awe and Surprife; and to move all our religious Passions and Affections; which is the proper use of all Figure. Even Human Metaphor, were it used to express or conceive any thing which we never could have had any Idea, or Consciousness, or Notion of, but merely from that Metaphor Alone, would convey to us no Real or true Knowledge; and much more would this be true of Divine Metaphor, if it was the only Method we had of conceiving and expreffing the imperceptible things of God and another World: For what real or True Knowledge could we possibly have of the Infinite Power of God for instance, by the merely figurative Idea and Expression of a Strong Hand, or Mighty Arm, if we could never have known it more exactly some other way?

For these Reasons it is, as I observ'd, that wherever God is pleased to reveal any thing intirely new concerning heavenly Things, he always does it by Analogy with the things of this World, and not by Metaphor only; in such Instances we always find Analogy us'd to Inform the Understanding, as Metaphor and other Figures are, to Affect the Imagination. And there is so little danger of mistaking one for

the other in Scripture, that no Person who will use his common Sense without prejudice, can ever confound them. For who, could otherwise than wilfully, mistake the Analogy in the Words Son and Begotten when applied to Christ, for pure Metaphor and Figure only; or the Words Door, and Way, and Vine, and Light of the World, when spoke of him, for an Analogy as compleat and perfect as the former; without the utmost Violence to his Understanding? And yet as plain and obvious as this is, the not duly confidering this material Difference between Divine Metaphor and Divine Analogy has been the Occasion of numberless and Fatal Errors in Religion.

2. THE second Difference is this. In Divine Metaphor the Resemblance, or Proportion, or Correspondency is Imaginary; 'tis pure Invention and mere Allusion alone, and no way founded in the Real Nature of the things compared. But in Divine Analogy the Refemblance, or at least the Correspondency and Proportion is Real, and built on the very Nature of Things on both fides of the Comparison. There is fomething realy correspondent and answerable and proportionable in heavenly and fpiritual Beings, to those Conceptions which are justly substituted to represent them. As for instance, there is certainly some inconceivable Perfection in God answerable to Human Knowledge; which is obtained by the Labour 2

Labour of Thinking, and the Operation of Matter and Spirit in effential Conjunction: Goodness in God is an inconceivable Excellency of his Nature correspondent to what we conceive and express by the same Word in human Nature; And the Similis Ratio or Proportion runs thus, What Knowledge and Goodness are in the Nature of Man, That some inconceivable but correspondent Perfections are in the Nature of God. And fo 'tis in all the other Attributes, which tho' totaly different in Kind from those Properties in us bearing the same Name, yet are thus very usefully and truly represented to our Mind, so as to answer all the purposes of substantial Knowledge and Religion.

3dly. What yet more widens the difference between Divine Metaphor and Divine Analogy is this. Divine Metaphor expresses immaterial Things by our Ideas of Sensation only. But Divine Analogy furnishes us with a Knowledge of the same Objects by substituting the Conceptions or Complex Notions of our Mind to represent them. Thus when the Glory of God is expressed by the resplendent Light of the Sun, even this is nothing more than mere Metaphor; the indeed it must be consessed that a more noble and exalted one cannot enter into the Mind of Man. But when we represent the Knowledge of God by Our Knowledge, and the Goodness of God by the Good-

ness of a Man (which are the only Direct Notions we can have of either Knowledge or Goodness) this is true Analogy. When the Joys of Heaven are called a Crown of Righteousness, and Heaven itself described as a New Jerusalem, these are mere Metaphors borrow'd from Ideas of Sensation; but when 'tis said that the Righteous shall obtain Joy and Gladness, and Pleasures for evermore, this is an Analogical Conception; and represents an Inconceivable future Bliss Correspondent and Answerable to the best Conception we are able to form of Joy and Pleasure here, in the Gratification of all our reasonable Affections.

THE Ground and Reason of this last Distinction between Divine Metaphor and Divine Analogy will appear very obvious if we consider, that there can be no Real Resemblance or true Correspondency, between mere Objects of Sense or their Ideas, and Immaterial heavenly Beings. But there may be a real Resemblance, or at least a true Correspondency and Proportion, between the Operations of our Mind (as well as our Complex Notions formed partly out of them) on one Side of the Comparison; and the immaterial Things they are substituted to represent on the other. For as we are made in some Measure after the Image of God, especialy in our spiritual Part, this serves to render all the Analogy rationaly built on fuch Conceptions and Notions, Real and Just

with respect to him and his Attributes; as well as to other purely spiritual Beings who are created in a yet Nearer Likeness to him. And therefore his Natural or rather Supernatural Attributes we conceive by Analogy with the Operations and Properties of our own Minds; and what we call his Moral Attributes, we conceive by Analogy with our complex Notions of human Virtues and moral Excellencies.

Now therefore to prevent any Mistake hereafter in relation to those Instances which may be given of Analogy, I must observe that tho' Light, in its greatest Resplendency is Material, and an Object of Sensation; and therefore cannot be transferr'd to God otherwise than Metaphoricaly; there being nothing in his purely spiritual Nature correspondent or answerable to Matter: Yet as Intellectual Light is used for Knowledge, and becomes expressive of the most noble Faculty or Persection of the Nature of the true Analogy; and therefore whenever I use it as an instance of such, I take it in that Sence, and as it excludes all Materiality.

AGAIN, The Idea of Substance is an Idea altogether of Sensation, as it includes Length, Breadth, and Thickness; and therefore cannot be transferr'd to God in this Sence, otherwise than by pure Metaphor; and this precariously

riously too, since it is no Scripture Metaphor. And therefore whenever I mention our conceiving the Substance of God by Analogy with material Substance, I ever mean as it imports the Notion of *Being* in general only.

So again, Wind or Breath are Ideas of Senfation, and cannot be transferr'd to the Holy Ghost otherwise than Metaphoricaly: But as Wind or Breath from its first Propriety comes to signify Animal Life both in Man and Beast, and from thence is used to express the immaterial Spirit of a Man, which is a Notion complex enough to take in all the Operations of an human Mind; then 'tis pure Analogy, us'd to conceive the Incomprehensible and Holy Spirit.

To fum up the Difference then between Divine Metaphor and Divine Analogy in full. Metaphor expresses only an Imaginary Resemblance or Correspondency; Analogy conveys the Conception of a Correspondent Reality or Resemblance. Metaphor is rather an Allusion, than a real Substitution of Ideas; Analogy a proper Substitution of Notions and Conceptions. Metaphor at best is but the using a very remote and foreign Idea to express something Already supposed to be more exactly known; Analogy conveys something correspondent and answerable, which could be No otherwise usefully and realy known with-

without it. Metaphor is mostly in Words, and is a Figure of Speech; Analogy a Similis Ratio or Proportion of Things, and an excellent and necesfary Method or Means of Reason and Knowledge. Metaphor uses Ideas of Sensation to express immaterial and heavenly Objects, to which they can bear No Real Resemblance or Proportion; Analogy substitutes the Operations of our Soul, and Notions mostly formed out of them, to represent Divine Things to which they bear a Real tho' Unknown Correspondency and Proportion. In fhort, Metaphor has No real Foundation in the Nature of the Things compared; Analogy is founded in the Very Nature of the Things on both Sides of the Comparison: And the Correspondency or Resemblance is certainly Real, tho' we don't know the exact Nature, or Manner, or Degree of it; at least we may fafely presume this from the Truth and Veracity of God, who has thus made his Revelations to Mankind under the Analogical Conceptions and Language of this World.

THO' nothing is more plain and evident than this Analogy, which runs thro' all our Conceptions and Reasonings upon the Things of another World, when we come to reflect and consider the Matter closely; yet we fall into it so naturaly, and are so used to it from the first, that we are generaly insensible of it; and apt to take it for granted that those Conceptions are as Direct and Immediate, and our Lan-

Language for them as strictly proper, as when they are applied to the Things of this World. And indeed there would have been no harm in leaving the World to continue in that Opinion; there would have been no Occasion for undeceiving Men, nor for putting them upon distinguishing so nicely the nature of Metaphor and Analogy, if there had been any other effectual way of clearly and fatisfactorily obviating the many dangerous Mistakes, and even fatal Errors prevailing in this Age, which strike at the very root of Christianity. It is now become absolutely necessary to put this matter into a Glaring Light, fince the whole Socinian System, and all that Infidelity which is the Effect and Consequence of it; as well as fome more Modern Systems which are in no small degree built upon its general Principles, turn upon resolving all Revelation and the Mysteries of Christianity into mere Metaphor and Allusion only: And upon their ever confounding this with the true Analogy, which is of a quite different kind; which is founded in the very Nature of Things, and is absolutely necessary even to our Thinking of heavenly Objects, tho' we should never express our Thoughts by Words.

HAVING thus stated the wide Distinction between Divine Metaphor and Divine Analogy, as far as was necessary here; I shall only take notice of one Objection against this Distinction which

which may be made by those who always find their Account in Confounding them.

PERHAPS they will fay, that by their resolving several Things in the Gospel Mysteries into Metaphor, they do not intend to reduce them to Mere Figure only, and so bring them to Nothing as I insinuate: But on the contrary they will affirm, that they intend to understand by those Metaphors something as Real, and Solid, and True with regard to spiritual Things, as I wou'd make this Analogical Sence of them to signify.

Now to this I answer, That the Gospel Terms, when applied to Things of another World, should be Intended by them to mean Something true, and real, and solid (as indeed all Metaphor is intended to do) yet if they be taken as Mere Metaphor, they cannot express or convey any thing of a Correspondent Reality in those Divine Things; or any thing which has a Real and True Proportion or Resemblance in the Very Nature of those spiritual Objects. And therefore, however they may Intend it, it cannot thus signify as much Real and Solid Truth with regard to the Mysteries of the Gospel and heavenly Things, as Analogy does; because this not only expresses Somewhat Real, and Solid, and True; but Correspondent also, and Proportionable, and Answerable in the Very Natures of the Things compared.

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EVEN in those Expressions of Scripture which are allowed on all hands to be pure Metaphor, tho' Some Truth and Reality be certainly meant by them, yet are they widely different from Analogy. As for inftance; when God is said to have a Mighty Arm, it means fomething as real and true, as when it is faid God is Powerful: And yet there can be nothing Correspondent and Answerable to a great Arm of Flesh, in God. Whereas when God is said to be powerful, and wife, and good, we don't only mean fomething true, and folid, and real; but also inconceivable Persections in his real Nature Correspondent and answerable to Power, and Wisdom, and Goodness in us. And again, to make this yet plainer; when Generation is made a mere Metaphor for a transcendent Act of Creation, it may indeed be Intended to fignify fomewhat real, and folid, and true; but can mean nothing in the Divine Nature so correspondent and proportionable to human Generation, as that Christ should be in as much Truth and Reality the Son of God by supernatural Generation, as one Man is the Son of another in the ordinary way of Nature; which is the true and analogical Acceptation of the Term Begotten. And for these Reasons it is, and in this Sence, that we justly charge our modern Arians with bringing the Mysteries of the Gospel to Nothing by their unwarrantable and metaphorical Interpretations.

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But if, after all this, they should allow the Terms in which the Gospel Mysteries are expressed, to signify not only something Real in spiritual Things, but also somewhat Correspondent and Proportionable to the Things of this World substituted for them; and yet will still call this Metaphor: They are then grossy guilty of consounding two Things totaly different, by perversely giving them the same Name to serve a vile Turn; and also make a Concession which at once renders them shame-sfully inconsistent with themselves, and overturns all their Schemes of Divinity.



BOOK II.

CHAP. I.

Of the Pure Intellect.

AVING in the first Book consider'd the Ideas of Sensation and Ideas of Sensation as the only Materials which the active and busie Mind of Man hath to work upon; and as the fole Groundwork or Foundation for the whole Superstructure of human Knowledge; I come in this fecond to treat of the Pure Intellect. By which I would have it observed here, once for all, that by this I do not mean that immortal immaterial Part of us, denoted in Scripture by the Word Πιεθμα or Spirit; nor do I mean any the most refined and exquisite parts of the Body, or animal Spirits, which are more immediately subservient to the intellectual Operations of that Spirit; but by the Pure Intellest I always understand Both these operating together in essential Union and Conjunction; fo that all Thinking or Reasoning is a mix'd and compound Act of both Matter and Spirit. Thinking is by a general Mistake attributed to the Pure Spirit, exclusively of those material Organs without which it cannot exert one Thought; and in a necessary Conjunction with which, it performs all its Operations.

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THIS will be yet clearer, if we diffinguish these following Words of a near Signification; and which have therefore been used promiscuously.

THE Spirit is the purely immaterial Part of our Composition, which is capable of Separation from the Body, and can then exist and operate independently of Matter: This is often by mistake call'd the Soul, in a vulgar and more indistinct way of speaking; but is distinguish'd in the Scripture by the Word Tree
pa Spiritus.

THE Soul, or rather inferior Soul, as it is used to be called in Distinction from that which is pure Spirit; is a Principle resulting from an essential Union of the pure Spirit with our material Frame; and it is in Scripture denoted by the Word Foxil Anima, or Soul.

THE Mind, in a common and more indiffinct Acceptation, is Synonimous with Soul; but is in truth a more general and complex Term, and includes the pure Spirit, together with the Intellect, the Will, and Memory, and all the Passions and Affections of the inferior Soul; and is properly Ness Animus, or Mind.

THE Pure Intellect taken in Distinction from those three, is properly the pure Spirit or immaterial Part of us, as acting in effential Union and Conjunction particularly with those animal Spirits and remote imperceptible Fibres of the Brain, which are more immediately subfervient to Thinking or Knowledge, and all the Operations of the Understanding. This is call'd Ningis Intellectus, or the Pure Intellect.

IT hath been the occasion of numberless Errors and Mistakes in Religion, and too many of them fatal; that Men have been used to think and speak of the pure Spirit, or superior Soul, as if its Operations were Now in all refpects the same, and as intirely independent of Matter, as they will be when it is in a state of Separation. Men commonly speak of it as of fomething Within us, and not Of us; as if it thought and reasoned In the Body, and not together With any part of it; as if the Body were a mere Box, or Case, or Place of Residence for it. Not considering that there is as much Truth in faying, that the Body is in the Spirit, as in faying that the Spirit is only In the Body; tho' this founds odly to a vulgar Ear; or indeed to any one who is not capable of understanding, that these two different Principles could not conflitute one and the same Individual Man, unless both were intimately united in Operation and Essence,

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IT must be allow'd we can form no other Notion of Knowledge in an Angel or separate Spirit except by that of Thinking; but this is no more than an Analogical Conception, which the Mind fubilitutes instead of the real true manner and kind of Knowledge in Angels which we are utterly ignorant of: and which is as imperfectly represented by Thinking, as their Motion is by the moving of our Fect. All their Knowledge, as far as we can apprehend it, must be Intuitive and Instantaneous; whereas ours at the best is successive, and gradualy perform'd by the concurrent Motion of some bodily Parts within us; which is the Cause of that Labour and Weariness we experience in the Act of Thinking. If the pure Spirit within us cou'd think and reason Independently of all material and bodily Organs, we should never be tired with thinking; but on the contrary we feel it to be a Labour of the Brain, and we find our felves as much wearied with intense Thought, as with hard bodily Labour. If it were not thus, the Body would be Poffesi'd only of a Spirit, and not a Partaker with it; and Thought would not be an Operation of the Man, but of fomething Within him.

I CANNOT forbear again remarking here the shameful Inconsistency of those Men, who maintain that we have as clear and distinct an Idea of Spirit as we have of Body; for this rea-

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fon, because we have as clear and distinct an Idea of Thinking, as we have of Extension or Solidity: And who at the same time argue the Soul may be material, because God can fuperadd to Matter the Power of Thinking. For is not Thinking and Willing even in their Hypothesis, oppos'd to Extension and Solidity, as Estential Properties utterly incompatible in the fame Being; so that Body and Spirit are by these Properties effentialy distinguished from one another, as well as in our Ideas or Conceptions of them? And how then can Thinking be fuperadded to Matter, without making it a Spirit? If we have a clear Idea of Spirit from Thinking, and of Body from Extension and Solidity; then, whenever Matter is made to think of itself, without the Concurrence of fpiritual Substance, all our Ideas are changed and confounded; then it might be faid we have a clear Idea of Matter from Thinking; and we must look out for some other effential Property to give us a clear Idea of Spirit. To which I shall add, that one and the same Property of Thinking cannot be Effential to one fort of Being, and Superadded only and merely Accidental to another; wherever it is, it must be an original effential Property; fo that the Removal of it will make a Thing cease to be what it is; as the superadding it will make a Thing what it was not in its own Nature before. It is even ridiculous to fay, that tho' Thinking is not originaly effential to Matter, L4 yet

yet it may be made to Think by accident, so as that Thinking may be a new and adventitious Quality of it. For it must be granted, that whenever Thinking goes together with Extension or Solidity in the same Body even by Accident, they will each of them cease to be any Marks of Distinction between Body and Spirit.

. Besides, if the Soul may be material, and Thinking is superadded to it; sure this can give no Idea of the manner of Knowledge in a Being altogether immaterial, and which hath Knowledge not superadded, but originaly in its own Nature and Essence. If they fay that a material and immaterial Substance may both of them Think, tho' after a different Manner; this is playing upon the Word Thinking, and taking it for Knowledge which is a general Word, and includes the Knowledge of God and Angels; whereas the proper Acceptation of it, is for the particular way of Knowledge in Man. But call the Knowledge of God and Angels by what Name you will, nay call it Thinking it will end in the same thing; for the Manner of it in God, and Angels, and Man must be allow'd as effentialy different as their Nature; fo that Thinking in Man can give us no Direct Conception of Thinking in a pure Spirit.

By the Pure Intellect cannot be understood a spiritual Substance within us acting of itself,

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and intirely free; as if the Spirit were only included and confined Within the Body, and refided there as in a Habitation. Nor must it be confider'd as a Being Disjoined and Separate and acting by the help of bodily Organs, as fo many mere Instruments, by which it performs all its Operations; for in truth and Reality the Body is no more a mere Instrument to the Soul, than the Soul is to the Body. Tho' this is a plain Truth and will be eafily granted, yet it is generaly overlooked by the Writers of Logic and Metaphysics; and whoever observes it, will find a gross Misapprehension of this fundamental Point run thro' all the Language of most of those who have treated of human Understanding. They proceed upon a Supposition that the Mind acts as if the Man were All Spirit; or as if all the Organs of the Body were so many Instruments at best, which are necessary to exert those Powers and Faculties Inherent in Itself alone, independently of Matter; and consider'd abstractedly from its close Conjunction and essential Union with the Body. Thus they suppose Thinking with all the Modes of it, and Willing to be Actions purely spiritual, as if they had no Dependence upon Matter; and even all the Passions in human Nature are spoke of by them, as so many Motions or Affections of the Soul only, as if it were in actual Separation from all Matter; and exerted its Operations only In the Body, and not in any Conjunction or Co-operation With

With it. This hath been the occasion of so many grievous Mistakes, and even pernicious Errors that it would be endless to recount them; many of them I shall have occasion to speak of in the Sequel of these Discourses: And by digesting this throughly, that the purely spiritual part of us never acts at present but in essential Union and necessary Concurrence with Matter; the Reader will be able to see thro' the rest whenever they occur.

AFTER what Manner the Spirit of Man may act in a State of Separation we are utterly ignorant; it is in itself altogether Immaterial, and we know as little of it confidered in that State, as we know of the Nature of Angels: Nor can we in the least conceive how things Material do affect a pure Spirit; but this we know, that while it is united to the Body it can exert no Act of its own intirely diffinct and independent of it. Its most Refined Reafonings, and most Abstracted Speculations are performed in Conjunction with those animal Spirits and imperceptible Fibres of the Brain, which lie far out of the reach of all human View; even by the Help of Glasses which magnify to the largest Size. For which Reason, the Mind cannot have an actual Perception of any thing Without it, but as the Object first affects some of our Senses, and then a Likeness of some fort, or Representation of it is conveyed inwardly to the Imagination. So that

that we are to consider the pure Intellect and Mind as a Composition of Spirit and Matter, in strict and effential Union with one another; infomuch that all their Operations are the joint and inseparable Acts of both together; such as could not proceed from Matter, or Spirit alone; and such as would be Operations of a quite different Kind, if the spiritual Part of us were to act by itself. Having premised this, I shall proceed to consider the several different Operations of the Intellect upon those Ideas of Sensation, which are as it were stored and layed up in the Imagination; I mean those Operations which necessarily presuppose Sensation, and contain the whole Process and utmost Extent of human Understanding. Accordingly,

I. The first of those Operations of the pure Intellect is that of a Simple View, or Survey of those Ideas of Sensation, in the very Order and Condition they lie in the Imagination, without Altering the Nature or Situation of any one of them; without passing any Judgment, or making any Inferences with Relation to them. This the Logicians have rightly termed Simple Apprehension, but do unhappily always consound it with pure Sensation, and the mere Mechanical Perception of external Objects; by which means the first and sundamental Distinction between Reason and the natural Instinct of Brutes is lost.

THERE is an effential difference between a simple Apprehension of the Mind, and a simple Perception of the Sense; the Consequence of this is an Idea in the Imagination; the former frames or occasions no New simple Idea, and only apprehends one that is Already made and presented to its view: As when by looking upon a human Body, a Representation or Similitude of it is transmitted thro' the Eyes to the Imagination; this is the Cause of a New Idea, in which the pure Intellect hath no part; it contributes nothing to the Production of that Idea, and it is formed without the least Act or Concurrence of the Mind. In all Senfations the Imagination is purely Paffive, difposed by Nature to Receive only, and Retain fuch Impressions as are made upon the Senses; fo that there may be an immense Number of fimple Ideas lodged there, before we need necessarily suppose one simple Act or Apprehenfion of the Intellect with relation to them, which must be an Act Subsequent to all Senfation whatfoever; and never to be confidered in Conjunction with it, as if it were one and the same thing. The simple Apprehension I am now speaking of, is an Act or Operation of the Mind, and not of the Senses, which last is common to us with Brutes; but the first a Perfection and Excellency of an human Soul: Infomuch that it is the most noble and elevated Manner of Operation in the Intellect; and that

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that by which it comes nearest to the Manner of Knowledge in Angels; Præcipua, says a great Philosopher, Intellectûs humani sicut Angelorum functio videtur esse, ut sit ex sua natura intelligens; hoc est simplici Intuitu, non ratiocinatione cognoscens.

· Now therefore antecedently to this simple Apprehension, or any other Act of the pure Intellect, we are to suppose the Imagination plentifully stored and furnished with Ideas of Sensation altogether without its Concurrence. They began to be transmitted inwardly thro' the Senses from our Infancy; they daily multiply by Experience and our Conversation with external sensible Objects; and are increased to a prodigious Number before we are conscious to our felves of any Operations of the pure Intellect upon them. In this common Storehouse, and Receptacle, those Ideas lie in Confusion together, all disjoin'd and unranged; and in no other Order than that wherein they Chance to be first transmitted. And were there no Immaterial Principle at all within us, they would always remain in the same disorderly Condition, undisturbed and unobserved; and without any other Alteration than what would be made by the Accession of New Ideas from Objects as yet unperceived; and by the reviving of those that were defaced or obliterated, from the Repetition of fuch Impressions as had been made before.

CHAP. II.

Of Instinct in Brutes.

His is the very State and Condition of Brutes. Tho' they are capable of all the Sensations that are in us and tho' the Senses of many of them are more Acute than those in man, and confequently more fusceptible of quick and vigorous Impressions from sensible Objects; yet all this is no more in them, than the striking of one material Substance upon another; the Effect of which remains just as long as there is a Disposition in the animal Spirits to retain it: But for want of an higher and Immaterial Principle, when the Idea is once formed, they can take no After View or Notice of it distinct from the Sensation itself. This is the utmost Extent of all that Knowledge in Brutes, which we call by the Name of Instinct; and is realy no other than a Calculation or Distrosition of their Senses by the Author of Nature, to excel in those particular Instances of Sensation, wherein the Being or Preservation of every Species is most concerned. They are never actuated or influenced by more than One simple Idea at a time; nor by that neither, but when there is some Actual Impresson of the external Object to stir it up within them, or some Remains of the Impression continuing

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tinuing in the Imagination and Brain; and all they perform is at the *Impulse* and *Instigation* of particular Ideas of Sensation, which is the only *Direction* they have in all their Operations.

For this Reason Brutes can have no such thing as Memory properly fo called; for after the Impressions are made, or the Ideas form'd, they lie in their Imagination (without any Notice or Observation) to sway and direct their Motions, as long as they last: But their Ideas decay gradualy, so as never to be revived again by any proper Recollection; and must be renewed by a Repetition of the same, or of a like Impression, from the Presence of the Object; which is as different from Memory as natural Instinct is from Reason. The bare receiving and retaining the Impressions or Ideas of external Objects in the Imagination, is not Memory even in Man; but an Ability or Faculty of Viewing them at Pleasure, in the Ablence of the Objects which they stand for in the Mind; of Reviving them again within us and Clearing them up after they have grown Confused and Obscure, without any New Impression from Abroad: And above all a Power in the Intellect of Impregnating the Imagination with all its own Alterations and Combinations of simple original Ideas; together with a Faculty in the Mind of Retaining and Recollecting all its various Complex Notions and I

and Conceptions, at its own Will and Pleasure; nothing of all which is in the Nature and Power of Brutes. It may feem indeed that a Dog can at once attend to the Shape, and Smell, and Voice of his Master; and put those Ideas together to make up one compounded Idea. But the Dog frames no Idea of his Master from them all at once; but ever distinguisheth him by some One of them at a time, and by them all successively. If he hears his Master's Voice he attends only to that; if he Sees him, all Attention to his Smeil and Voice is lost; and when all these Ideas of the Master are in Any Degree defaced and impaired by Absence, there can be no renewal of them but by the Approach or Presence of the Master.

The common Objection against what I have said of Brutes here is, that a Dog Dreams, and Barks, and Moves in his Sleep; that he is Uneasy in the Absence of his Master; distinguisheth the Smell of him among a thousand, and Knows him again when he sees him; that he will find the way Home again after being conveyed to great Distances from thence; which Operations could not possibly be performed without a Memory. But this Objection supposes me to have afferted, that Impressions made by external Objects upon the Senses and Imagination of Brutes, last no longer than the Presence of the Objects; that these being removed leave no Footsteps of themselves behind;

hind; and that all Ideas of them immediately vanish, when the Objects are withdrawn. Whereas I affert the quite contrary; that external Objects do often leave behind them more Deep and Lasting original Impressions upon the Imagination of Brutes, than they do upon that in Man (I mean exclusive of Recollection in us) and the Ideas remain there in the Absence of the Objects, for a Principle of Operation in them; and to direct, and actuate them and determine all their Motions.

It is by these the Dog Dreams and Barks in his Sleep, distinguisheth his Master in a Crowd from all other Men, and hath fuch a ftrong Propension towards home, that he will find the way to it from a great diftance before the Traces of the Road are worn out of his Brain. Nay I affert farther, that it is necessary their mere Sensations, and the Ideas or first Impressions in their Imagination, should be more strong, and lively and durable, than they are in Man (as daily Observation shews us they are) because Brutes are altogether acted and governed by Sense; and those stronger and more vigorous Impressions of sensible Objects, and the more exquisite Disposition of their Organs to receive them, is plainly defigned by the Author of Nature to supply the want of Reason, and of any immaterial Principle in their Composition.

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But then nothing of all this is truly Memory; tho' it is formething Analogous to it, for which we have no diftinct and proper Word, yet it is intirely different from it both in Kind and Degree. For as the Senfation or Idea grows languid and wears away, so doth it gradualy cease to influence or move the Brute; it cannot be continued at one stay, by any Attention or Advertency to one Idea more than another; it cannot be regain'd or reviv'd at Pleafure when it is become weak and feeble, by any voluntary Recollection from within, or any Hint or Intimation only from without, as in Man; nor can it ever be restor'd again, as I observ'd, but by a new Sensation from the Presence of the Object. Memory is not a bare Retaining simple Ideas in the Absence of the Objects they represent; but a Power of Recollecting them at Will; and of attending to one Idea more than another, without regard to the Strength and Acuteness of the Sensation.

ANOTHER Objection against the Opinion of Brutes having no Principle of Action in them above Matter is, that upon this Supposition they could not Move themselves. To which I answer, that they do not Move themselves, tho' they may be said to move Of themselves; as a Clock can't in any Propriety of Speech be said to move itself, tho' it moves of itself by the Force of Spring, or Weight, or Pendu-

Pendulum; And do we think that God cannot inconceivably form a piece of Clockwork which shall go of itself, and perform all its Motions (if I may be allow'd fo diftant a Comparison) for ten, or twenty, or thirty, or even an hundred Years together; unless some outward Violence or inward Failure of the Wheels or Springs occasions a stop of that Motion, which kindles and keeps up the animal Heat and Warmth, and preserves all parts of the admirable Machine from mouldering and Diffolution? And, to carry on the Similitude, would it come much short of Frenzy in Men to argue that a Clock must have some degree of Reason and Memory, and an Immaterial Principle in its Composition; because it moves of itself? Or, on the other hand, supposing the Clock to be Mere Matter, to dispute whether God cou'd not endue it with a Power of Thinking if he pleas'd?

BRUTES are moved by the Internal Impulse of those Ideas which they have got from the Impressions of outward Objects, while those Ideas last, tho' the Objects are Absent; as well as when they are Present: Just as the Motions of a Watch are not only varied immediately by the Finger from Without, while it actualy touches the Machine; but also by the Impression Lest upon the Spring by the Hand, after 'tis removed. All the Actions of Brutes are from a Necessity of Nature; they

cannot act Otherwife than they do, in the same Disposition of the Parts whereof they are compounded, and under the same Impressions from external Objects. They ever yield to the most Powerful Sensation, which remains as a strong and fure Byass upon them, 'till the sensitive Idea is defaced or worn out; or till some other Rub in their way, or some stronger Impulse or Impression diverts their Course, and gives the Motion a new Determination. They cannot be properly faid to Intend or Design any Motion one Moment before they move; nor can they of Themselves alter any particular Motion, or change it for another. And tho' they have a Propension and Tendency to many Things, which are for their own Preservation, and that of their Species; yet all this is from a certain Necessity, and a wife Disposition of the Parts of their Frame; from an Aptitude in them to be so moved by the Temperature of the Air, the Seasons of the Year, and the various Impressions of such external Objects as conduce to the Preservation of their Being, and the Continuation of their Species.

Now should we stop here, and cou'd suppose that Characters of all the Objects in Nature, with all the Ideas they have an aptitude to cause in us, were stamped on our Imagination; and painted in lively and lasting Colours, so as to remain there distinct and intire; yet this alone would not amount to the least de-

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gree of Reason. An Imagination so furnished could be conceived as no other than a large and curious Picture of the whole Face of Nature, retaining the Similitudes of a vast Variety of Objects, in the very Order and Proportion they were delineated; and at the best preserving them in the same Rank and Form perhaps in which they were received thro' the Senses. All this being hitherto no more than the Impression of one Material Substance upon another, there it must remain intirely useless and in vain as to any true and Proper Knowledge; and altogether unfeen and unobserved, without fome higher and Immaterial Principle to take a Prospect of it in general, and a Survey of the feveral Parts of it fuccessively. When the Mind proceeds no farther than a bare View of these Ideas, it may be called an Intuitive Knowledge; and even this First Step of real Knowledge we could not be capable of, if the Thinking Substance within us were altogether material.

THAT Question so much debated, and so tediously pursued by some, Whether God by his Almighty Power cannot superad to our Idea of Matter a Faculty of Thinking? is shamefully trifling and frivolous, unbecoming Men of common Sence; -but much more Philosophers and Metaphysicians. The very Question supposes that Matter hath nothing of Thinking in its Own Nature, and this is readily owned

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by them; because of that plain Consequence, That if Thinking were Natural to Matter, then every Particle and every System of it would Think: So that the Question can have no more Meaning in it than this, Whether God can Alter the very Nature of Matter, fo as that it shall be Matter and not Matter at the fame time? Whether he can make the same Thing to be a Thinking, and Unthinking Being at the same time? To make the Question Sence it must be, Whether God created Matter with an Aptitude and Capacity to Think in any Particular Contexture, or Combination of its Particles into any System whatsoever; or by the Addition of any peculiar Motion added to it? But if so, then Thinking would be a Primary Effential Quality of Matter, whenever it sublisted under that particular requifite Disposition or Motion of Parts; and then again do but Change this Disposition of its Parts, and put them into Another Motion or Situation, which are things merely Accidental to it, then it loses that effential Quality of Thinking: And thus the same Faculty shall be Essential and Not essential; Accidental and Not accidental to the fame thing. So that now the Doubt is necessarily resolved into the first Senceless Question again, Whether Almighty Power cannot superad to Matter an Essential Quality which is Unnatural to it?

IF Men should give themselves up to the starting such Questions about every thing in Nature and Religion, Whether Almighty Power cannot alter every Thing from what it is, and make it something else; what Jargon would they make of Philosophy and Divinity? The true Question is, What Almighty Power Little does and not what it Can do? Power Hath done, and not what it Can do? Sure they must be very zealous for the Materiality of the Soul who raise a Question, Whether God may not interpose his Almighty Power to work Against Nature, and alter the general Laws, and Properties, and Course of it in every Man that is born. To support the Affirmative of this Question they define a Spirit a Thinking Substance, designedly leaving a Fallacy in the Dubiousness of the Word Substance; and thereby difingenuously confounding all Distinction between Material and Immaterial Being, which is all we can mean by Substance when apply'd to Spirit. The Tendency of that way of arguing is, to Conclude our Souls material; for if it is as easy for God to superad to Matter a Power of Thinking, as to superad a spiritual Substance or Being; then the latter is altogether Unnecessary, and therefore Improbable.

IF it is here said, that since even sensitive Perception is not originally Essential to Matter as such, it is as easy for us to imagine that M 4 the

the almighty Power of God may superad a Property of Thinking to Matter, as a Property of Sensitive Perception; I answer, that no Man can with any Truth, or Justice to his own Mind say, that it is as Easy and Natural for him to imagine the one as the other; or that he conceives no greater Absurdity and Inconsistency in the former, than in the latter: For, however unknown the Reason may be, and how little soever we are able to account for it, the mind of Man cannot but surmise that these two things are not equally probable and rational; so that at first sight the Objection carries in it something of Unfairness and Disingenuity.

But on the contrary, our Reason and Imagination do both of them readily fuggest to us this wide difference between Thinking and Senfation; that the first, and not the latter, must be originaly an Essential Quality in whatever Being it is found: For if we did not naturaly conceive it as fuch, Men would never have attributed it without Scruple to the Effence of Spirits in general, and to God in particular; to whom they never yet ventur'd to attribute fenfitive Perception, otherwise than in pure Metaphor. So that we cannot imagine Thinking to be superadded to mere Matter under any Modification, or Contexture, or Motion whatsoever, otherwise than as an Essential Quality, not only Above the Nature of it; but but even fo Contrary to it, that the superinducing of it upon mere Matter must imply this Contradiction, that it shall be Matter and not Matter at the same time; and must confound all the commonly received Differences and settled Distinctions in the Mind, not only between the Nature of Man and that of all irrational Animals, but also between these and all purely Spiritual Beings; nay, between these last and the whole Race of Insects, even the very lowest of them that are endued with Lise, or Sense, or Motion.

IF it is further urged, that Sensitive Perception is effential to Brutes (which on my Supposition are mere Matter) tho' not essential to the Parts of that Matter of which they are compos'd; and therefore the fuperadding even this effential Quality must change the Nature of Matter, and make it quite another Thing from what it was before; fo that the same Contradiction holds here as in the superadding of Thinking to it, namely that it shall be Matter and not Matter at the same time. The Answer is obvious, that sensitive Perception is Essential to Brutes not as they are Matter; but as they are a System of Matter under a Certain Modification, and Contexture, and Motion of its Parts, by which they are adapted and disposed to receive certain Impressions from external Objects: But that all this is unravelled again, and intirely ceaseth with

with the dissolution of the Frame; whereas we necessarily conceive Thinking not only original and effential to the Thinking Substance, but Inseparable from it. Sensitive Perception therefore cannot be called essential to Brutes, in the same Sence that we conceive Thinking essential to the Soul of Man; nor can it be faid to be Superadded to Matter, in the same Sence that some Men suppose Thinking may be so: Nor can we suppose the Absurdity and Contradiction to be the fame in both Suppofitions; there being no Propriety in that Phrase of Sensitive Perception being superadded to Matter; any more than in saying, that Motion and Sound are superadded to the Matter of a Clock. Motion and Sound are effential to a Clock, but not to the Matter of it.

I AM aware of the last great Objection which lies against this whole way of arguing; that from thence it will be inferr'd, that all Sensitive Perception in Brutes must intirely differ from that which is Human, and be guite of another Kind; so as to be a resemblance only, or a fort of Imitation of our Sensations. I shall make no other reply to this, than to leave the Objection as I find it. For I don't know why we may not allow Sensitive Perception in Brutes, to be something correspondent only and Analogous to Sensation in Man, as natural Instinct is to Reason. Their Sensations may be all as Reas as ours, and yet be of a very different different Kind; and that they are so, is more than probable, fince it is plain they can have no fuch Consciousness of their own Sensations as we have of ours; nor have they any Knowledge of them properly so call'd, as we have; nor have their Sensations any immediate esfential Concurrence of Spirit as those which are human: So that fince this feems to be the Case, all the Impressions made upon the Organs of Sensation in Brutes, and the Ideas consequent to those Impressions are realy to be confidered as abstractedly and as much separated from any Concurrence or Observation of a true Principle of Reason and Understanding, as the Sound and Motions of a Clock. And for this reason I would have it remark'd here, that whenever I use the Words Knowledge, or Discerning, or Distinguishing, or Action, as applied to Brutes; I don't mean that they have any fuch Powers properly speaking as those which are called by the same Names in Mankind: But only that these are the best Analogous Notions and Words we have, to represent those Movements of theirs which seem to Mimick the Actions and Faculties of Men.

But however this may be, yet the Ob-fervation arising from thence is very natural; that those Men run into an unreasonable Extreme on the other hand, who to avoid the Souls of Brutes being immaterial, will have them to be no other than a more refin'd and complicated

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complicated fort of Engines or Instruments; and call them mere Machines, or Puppets, or Clockwork; as if the Wisdom and Power of the great Creator in the Disposition of Matter and Motion, were to be directed by the Rules of our Mechanics; and confined to observe the Meafures of human Artifice and Contrivance. As if God could not, after an Inconceivable manner, work up a System of mere Matter into a Brute; and by a curious Disposition and Contexture of all its Parts, vaftly out of the reach of our Comprehension, could not render it in a peculiar manner susceptible of such Motions and Impressions from external material Objects, as may be the impulsive Cause of all that variety of Actions we see in them; and particularly of those which have so near and lively a Refemblance of our human Senfations. So that all the Arguments to prove Brutes mere Machines and Engines, in the common Acceptation of those Terms, are precarious and imaginary; and the Words carry with them an odious tho' tacit Comparison between the Art and Contrivance of Man, and the infinite Power and Wisdom of God, whenever they are used otherwise than as bare Ilhustrations only of the Actions of Brutes; after which manner alone I would have them understood wherever they occur in this part of my Discourse, Synd the American's solution of the

They who hold Sensitive Perception in Brutes to be an argument of the Immateriality of their Souls, find themselves under a Necessity of allowing those Souls to be Naturaly Immortal likewise; and they are so embarassed in thinking how to dispose of those Irrational Immortal Souls after the Dissolution of their Bodies, and what sort of Immortality to contrive for them, that they imagine them all to return into the great Soul or Spirit of the World; or by a Metempsychosis to pass into the Bodies of succeeding Animals; and then when they have done their Work, at the End of the World they are to be discharged out of Being, and again reduced to their primitive Nothing.

But if those Souls are once granted to be Immaterial, it is utterly inconceivable that they should not Naturaly have the same Immortality with those which are Human; since we cannot with any Sence or Consistency distinguish two Different Kinds of Immortality for created Spirits. If the Soul of Brutes is Immortal, That cannot, when separated, be thought to remain altogether in a State of utter Inactivity and Insensibility, which communicated Sense and Activity to Matter while in Conjunction with it. And if so, they must be sensible of Happiness or Misery; and in some Degree liable to Rewards and Punishments, as eternal as their Souls.

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What heightens the Abfurdity of this Way of Thinking is, that in imagining the Souls of Brutes to be Immaterial, Men must necessarily distinguish a great Variety of them both in Nature and Degree; one fort for Birds, another for Beasts, and another for Fishes. And these must be all subdivided again into very different Species of immaterial Souls, according to the different Sorts there are under each of those general Heads. Nay every Fly and Insect must on this Supposition have some fort of immaterial Soul, even down to the Cheese Mite; and what is yet more absurd is, that there must be an infinite Variety of Immortalities imagin'd to suit the Rank and Condition of every individual, living, sensible Creature.

I SHALL conclude this Head of the Simple Apprehension or intellectual View of the Mind which follows upon Sensation, when I observe that the Reason why the Intellect, which takes a clear and distinct View of such numberless Objects of Sense in their Ideas; hath not however the least obscure or indistinct direct Apprehension or simple Intuition of a Pure Spirit; is, because we neither have an immediate Conscious field, nor a Direct sensible Perception of any thing relating to the Nature of such a Being; nor can there be any Idea of it, to be viewed in the Imagination; which is however Capacious enough to take in all visible Nature, and

to store up an immense Number of Ideas of all Objects which occur to the Senses. What an amazing Variety of them are daily conveyed in by that one Sense of Seeing? to which if we add those of the other Senses, we shall render the Number inexhaustible; and yet nothing of all these is properly Knowledge, consider'd in themselves, and abstractedly from that Intuition or View taken of them by the pure Intellect: They are only the rude and unwrought Materials, heaped together for that Superstructure which every Man is to raise according to the peculiar Disposition of his natural Genius, the different Methods he pursues, and the Degrees of that Application of the Intellect which he uses.

CHAP. III.

The second Operation of the pure Intellect, That of Judgment.

HE second Operation of the pure Intellect upon the Ideas of Sensation is commonly called the Judgment it passes upon them. Because my Purpose is not to go thro' the Art of Logic in general, but to trace the Rise, and Progress, and Extent of our Knowledge, more especially as it relates to Religion and the things of another World; I shall not enlarge upon this Operation as far as the Nature

Nature of it requires, nor am I willing wholy to pass it by.

THE great Variety of Ideas of Sensation which is conveyed to the Imagination and lodged there, is not for the fole guidance and direction of us, by any inward Instinct, or Impulse of theirs; and in order to remain there always unviewed and unobserved by any higher Principle; which is the Condition of Brutes. Nor are they there only for the naked View and Simple Intuition of the Mind which is its first Operation upon them; but as Subjects for the Farther Employment of our Understanding and Will; for Observation and Judgment; for all our Inferences, Discourses, and Reasonings; for the Exercise of all the Faculties of an human Soul; and for Ingredients which go into the Composition of all those Complex Notions and Conceptions which the Mind raifes up to itself for its own use, and to supply the Want of Simple and Original Ideas: Infomuch that it hath an arbitrary Sway and fovereign Power over them; and they are subject to the Exercise of all its Operations at pleasure. Concerning these Ideas and the several Operations of the Mind upon them, these Mistakes are common among Logicians, and fome Writers of Metaphysics.

Tно' they rightly lay down Ideas as the only Materials for the Mind to work upon; yet

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yet they do it in the General, without limiting them to those of Sensation only; and without exploding and rejecting fuch as are falfly fupposed to be Purely Intellectual, and equaly Original; and which are imagined by some to come into the Mind another way than by Senfation or Reflection; all which are accordingly thought to be (in common with those of Sense) the first Ground-work and Materials of our Knowledge. As these last are not mentioned in their Introductions to the Art of Reasoning, which they must and ought to be, if they believed there were any fuch Ideas; fo neither is there any Provision made for the real want of these purely intellectual Ideas, thro' their whole Systems. This fure is an inexcusable Omission, and a fundamental Defect, both in the old and new Logic; that they make no Provision for explaining the true Manner of coming to the most excellent Part of our Knowledge, that of things Divine and Immaterial. This must be either by Ideas of them Purely Intellectual; or by Ideas of Reflection; or by the help of those of Sensation formed into Complex Notions, by confidering them together with the Operations of the Mind; and then substituting these Notions Analogicaly to represent things Immaterial. Now the two first of these Methods are merely Imaginary, and have no Foundation in Nature or Reason; and the last is intirely omitted by the Writers of Logic; who not knowing where to fix the Rife and true Manner

Manner of our spiritual Knowledge and Conceptions, have made it over to be treated of in Metaphysics, under the first mention'd Head of Ideas Purely Spiritual and Intellectual; with much Obscurity and Confusion, and with yery little, or no real Improvement of human Understanding. Combination of the combination o

OTHERS confound those original Ideas of Sensation, with the Operations of the Mind upon them, so far, that they fancifully lay down those Operations as a new Set of original Ideas for the Mind to work upon. What an aukward Abfurdity is this? The same thing shall be an Idea, and the Operation of the Mind upon an Idea at the same time; and thus we must have a new Idea for another second Operation, and fo on In Infinitum. And this new Set of Ideas is expressed by a Term as absurd, an Idea of Reflection; a hard Word without any real or determinate Meaning. If they had distinguished them in plain Language, into Ideas of Sense, and Ideas of Reason, (which they might with equal good Sense have done) all the Amusement would cease; because every Body could then fee that Reason is the Operating of the Mind upon our Ideas; and some Ideas must therefore necessarily be Presupposed, either those of the pure Intellect, or of Senfation, or of both.

AND lastly, whereas this of Judgment is a very Complicated Operation, and confifts of many Particulars, which if enlarged upon and treated of with Distinctness and Perspicuity, would contribute much to the Direction of our Understanding in the pursuit of Knowledge: Yet these are slightly passed over and resolved immediately into Proposition and Enuntiation; whereas these latter should be treated of separately from Judgment, and under a diffinct Head. For the Operations of the Mind comprised under that of its Judgments, may be without any Actual Affirmation or Negation. If it is faid that Propositions are the Judgments of the Mind reduced to Sentences; I grant it, but thefe are as Accidental to the Inward Judgments of the Intellect, as Words or Terms are to the Ideas in the Imagination, and should be treated of with the same Distinction; besides that some of the Operations comprehended under that general Name, do not admit of any Affirmation or Negation. I shall instance in some of the chief of those Operations of the pure Intellect upon our Ideas, which I include under this Head of Judgment.

I. THAT of Separating them from one another, and Ranging them into any order at Will. Our Ideas lie originaly in the Imagination, in the same confused and disorderly Manner, in which

which outward Objects from our Infancy happen to strike upon our Senses; and would always continue in the very same situation, if they were not in the Power of the Intellect to dispose and manage at pleasure: By Singling out one or more from the rest, for a more Dissinct and Particular View and Consideration; by Sorting and Transposing them for any Purposes of the Mind; and particularly Ranging them under several distinct Heads or Kinds for the forming Universal Ideas; as when the Ideas of all Men we have, and have not seen, are represented by the Idea of One Man, which stands for all Mankind.

The Ideas of Sensation in Brutes lie within them unremoved, and their situation is unchangeable; they cannot put them out of the order wherein they were transmitted thro' the Senses; because they are purely passive, not only in the Reception of all their Ideas, as we are; but in that Instigation and Impulse of those Ideas which excites and prompts them to all their Operations. Their Ideas being, as ours are, the Impressions only of one Part of Matter upon another; and there being no active immaterial Principle within them to change their Position, they must necessarily remain thus six'd and Unalterable while they last; as so many Figures of a Seal impressed upon Wax.

2. Another instance is that of Comparing our Ideas one with another, to mark and observe their Agreements and Disagreements in every particular, whether essential or accidental to them; as when the Idea of a Tree and that of an Horse are compar'd in respect of their Vegetative and Animal Life; in respect of the Circulation of the Sap in one, and of the Blood and Spirits in the other. This Operation ought to be distinguished from that of considering the Relations they bear to one another, which is but one particular way of comparing them; the Likeness and Unlikeness of Ideas, their Agreements and Disagreements, are things different from their mutual Relations in all other Instances, and their Dependences upon one another; and therefore these are of a distinct and separate Consideration.

BRUTES do not Compare in any degree; for as they have a bare Sensation only of the Object, and not even a simple Apprehension of its Idea within them, distinct from that Sensation; so they can never attend to more than One Idea at once; they must necessarily advert to their Ideas successively one after another, and separately; but can never put two or more Ideas together to make a Comparison. If they had any Power for such a Performance within them, we should see them actualy put two or more outward Objects together;

gether, as we do, for their more convenient and easy distinguishing. Brutes may indeed be Said to Discern the difference between two or more Objects which are present to their Senses; and to distinguish them in some sensible Circumstances which immediately strike upon them: But this is not Comparing Ideas, no nor their Objects, even when they are Present; nor is it any thing of the fame nature with Discerning in Man; for they distinguish those Objects no otherwise than by being most Influenc'd and Moved by such of them as do make the strongest, and most vigorous, or the most frequent and lasting Impressions upon their Senses.

3. A THIRD instance is that of the Intellect's Enlarging or Diminishing those Ideas in any Proportion whatsoever. When we have looked upon a Tree we can shut our Eyes, and enlarge the Idea we have of it to any Size, even to reach the Clouds; or diminish it in our Thoughts till we reduce it to what it was in its first Principle or Seed. This is what a Brute can't do; it cannot enlarge or diminish the Idea of an Object which is even present to the Sense; so far is it from being able to make the Idea of it larger or fmaller, that it necessarily retains it just as it was received from the Sense. For Mere Sensation is but the Action or Impression of material Objects, upon Organs which are material; and the Ideas of Brutes

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are caus'd only by the Impression of the animal Spirits from those Organs upon the Imagination; that is upon the most spirituous and refin'd Parts of the animal Frame, disposed by Nature for the common Reception of those Impressions; and therefore a Simple Idea can receive no Alteration whatsoever in Brutes but what comes from the external Object; and this can make no Impression but according to its own natural Bulk and Size.

So that in order to a Possibility of Enlarging or Diminishing any one Idea, we must necessarily suppose some Principle distinct from Matter, and Superior to it; that is some immaterial Principle which hath a Power over those Ideas that mere Matter cannot have. If a Brute could enlarge or diminish an Idea in the least degree, it is easy to conceive it must be able to do fo in any Proportion; for the fame Power or Faculty that enabled it to Begin that Operation, must enable it to Carry it On farther; the first Act of enlarging or diminishing being equaly, if not more difficult, than a proceeding in it, and as intirely inde-pendent of all Matter and Sensation. To which I shall add, that the Sensations of Brutes are all the Direction they have for their Prefervation and Safety; and if they could thus Disguise them, by Altering the Size and Proportion of their Ideas; those Ideas would not N 4 answer answer the Ends of Nature, but Misguide them in all their Operations.

4. ANOTHER Act of the pure Intellect comprehended under its judging of Ideas, is that of Dividing and Compounding them. A fimple Idea, as hath been observed, is not that only which is intirely Adequate to what it represents, and Indivisible into more Ideas of the Same Kind; but that which is taken in with any Distinctness by One single Act or Operation of one and the same Sense; such as that of an Horse or a Tree; and this may be subdivided into more Ideas of the several Parts and the Idea of each Part may be viewed and confider'd feparately by the Mind. This is utterly out of the Power of Brutes; a Dog which first hath had one view of his Master may, while he is present, look at his Face, and afterwards at his Feet, or at any other part of him fuccessively; but this is not Subdividing the Idea of an human Body into the Ideas of its Parts: For when the Dog's Eyes are shut, or the Man disappears, he is utterly incapable of this Subdivision in the Absence of the Object.

THE Power of the Intellect is no less in Compounding its Ideas either in the Whole, as when it compounds the Ideas of many Trees to make up a Wood; or of many Houses to make up that of a City: Or in Part, when it separates the Parts of different Ideas to frame

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a new Composition out of them. And this is done either According to Nature, as when the Ideas of the Stem and many Branches are put together to make up that of a Tree; or Against Nature, as when part of an Horse and part of an human Body are united into a Centaur; which latter fort have been well called Chimerical.

BRUTES can no more Compound than they can Divide; for all Sensation is of Particulars and therefore so must the Ideas be which are consequent to it. What is there in Them which should unite any of those Particulars into one Compound Idea? Not the external Objects, which can each of them make but one fingle Impression of themselves; nor the Organ of Sense, which receives the Impressions fingly, and transmits them so to the Imagination, which also being material retains them just as they are transmitted from the Senses. So that nothing can put two or more of them together into one compound Idea but some Principle superior to Matter, and to all that the Object hath any Aptitude or Power to work either upon the Organ of Sensation, or upon the Imagination. It hath been urged that a Dog compounds the Shape, and Smell, and Voice, to make up a Compound Idea of its Master; and that it knows him by all three at Once, which, as I have observed, is not true: However were it fo, this would be a compounding

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of inward Ideas only in the Presence of the outward Objects of them; so that unless the Dog could unite those three Ideas in the Abfence of his Master to make up One Idea of him, it is not properly that compounding which is the Privilege and Power of an human Intellect.

CHAP. IV.

Of Abstraction.

NOTHER Act of the pure Intellect in relation to the Ideas of Sensation commonly reduced to this head of Judgment is said to be Abstraction, which is usually distinguished into two Sorts, and both of them equally groundless.

I. The first is a Logical Abstraction in order to form General Ideas; which is thought to be performed by withdrawing the Mind intirely from all the Individuals, and then forming one single Idea which shall represent the Whole Kind or Species at once; as when we remove our Thoughts intirely from all the Individuals of Men, and frame to our selves one general Idea distinct from them all to represent the whole Race. And these General abstract Ideas shall, in the modern refined Method of forming them, prove the strangest and most inconsistent

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confiftent Monsters in the World. Thus the General abstract Idea of Man, shall not be of a black or white, short or tall, thick or slender Man; but shall be All these and None of them at the Same time: The general abstract Idea of a Triangle shall be neither of an Equilateral, nor Equicrural, nor Scalenum; neither Oblique nor Rectangle, but all and none of these at once.

Now this is utterly impracticable, and therefore Abstraction in this Sence is a hard Word and without any determinate Meaning; for if the Intellect abstracts from all the Ideas of every Individual, it can have no Idea at all left to operate upon. When we fay Mankind, it expresseth no one Distinct, Abstract, General Idea which stands in the Mind for all the Individuals at once; but it fignifies the Idea of One Individual, which is no otherwise made general, than by our conceiving all the rest of the same Kind By that one; so that in truth it is the fingle Idea of any one Individual which is made to stand for and represent the whole Species. There is no fuch thing in Nature as any Universal realy Existing, either to strike upon our Senses, or to be an Object of our Reason; and consequently there can be no fuch general abstract Idea in the Mind. If there were any fuch, it would be equaly Simple and Original with that of one Individual; and, which is yet more abfurd, whether fuch an Idea

Idea were suppos'd to be from Nature, or from Abstraction, or Creation of the Intellect, it would necessarily imply this plain Absurdity, That it would not only be both a Particular and Universal Idea, as you differently Consider'd it, which is very allowable and may be true; but it would be actualy and In itself both a Simple and Compounded Idea at the Same time, which is downright Contradiction; Simple, as it represented the whole Kind at once, in one simple Idea abstracted from all the Individuals; and Compounded as it Included them all.

AND now we may have leave to wonder at those Persons, who single out this sort of Imaginary Abstraction for the only persect Di-stinction between Men and Brutes; and chuse to place the only Difference between them in that fort of Abstraction which one would think could never enter into the Head of Man or Beaft. Nay we may with good reason say, that of all the Operations of the pure Intellect they are least distinguishable in this of making the Idea of one Individual stand for all of the fame Kind, which is the True Abstraction. When we have an Idea of one particular Man, this ferves us to distinguish the whole Species from any other: And thus far even Brutes feem to approach to this Power, namely, that the Idea of a Particular Man whom a Dog for instance hath seen, serves in his Imagination

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whereby to distinguish any Individual of the Same Species, (as often as it is excited again by the Presence of any other Man) from the Individuals of any Other Species.

IF Men had faid that tho' Brutes distinguish every Individual as it is an Outward Object, and as it actualy presents itself to the Sense; yet this is not distinguishing Ideas in The Absence of all the Individuals, or making one Idea or Conception stand for the Ideas or Conceptions of them All. That they can't any way diftinguish one whole Species from another; much less discern any determinate essential Property, wherein All the Individuals agree; as Rationality in Man. And laftly, that they cannot distinguish even between the Individuals, but in fuch Qualities as depend upon actual outward Sensation; whereas Men can distinguish between both the Species and Individuals in things intirely independent of all outward Sensation. If these things, I say, had been urged, they would indeed have made a perfect Distinction in this respect between Men and Brutes. But for Men to allow Brutes Reason in common with Mankind, that is, allow them to be reasonable Creatures; and yet afterwards to place the Distinction between them and us in a fort of Abstraction which is altogether Irrational; is no other than first Raifing Brutes up to the Dignity of human Nature, and then Degrading Mankind below it.

IHOPE

I HOPE from what I have faid it is reafonably plain how falle and groundless that Opinion is, which afferts, that Brutes do some of them reason in certain Instances, as surely as they have Sense. And, that if they have any Ideas at all, we cannot deny them to have some Reason. But if Some Brutes reason, why not All Brutes? Or which are those Brutes which do reason, and which do not? Which are the rational Brutes, and which are irrational? Again, which are the certain Instances in which they do reason, and which are to be referr'd to pure Instinct? Surely if some of them have reason, they all have more or less of it; it is sure they are all directed in their Operations by one common Principle, whether that be Reason or Instinct; which last is no other than the prompting and Impulse of Ideas from the Impression of outward Objects.

IF you grant they have Some degree of Reason, it will be hard to tell why they have not a Greater degree of it; for they have as many Senses as Men, and generaly more acute; and consequently have all their Ideas more distinct than we have. Ideas of Sensation are the only original Groundwork of all Our Knowledge; and if Brutes have all the Materials which we have, and can Reason upon them, what should hinder them from attaining

taining to the same degrees of Knowledge which we have? What trifling is it to fay they reafon but a Little? They compare their Ideas but a Little? They compound them but a Little? For fince material Objects can cause Ideas by making Impressions of themselves, but no mere Matter can operate upon those Ideas after they are once form'd; then the cause that we reason more, and Brutes less, must be, either because their Organs are not so well disposed to act in Conjunction with an immaterial Principle; or because the immaterial Principle in them is of a very Diminutive Kind; or not Quite so immaterial perhaps as ours. They who stretch their Zeal so far for making Men of Brutes, are the very Persons who labour to make Brutes of Men; and will have the Soul of Man to be nothing but Matter with a Faculty of Thinking Superadded to it: And if so, the Soul of a Brute, according to them, must be Matter with Reason superadded to it; for Thinking and Reason fignify the fame thing.

It is confessed then by these Men, that Thinking is a Faculty that is not originaly in the Nature of Matter, but Superadded; and if so then it is a Faculty Above the Nature of it, and therefore Contrary to the Nature of it. But it implies no Contradiction, say they; no more, say we, than that God should make the same thing to be Matter, and No Matter at the

the fame time; no more than in supposing that Almighty Power should take away Knowledge from a pure Spirit, and superad Gravity or Solidity to is; that is should make it something else, and not Spirit. To which I may add this Contradiction farther, That the same Faculty of Reason shall be Essential to a System of Matter, and yet only Accidental and Superadded to that same System by almighty Power; for that Thinking is Essential to Man I hope will be allowed by those, who contend for the Possibility of its being Superadded to Brutes.

What Extremes these Advocates for Brutes run into? They attribute Thinking to Beings purely Immaterial, to Angels, and to God himself; whereas it is properly the joint Act or Operation of pure Spirit and Matter in effential Conjunction; and on the other hand they attribute Thinking or Reason both to Men and Brutes as Mere Matter, without any Union with an immaterial Substance; and both with equal Absurdity. That which deceives Men in this latter Opinion is, that in all their Reasonings in savour of Brutes, they ever consound the actual Perception these have of outward Objects, with the Knowledge we have of the Ideas of those Objects after they are lodged in the Imagination: Whereas the simple Apprehension of the Mind; Judging in all its Instances; Reasoning, and all the Operations of the Intellect are mostly imployed

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and exercised immediately upon Idéas, and not upon their external Objects.

THIS it is which evidently shews the Neceffity of an immaterial Principle in Man; for the Action or Impression of Matter upon Matter, may occasion many, and very distinct *Ideas*; but these are as yet nothing more than so many immediate sensitive Perceptions of the outward Object conveyed to the Imagination; which may from within prompt and excite Animals to many Operations: But being only confequent to the simple Perceptions of the Objects, and not being any New Perception or Apprehension of the Ideas themselves, it is a Degree of Knowledge which can receive no other Increase than what proceeds from a Renewal or Repetition of the same or like Impressions; unless there were a Principle above Matter to apprehend the Ideas themselves, to judge of them, and to reason upon them. Without this there can be nothing beyond a bare Perception or Idea of the Object, which is sooner or later worn out as there are new Impresfions of different Objects; or according to the Disposition of those refined and spirituous Parts of the Frame which are more immediately subservient to the Imagination, the Seat of those Ideas.

ALL hitherto is but a naked Perception of the outward Object; but when these Ideas are

once ftamp'd, what should begin Anew to operate upon them? To take a View of them; to alter and transpose them at pleasure; to enlarge and diminish; to divide, compare, and compound; to draw Inferences from them; and weigh and consider all their mutual Relations and Dependencies? Surely not Mere Matter, which could do no more than either Leave Impressions of itself, or Retain those Impressions when they are made; and by that means cause a simple bare Perception of the external Object; but could not proceed one Step farther towards any Higher Operation Upon that Impression or Idea.

To clear up what hath been faid, and enforce this Argument, I shall reduce the difference between that *Knowledge* and Persection which is in us, and that *Perception* which is in Brutes, to these sew short Observations.

of the external Objects themselves; but the Ideas of them are the immediate Objects of the Intellect in Man. They have a bare naked Perception of the sensible Object only; we have a farther Perception or Apprehension of the Idea itself in Distinction from the Object and separate from it. By the Idea they apprehend the Object; by the Intellect we apprehend the Idea.

- 2. THE Knowledge of Brutes Terminates in Ideas; ours only Begins there.
- 3. THEIR simple Ideas of Sensation are the whole Extent of all their Knowledge; whereas they are only the Groundwork and first Materials of ours.
- 4. If their Ideas are ever so little defaced or decayed, they can never be repaired but by a New Impression of the Object: Ours can be renewed and revived again, when faded, by voluntary Recollection Without the Object, which is truly and properly Memory.
- 5. THEY Necessarily follow the Instinct and Prompting of their fensitive Ideas in all their Operations; we can regulate all our Operations even in Opposition and contrariety to them.
- 6. THEY cannot Alter the Nature, or Proportion, or Disposition of any of their Ideas; we can Transpose, and Alter, and Compound them even Against Nature.
- II. THE other fort of Abstraction is called Metaphysical, and is faid to be perform'd by taking the Mind intirely off from all the Objects, or rather Ideas of Sensation, and all its Compositions out of them; and from all those Complex Notions and Conceptions of things in

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this World, which are made up of Ideas of Sense considered together with the Mind's operations upon them; in order to form Abstract Ideas of Heavenly Things and Incorporeal Beings. But this is utterly impracticable in this Life, as any one may find upon a Trial; after the utmost Efforts of the purest Intellect to conceive or frame such an Abstract Idea, he will find his Attempt vain and trifling. If any one fuch Idea could be affigned, and a proper Name found out for it, we might the less wonder how Men could pursue this Notion so far as they do, to the great Hinderance of true Knowledge, and Perplexity of human Understanding.

IF we Abstract intirely from Material Sub-stance and its Properties, we should have no Idea nor indeed Consciousness of Being at all; for that could never enter into the Mind without the Idea of something actualy Existing up-on which to exercise our Thoughts; and since the Mind can directly perceive nothing actualy existing but what is Material, our very Idea of Existence must take its first Rise from thence. If we abstract totaly and intirely from Thinking, we can have no Conception at all of the Knowledge of any Incorporeal Being; therefore Think-ing, which is the joint Operation of pure Spi-rit and Body united, is the best Notion and Representation we can have of that Knowledge, which is performed without any Concurrence

or Communication with Matter. If we abstract, I say, intirely from our Thinking, which includes the Labour of the Brain; we could form no Notion or Conception of the Wisdom of Spirits in general, much less of the Wisdom of God; and therefore for Want of any fuch abstract Notion or Idea, which Men are pleas'd to speak so much of, we are forced to substitute that of our Thinking, to represent an inconceivable Correspondent Perfection which is in God. So if we totaly abstract from the Notion of Power in Man, we shall have neither a Word, Idea, or Notion left for that incomprehensible Perfection in God called by the same Name; and thus it is with his Goodness, and with all other Perfections which we attribute to him.

THE Case is the very same in the Mysteries of Christianity. If we totaly and intirely abstract from the Ideas or Notions we have of Father, Son, and Spirit in the strictly literal and proper Signification of the Words, when spoke of Men; we can have no Notion or Conception at all of any personal Distinction in the Divine Nature: And therefore it is that God, in Condescention to our only way of Knowledge by the Operations of the Intellect upon Ideas of Sensation, hath thus revealed that Mystery to us for which we could have had no fuch Abfract Notion or Idea; and consequently no Idea or Conception At all, if it were not to be conceived by the Mediation and Substitution of fuch 0 3

fuch as were plain and familiar to us. If we abstract intirely from a Price, Purchase, or Redemption among Men; we could have no Purely Intellectual or Abstract Notion or Idea of the real worth and value of the Blood of Christ to obtain Salvation for us; and consequently no Notion or Idea at all of it: Therefore this Mystery is reveal'd to us under that Analogical or borrowed Conception among Us, which is most fuitable and answerable to the Nature of that Divine Price or Purchase; to that Value and Merit which, as it is in its own Nature, is utterly incomprehensible to us. And laftly, should we abstract intirely from the Notion we have of a Man's interceding to a Prince, in behalf of a Criminal; we should have no Notion or Idea left in the Mind to represent that Intercession, which Christ makes in our behalf to God.

THUS I might run thro' all other Instances of Divine Things, and shew how we can form no Ideas or Conceptions of them intirely Abfracted from those of Sensation, and the Operations of our Minds upon them; and that when we Attempt to do fo, we can neither think nor speak at all of them. The true Abstraction (if Men Will call it by that Name) confifts, not in thus aspiring above the Power and Reach of all human Understanding, and hunting after Ideas or Conceptions of Divine Things and incorporeal Beings intirely abstracted from all

all Senfation, and totaly independent of it: But in altogether laying afide that vain and fruitless Attempt, and in substituting the only Notions we have, and which are Natural, and Easy, and Familiar, to Represent and Stand For those immaterial heavenly Things, of whose real Nature and Properties we can otherwise obtain no Notion or Idea; and in raising and transferring our Thoughts thus, from the Literal Strict Propriety of those Words and Phrases, in which we express them; to that Analogical Import and Signification of them, by which they are as it were fanctified and spiritualized. That is, by confidering each of the Conceptions we thus fubflitute, as representing a real and Correspondent, but Inconceivable Nature or Perfection, of which we cannot in our prefent State form any Abstract Idea or Notion; or indeed any other Conception at all, than by Mediation of the Ideas and Notions of this World. This is the True and only Abstraction we are capable of with regard to Things spiritual; which, we fee, is fo far from being intirely independent of all Ideas of Sensation, and the immediate Operations of the Intellect upon Them (as some would have it) that we can no otherwife think and speak of such Objects than in these worldly and human Symbols; and that if we abstract from These, we must at the same time abstract from All thought of heavenly and fupernatural Beings, and can have neither Names nor Ideas for them.

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Thus might we reassume all the foregoing Instances, and shew how we are capable of no other abstract Notions of the Existence and Attributes of God and pure Spirit, than fuch analogical Representations as I have described; unless Men will still call these Abstract and purely Intellectual Ideas, because they stand in the Mind for what is Incomprehensible, and of which we can have no proper abstract Ideas or Notions at all. When we employ our Thoughts on the Mystery of the Trinity for instance, it is not to be done by aiming at any Abstract intellectual Ideas of that incomprehensible Unity and Distinction in the Divine Nature; which can never be obtained: But by exercifing our Mind on those Substituted Conceptions in which that Mystery is revealed to us; by considering the familiar Notions of a Father and Son by Nature, together with the best Conception we can form of our own Spirit which is united to Matter, as the only Correspondent Representations we can have of that Divine Distinction; and by taking those Terms in the Analogical Sence, as being expressive of what is Answerable, tho' Still inconceivable in the Divine Nature.

Now in proceeding thus we must necessarily inser, that if this Mystery is revealed to us under such Analogical Resemblances as evidently imply a Real and even Personal Distinction;

tion; we are to think and speak of it as such, or not think or speak of it at all. I here leave the Reader to run over all the other Mysteries of Christianity in his own Mind; as well as every thing in Natural Religion relating to the Nature of God, and the things of another World; and fee whether this is not the True Abstraction? And whether any thing hath been of more fatal Consequence to Religion, than mistaking it for an airy fanciful Pursuit of Abstract Notions, and Purely Intellectual Ideas of things altogether imperceptible and inconceivable as they are In themselves, by the help of even the most exalted Notions we can form? I shall only give the Hint here, that this true Abstraction, or rather transferring of the Mind from our Ideas and Notions of things temporal, to those spiritual Things which are thus represented by them; holds not only with respect to the Understanding, but also the Will and Affections of an human Soul: Which are never by any Direct and Immediate Operation employed on Abstract intellectual Ideas of heavenly Things; but are then lifted up from Earth to Heaven when they are exercised on our common and natural Ideas or Notions confidered as Types, which represent answerable inconceivable Antitypes. Thus are our Love, Joy, Fear, Hope, Desire, Gratitude employed, not Immediately upon any direct Ideas of the real Perfections of God or Heavenly Bliss, which are incomprehensible; but upon the Analogous Conceptions

Conceptions we form of the Goodness and Power of God, and of a Future Bliss, from the best Notions of that Goodness, and Power, and Happiness which we experience Here: That is in other Words, we employ our Affections on things inconceivable, in their correspondent Substitutes alone; in which case the Ideas or Conceptions don't stand for their Proper original Objects, but are us'd as Representations of what is highly exalted above the Reach of all our Faculties. This is the only Method we can arrive to of sanctifying our Affections; of removing them from things on Earth, and Setting them on things above; things Not seen, and whereof we can have no Direct or Abstract Ideas at all.

WHAT hath been faid hitherto of the Operations of the pure Intellect, relates to Simple Ideas of Sensation only; and therefore it will be convenient to observe here, That the same Operations are likewise exercised upon all those Alterations and Compositions which the Mind raises up to itself out of those simple Ideas; whether according to Nature, as the Idea of a Wood or an Army; or against Nature, as the Idea of a Centaur. When the Imagination is impregnated with those voluntary Alterations or Combinations of simple Ideas, the Mind hath the same full Power over them, which it had over fuch Ideas as were fimple and original; as that of Intuition or simple Apprehen-. fion,

fion, and of Judgment in all its Instances of Comparing, Compounding, Enlarging, Diminifhing, and Dividing. The Mind hath likewise the same arbitrary Dominion and Sway over all the Complex Notions and Conceptions which are formed out of those simple or compound Ideas, considered in Conjunction with the Operations of the Intellect upon them; such as our Notions of Justice or Charity, and of all Virtues and Vices.

But what is more Material to be observed is, that tho' we have no abstract and purely intellectual Ideas of celeftial and immaterial Beings for the Employment and Exercise of any Operations of the Mind: Yet that which fully compensates the intire want of such spiritual and intellectual Ideas, and serves all the ends of Reason and Religion in this Life is, that these Operations are employed and exercised upon all our Conceptions and complex Notions, in the Same Manner, when they are Symbols only and Representations of things purely spiritual; as when they immediately represent things merely Human or Temporal. That is, the Mind exercises all its Faculties and Operations upon its Notions and Conceptions, as well and Eafily when the Terms by which they are expressed are taken in their Analogical Sence and Meaning; as when they are confidered in their First and strictly Proper Signification; the Mind is equaly conver-

fant with these Conceptions when they reprefent their Archetypes, as when it thinks of them without any farther Reference or Relation to the things of another World. As for Instance, the same Operations of the Intellect are exercised upon Spirit when it signifies a purely Immaterial Being, as when it is taken in its more original Acceptation for our Soul, which is Matter and Spirit in effential Union; upon Knowledge when it is used to reprefent a Perfection of God, as when it stands in the Mind for that which is Human, the only Knowledge we have any direct or proper Conception of. And so it is in all other Instances; our intellectual and reasoning Faculties have the same full and free Scope and Liberty here, in Apprehending, and Judging, and Inferring, which they could have if there were no fecondary or Analogical Acceptation of our Words and Ideas; as will more fully appear hereafter.

CHAP. IV.

Of Relation.

HE fixth Instance of the Mind's Operation upon its Ideas refer'd to the Head of its Judgments is, that of observing their mutual Relations and Dependencies. This is Comparing indeed, but it is in one particular Instance

Instance only; not in the Likeness and Unlikeness of things, which is very different from Relation and Dependency: For there may be a Similitude where there is no Relation, and there may be a Relation or Dependence where there is no Similitude; as that between God and Material Substance which is referred to him as its Creator. I shall dwell no longer upon this Operation of the Intellect, than is necessary to shew the Method and Procedure of human Understanding in the Attainment of Knowledge.

1. FIRST then, when the Mind confiders the mutual Relations and Dependencies between all its Ideas of sensible Objects as they are in their own Nature, without any respect which they bear to Man as a Rational intelligent Agent; from hence there opens a large and spacious Field of Knowledge: That of natural Causes and Effects; of the Manner of material Beings Operating upon, or Suffering from each other; of all their active and passive Powers, as some express it; and in short of their affecting and influencing one another in innumerable Instances; and this is called Natural Philosophy.

But here it is worth observing, that all the real true Knowledge we have of Nature is intirely Experimental; infomuch that, how strange foever the Affertion feems, we may lay this down

down as the first fundamental unerring Rule in Physics, That it is not within the compass of human Understanding to assign a purely speculative Reason for any one Phænomenon in Nature; as why Grass is green, or Snow is white? Why Fire burns, or Cold congeals? By a Speculative Reason, I mean, affigning the true and Immediate efficient Cause A Priori, together with the manner of its Operation, for any Effect whatfoever purely natural. We find indeed, by Observation and Experience, that such and fuch Effects Are produced; but when we attempt to think of the Reason Why, and the Manner How the Causes work those Effects, then we are at a Stand; and all our Reasoning is precarious, or at best but probable Conjecture.

IF any Man is furprized at this, let him instance in some speculative Reason he can give for any natural Phænomenon; and how plaufible foever it appears to him at first, he will, upon weighing it thoroughly, find it at last refolv'd into nothing more than mere Observation and Experiment; and will perceive that those Expressions generaly used to describe the Cause or Manner of the Productions in Nature, do really fignify nothing more than the Effects. The most plausible Reason which can in fuch Cases be affigned, will be found to amount to nothing beyond a bare Comparifon or Analogy of some Effects with others;

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as when Inferences are made from the Proportion of Velocity in other Liquids thro' Tubes of certain Conical Figures, to the Circulation of the Blood and Spirits in the Arteries and Veins of an human Body. Now tho' this last should be allow'd a plaufible way of Gueffing how far the Effects may be Similar in both; yet what Certain Scientific Conclusions can possibly be drawn from it, when fuch a Variety of Circumstances, as occur in the complicated Frame of an human Body, must join to render the Cases so widely Different? Or what can be more groundless than to conclude, with a Philofophic Air of Positiveness, that because the smallest Particles of some Medicines which we can difcern with Microscopes, seem, when thus view'd, to resemble Wedges, Globes, &c. therefore the Invisible Particles of which even These are compos'd, wou'd be found of the fame Figures, were the Clufters diffolved and capable of being thus feen: And that confequently when they are diffolved in the Humours of our Body, they must act Mechanicaly just as a Wedge or Globe, &c. does out of it? All these Observations may with equal Justice be extended to the Accounts given of the Mechanical Causes and Manner of Motion and Operation in the Larger Bodies of the U-niverse; whenever the Terms used in such Treatises are pretended to fignify any thing beyond Effects known from Experiment.

FROM hence we may see how little that abstracted and Mechanical way of reasoning from the Structure and Configuration of the minute Particles in Medicines, and of the Solids and Fluids in human Bodies, which obtains fo much of late, is like to contribute to advance the Art of Healing; fince it is in Truth no other than running altogether into Hypo-theses, tho' our modern Mechanical Reasoners profess, at the same time, to reject and explode them utterly. For however they may tell you plausibly in General, that the different Species and Effects of Bodies, with their specific Qualities and Attributes, proceed from nothing else but the different Figure, Size, or Motion of their minute Particles: Yet when you come to Particular Instances, and demand of them what that peculiar Configuration, Texture, Size, or Motion of the Particles, for instance, of Flower of Sulphur, or Campbire, or Mercury is, which renders them capable of Operating after fuch and fuch a manner, and producing such Effects in the Solids or Fluids of an human Body, and How they act; you will find them utterly at a Loss. And whoever reads the Mechanical Reasonings of some of our best and most ingenious modern Physicians upon the Operations of those very Medicines, will find them all precarious Conjecture; and nothing more than uncertain Hypothesis, dressed up in the Style and

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and Form of Certainty and Demonstration. I cannot forbear therefore mentioning again this Fear and Jealousy of my own, which I am persuaded is not altogether groundless; That there never will be any great and considerable Advances made in the Art of Healing, till all Hypothesis and Mechanical Reasoning is out of Vogue; and till Men are come about again to the ancient Method of pure Experiment, and the common obvious Reasoning intirely from thence.

THUS short and impersect is all our boasted Knowledge of Nature; we are intirely in the dark as to the inward Structure and Composition of the minute Particles of all Bodies; and can with no degree of Certainty judge or determine any thing concerning them, but from their outward Appearances and fensible Effects; when we attempt any thing beyond this, all our Reasonings are full of Consusion and Uncertainty. And yet even this purely Experimental Knowledge of Nature is however a Degree of it aptly fuited to our present State and Condition in this Life; it answers all the Reasonable Ends of our Well-being and Preservation: And if we had Sagacity and Acuteness of Sense enough to penetrate into the very Intimate Essences of Things, and into the exact Configuration of the Minutest Parts of Matter, it would perhaps answer no end

but that of useless Speculation and Amusement.

2. FROM our Ideas of Sensation we infer the certain Existence of those external Objects which cause or occasion them in us; from the Existence of these again, we infer a first Cause of all things eternaly and necessarily existing; fince nothing could produce itself, or act before it was: And from hence again proceeds the Knowledge of that Relation which he bears to us as our Creator, and Preserver. From hence again we infer the probable Existence of created immaterial Beings, which bear to us the relation of fellow Creatures; fince we can fet no Bounds to Space, nor to Almighty Power; which must be able to create Beings of Persections vastly superior to those of Mankind; and free from those Weaknesses and Imperfections we labour under; and to whose unbounded Power and Majesty it seems most agreeable to have done fo. From these Relations and Dependences flow all the Duties comprehended under Piety towards God, fuch as Worship, and Prayers; Thanksgiving, and Praise; Reliance upon his Providence, Gratitude, and Fear; as also Veneration and Honour towards those our fellow Creatures of fo fuperior a Rank and Degree, that we can have no Direct or Proper Idea of them in this World.

AGAIN, when we come to consider the Relation we bear to our fellow Creatures of the same Nature and Degree in this World, thence arise the Duties of Humanity and Justice. And when we distinguish these by the several particular Relations of Consanguinity or Assimity, such as Wife or Husband, Parent or Children; or in any other Respects more circumstantial or adventitious, such as that of Master or Servant, Prince or Subjects; from thence slow all the several respective Duties and Obligations which unbiassed Reason and Experience teach us to be necessary to the Benefit and Advantage of the whole Kind, and of every individual Man in particular; and are therefore to be discharged to each other mutualy, according to the nearness or distance of that Relation they bear to us.

LASTLY, When we come to confider the nearest of all Relations, that which we bear to our selves, the regard that every Man ought to have for his own Welfare and Happiness; and the Relation which all Other visible Creatures bear to him as a Rational Agent, thence arise all those Virtues and Duties which naturally tend to promote the Good of Body and Mind, such as Sobriety, Temperance, Chastity. And all comprehended under this second Head, is properly Natural Religion or Morality; for the Sanction of all the Rules and Precepts whereof,

whereof, and to shew their tendency towards our Happiness in another World, the Under-standing proceeds thus: From the apparent un-equal Distribution of Rewards to those who observe them; and of Punishments to such a transgress them in this Life, so plainly inconfiftent with Goodness and Justice in a persect Being; we infer the Necessity of a future State for a final Reward and Punishment; and confequently the Immortality of human Souls.

BEFORE I proceed to the next spacious Scene which opens itself to human Understanding, it is worth observing here; that tho' all our Knowledge of Nature consists either barely in the mere Contemplation and Simple Apprehension of our Ideas of Sensation; or in Experiment and Observation of outward Appearances, and of the various ways of external Objects operating on one another; insomuch that all the pretended Theory and Speculation of natural Causes and Effects is precarious Conjecture: Yet when we proceed to Morality, our Knowledge, tho' more truly Speculative, is Certain and Undoubted, for the Regulation of our Practice. We have a more evident, clear, and diffinct Knowledge of the Truths of natural Religion, than of the Nature or Essence of any sensible Objects, on which their Properties and Effects depend. Material Bodies strike upon the Organs of Sensation only by their Qualities and Effects; and just as these receive

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receive the Impressions, so they are directly convey'd to the Imagination, but without any clear and Adequate Representation of the intimate Essence of the Objects; and consequently we can know nothing more of them than from their fensible Properties and Appearances, and from observing how many different ways they influence and affect one another. But the Case is otherwise when the Intellect confiders the several Relations they bear to one another and to us, and their mutual Respects and Dependences; here its Knowledge is Clear and Adequate; here it expatiates and exerts all its Powers; the Judgments it passes upon these, without Partiality and Passion, are Certain; its Deductions are Undoubted; its Conclusions without Confusion; and all the Rules and Precepts it forms concerning those Relations are of eternal Verity. And 'tis agreeable to the Wisdom and Goodness of God that the Case should be thus; since even the Experimental Knowledge we have of natural Objects is perfectly fufficient for all the Ends of natural Religion and Morality; and as to any O-ther Use of it, serves the Conveniences and Exigences of This Life only; whereas the Truths of Morality have a farther Respect to Eternity and the Purposes of another World.

P 3 C H A

CHAP. VI.

Of the different Kinds of Knowledge and Evidence.

T being a Matter of no small Consequence to the Procedure of the Intellect in general, to state the several very different Kinds of Knowledge, as well as the Degrees of it in each Kind which admits of them; I shall observe that there are these six very distinct Sorts of Knowledge following, and as many very different Kinds of Evidence upon which they are founded.

I. THE first is that which we have from our Senses; and confists in an Intellectual View of all those Ideas which are thro' them conveyed inwardly to the Imagination. This is a Knowledge Direct, and Immediate, and Intuitive; utterly exclusive of all Reasoning and Argumentation: The View is Simple, and the Ideas hitherto uncompounded; and the Intellect is as yet no farther employ'd than in a bare Contemplation of the Ideas. It is this view. of the Intellect which renders it properly Knowkdge, and distinguishes it from Natural Instinct in Brutes, which are not capable of any fuch View of their Ideas. This carries in it the Highest Kind of Evidence, because it is so direct,

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rect, and immediate, and fimple, that it admits of no Medius Terminus, or common Meafure, and confequently of no Proof or Evidence at all from Reason; and all manner of Proof or Evidence would, if Attempted here, have less of Perspicuity and Certainty in it, than that which it already contains in its own Nature. This is a Knowledge which admits of no Degrees of Evidence, for All external Sensation is equaly certain and undoubted In itself; and the Evidence of One Sense is equaly clear with that of Another, in respect of their proper and different Objects; and this Evidence can be no otherwise varied than by the present Disposition of the Organ of Sensation; or of the Medium; or by the different Degrees or Manner of Impression from the outward Object. When the Sensation is regular and perfect, the Affent of the Intellect naturaly and Necesfarily follows all at once; but however is not Extorted after the Manner it is in Demonstration, which compels by intermediate Proof and Deduction. Wherefore it would be an odd Affectation to call this fensitive Evidence by the Name of Demonstration, merely because it is obvious and natural, and not to be deny'd; or because the contrary can be reduced to such a Contradiction as this: As if a Man should fee a Tree, for inftance, before his Eyes, and should fay, the Denial of it implies That the Tree should be there, and not there at the same time; or that he both sees and doth not see a Tree at the Same P 4

same time. Men may in Words indeed profess their Dissent from the Evidence of Sense, and charge it home with Falshood and Fraud; yet this is no other than giving themselves the Lie: It is acting against Nature, which will recoil with irrefiftible Force whenever the unnatural Restraint is relaxed. When the Organ is rightly disposed and exercised upon its proper Object, in a just Distance and Medium, the clearest and strongest Reason must yield to its Evidence, and can never interpose but when there is a reasonable Suspicion of some Failure in the Act of Sensation: Nor can it make any Inquiry whether the Evidence of Sense is true? But only whether it is truly the Evidence of Sense? So that for a Man to argue against the plainest Evidence of Sense, is to oppose the Evidence of Reason to what in its own Nature admits of No Reasoning at all; or what is worse, to lay aside both Sense and Reafon, and form a Judgment upon any Instance of Sensation without Regard to either of them.

IT will be proper to add these two Things farther concerning the Evidence of Sense; first, that it was Necessary it should be so direct and immediate, so clear and undoubted; because it is the First Foundation of all Other Knowledge of things Human and Divine. If the Truth of this Knowledge admitted of any Doubt, or were capable of any Proof, we should wander about in an everlasting Sceptici/m.

ticism, without the least Certainty in any thing: For no Proof urged for it, can be plainer or more evident than that which it is brought to prove; and would therefore Itself require another Proof, and so on with endless Confusion. The other thing to be observed is, that all Self-evident Propositions, and Axioms, and Postulata, are clear and evident in Proportion to their near Affinity to Sensation; and owe their apparent Truth and Certainty to a more Immediate Correspondence with it. As that The Whole is greater than the Part; two Things equal to a third are equal in themselves; all which and such like are derived more directly from Sensation, and therefore have in them a Degree of Evidence little inserior to it.

Now what I have faid of fensitive Knowledge must be understood of the Immediate and bare Act of Sensation only, or of the Idea confequent upon it; which the Intellect first takes for granted, and then makes its own Remarks, together with all its Inferences and Deductions from it. So that thus far only it is properly Knowledge, or a Necessary Assent of the Mind to an evident Truth; and not Faith; (for indeed All that is strictly and properly Knowledge doth, as fuch, exclude all that is properly Believing) and a Man is faid actualy to Know and not to Believe what he truly fees with his Eyes and hears with his Ears: Faith may be Consequent to that Assent of the Mind upon sensitive Evidence, but cannot be that

that Very Assent of the Mind which makes it Knowledge. Thus they who actualy faw Lazarus come out of his Grave at the call of 7efus, could not be faid to Believe that they faw him rise from the dead, but to Know that he did so. They who were Eye-witnesses of Christ's Ascension, could not be said to Believe that they faw him ascend; but to Know it. This Knowledge indeed and immediate Evidence of Sense may be a good Ground and Foundation of fuch Truths as are directly deduced from thence by moral Reasoning and Deduction, and which may so become the Objects of our Faith. As the raising Lazarus from the dead was a fensible Evidence of a Divine Almighty Power in Christ; and his ascending up into Heaven a sensible Evidence of the Truth of his Doctrine, and of his being the Son of God and the true Messah, as he declared himself to be: The Spectators had a Knowledge of the Facts, and a Faith of those Truths whereof they were intended as a Proof and Evidence.

So it was with Thomas the Apostle; he could not be faid to Believe that he felt the Print of the Nails in the Hands of Christ, and the Mark of the Wound in his Side; but that he actualy Knew them to be there: And from thence he Necessarily inferr'd the Truth of his Refurrection, which was Knowledge still; and upon this Sensitive and Rational Knowledge it

was

was that he founded that great Article of Faith, which he made open Profession of by crying out My Lord and My God. The Saying of our Saviour upon that Confession of his Faith was, Bleffed are they which believe and have not feen; which is our Case who are now Believers: Not because we believe without Knowledge; but because our Faith is founded upon Rational only and Moral, and not upon any Sensitive Evidence of our own. We have first a Knowledge or moral Certainty of the Truth of the Facts, from their Testimony who had a senfitive Evidence of them; from the Hiftory of the New Testament, and the rational Proofs of its being the Word of God: And it is upon this Knowledge we found our Belief of Christ's being the Son of God and true Messiah; of his having almighty Power; and of his being Our Lord and our God.

As it was necessary to distinguish these two things with some exactness, Sensitive Evidence and Faith properly so called, upon many Accounts; so especially was it requisite in order to open the Fallacy of those who insist upon Strict Evidence, in opposition to Revelation and Mystery. The Evidence of Facts related in Scripture, either Sensitive or Rational, is not properly Faith, but Knowledge; and the Rational Knowledge of such Facts Men either have, or may have if they please, after the same Manner they now come by the Knowledge of other Trans-

Transactions related in Prophane History. And as for those reveal'd Truths which are Deduced from them, and which are properly the Objects of our Faith, fuch as Christ's being the Son of God and true Messiah, his having almighty Power, and being truly our Lord and our God; it is plain they are of fuch a Nature as not to admit of any immediate Sensitive Evidence. Had those mysterious Doctrines and Truths been In themselves capable of Immediate sensitive Evidence either to the Jews or us, they would then become Knowledge, as was that of the Facts and Miracles; and fuch evident Knowledge as would necessarily Exclude all Faith. So that tho' our modern Unbelievers had actualy Seen all the Miracles wrought by our Saviour, yet still upon their Principles they must have continued void of all Faith in those Mysterious Doctrines to which the Miracles were design'd to procure our assent. For Miracles are but a Mediate external Proof of the Truth of fuch Doctrines, and have no Natural and Necessary Connection with the Propositions reveal'd; and tho' an hundred of them were wrought for the procuring our Affent to One Mystery, it would still remain as Incompre-bensible as before. But these Men are not satisfied with any thing short of a strict and Immediate intrinsic Evidence for the Doctrines themselves; insomuch that their obstinate refufal of an Assent to these reveal'd Truths, upon fuch a Principle, is in this Respect a Degree.

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of Perverseness even beyond that of the harden'd Jews; who attributing Christ's Miracles to the Power of Beelzebub, and no other than giving Testimony to himself, required a Sign from the Father in *Heaven*; and had this been granted they were content to acquiesce in the Belief of his *Dostrines*.

Bur our modern Unbelievers, if consistent with themselves, must have rejected the Doc-trines notwithstanding their seeing even Such a Miracle from Heaven: For this would be but a Mediate Evidence still of the Truth of those divine Doctrines our Saviour preach'd; some of which would have continued, by their very Nature, equaly Mysterious and Inconceivable to them as before. And therefore They must have called for either a Direct fensitive Intuition, or an Immediate Evidence of the divine Truths themselves; such as would give them a Clear and Adequate Knowledge of the real Intrinsic Nature of Things, which is incomprehensible either to Sense or Reason: And upon a Refusal of this, they must intirely have declined any Faith where they had no Direct Know-ledge by Ideas, nor immediate Comprehension of the incomprehensible Mystery Itself. Is it not a monstrous Inconsistency in our Opposers of Revelation to profess themselves willing to become Believers, if all Points of the Christian Faith were put into such a Light as that it would be Impossible to BELIEVE them: For whether

whether they had the immediate Evidence of Sense, or of strict Demonstration for them, it would be then all Knowledge or Science, and not Faith.

II. ANOTHER Kind of Knowledge is that which we have from Self-Consciousness. As we come to the Knowledge of things without us by the Mediation of their Ideas; 10 on the contrary we have an Immediate Feeling or Consciousness of what is transacted in our Mind, without the Intervention of any Ideas whatfoever. Thus we have a Knowledge of all the Faculties or Powers and Operations of the Soul; not only those of the Intellect and Will, together with all the various Modifications of them; but of all the Passions likewise and Affections of the Inferior Soul. This Kind of Perception some have not unaptly called Internal Sensation, in order to distinguish it from that Perception we have of External Objects by their Ideas, and which cannot otherwise be known than by some Representations or Characters of them lodged in the Imagination.

Concerning this Kind of Knowledge which we have of the Faculties of our own Minds, fo very different from what we have by external Sensation; it will be necessary to observe, that we have no degree of it Antecedent to the Actual Exercise of those Faculties upon the Ideas of Sensation; as we should have had no Knowledge

ledge of any of our bodily Motions if the Parts were not actualy moved: Infomuch that it is from the internal Sensation or Consciousness of those Operations of the Powers of the Mind upon such Ideas, that we necessarily infer its very Existence; and obtain the highest moral Certainty of an immaterial Principle within us, endued with a Power of voluntary Motion or Activity in itself, and of communicating Motion at Will and Pleasure to the Parts of the Body. Thus we could have had no Consciousness of Thinking, antecedently to, and abstractedly from any Object or Idea actualy thought upon; or of Willing without something actualy Will'd or defired; nor of Love, Hatred, Fear, till those Passions were Exercised upon some Object loved, or hated, or seared; and fo in all the other Faculties and Affections of the Mind.

Now fince we can have no Consciousness of any of the Powers of our Minds before they actualy operate; and that their first Operations must necessarily be upon Ideas of Sensation; it is plain we cannot have Simple Ideas of them, but are obliged to form to our selves Complex Notions of them, made up of those Ideas upon which they operate, together with the Manner of the Mind's operating upon them, and of its affecting the Body in those Operations.

Tho' this Kind of Knowledge necessarily Presupposes that which we have from external Sensation, and is of a more complex Nature; yet it is nothing inferior to it in Point of Certainty and Evidence. The Necessary Affent of the Mind doth not only follow of Course upon this Consciousness, as it is in the Case of external Senfation; but Falls in with it: They are so closely connected that the Consciousness is itself the Immediate Act of Assent or Knowledge; at least they are so inseparable that they cannot be diftinguished even in Thought. When this internal Sensation or Consciousness is truly natural, by means of a due Tone and Temper of the animal Spirits, and of the finer Parts of the Body which are the more immediate Instruments of those mental Operations, we can never be Deceived in this Article of Knowledge. It is fo Sure and obvious, fo Clear and distinct that it admits of no Proof or Farther Evidence from Reason; and yet it would be perverting the true Procedure of human Understanding to confound this with Demonstration: Since it is so Immediate and Intimate to us that there is no room for any Application of a Common Measure either to illustrate or increase its Evidence; or to discover the Truth or Falshood, in any Instance, of those Faculties and Operations whereof we have fuch a real internal Feeling. So that for a Man to argue away any Instances of this Knowledge

we have from Self-Consciousness, or deny their Certainty, would be no less absurd than flatly to contradict the most clear and distinct Perception of External Sense. Only it is to be observed that all here said of this Knowledge is to be understood of the First and Immediate Perceptions of our mental Operations, and of their Reality and Truth; and not of any Farther Observations made upon them by the Intellect, or of any Deductions or Confequences afterwards drawn concerning the Nature or Manner of those Operations. To instance in some few Particulars of this Kind of Knowledge.

A MAN who by an immediate Confcious-ness of what passes within him doth not Know certainly, that he hath a Faculty of Reason and Understanding as well as of Sensitive Perception; and that these two are totaly different in Kind, and not in Degree only; is not capable of being altered in his Opinion by any Argument or Perfuafion: This Knowledge is fo immediate, that tho' many other Arguments may be offered to render that Point highly Probable; yet nothing can work a full Conviction of the Truth of it, but the Regard and Attention he hath to an inward Feeling and Consciousness of fuch a reasoning Faculty within him. If by being Conscious to what is transacted in his own Mind, he doth not perceive fuch an Essential Difference between Thinking and Sensitive Pera

Perception, as is a sufficient Ground for these Consequences, That Reason is a Faculty intirely different in Kind from that Instinct and sensitive Perception which he observes in Brutes; and That mere Matter is not capable of Thinking and Reason; no Evidence whatsoever built on any Foundation from Without, can add to the Truth and Perspicuity of those Conclusions, or raise them up to an higher Degree of Certainty in him.

AGAIN, we have an immediate Consciousness of a Freedom of Will within us; or of a Power to act or forbear to act, and to act this way or the quite contrary in all Matters of Duty, as well as in all things indifferent: From whence the natural Deduction of Reason is, that our Actions being Free and Voluntary they must be capable of being Imputable to us as moraly Good or Bad, and confequently liable to Reward or Punishment from Him who endued us with that Faculty. This free Principle within us is so Self-evident, that no Reason or Argument can render it more so; all attempt of Proof for the Corroboration of it is utterly needless, and serves only to perplex and confound the clearest Evidence the Mind is capable of for the Truth of any thing: So that in all Contention and Debate relating to this Point, as well as to what immediately depends on it, the last Appeal for a final Decision must be to the immediate Confciousness of the Mind; and

and he who would not determine against abfolute Decrees, and unconditional Predestination, Election and Reprobation, from a Discernment of Freedom of Will within himself; must be a corrupt Judge and blinded with Prejudice; and is not capable of a full Conviction from any other Topic.

Thus again, we have an immediate Con= sciousness and internal Sensation of Remorse on the Committal of wicked Actions, and of a fecret Complacence of Mind on the Performance of fuch as are moraly Good; and by the same Consciousness we perceive these to be immediate natural Spurs to one, and Determents from the other. And as we have an immediate Self-Consciousness of these Possions, so by an obvious Deduction of Reason, they become such a folid Ground of Evidence for the effential and eternal Difference between Virtue and Vice, that he who will not be convinced of this difference by Reasoning from such Consciousness, would be hardy enough to refift all Arguments built on any other Foundation. I do not fay that these Passions of Pleasure and Pain naturaly consequent to our Actions, are Themselves an Immediate Evidence of the moral Good or Evil of Actions prior to any Deduction of Reason; or that we have an internal Instinct and Moral Sense, whereby we Immediately and Intuitively discern the Difference of Virtue and Vice without any Inserence of Q 2 Reafon,

Reason, and previously to it, as some ridiculoufly affert: Because nothing can be plainer than that the Actions themselves must be Ap-prehended as Moraly Good or Bad before such Natural Pleasure or Pain can be caused by them; and confequently their moral Good or Evil must consist in something previous not only to those Passions, but also to Any Faculty Whatever that Apprehends it. But I say there cannot be a furer Ground on which to build an undoubted Argument for that real and unalterable Difference between Virtue and Vice, which is antecedent in itself both to our Perceiving it, and being thus affected by it, after Any manner.

Nor does it take off any thing from the Certainty of this Knowledge I am speaking of, or the Force of its Evidence, that some Men have little or no Remorse in the Committal of habitual and known Sins. For it was not fo with them at First; they are in an Unnatural State, and have almost quite defaced and smother'd one of the strongest Passions in human Nature by inceffant Contradiction, and offering it perpetual Violence, till they are almost past any Feeling or Consciousness of it. And when this genuine and proper Ground of a reasonable and satisfactory Proof of the Difference between Virtue and Vice, is rendered weak and feeble in Men; then they become clamorous in their Demands either for an Instinct

Instinct whereby to discern it Immediately and Intuitively; or for such strict Demonstration as is quite beside the Nature of Morality, as well as reveal'd Religion. And this unreasonable Claim of theirs has put some well meaning Persons upon absurd and fruitless Endeavours to prove that fuch an Instinct or Sense is actualy implanted in human Nature; and others to prove that fuch Demonstration may be had in all the important Points of natural Religion.

So again, if from that immediate Consciousness Men have of the Operations of their own Minds, they are not convinced that their Knowledge is of the Operations Themselves, and not of any Reflex Ideas within them of those Operations; a stronger Argument cannot be offered for their Conviction.

LASTLY, if a Man from the Observation of what passes within him is not Conscious to himself that he hath no Purely Intellectual, or Abstract spiritual Ideas for the Exercise of the Operations of his Mind, independently of all Ideas of Sensation (the Necessary rational Confequence from which is, that he hath no way of conceiving things purely Spiritual and Immaterial but by Analogy with those Complex Notions and Conceptions, form'd from those Ideas confidered together with the Operations of our Mind upon them) it will be in vain to offer Q 3 many

many other things which may be faid upon this Point for farther Proof and Illustration.

THESE two forts of Knowledge are Immediate, and consequently a Sort of Intuition; and confidered strictly in themselves, do exclude all Reasoning and consequential Deduction, which, as we have seen, are of an After Consideration. And this leads us to another Kind of Knowledge or Evidence very different from either of them, which is Mediate and altogether acquir'd by Deduction and Confequence: That is Reason; which differs from the Understanding or Intellect, in that This is a more general Term and denotes the very Power or Faculty itself; but the other expresseth an Operation of that Faculty, and is limited to that one Particular Operation which confifts in Illation or Consequence. This therefore we are to distinguish into Four different Heads of Knowledge, according to the different Manner of the Intellect's Procedure in making its Deductions and Confequences, and according to the different Kind of Evidence in each of them.

I. THE first Head of this Knowledge or Evidence is that of Science or Demonstration; which may be placed in the clearest Light at once in the Syllogistic Form, or in what is reducible to it, by the actual Application of a common Measure, Determinate and Certain, to two Extremes which are Infallibly Commensurate with

it: So that the Conclusion follows by an Abfolute Necessity, and Compels the Assent of the Intellect to the Truth of it, even in Opposition to any Tendency of the Will to the contrary should it be Attempted; and the Knowledge is as infallible, as the direct and clear Perception of Senfation or Self-Consciousness. The Logicians confine Demonstration to Causes and Effects; and they make two forts of it, that of proving the Effect from the immediate Cause, and that of proving the Cause from a remote Effect. The Mathematicians apply the demonstrative Form to Number, Extension and Figure; but with this difference, that tho' they make their Inferences expresly, yet they carry one of the Premises in their Mind. And from thence again the Name only, and empty Colour of it came to be introduced into Ethics and Metaphysics; not without a plausible Appearance of a great Improvement of them; but in Confequence and Reality, not without darkening and enervating all the Doctrines and Precepts of Morality and Natural Religion.

II. THE next Head of Knowledge which we have from Reason is, that of a Moral Certainty, the utmost Degree of which approaches next to what is Demonstrative. This Knowledge is acquired by fuch Proofs or Mediums as have an Indubitable Connection only with the two Extremes. The Force and Evidence of this a plain Understanding is capable of apprehend-Q 4

hending, and it rarely or never requires the Syllogistic Form for the Instruction of Persons unprejudiced; tho' this is fometimes necessary for the Confuting perverse and groundless Opposition. The Arguments here are drawn from Topics of Reason in general, and the Evidences which go to make up a Moral Certainty may be a Combination of all Kinds of Knowledge, not, excepting even that of Science or strict Demonstration. From thence indeed Arguments may be drawn in Natural Religion; as when we prove the Power, and Wisdom, and Goodness of God from Aftronomical Propositions already demonstrated: But then the Moral Deductions made from thence are not Themselves capable of the fame demonstrative Evidence; the Mathematical Propositions are taken for Granted here, and then Moral Arguments are built upon them, which conclude with a quite Different Kind of Certainty. The Affent of the Mind here is free and Voluntary, and follows by a Moral Necessity only; which obligeth every one not to oppose or contradict the common Sence and Reason of Mankind; and in Religion particularly (in Relation to which we have this moral Evidence more especialy under Consideration) the with-holding our Assent to it is ever utterly Inexcusable. Thus as in Demonstration the Asfent of the Intellect is Compel'd, nay tho' it should meet with the Opposition of the Will; so in Moral Evidence it is quite the Reverse; for in this the Will hath a great Power and Influence

Influence in promoting or obstructing that Affent: And hence it comes that there is Room left for Passion and Prejudice of all Sorts to interpose here, and give a Byass to the Intellect contrary to its own natural Tendency; and to the Right it hath of judging and determining upon all Degrees of moral Reasoning according to the true Merits of the Cause.

WE come to the Knowledge of every thing in Natural Religion for which we have a moral Certainty, by a long and imperceptible Series of Reasoning; and the Progress is slow from one Step to another, till at last the Mind forms to itself Propositions of clear and unquestionable Verity; which some Men are apt to look upon as so many Axioms and First Principles and Postulata, because they require no express and immediate Deduction of Reafon for their Certainty and Evidence. Thus the Evidences of Natural Religion and Morality grow up with us from our tender Years, and receive a daily Increase of Strength, from continued Observation, and the habitual Exercise of Reason, according to the Advantages of Education: Infomuch that this Knowledge of the plainest and most obvious Moral Truths is gradualy obtain'd by Deduction and Confequence; fuch as, There is a God. God is to be worshiped by Man. Every one ought to enjoy what is his own. Where there is no Property there is no Injustice. The Procedure of the Intellect in coming

coming to this Knowledge is by fuch infenfible Degrees, that Men are sometimes apt to look upon these and such like Propositions as Sentiments purely natural and Innate; and a Sort of Principles congenial to the Mind, whereof they have a kind of Intuitive Knowledge, exclusive of all preceding Deduction, as being fuperfluous and unnecessary. Now tho' these plain Truths are fo evident that they leave no room for Doubt, and that the contrary may be reduced to Absurdity, and a Contradiction to the common Sense and Reason of Mankind; it would however be very improper to call any Proofs and Reasons which may be offered for them by the Name of Demonstration, or to asfert that they either have, or are capable of having Mathematical Certainty. This is no other than confounding two very different Kinds of Knowledge; which when rightly distinguished are both of them equaly true, and folid, and undeniable, and founded upon the strongest Evidence the Nature of either will admit of, and yet are not capable of the same kinds of Proof; and therefore the Abfurdity of blending these together is the very same, as if we jumbled Moral Certainty and Evidence, with that we have purely from external Senfation or from Self-Consciousness.

Now because natural and reveal'd Religion are capable of no other than a Moral Certainty; and that to the great Disadvantage of both,

this hath been confounded with Demonstration; and because some Men have afferted that natural Religion or Morality is capable of Mathematical Certainty, and that others have in vain attempted to frame Systems of Morality purfuant to that gross Opinion; I shall distinguish the different Nature and Properties of these two kinds of Evidence, in opposite Columns under two distinct Propositions, the one Mathematical and the other Moral.

Mathematical Certainty,

As in this Proposition.

The three Angles of a right lin'd Triangle are equal to two right ones.

HERE there is the utmost Degree of Abfolute Certainty; the Evidence is Infallible, and the Consequence follows by a Natural Necessity.

THE Demonstration, when understood, Compels and Extorts the Moral Certainty.

As in this Proposition.

There is a God.

On this fide there is the utmost Degree of Moral Certainty; the Evidences for it are Indubitable, and the Consequences follow by a Moral Necessity.

THE Arguments on this fide Ought positively to Determine the JudgAffent of the Intellect.

Judgment; they Demand and Require the Assent of the Intellect.

In this Point of Knowledge there is no Concurrence of the Will; it is the fole Operation of the Intellect, and no Prejudice or Passion can so interpose as to Sway or Influence its Judgment or Illation.

In this Knowledge a Concurrence of the Will is requisite even to the Affent of the Intellect; and it hath a great Power and Influence in promoting or obstructing that Asfent: So that a Man shall either give it, or with-hold it, as he is impartial and unprejudiced; or as he blinded with Paffion, or habitual Immorality.

On this fide there can be no Degrees of Evidence or Certainty; all Demonstrations are equaly certain; there can be no Proof but of one Kind; nor can there be any Additional Force of Arguments drawn from Other kinds of Knowledge.

This fide admits of feveral Degrees of Certainty; it takes in All Kinds of Knowledge; and the Truths of Morality are More or Less evident according to the Strength and Perspicuity of the Arguments by which they are proved.

One Demonstration amounts to the utmost Infallible Certainty; an hundred Demonstrations of the same thing, would not Increase or confirm the Evidence, which necessarily excludes All Possibility of the things being otherwise; and every Proof but the One shortest and Clearest are superfluous.

On this fide there is a Concurrence of Sen-fation by visible Figures and Diagrams, to help the Mind in a ready apprehending and retaining a continued Chain of Deductions; the very thing which enables Men in Mathematics to proceed in a Series of Enthymemes, leaving out one Proposition of the

HERE Many various Arguments may concur to make up even the highest Degree of Moral Certainty for any one Point; and yet no Two Arguments be exactly of the same weight. This moral Certainty excludes all Reasonable Cause of Doubting, tho' not a bare Natural Pofsibility of the things being otherwise for ought we know.

HERE there is no Visible Clue of that kind for the Procedure and Guidance of the Intellect; but all its Deductions are Purely Rational, and all its Resolutions and Conclusions are intirely Abstracted from any Intellect of Sensation; and therefore it is that in Matters of Difficulty here the Dialectical

Argument in the complete Form.

lectical Form of Syllogism is mostly in Use, wherein the common Measure is actually apply'd to both Extremes.

HERE all the Contradictions and Abfurdities confequent upon a Denial of the Truth, are plainly difcernible in the Very Nature of the Things themselves; they are in a great Measure immediately evident to Sense; and are therefore glaring and palpable; and follow with an absolute and Infallible Certainty, like all other Conclusions which have Mathematical Evidence.

HERE the Contradictions and Absurdicties you are pressed with in Argument, are discernible by the Intellect alone; they have a Respect to our way of Thinking and Reasoning; and follow with a Moral Certainty only, upon a denial of the Truth, like all other Conclusions which have Moral Evidence only.

This takes Place in things Natural, and Material, and Senfible, fuch as Quantity, Figure and Extension; the Ideas of all which we have from Direct This extends itself to things Spiritual and Supernatural, such as God and his Attributes, and all other Immaterial Beings; whereof we can have

and Immediate Senfati-

no Direct and Immediate Ideas; and which are therefore no otherwise conceivable, but by the Mediation of things natural. God and his Attributes are the Immediate Objects of our Knowledge and Faith intheir Types and Representations only; and the Mediate Objects of both as to their Real Incomprehensible Nature and Substance.

On this fide the I-deas are Simple and Determinate, and concerning which there is a General Confent; and therefore all their A-greements and Difagreements may be render'd fo distinct and manifest as to strike the Mind fully and irresistibly, at once.

Our Reasonings on this fide are all about Notions and Conceptions; which are not only very Complex in themfelves, and each of them a Composition of many Ingredients; but wonderfully varied according to the different Sentiments of Men and their very oppolite ways of Thinking; fo that there is no fmall Difficulty in bringing Men to fix and

and afcertain their moral Notions and Conceptions by the True Measure or Standard.

This is strictly Knowledge or Science, and necessarily excludes all Belief in general, and Faith properly so call'd, and all Assent of the Mind upon the Testimony of others.

HERE we may be faid both to Know and to Believe the same Proposition, in natural or reveal'd Religion. To Know it upon the utmost moral Proof and Evidence; and to Believe it in general, because the voluntary Concurrence of the Will is requisite to that Asfent of the Mind, and it is not extorted. And it is also a Religious Faith when there is a full Concurrence of the Will and Heart to it, Subsequent to that Asfent of the Intellect.

This Proposition contains Matter of pure Speculation or Theory only; and it requires no Concurrence

As there is a Concurrence of the Will requisite in order to influence the Assent of the Intellect to the Truth

of the Will either To or after the Affent of the Intellect; fo that the Practical Uses of it are merely accidental.

truth of this Proposition; so must it asterwards continue to Close with that Assent in order to regulate our Practice, and to sway and influence the Manners of Men, which is then a truly Practical Faith.

1. FROM the very different and even opposite Nature of Moral Certainty, and that which is strictly Demonstrative and Mathematical put into this Light; it must appear First, that there is as little room for the latter in Morality and Natural Religion, as in Revelation. To make this Point the more evident, I have taken for my instance the fundamental Truth of all Natural and Revealed Religion, and which of all others is prefumed to be the most strictly demonstrable. The Proposition is undoubtedly and unquestionably true; it hath the highest kind of Evidence the nature of the thing will admit of: It is founded upon the plainest Reafon and the utmost Moral Certainty; so as to Demand and Claim the Affent of the Intellect; and render its Diffent inexcusable Partiality and Wickedness. But that it is not strictly Demonstrable is plain from the very Existence of a Deity being revealed in Scripture by the name I am, which is in other Words, I exist; and from that

that faying, The Fool bath faid in his Heart there is no God: For if there were any One demon-firative Argument, or a Mathematical Certainty for it, this would render all Other Arguments either from Scripture or Reason intirely needless; and there could not be such a thing as a speculative Atheist in the World; whereas the Experience of all Ages hath shewn, that there are many fuch Fools, otherwise of great Learning and natural Sagacity, who have argued that there is no God. They have indeed varied much in their Manner of doing this; some who denied the Existence of a Deity, have however allowed a First Cause; others who allow'd a First Canse, have deny'd it to be an Intelligent Agent; others who allow him to be an Intelligent Agent, yet deny his Providence; and some who allow his Providence, have however corrupt Notions of his Attributes, and fuch as by immediate Confequence destroy his very Existence. And we are not without a lamentable Instance, even in our own times, of a Person of great natural Sagacity and close Application; who hath first undertaken to Demonstrate the Existence of One God Only, by a Chain of Metaphyfical Deductions: And yet afterwards hath publish'd another Book of no small Bulk to demonstrate, by the same dint of Metaphysics, the Existence of More Gods than One; tho' if you strip both these Undertakings out of their Metaphyfical Dress, the irreconcileable Inconsistency and Contradiction between

between them will be evident to common Sence and Reason; and nothing will appear plainer, than that there can be no Demonstration for the Existence of One God, but what must conclude as necessarily against the Existence of any Other God whatsoever, Co-ordinate or Inferiour.

WHEN the Reader's Astonishment is over, how this Palpable Monstrous Inconsistency should pass with such Currency and Smoothness as it hath done, and without a general Obfervation and Abhorrence; I shall go on to remark, that if there were any one clear demonstrative Argument of apparent Mathematical Certainty for the Existence of a Deity and his Attributes, then all that Variety of Opinions would fall of Course; nor would there be any fuch thing as *Idolatry*, or worshipping more Gods than one: And what is yet more strange, whosoever was capable of understanding that Form of Demonstration might be faid indeed to Know there is a God; and yet not Believe in him, according to the proper Acceptation of a Religious Faith. Alas! nothing is farther from the Nature of Mathematical Certainty, than Metaphysical Abstractions; and Mankind would be in a desperate Condition indeed, if they were to depend upon fuch Abstractions for the fundamental Point of all Religion natural and reveal'd; and were to be conducted by a Spider's Clue thro' an intricate

intricate Maze of nice and thinspun notional Abstractions, before they could arrive at this Conclusion, Therefore there is a God; or which is in Effect or Consequence the very same, Therefore there is but One God.

THAT Mathematical Certainty is not to be had but in things Mathematical, and that Demonstration properly so call'd can have no Place in Morality or Natural Religion, hath been the general Opinion of the Wife and Learned; accordingly it is a faying of Jamblicus, That Demonstrations are not to be expected in Matters concerning God and things Divine. And in an excellent Treatife of natural Religion (which went thro' the Hands of two great and Learned Prelates of our own; and which hath more Force of Argument and strict Reasoning in it, than all the Abstracted and Metaphysical Tracts which have fince appeared upon that Subject) there is another faying full to the same Purpose. Do Men expect Mathematical Proof and Certainty in moral Things? Why, they may as well expect to see with their Ears, and hear with their Eyes.

THE endeavouring to gratify Men in that unreasonable Expectation is not only Absurd, as being altogether impracticable; but hath been of Pernicious Consequence in these two Respects. First, As the Writers in this way have furnished the World with an handle for

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thinking that nothing in natural Religion is to be regarded as strictly Obligatory, farther than it is capable of fuch demonstrative Proof: And fince the Nature of it will not admit this, the unavoidable Miscarriage of all who attempt it is of no small Prejudice to the Cause they would thus maintain by A Zeal without Knowledge. For I appeal to any observing Person, whether the Effect and Consequence of it hath not already been, the supporting and encouraging Libertines and Unbelievers in their Demands for Demonstrative Certainty and Evidence in every Point both of Faith and Practice? And whether every Thing now published in Religion is not too generaly look'd upon with Contempt, which hath not some Air and Appearance at least of demonstrative Certainty and Evidence? The discerning Men among Infidels, Freethinkers, and Libertines do well know that fuch Evidence is never to be obtained either for Natural or Reveal'd Religion; and that nothing can contribute more to the Advantage of their Cause, than thus drawing off their Antagonifts from a truly rational and folid way of Argument, and putting them upon an impossible Task; wherein they must necessarily waste and consume all their Strength and Vigour in empty Noise, and Flourish, and Beating of the Air.

Secondly, As it is a direct Infinuation against all Reveal'd Religion; for if mere Morality is strictly Demonstrable, and Revelation is capable R 3 of

of no more than Moral Evidence, then it can never be upon an equal Foot of Certainty and Credibility with natural Religion. This Confequence is so obvious that all who are evily inclin'd to Revelation must plainly see it; and they accordingly insist upon Mathematical Certainty and Evidence in Religion, and relish nothing but what hath a Colour at least of Demonstration: And from thence it is that all our new-sangled Metaphysical Morality is grown into Mode and Fashion; and that our Modern Writers upon that Subject have unwarily formed their Discourses to the prevailing Taste and Genius of an Unbelieving Age.

2. Another thing which appears from the above Opposition is, that notwithstanding the greatest Evidence we have for natural Religion, it however includes a Religious Faith; and that this Faith, as it ought to be, is Founded on the utmost Moral Certainty. When from a full Proof and Evidence to their Reason, Men have given their Affent to the Existence of a Deity; and from thence have inferr'd that he must have all incomprehensible Persection, and infinitely greater than we can imagine; and have accordingly substituted the highest Persections discernible in the Creature, and in our human Nature in particular, to stand for his inconceivable Perfections: Then the hearty Concurrence of the Will to that great and fundamental Truth improves and Completes

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it into a Religious Faith in God, and in all his Attributes; and Inclines the Mind to the Difcharge and Performance of all those Duties which are deduced from them by the Light of Nature; fo that without Faith it is impossible to please God in any Religion. Faith, in the strict Propriety of the Word, is as necessary in Natural Religion, as in Reveal'd; for the we have the Utmost Proof and Moral Evidence for the Existence of a Deity, which is so far Knowledge only: Yet still because the Intrinsic Nature of God and his Essential Attributes are utterly Incomprehensible and ineffable, and can be no Immediate Objects of our Understanding; Men must Indirectly, and by the mediation of their Substitutes, give the Affent of the Intellect here, as well as the *Consent* of the *Will*, to the truth of things as *Mysterious* as any in all reveal'd Religion; and which they are oblig'd to conceive and apprehend by the same Analogy we do all the Mysteries of Christianity.

3. The last thing I shall observe from the different Nature of Moral and Mathematical Certainty is, that Evangelical Faith (which as we see adds no more to that which is necessary in natural Religion than the believing the Word of God, whose Existence and Attributes we were obliged to believe before) is no Precarious or Implicit Assent of the Mind. The case here is the very same as it is in Natural Religion; we have the utmost moral Certainty and Evi-

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dence for the Scriptures being the Word of God, or a Supernatural Revelation from Heaven; we neither give our Assent to this great Truth our felves, nor defire that others should do so, but upon the utmost moral Certainty and Evidence Men are capable of receiving for a Truth or Fact of that Nature. Now whether they Are fuch or Not? is no immediate Point of Faith, but of Knowledge; and if Men, sway'd and influenced by Prejudice or Prepossession against plain and full reasonable Evidence, with-hold the Affent of the Intellect here; there can be no fubsequent Concurrence of the Will, and consequently no Evangelical Faith. But if the Affent of the Intellect is given to that great Truth, and there is moreover a Concurrence of the Heart and Will; then Men act just in the same Manner they did before in natural Religion: They give the Affent of the Mind to Truths in the Word of God, no more Incomprehensible nor otherwise Mysterious than his Nature and Attributes; to things as Eafily conceiv'd and expressed by the very same Analogy; things whose real Nature admits of as little Intrinsick Immediate Proof or Evidence; and accordingly do afterwards fuffer these mysterious Truths to Influence their Lives and Practice; and that is a complete Evangelical Faith.

THESE two things therefore in respect of Evangelical Faith, are of no small Consequence to be rightly distinguished in all our Controversies with the Adversaries of Revelation.

I. THE first is, the Assent of the Understanding to the Truth of any Proposition upon Sufficient Undoubted Evidence or a Moral Certainty; which is thus far merely Knowledge, and of a very different and separate Consideration in itself. Here then we are to fix our Foot, and join Issue with all Ranks of Unbelievers upon the Point of Knowledge only; for as in Natural Religion the first and great Question is not, Whether we Believe the Existence of a God? But whether there Is a God? So the first and main Point to be decided with Regard to Revelation is not, Whether we Believe the Scriptures to be the Word of God? But whether they realy are so? And whether we have sufficient Reason to Know they are so? Whether we will yield the Assent of the Intellect to that great Point of Knowledge, as to a Truth founded upon the utmost Moral Proof and Evidence the Nature of the Thing will bear, and that we are now Capable of receiving? Nay, fuch Proof and Evidence as would be not only a full Conviction to the Understanding in any Matters of the same kind merely Temporal and Human; but much greater than They can admit of. This Point of Knowledge in general is first to be decided; and when there is an Asfent of the Understanding to it, then the Concurrence of the Will and its closing with it; which is Subsequent to that Knowledge, completes an Evangelical Faith. And the Procedure

is thus, As, when the Existence of a Deity is assented to, in natural Religion, upon full Moral Proof and Evidence, Men Believe in the incomprehensible Nature and Attributes of God: So upon the Assente of the Understanding in general to the Scriptures being a divine Revelation; the Assente of the Intellect, and Consent of the Will is yielded to all the particular Doctrines contained in them; tho' some of them relate likewise to things as incomprehensible, as the real intrinsic Nature of God and his Divine Attributes.

Thus we see that Men must Know, before they can rightly Believe; and have a full Conviction of their Judgment upon sufficient Evidence, before there is any closing of the Will to Complete the Nature of Evangelical Faith; which is literaly as the Apostle defines it, The Evidence of Things not seen, or the Assent of the Understanding to the truth and Existence of things Inconceivable, upon certain and evident Proof of their Reality in their Symbols and Representatives. This shews the strange Inconfistency of those Men who reject the Faith of Christian Mysteries, under Colour of wanting Strict Reason and Evidence; for as it is their present Guilt, so the Ground of their Condemnation hereafter will be their Want of Knowledge, when they had all the proper Means of attaining it; and that they did not yield the Affent of the Understanding upon the same or greater Moral Certainty and Evidence, than would bea full

a full Conviction to them in Matters merely Human of the same Sort. That they withheld that Assent either thro' Passon or Prejudice; or for want of Application to weigh and consider the Force of that Evidence; and that they insisted upon a Sort of Proof and Evidence, which is proper only to a quite different Kind of Knowledge, and such as would render all Religious Faith impracticable.

THE Influence of the Will upon the Affent of the Intellect to Truths capable of Moral Evidence only, is so great, that if Men were once well enough inclin'd to Morality and Natural Religion, to wish the Gospel and all the Doctrines and Precepts in it were true; they would foon discern the prevailing Strength of that Moral Evidence which Claims and Demands the Assent of the Understanding; as Christ himself observes, John vii. 17. Edu Tis Blay If any Man is willing, or disposed, to Do the Will of God whatever it appears to be, He shall KNOW of the Doctrine, whether it be of God? Or whether I speak of my self? But when Men are byaffed and blinded by their Immoralities and Violations of Natural Religion; then the plainest Evidence even of Sensation for the Truth of any Doctrine, may be Evaded; as the Jews evaded the sensitive Evidence of Miracles for our Saviour's Divine Mission; nay tho' they called them Miracles, yet they attributed the Power by which they were wrought to. Reel-

Beelzebub the Prince of the Devils: And the Romanists at this Day elude the clearest Evidence of their Senses in the Point of Transsubflantiation, by refolving an Heap of Contradictions both to Sense and Reason, into the Almighty Power of God. The clearest Evidence and Conviction of Self-Consciousness may be stifled and lost for want of a due Attention and Regard to it; and thus Multitudes have overturned the glaring irrefragable Evidence of their own Minds for a Freedom of Will, by Arguments drawn from God's Prescience and Decrees; which is opposing the Evidence of Reafon, to that of Self-Consciousness; a Knowledge of equal, if not greater Truth and Certainty than that of Reason, and which ought not therefore to be confronted with it. So again, may the utmost Degree of Moral Certainty always admit of some Evasion or other; as the Jews evaded all the Arguments of Christ for his Divine Mission, drawn from Types and Prophecies; they were realy Blind to the Force of them from inveterate Prepoffession and Prejudice; and the Perverseness of their Wills quite obstructed all Assent of the Intellect to the Truth of his Doctrine. This is the very Defcription given of them by our Saviour himfelf. They Seeing, see not; and Hearing, they hear not, neither do they Understand: which was not from any Natural Desect in their Intellectuals, nor for want of the Utmost Moral Evidence; but as he observes, Because their Heart 2005

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was gross, and Lest they should Understand
with their Heart.

Thus necessary to the Assent of the Intellect, even where there is the utmost Moral Certainty and Evidence, is the Concurrence of the Heart and Will, and an intire freedom from all Prejudice and Prepossession; and therefore the Guilt and Hypocrify of the Jews confifted in this, that they were not as ready to give their Affent upon a Moral Certainty and Evidence in Matters of Religion, as in things indifferent and Merely Human. They could obferve that when the Skie was Red in the Evening, it was a Sign of Fair Weather the Day following; and if Red and Lowring in the Morning, it was a Sign of Foul Weather that Day: But they Could not discern the Signs of the Times, and of that Time in particular wherein there was a Completion of all the antient Prophecies from the Beginning of the World, relating to the perfonal Appearance of the Messiah; and for this Reason it is that we find Christ upbraiding them not fo much for want of Faith, as for their stupid and wilful Ignorance; calling them Fools and Blind, as being deftitute of that Knowledge which was to have been the Foundation of their Faith in the promised Messiah.

2. The other thing necessary to be observed in relation to Evangelical Faith is, that Confent of the Will and Concurrence of the Heart which

which is Subsequent to the Assent of the Intellect, and founded upon it; and is to be well distinguished from any Influence of the Will which is Prior to that Affent. Every Affent of the Mind to the Truth of any Propolition capable of Moral Evidence only, hath been promiscuously and indifferently call'd a Believ-ing it, to the great Confusion of our way of Thinking and Speaking. Every Affent of the Mind to any Truth in Religion is not Faith, tho' all Faith is an Assent of the Mind. This general Word Belief must therefore be well distinguished, into that Assent of the Mind which is properly Knowledge; and the Concurrence of the Heart and Will which Completes and improves it into a Religious Faith, Consequent to that Knowledge and Founded upon it. Assent of the Intellect, or Judgment of the Mind, must be First fixed or determined, in relation to any Proposition whatsoever in Religion; the Proposition must be perfectly Intelligible, and the Truth of it must appear from a Moral Evidence, sufficient for a Full Conviction of the strictest Reason: So that it must be a Point of Knowledge, Before that full Confent of the Will and clofing of the Heart with that Point of Knowledge, which renders it both Faith and Knowledge at the same time; nor can there be an Immediate Assent of the Intellect, or Concurrence of the Will to any Proposition that is Unintelligible or Incomprehensible; whatfoever is fo, cannot be a Direct and Immediate

mediate Object either of Knowledge or Faith. I shall explain this by a few Instances, as particularly in this Proposition.

There is a God. This must be first well Understood; for the' the whole Nature of God, and of all his Real intrinsic Attributes is utterly incomprehensible; yet we apprehend them all clearly, and they become very obvious and intelligible in their Types or Analogical Representations; particularly the Operations and Perfections of an human Mind. The Proposition is then Proved from the Light of Nature or Revelation, or from both; and the unprejudiced Mind yields an Assent to it upon the apparent reasonable and Moral Evidence there is for it; and this Affent, or Belief in General, as 'tis sometimes named, or Speculative Faith (as fome call it) is realy so far properly Knowledge. But when the Will closes intirely with that Affent, and there is a Concurrence of the Heart, as well as of the Head to this great Truth; which doth ever more or less influence the Life and Manners of Men, in Proportion to the Attention and Application of their Minds to it; then it becomes a Religious Faith founded upon the utmost Moral Proof and Certainty: And as what is Intelligible in that Proposition, is the Immediate Object both of our Knowledge and Faith; so the Remote and Mediate Object of them both, is the Incomprehenfible Nature and real Intrinsic Attributes of the Divinity. THUS

Thus again, The Scriptures are the Word of God, or A Divine Revelation. If from the Miracles of our Saviour; the exact and full Completion of Scripture Prophecies, from the Beginning of the World, centering in him only, and in no other Person whatsoever; together with that Improvement and Exaltation of Natural Religion and Morality which is apparent thro' the whole Tenor of the Scriptures; if, I fay, by Arguments drawn from these and such like Topics Men void of Prejudice yield an Affent to the Truth of this Proposition, it is still but Knowledge founded upon the utmost Moral Certainty: And then it becomes properly Evangelical Faith, when there is a full Confent of the Will and a Concurrence of the Heart, together with an intire Resolution of yielding an Affent to the Truth of every Proposition contain'd in them; and when this proceeds on to a ready Obedience, and to an actual Performance of the Precepts of the Gospel, it may then properly be called a Practical Faith.

AGAIN, Christ Shall change our vile Body, that it may be like unto his glorious Body. This Proposition is as Intelligible as any other wherein we affert one thing, or one Man to be Like another. When from the Proofs of the Scriptures in general being the Word of God, a Perfon unprejudiced yields the Assent of the Intellect

tellect to the Truth of this Proposition, he in strict Propriety may be faid to Know it: But the Christian Feith founded upon this Instance of Knowledge, is a closing of the Heart and Will with what appears to be true from full Proof and Evidence; the Consequence of which is a lively Hope and Expectation of that great Change, tho' we know nothing of the true Real Nature and Manner of it, and do therefore reverence and regard it as a Mysterious incomprehensible Truth.

ONCE more, Christ ever liveth to make Intercession for us. This Proposition is as intelligible as that wherein one Man is faid to intercede for another; and the Truth of it depends upon the same Moral Proof and Evidence with that foregoing. If a Person obstinately with-holds his Affent to the Truth of this Proposition it is wilful Ignorance properly, and Blindness in the midst of the clearest Means of Knowledge. If he yields the Affent of the Intellect, this may be call'd Believing it in the general and confused Sense of that Term, as we are faid to Believe any thing we Know upon Moral Evidence. And then this Knowledge is improved to Evangelical Faith, when the full Consent and Concurrence of the Will falls in with it; which is followed by a Reliance upon this Intercession, tho' the Nature and Manner of this Divine Performance are so incomprehenfible, that we can know nothing more of it, than that it cannot be after the fame Manner with any *Human* Intercession; or even *Angelic*, if it were possible for us to have any Notion of such Intercession.

If it is here objected, that I place the distinguishing Character of Evangelical Faith in the Act of the Will, Subsequent to that Assent of the Intellect which is properly Knowledge; and not in the Assent of the Mind to things Incomprehensible, which seems to be the very thing that makes it Properly Faith. I answer, that the Assent of the Mind to the Reality and Existence of things Incomprehensible, is not to be Excluded from the Nature of Evangelical Faith, for it must Mediately and Ultimately refer to what is Incomprehensible. But then this is of an After and Secondary Confideration; and the true Nature of a Religious Faith is to be clearly stated and resolved in respect of what is Directly and Immediately understood and comprehended, before any thing which is neither understood nor comprehended can come into the Account, or be efteemed a necessary Ingredient of it either in Natural or Reveal'd Religion. To explain this let us inftance in the fundamental Propofition of all Reveal'd Religion; and the rather because it was delivered by an audible Voice from Heaven.

This is my beloved Son.

THAT which makes this a Point of Knowledge, is the Affent of the Intellect to the Truth of it, as a Proposition Intelligible and perfectly Understood as any thing in human Language; and upon the utmost Moral Proof and Evidence of its being spoken from Heaven: This is Believing it in the General Acceptation of that Term, as you may be faid to Believe any Proposition even in Civil Matters, which is so proved and understood. That therefore which makes it a Religious Faith must be some Farther Concurrence of the Will than what was necessary to make it Knowledge; and that is a closing of the Heart with it as a Proposition in Religion; and a full Perfuafion of the Mind that Christ (not in any Unintelligible Manner, but) according to what the very Letter and strict Propriety of the Words import, is the Son of God in as True and Real a Sence, as one Man is the Son of another.

HE who believes thus far, and esteems and reverenceth Christ as such; without any Farther respect to what is Incomprehensible in that Proposition, namely the Supernatural Generation, and the divine inestable Manner of it; hath an Orthodox Evangelical Faith. What then, you will say, becomes of the so much controverted Mysteries of the Gospel, and our Faith in them?

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They are all very secure, and what is Mysterious in the Propositions of the Gospel is all laid up out of our reach, to be the Direct and Immediate Objects of our Knowledge when we come to see Face to Face; and we are Now only to know and believe that they are Incomprehensible.

Bur you will ask again, What then becomes of Divine Analogy, and of our Conceptions of things Spiritual by Symbol and Representation; and of what use is this, if the Assent to what is Incomprehenfible in them, is not the fole Distinguishing Mark of Evangelical Faith? I answer, that there was true Evangelical Faith in the World long before that Analogy was ever thought of; or the true Manner of our conceiving things Divine and Spiritual by Symbol and Representation only, came to be considered and rightly adjusted. Men truly Orthodox Believed as far as they Under food; and did not perplex or embarrass either their own Heads or the Christian Faith, with any nice and intricate Notions and Conceptions of what was utterly incomprehenfible; it being no matter of Duty or Obligation in respect either of their Knowledge or Faith; and it being on the contrary matter of Duty to know and believe what they Under flood, and not to concern themselves with those secret things which belong to God alone. They took every Proposition in the most plain and Obvious Signisication

cation of the Words, and yielded the Affent of the Intellect, and the Confent of the Will and Concurrence of the Heart to it as Such; they believed it as Far as it was Intelligible, and never did expressly take what was Incomprehensible into the Account of either their Knowledge or Faith; and it had been happy for the Christian World if it had continued so to this Day.

Bur since Infidels and Heretics began, on the quite Contrary, in all their Controversies with the Orthodox, intirely to overlook or lay afide whatever was plain and Obvious and Intelligible in the Doctrines and Mysteries of the Gospel; and to raise many Doubts and Difficulties about what is altogether Unintelligible or Incomprehensible; since they now oppose what we can have no Direct Conception or Idea of, to what is plain and obvious and eafily understood; and charge what is Intelligible with Abfurdity and Contradiction, by arguing from an intrinsic Incomprehensible Nature; wherein they cannot judge or differn what is, or is not Consistent with it. And since they labour to render the Christian Faith, plain and obvious in itself, dark and obscure by judging of the Antitypes in all respects as they do of the Types; forming all their Arguments upon this groß Supposition, That they must Both be of the fame Nature and Kind in all respects; and that things Human and Divine are alike to be

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perceived by Direct and Immediate Conceptions and Ideas. Then, I fay, it became necessary to distinguish rightly, in every Proposition relating to our Christian Mysteries, what is the Direct and Immediate Object of our Knowledge and Faith, which only is Matter of Duty and Obligation, and binding upon our Consciences; and what is the Mediate only and Ultimate Object of them. Then we are compel'd to explain the Nature of that Divine Analogy by which we apprehend things otherwise incomprehenfible; and to place it in fuch a full and glaring Light, that there may be a just and right Application of it, in all the chief Points of Controversy with the Adversaries of Revelation: In order to make it appear that the Affent of the Mind may, and must be given to the Reality and Existence of things Incomprehenfible and ineffable; and that these cannot be Excluded from being the Mediate and Ultimate Objects both of our Knowledge and Faith,

Now tho' it was necessary to distinguish the Assent of the Intellect to what is perfectly understood, upon sull Proof and the utmost Moral Certainty; the Influence of the Will prior to the yielding that Assent; the Consent of the Will Subsequent to that Assent, and sull Concurrence of the Heart to the Truth of the Proposition assented to; and to the Reality and Existence of what is Ultimately signified and intended in that Proposition: Yet I would observe

ferve here, that all these together are usualy and not unaptly call'd by the Name of Faith both in Natural and Reveal'd Religion.

As Faith is founded upon Knowledge, so we can strictly and properly be said to Believe only what we Know; but this Faith at the same time necessarily includes an Assent of the Mind to the Reality and Existence of things, the true Nature and Manner of which we can have no Knowledge of by any Direct or Immediate Idea or Conception. For tho' we can neither Know nor Believe in God As he is Incomprehensible, or What is incomprehensible in him; yet we both know and believe that he Is, and that he Is Incomprehensible: So, tho' we neither Know nor Believe the Mysterious Revelations of the Gospel As they are incomprehensible, or What is Incomprehensible in them; yet we both know and believe them to Be real, and Incomprehensible.

FROM hence it appears that the Faith of the Gospel is no such Implicit and Precarious Assent (as the Enemies of Revelation represent it) to things altogether Unintelligible and Inconceivable; since, as we have seen, nothing that is Incomprehensible and above Sense and Reason can come at all into any Question between us: All this must be intirely laid aside, in those Contests and Disputes which have been raised concerning the Evangelical Faith of any Proposition; we can have no Controversy but S 4

about what is perfectly well Underflood, and As far as it is so; and concerning that Moral Certainty and Evidence upon which Propositions as clear as any in human Language are sounded. Our Controversies must turn altogether upon the Point of Knowledge; and when that is decided, the Appeal must be from thence to the Heart and Will, whether this ought not to close with that Point of Knowledge so as to render it Evangelical Faith; for as to what is utterly Incomprehensible in any Proposition whatsoever, it can be no direct and immediate Object either of Knowledge, or of that Faith which is built upon it.

III. THE third Kind of Knowledge which we have from Deduction of Reason, is that of Opinion; the shortest and most apt Description of which, that I have met with, is that of Plato's, who defines it A Medium between Knowledge and Ignorance; it is made up of a Mixture of both, and every Opinion is the more or less true or false, as one or the other of those two Ingredients prevails. So that there can be no Mere Opinion of any thing known from external Sen-Sation, or Self-Consciousness, or Demonstration, or Moral Certainty; or even from Sufficient Teflimony either Human or Divine: Tho' it may be Founded upon Topics drawn from any, or all of these Kinds of Knowledge, not excluding even Science; if they are first taken for Granted, and each of them established upon that Certainty

tainty and Evidence which is peculiar to them. This is a Kind of Knowledge Inferior to any of the aforementioned, and approaches nearest to that which is founded on Moral Evidence; but differs from it in this, that whereas in the utmost Moral Certainty the Conclusion admits but of a bare Natural Possibility of the things being otherwise than we apprehend it, and leaves no Reasonable Cause of Doubt or Error: Here the Conclusion ever follows from Premises Indeterminate and Uncertain; and accordingly leaves room more or less for Doubt, and for fome Likelihood, or Fear, or Distrust of the things being otherwise than we apprehend it; fo that in respect of all the Degrees between the utmost Moral Certainty in the One Extreme, and the Lowest Probability in the Other; these two Kinds of Knowledge run into each other, and are not easily to be distinguished even in Imagination.

Now for the rightly adjusting those Extremes, as well as the several Intermediate Degrees of this Mix'd Kind of Knowledge, as we may now call it; the best way I can think of is, by a Parallel drawn from common Mechanism. Since all Kinds and Degrees of Moral Proof, and Probability are no other than our confidering and offering the Reasons For and Against the Truth of any Proposition; you may imagine your felf throwing the Reasons and Arguments on both fides into the Scales,

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and weighing them in a Balance. If there is an Æquilibrium without any Inclination of the Balance to one fide or the other, it is then no Degree of Knowledge, nor even of Doubting; but downright Ignorance: The Reasons on both Sides destroy each other, so that the Intellect can form no Judgment, nor can it yield any Affent; and if there is any Decision of the Point in Scrutiny, it must be from the Arbitrary Imposition and precarious Act only of the Will. If from any Natural Weakness or Defect, or want of Improvement of the Intellect, it cannot find out the True Reasons; nor determine upon the intrinsic Weight of them, so that the Judgment varies, and that each Scale preponderates Alternately; then nothing can be concluded, and it is a state of Hesitation and Suspence, of Doubtfulness and Uncertainty. If one side of the Question preponderates, tho' but a Little, and continues in one Stay; fo as that the Inclination or Difference is but scarcely discernible; it is then only a bare Appearance of Truth, and nothing more than a Conjecture. But if the Preponderancy is distinctly Plain and Visible, and yet there is Weight enough of Reafon on the Contrary fide of the Question, to continue the Scales still Pendent and in Motion; then indeed it is properly Opinion and Probability: And the matter of Opinion is better or worse sounded, according as it approaches nearer, either to mere Conjecture on the one hand; or to Moral Certainty on the other. Bus

But then the Nature of it is changed, and it loses the very Name of Opinion and Probability, and is resolved into a Moral Certainty; when the Reasons and Arguments are so strong and cogent, that the Scale weighs to the Ground. For then the Balance is destroyed, and there is no reasonable Cause lest for a farther Opposition or Scrutiny; the Proposition Claims the sull Assent of every unprejudiced Mind, and ought to conclude and Determine the Judgment as Surely, tho' not as Necessarily as Demonstration; the nature of which is to admit of no Weight whatsoever to be thrown into the Opposite Scale.

Now concerning this kind of Knowledge, which is distinguished by the name of Probability or Opinion; whether it is sounded Internaly upon our own Reason, or Externaly upon the Testimony and Experience of others, I shall observe these three Things.

I. THAT there are two latent Causes of the Worst fort of Fraud and Deceit in this Scrutiny for judging and determining upon the Truth of Propositions, in Religion especially, because it is being deceived in Matters of utmost Consequence. The one is in the Intellect itself, which holds the Balance; for if a Man is Ignorant and Weak in his Judgment, so as not to discern what Reasons are proper to be consider'd, and what are foreign to the Question, he may be grossly imposed

imposed upon by Fasse Weights. And if his Ignorance proceeds from want of Industry in the Improvement of his Understanding; and of Application in the Use of those Means of Knowledge which are in his Power, his entertaining even Wrong Opinions is Inexcusable. The other too common Method of deceiving a Man's self is, when instead of plain and Genuine Reason, he throws his Humour, or Pride, or Passon, or Prejudice, or Vanity into the Scales; so that these, by an invisible Disposition or Turn of a False Balance (which is here no less An Abomination to the Lord, than in Merchandize) shall Outweigh the plainest and most cogent Arguments, which can be offered for the Truth of any Proposition.

2. THAT the mere Probability or Opinion is a kind of Knowledge Inferior to that of Moral Certainty, yet in Matters of Religion it Deferves and even Requires the Affent of the Intellest and Concurrence of the Will. In the common Affairs of This World, wherein Men are not so subject to Prejudice and Prepossession, the Higher Probability always determines the Judgment; fo that in cases wherein the Difference or Inequality between the two opposite Sides of the Question is not very Distinguishable, Men ever close intirely with the greatest Appearance and Likelihood of Truth, even in Matters of the greatest Consequence; wherein the Health of their Bodies, and their whole worldly

and Incline A limit on

worldly Fortune is concerned; nay, and when their very Lives are at stake: And this is so remarkably true, that the main Conduct of human Life, thro' the whole Course of Temporal Affairs is influenced and governed by the Highest Probability; insomuch that in many Instances it would be esteemed downright Folly and Madness not to be determined and directed by it.

THIS Opinion or Probability ought to have its proper Weight in matters of Religion likewise; the best Proof that can be thought of, or offered in every Instance of any Importance here, Ought to determine the Affent of the Intellect; and this should be follow'd with a Consent of the Will. Religious Matters of Opinion only, and founded upon a Reasonable Probability are of no small Consequence to the promoting Virtue and Holiness in every Man in Particular, and contribute not a little to Peace and Unanimity in the Church in General; fo that tho' the Things themselves, which are founded on Probability, may be in their own Nature Indifferent; yet the Determination of the Judgment concerning them, as far as Men are able, may become no Matter of Indifferency, but of Duty and Obligation; because all Christians ought, as far as it is practicable, to arrive at a perfect Harmony and Agreement even in religious Opinions. Prove or try ALL Things, fays the Apostle, hold fast or adhere firmly to That 4

That which is good. We are for Peace fake Oblig'd to use the best Means of informing the Judgment in these religious Matters even of Opinion; which tho' they cannot Claim or Demand the Affent of the Mind, as in Moral Certainty; may yet render the with-holding it, so as to keep the Mind ever Fluctuating and in Suspence, utterly Inexcusable: And this is the Case of those who, in one Extreme, will give no firm Assent to any thing in Religion, without Demonstration and Mathematical Certainty; and of those, in the other Extreme, who take up their Opinions without a just Regard to any impartial Reasoning of their Own, or to the Decifions and Determinations either of the Church in general, or of fuch as ought to be prefumed the most Wise and Knowing in it; which have been always reckoned the fundamental Rules of Probability, with regard to religious Opinions. The danger of Deceit and Fallacy here is, when Men put any degree of Mere Probability upon the Foot of Moral Certainty and Evidence; or. on the Contrary, what is moraly Certain and Evident upon the Foot only of a Bare Probability.

3. The last thing I shall observe is, that no Point of Mere Opinion and Probability, can be a sufficient Foundation for a religious Faith, in the true and Proper Acceptation of that Word. Faith must be built upon Knowledge; and if that is Not Clear and Certain, the Assent

of

of the Intellect and Concurrence of the Will must be Dubious and Wavering; and of Confequence not absolutely Obligatory upon the Consciences of Men, as every Article of the Christian Faith is. We may indeed be faid to Believe things for which we have No moral Certainty; but then that Belief must have the same degrees of Wavering and Uncertainty, with that Probable Know-ledge only upon which it is sounded.

Opinion hath been used promiscuously, in the large and Vulgar Sence of the Word, to express indifferently Any Judgment of the Mind form'd either upon Moral Certainty, or Bare Probability only; fo that nothing is more common than to fay, a Man is of fuch or fuch Opinions, in relation even to the plain Fundamentals of Christianity; and the Equivocation or Fallacy latent in that Term hath too often given a specious Colour to the fatal and deadly Errors of some Men; and hath a tendency to deceive such as are truly Orthodox into a mild and favourable Judgment of fuch Principles as are absolutely Heretical: Whereas in the True and Proper Signification of that Term, it is to be restrained to that Assent of the Mind which is founded upon any Proof or Evidence Short of a Moral Certainty. Hence therefore we have this peculiar Mark and Character of Herefy, as it is diftinguished from all erroneous Opinions in the general; that it is a Denial of a Plain and express Religious Doctrine or Proposition, in the most obvious and

and intelligible Sence of the Words, which is founded upon a Moral Certainty and Evidence: And whether fuch a Proposition is denied Expressly, or by Immediate necessary Consequence, it makes no Alteration in the nature of the thing; there is only this Circumstantial Difference, that the one is more Covert and clandestine, the other hath an Air of Openness and Ingenuity.

FOR instance, as if a Person should affert, That Christ is not the only begotten Son of God, in as True and Real a Sence and full Import of those Terms, tho' not in the same Literal Propriety of Them, as when they are used for an human Son; but in mere Metaphor only. That the Holy Spirit of God is not Gcd; nor ought to be call'd so. That the Son is not Originaly and Intirely of the same real Nature and Essence with his true Father. That the Son and Holy Ghost are not Divine Persons in the plain, and obvious, and most intelligible Sence of the Term Divine; but in some Abstract Metaphysical Acceptation of it, so unintelligible that it will not admit of any Explanation. That we must worship the Son as an OMNIPRESENT INVISIBLE Being; and yet must not pay him SUPREME and ULTIMATE Worship. And should be positive that. Christ is not the true God; and aggravate this by adding, That they are worthy of Censure who say he was made out of nothing; tho' this can mean no more than, Let Men imagine him to be what else they please, yet he is not the true God. And should likewise hold firmly That

That Christ is not Co-eternal with the Father; and should add, that They are justly censured who say there was a Time when he was not; tho' this cannot possibly have any other intelligible Sence or Meaning, but that Tho' he is not eternal as the Father is, yet they deserve Censure who presume to say he is not Eternal: Or at best, Let Men think what they will else of him, yet they must not think him truly Eternal.

Tho' Men are indispensably bound in Duty to agree in all Points of Religion which are Plain and perfectly Intelligible, and for which there is a Moral Certainty, as being the Effentials of it; yet they may often be of different Opinions in other Points of it which are not so, without any just blame or Censure: For the Weakness of human Understanding is such; there are fuch different Turns in Mens Minds; they have so many various ways of Thinking; and there is fuch a want of Education and Refinement in the Generality of Mankind; that after the most Sincere and Diligent Endeavours they cannot exactly agree in Matters of mere Probability. The unavoidable Necessity of this variety of Opinions often renders it Excufable; and it is attended with this accidental Advantage, that it affords a large Scope for the Exercise of Humanity, and Meekness, and Condescention in Men, and for their Bearing with one another. But then it ought well to be consider'd, that tho' this Difference in religious Matters of Opi-

nion may be very allowable and Innocent in itfelf; yet it may become highly Criminal when Men confound things for which there is no other than a bare Probability, with fuch as have a plain Undeniable Certainty and Evidence: And when with matter of Opinion only they intermix Pride and Vanity, Presumption, Positiveness, or Prejudice; Breach of Communion, and Resistance of Lawful Authority, or Disobedience to spiritual Governors; who for that very reason, because Men cannot be suppos'd to agree intirely in religious Matters of mere Opinion and Probability, and because these are not Fundamental or Essential to Religion, have undoubted Power of Juding and Determining finaly in Such Matters; tho' they have no farther Power in Matters Effential, and founded upon plain Moral Certainty and Évidence than that of Explanation and Illustration only.

IV. The fourth and last Head of Knowledge obtained by Deduction of Reason is that which is derived from the Experience and Information of others, and is founded upon Testimony. This is a kind of Knowledge very different in its Nature from any of the former, and built on a very different kind of Evidence; and it hath been very imperfectly defin'd, An Assent of the Mind given to the Truth of any Thing upon the Testimony of another; to which should have been added, upon a full Conviction of the Reasonableness of yielding that Assent: For every Proposition

tion to which we yield an Affent, either Is or Ought to be a Point of Knowledge, before it can regularly be either a Belief in general, or a religious Faith in particular. The first Part of that Definition hath blended together these several things very Different in themselves, and which ought to be well distinguished; namely Knowledge; Belief in general; a true religious Faith; and a blind Implicit Assent of the Mind, that is, where there is not first such a Conviction of Reason as is a just and solid Ground for that Assent.

ALL the kinds of Knowledge we have histherto treated of arose from Our selves, and resulted from the Immediate Use and Exercise of our own Natural Faculties; but this is in a great measure from Without us, and is owing to the Reason and Understanding of Others: Which then becomes truly Our own, when we give no hasty and precarious Assent to any Information or Testimony; but use our Reason strictly and impartially in Searching and Trying every Instance of this Knowledge, so as to Approve or Reject it as it appears to us to be true or false, reasonable or absurd; or in Proportion to those Degrees of Probability wherewith it comes recommended.

Now, there must be such a Concurrence of our Own Reason in these following Particulars, with regard to every Point of Information or Testimony, as shall render it truly Knowledge, as well as Belief or Faith.

T 2

- 1. Our own Reason must be imploy'd in judging of the Subject Matter of the Information; and whether the Words and Language in which the Information is made are perfectly Intelligible? If they are not to be Underflood, the Information is to be rejected, not as Absurd or Contradictory; but as being Senceless and without any Meaning at all. No Man can be inform'd of what he is not Capable of understanding; and there can be no Information or Revelation to Mankind concerning the Real Intrinsic Nature of any thing in itself Incompre-hensible to us; the Information must be of fomething so Plain and Intelligible that Reason can clearly apprehend it, and judge of it. So that no divine Revelation concerning God and his Attributes, the Mysteries of Christianity, and all things Supernatural and Spiritual, reaches any farther than their Existence only, and that lively Symbol and Analogy under which they are represented to the Mind of Man; which is as Plain and obvious, and Intelligible as any thing in Nature and common Life.
- 2. Secondly, Reason must be convinced that the subject Matter of the Information is Possible, and that it implies no Absurdity or Contradiction. And if the Information is concerning any thing Supernatural and Spiritual, this is a sundamental Rule for the Procedure of the Intellect; that it must deduce no Absurdity or Contradiction

tradiction but from what is plain and Intelligible in every Proposition: And it must conclude that fuch Absurdities and Contradictions as arife from a Comparison between what is plain and Intelligible, and that which is Incomprehenfible, in respect of their real Intrinsic Natures, are all groundless and imaginary; as for instance in this Proposition, Christ is the only begotten Son of God. Now, that one Person should be the only begotten Son of another, is plain and intelligible; and a Man who believes the Scriptures to be the Word of God, concludes, without any farther Examination of what is Unintelligible and Incomprehensible, that this is as true and as void of Absurdity and Contradiction in respect of the Divine Nature, as it is in common Speech among Men; which is the Substance of this Proposition as far as we are obliged to Understand and Believe it: And he will look upon it as impious Trifling with the plain Word of God to raise any Absurdities and Contradictions, from fuch a Comparison between Human and Divine Generation, as infers that the Son cannot be intirely of the Same Nature and Esential Perfections with the Father.

As it is the Office and Privilege of Reason to reject every Information, which carries any manifest Absurdity or Contradiction In itself; so it must observe narrowly whether it is contradictory to any of the Preceding Articles of Knowledge; that of Sensation or Self-Conscious—

ness, or Demonstration, or Moral Certainty, or even to any Great Degree of Probability: For tho' these may Combine together for the Confirmation of the Same Truth; yet since they are all Natural means of Knowledge, and when they are truly genuine can never Deceive, they are every one of them to be duly regarded in their Kind, and are never to be set in Opposition to one another.

3. THIRDLY, our Reason must judge and determine concerning the Ability and Sincerity of the Person from whom the Information comes. In order to this Judgment, Information together with the Testimony or Evidence upon which it is founded, must be divided into that which is merely Human, and that which is Divine. As to Human Information, we yield the Assent of the Intellect to it in Proportion only to what appears agreeable to Truth from our Own Faculties of Understanding; and by the use of our Reason we make what was the Knowledge of Others properly our Own. This is very extensive, and makes up the greatest Part of that Knowledge with which the Mind of Man is furnished; it takes in all that we have from the History of Mankind and of Nature; the Accounts we have of all the Parts of the World which we have not feen; and in short all that we have from the Reason and Experience of Other Men: And we acquiesce in all this as so much Real Knowledge, and not

as any Precarious implicite Belief; but as an Affent of the Mind founded upon fuch human Testimony, as amounts to a Moral Certainty.

As to Divine Information or Revelation, no Search or Inquiry of this Nature can be made; fince Reason hath Already a full Conviction that it must exceed all human Certainty; for God can neither be deceived himfelf, nor deceive others. So that in respect of Divine Revelation in particular, the last thing our Reason is to have a full Conviction of is

- 4. Fourthly, that the Information or Revelation comes from God; or that the Scriptures wherein these Revelations are made are of Divine Authority; for a right Apprehension of which I shall observe these two Things.
- 1. THAT as God hath made Man the immediate Instrument of all Those Revelations, so must Evangelical Faith be partly founded upon Human Testimony or Evidence. Men were the Authors of all the Books in the Old and New Testament; and if we consider them abstractedly from any Consideration of their Divine Authority, they must be allow'd of equal Credibility at least with all Other Antient Writings; that is if we examine them impartialy by the same Rules of Criticism, by which we make a Judgment of other Authors. T 4

If we confider the Characters of the facred Pen-Men; their Antiquity, Style, and Manner of Writing; the Opportunities they had of being Themselves well Informed of the Truth of what they transmitted down to Posterity; the great Weight and Importance of the Subjects they treated of; the Accounts given of them by their Cotemporaries, and by those who lived in the Nearest Ages to them; their intire Consistency with themselves; together with the perfect Harmony there is between all those who in several Distant Ages have pursued the same design: Tho' we should suppose the Scriptures to be upon the soot of mere Human Testimony and Evidence; yet in these, as well as in all Other respects, our Knowledge of them, and the Belief that is built upon that Knowledge, must be of equal Truth and Certainty with that which is founded upon any Profane History. We may as truly and properly be faid to Know all the Facts and Transactions related in Scripture, and to be as Sure and as well informed of the Qualifications, and Characters, and Conduct, and Performances of all the Persons mentioned in it, and of Christ and his Apostles in particular: And we have the same Moral Certainty even upon the Foot of Human Testimony, that there Were such Perfons, and that they spoke and acted such things as are related of them; as we have that there were fuch Persons as Pilate, and Herod, and Augustus, and Tiberius Casar; and of all those Actions

Actions and Exploits of theirs whereof we have a particular Account in Profane History.

Now if to this Testimony merely Human, and founded upon the Credibility and Faith of antient History in general, we add that which is Divine, and which cannot be Pretended for any other Writings in the World; fuch as the Miracles of Christ and his Apostles, to which they always appeal'd for the Truth of their Doctrine and Mission; the concurrent Completion of all the Prophecies relating to the Meffiah from the Beginning of the World, in the Person of Christ Alone; the Scriptures being the only Book in the World which gives us any Account of the whole Series of God's Dif-pensations towards Mankind, from the first Creation for about four thousand Years together; the great Improvement of Natural Religion, and Exaltation of Morality fo visible thro' the whole Tenor of Scripture. And lastly, the Providential Care and Caution fo fignal and manifest in every Age, for transmitting down Books written at fuch great distances of time from One another, and All of them from Us; their being at this Day fo Confistent among themfelves, and so void of any Material Error, that in the immense Number of Various Readings, which have been with great Labour collected, there cannot any one Instance be found of a Contrariety or Opposition in respect of any Fundamental Point of Faith or Practice. If these things. things, I fay, are superadded and thoroughly considered, they give the Scriptures the utmost Moral Certainty, such as no merely Human Writings can admit of; and are the greatest Proof and Evidence for the Truth of them which we are Capable of receiving, without a continued daily Repetition of Miracles thro' every Generation. It is an Evidence founded upon the Testimony of God and Man; fuch as Claims and Demands the Assent of the Intellect, and that Concurrence of the Heart and Will which renders it an Evangelical Faith built upon the strictest Operation of Reason, and the utmost Effort of human Understanding. So that Revelation is a Solid Ground of Perfuasion; and our Faith is founded upon the Testimony of God: But Reason first provides that the Foundation is Sure and rightly laid; that we do not mistake that Testimony for what is merely Human, and build our Faith upon the Sand; and that the specious Superstructure be not Ignorance or Superstition, a blind Credulity or Enthusiasm.

But there is one thing more which clears up this Moral Certainty or Evidence beyond all Evasion; and that is, that the Authors of the Books in Scripture Professed to have wrote them by an immediate divine Commission and Inspiration; and most of them proved the Truth of this by Miracles, which were allowed by all to be Such at the time they were wrought:

And in those miraculous Operations they were so far from gratifying any Vanity or Interest of their own, that they suffered the utmost Contempt, and bodily Pain, and even Death sor the Doctrines they confirmed by them. Now, had they penned down the Scriptures as dictated Verbatim by an Audible articulate Voice from Heaven as loud as Thunder, this would not have amounted to a greater Moral Certainty for the Truth of them, than what we now have: For the Authors would still have been Men; we now must have rely'd upon the Testimony of Men and the same secret Providence of God for their being transmitted Pure and uncorrupted down to Posterity; and we might as well have been deceived in This, as in the Prosession made by the original Authors, of their having wrote by an immediate Divine Inspiration.

2. The other thing well worth Observation here is, that as God hath made Men the immediate Instruments of all his Revelations; so in merciful Condescention to the Weakness of our Understanding he hath made use of human Language, as well as of our Natural and most Familiar Conceptions and Ideas for the clear and easy Representation and Discocovery of things supernatural, and otherwise altogether incomprehensible. Since Men were the Instruments of these Revelations, they could not have been made in the Language of Angels;

Angels; or in any fuch Proper Terms as would literaly have expressed the Real intrinsic Nature of heavenly Things; there being no Capacity in Man for any Ideas or Conceptions of their Real Nature, nor any Words in human Language to express them. And if we should suppose that by a Miraculous Operation a Man had any fuch Visions and Revelutions of their real Nature vouchsafed to him either In the Body, or out of the Body, they would be Unspeakable, and it would not be possible for him to utter them; fo that he could not be the Instrument of Conveying them to the rest of Mankind. This made it necessary to have all the divine Revelations adapted to our natural Way of Thinking and Speaking; and accordingly the Wisdom of God hath so ordered it, that we are not obliged to yield either the Affent of the Intellect, or Consent of the Heart and Will, to any Doctrine which is not as plain or Intelligible as any thing in common Life: All therefore Beyound this, which is Unintelligible or Incomprebensible in any Scripture Proposition, is no Immediate and Proper Object either of Christian Knowledge or Faith; it belongs to Another World; and we are at present to know and believe no more of it, than that it is Incomprehensible, and therefore referved intirely for the Beatific

Thus we see no Assent of the Mind can be given to any thing Intirely unintelligible or incompre-

comprehensible, upon the Testimony either of God or Man; and if the Divine Revelations had not been very plain and intelligible, they never could have been Conveyed down to Us by those who received them first; for Men could never have transmitted to Posterity what they had no Knowledge of Themselves. So that nothing can be more unreasonable and ground-less, than the Objections of Unbelievers and Freethinkers against our Christian Mysteries, as Unintelligible and Incomprehenfible; fince they are Obliged to know and believe nothing more in them, than what is Plain and eafy, and very Intelligible. The same Objections will lie as strongly against all that the Heathen Moralists have wrote concerning God and his Attributes; nor for the same Reason could any Intelligible Sence or Meaning of their Writings upon those Subjects have been ever handed down to us; for nothing can be in its own intrinsic Nature more Mysterious and Incomprehensible than God and his Attributes; and therefore by that way of arguing Men must reject all the fundamental Articles of Natural Religion.

Since it is thus evident that Evangelical Faith requires the Affent of the Mind to nothing but what is plain and Intelligible in every Proposition, in the most common and obvious Signification of the Words; let every Man first have a sull Conviction of the Truth of each Proposition in the Gospel, as far only as it is

Plain and Intelligible; and then let him firmly Believe as far as he Understands. Let him be-lieve firmly, and without any base Equivocation or Fallacy, that there is but ONE God, the fole and only invisible Object of Any Divine Worship whatsoever: And Think and Speak of him, and Worship him under that plain and personal Distinction of Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, which most expresly runs thro' the whole Style of the New Testament; and leave the Incomprehensible Unity and Distinction (as common Sence would direct him) to the great Author of our Faith himself. Let him believe Christ to be The only begotten Son of God, in the most Full and most Obvious Import of those Words; that is, in as much Truth and Reality as one Man is the Son of Another: And leave the Divine Incomprehensible Generation to the Veracity of God; who proposed his Revelations to be *Understood* and *Believed*, according to the Way of Thinking and Speaking amongst Men. Let him believe that Christ, by his Death, did as Truly and Actualy make an Atonement to God for our Sins; as one Man works an Atonement and Reconciliation to Another for the Offences of a Third Person: And leave the Unintelligible Reality, and ineffable Manner of that Divine Operation for the Subject of eternal Contemplation and Praise in another World. And so likewise in every Other Instance of what goes under the Name of My/tery in the Gospel: Let him believe the Blood of

of Christ hath the same intrinsic Virtue and Esficacy, for the Real and Actual cleanfing of the Soul from the Guilt and Pollution of Sin; that Water hath for the washing any Filth or Dirt off from the Body. That the Intercession made in our behalf by Christ is as Truly, and Realy, and Actualy fuch; as if it were a strictly Proper and Literal Intercession. That Men shall undergo a great and glorious Change at the Refurrection of the Just; as Truly as a Man is here changed from the Point of Death, to a state of perfect Health; or from the Condition of a Slave, to the Glory of a Kingdom. Let Men I fay Believe as far as they thus perfectly and clearly Understand, without perplexing and confounding themselves or others with what is Incomprehenfible, and then they answer all the Ends of an Evangelical Faith; and do fulfil the whole Purpose of God in all his divine Revelations.

IF Men would come about to this Primitive Temper and Spirit of Believing; and leave off darkning and diffurbing the Faith of Christians, which is plain in itself, by blending what is obvious and Intelligible with what is Unintelligible and Incomprehensible: Then we shall relinquish all Analogy; and there will be no occasion for obviating all their pretended Absurdities and Contradictions, by shewing how we are under a Necessity of apprehending things spiritual and divine in Types only and Symbolical

bolical Representations. But fince the profess'd and open Arians, and Socinians, and Deists, and Freethinkers have utterly declin'd the Natural and Easy way of Believing; laying aside all that is obvious and Intelligible in the Doctrines of the Gospel, on account of what is altogether Unintelligible and ineffable. And fince our modern Clandestine Arians have, from their groß Ideas of three Human Persons, or rather even three Bodily Substances, argued the Son and Holy Ghost to be actualy and intirely Separate from the Father, as we conceive Three Men to be Separate from one another; and confequently Subordinate and Inferior to him. And fince these Enemies of Revelation have gained fo great a Point, as to draw off the Learned and worthy Defenders of Christianity from the Plain and open Field of Battle, into Unknown Ground full of inextricable Mazes and Windings: Where they are obliged to Engage them by undertaking Solutions of what is never to be folved; by Explaining what is Inexplicable; and by elaborate Illustrations of things altogether in the Dark. Since, I fay, this is evidently the prefent State and Condition of Christianity among us; the Doctrine of Divine Analogy is now become absolutely necessary; and is like to continue so as long as this Strain of Infidelity fo prevailing in our Age shall last; which it is to be fear'd may, in a greater or less Degree, be transmitted down to latest Posterity.

The Reason why I have, in this Preliminary Treatise, began with the first Rudiments of Knowledge; and traced the Procedure of the Understanding thro' every Step, from Ideas of Sensation up to our Conceptions of things Supernatural and Spiritual, may not perhaps be soon discerned: Yet I doubt not but the Necessity of it will evidently appear hereafter, when Men come to see the great Usefulness and Advantage of applying this Doctrine to our present Controverses with all Sorts of Unbelievers; together with the Difficulty of that Application, so as to run neither into the strictly Literal and Proper Acceptation of Scripture Terms, on the one hand; nor into mere Metaphor and Allusion only, on the other.

I HOPE I need not apologize for diffinguishing the several Kinds of Knowledge with some Exactness; together with that Kind of Evidence which is proper to each of them. The Mind of every judicious Reader must suggest to him, what Light and Direction it administers for the Procedure of the Understanding in general, as well as in Matters of Natural and Reveal'd Religion in particular; and what endless Confusion and Uncertainty may hereby be prevented in all our Religious Controversies and Disputes: Especialy if he hath observed, how these have all arisen from absurdly supposing the several Heads of Knowledge abovementioned

mentioned to differ only in Degree, and not in Kind; from blending and confounding the different Kinds of Proof and Evidence peculiar to each of them; from Mens infifting upon a Proof and Evidence peculiar to One Kind of Knowledge for that of Another, which is of a quite different Nature, and will not admit of it; from Opposing the different Kinds of Knowledge and Evidence to one another, which are each of them perfect in their Kind, and must never be supposed to interfere or clash with one another; and lastly from not distinguishing between a blind Implicit Affent of the Mind upon the bare Word or Testimony of another, and that Faith which refults from a full Conviction to Resson of the Truth of what is believed.

CHAP. VII.

Of the farther Improvement of Knowledge by Relations revealed.

W E have now by feveral Steps brought the Mind of Man to the utmost Bounds of that Knowledge, which it can possibly arrive at by the Strength of its own unaffifted Faculties; and where all the declared Enemies of Revelation and Mystery take up their Rest. Whatever Knowledge it obtains beyond that included

included under the foregoing Heads, is communicated to it from Heaven: Accordingly,

WHEN the Mind comes to learn and confider first, the more Particular and Fall Discoveries which are made to us of those Relations we had already some Knowledge of by the Light of Nature; and secondly those Relations we bear to God, and he to us, which are intirely New and Indiscoverable by Reason; this Knowledge includes the Substance and Foundation of all Reveal'd Religion.

I. As to the First, when to that general Knowledge we have by the Light of Nature of God as the Creator of all things, it is revealed that he Spoke them into Being, and created them by the Word; that he made Man in particular of the Earth, to which he added a Divine Principle of another Kind, breathed into it immediately from himself; and that the Living Soal was the result of that Union of Matter and Spirit; that he was created in Innocence, and in the Likeness and Image of God; that Adam and Eve were the first created Pair, and that all Mankind descended from them.

AGAIN, when to the general Relation of his Providence over us, it is more particularly reveal'd, that he Upholdeth all things by the Word of his Power; that in him we live, move, and have our Being; that a fingle Sparrow doth U 2

not fall to the Ground without him; and that the very Hairs of our Head are all numbered. And lastly, when that Relation he bears to us as a Judge, is rendered more full and express by these farther Particulars; That the Eyes of the Lord are in every Place beholding the Evil and the Good; that God shall bring every Work into Judgment, with every secret thing, whether it be good or whether it be evil; that he hath Appointed a Day in the which he will judge the World in Righteousness; that in Order to this universal Judgment there shall be a Resurrection of the Dead, both of the just and of the unjust; and that those who are alive at the last Day Shall be changed in a Moment, in the Twinkling of an Eye.

AGAIN, when it is revealed that there is but One God; for tho' the necessary Existence of one First Causeof all things, could be inferred by the Light of Nature; yet this was a Degree of Knowledge so General and Imperfect, and so little weighed and confider'd, that Deities were multiplied in the Heathen World according to all the Wants and Necessities of human Life: Insomuch that Revelation became absolutely neceffary to fix Mankind in the belief of One only true God, and that there is No other God but one. Of this one only God several Particulars are more expresly revealed in Scripture; as That he is a Spirit; That there is None good but he; That he Only is wife, and that his Wisdom is infinite;

infinite; That he is Almighty, hath all Power, and is the Only Potentate, King of Kings, and Lord of Lords; That he is Above all; That he is Just, and Righteous, and Merciful, and Holy; That he is Loving, and Gracious, and Long-suffering; That he sees the Secrets of all Hearts, and will reward every Man According to his Works; That he only hath Immortality, and Life In himself; That he is the Most High God and Lord of Hosts, incorruptible, invisible. These and such like more Full and Express Characters we meet with in Scripture of the One only true God, and which are applied to him only, and can be attributed to none but him. And these, with many such other Instances, are Improvements in that Knowledge we already have by the Light of Nature, of those Relations which God and the things of another World bear to us; and have a direct tendency to the Refinement of genuine Morality, and the exaltation of it into Christianity.

THESE Expressions are all plain and intelligible; so that when we speak of the One God in this Language of Scripture, we know what we fay; and tho' these Points are in some Measure agreeable to the Light of Nature, yet this Full and express and Clear Revelation of them is become Matter of Faith, in which all Christians must now agree. But as to such Words and Expressions as these concerning the only true God; That he is but One Person, U 3

God Of himself; Cause, Principle, Root, Fountain, Original, Archetype; That he is a Pure Act, Simple, Uncompounded, Undivided, Self-Existent, Underived, Unoriginated, Independent, Absolutely Supreme; and Perfect In himself; together with the Words Supremacy, Subordinate, Co-ordinate, Subsistence, Incommunicable; and above all his Metaphysical Substance and Essence; together with a Metaphysical and Potential Eternity, and such like: They are not the Language of Revelation, especialy when us'd to explain the Unity of the Divine Nature; but so many notional Affected Terms which some great and learned Men have invented to express their Peculiar Sentiments, and their several ways of Thinking of that Unity.

Some of those Terms are altogether Unintelligible, and without any meaning when applied to the Unity of God; several of them are purely Negative, and give no positive determinate Notion or Conception at all; and all of them fail in these two material Points. First that none of them have an Authority or Foundation in Scripture for any Divine Analogy, which will be fully explained hereafter; that tho' the meaning of them may be conceived and understood when they are applied to the one true God, in respect of his Creatures, and in Comparison with them: Yet when they are spoke of him consider'd In himself, and so applied to the Divine Nature; not as he is in his Metaphysical

physical (as some Men speak) or imaginary Substance and Essence, but in his Physical, that is in his True and Real Substance and Essence; their meaning is altogether unintelligible. As for instance, take any of those Words, suppose Unoriginated; when this Word is apply'd by way of Comparison between God and his Creatures, as between Him and the greatest Angel in Heaven; it hath a very obvious and determinate Meaning, and we eafily apprehend how the Angel is Originated, and God Unoriginated: But when the Word is applied to the real Nature of God as he is in himself, intirely Abstracted from all Respect to the Creature; it hath no meaning at all. We can form some Notion of what it is for a Being to be Created or not Created; but what the Word Unoriginated Means when spoke of the True Physical Nature of God, as when the Father is faid to be unoriginated in respect of the Son and Holy Ghoft, we are utterly ignorant; and can fix no Idea or Conception at all to it.

AGAIN, we know no more of Pure Act, but that they are two Monofyllables put together without any Signification; and so the Words Simple, Uncompounded, Undivided, when applied to the Divine Nature without any Comparison with the Creature, can at the utmost have no other intelligible Meaning but that he cannot be divided into More Gods than One. As to the Words Cause, Principle, Root, Fountain,

tain, Original, Archtype, Prototype; it is plain that God is all these in respect of his Creatures; and in this Sence they have a very obvious Meaning, and are very good and pertinent Terms: But when you intirely lay aside all respect to the Creatures, and Comparison with them; and apply those Terms to the Father only, in respect of the Son and the Holy Ghost, as they are Related to the Father; the Words are mere empty Sound without any Signification.

So likewise the Words Absolutely Supreme, and Independent; when they are spoke of the one true God in respect of the whole Creation, or any part of it; they are very good Words: But when you apply them to the Divine Nature, as it is in itself; or by way of distinguishing the Father from the Son and the Holy Ghost, they have no more conceivable or determinate Meaning, than if you repeated their Syllables backward. As for The Metaphy sical Essence and Substance of God; Barbara, Celarent, Darii are as good Sence; and it is impossible to fix any intelligible Meaning at all to them; unless they mean quite the contrary, his Phy-fical, that is his real True Nature and Essence as he is in himself, which is utterly incomprehenfible. So that when Men argue those Attributes to be Incommunicable; if they mean to any mere Creature, the meaning of them is plain and eafy to be understood: But when they

they apply those Attributes directly to God or the Father, without any Comparison with a Created Being, they speak of what they have not the least Idea or Conception; and they know as little what is Communicable or Incommunicable in him, in respect of the Son and Holy Ghost; as they do of his real true Phyfical Substance and Essence.

AND now, can we fufficiently lament and bewail all that irreparable Mischief, which hath been of late done by the Rumbling of these and fuch fuch like Sounding Words and Phrases thro' whole Volumes, in that groß and miftaken Application of them which I have noted? To the distracting Mens Minds; to the confounding themselves and those Readers who do not fee thro' this Fallacy; and to the perplexing and obscuring the great and fundamental Article of our Christian Faith, that of the Holy Trinity; which as it lies before us in Scripture and the Language of Revelation is (as far as we are obliged to understand or believe it) the Plainest Thing in the World. All this pompous Affectation of being wifer and more Knowing in the real Physical Nature of God and the Mysteries of Christianity, than the Scriptures can make Men; hath no other main Scope or Tendency but to propagate abfurd and inconsistent Notions, which a plain rational Man would be asham'd of; such as these following.

THAT the Son of God was Produced by an External Act of the Father's Almighty Power and Will; and yet was not made or Created.

THAT a Person should be by Nature Truly God, and yet not the True God; and that he should not have one Attribute Originaly and properly His Own, to render him even Truly God.

THAT there are two Divine Persons who had not any Divine Nature or Essence Originaly in them; that one of them Became Divine by a Communication of Divine Attributes; and the other by No Communication at all.

THAT there are Three Degrees of true and genuine Divinity, one above another; the lowest of which doth not give the Person who hath it, even the Name God. That one of those Divinities is Subject to the first; and that the Third is Subject to Two Divinities above him.

THAT there are three Persons Truly Divine; one of them the True God, the other Truly God, the third No God at all.

THAT there are two Intelligent Agents in the Universe, which originaly were neither effentialy God, nor effentialy Creatures; who

now have fomething of Both in them, but are realy and truly Neither.

THAT the Work of Creation was effected by a Delegated Power only; that a Finite Perfon exercised Infinite Power; and That likewise purely by Commission.

THAT the Father communicated his own Effential Attributes to the Son, without any Communication of his Real Intrinsick Nature and Essence: And yet that he communicated to him True Divinity, which of all things seems to the Mind of Man utterly Incommunicable.

THAT divine Worship, as well as Divinity itself, may and must be varied in Degrees, so as to be More or Less Divine.

THAT we may and must pay divine Worship to Two Gods; and divine Honour to a third Person who is No God, without Idolatry.

THAT there are three different Degrees or Kinds of Creation; and that there are two intermediate Natures between the Lowest of those Degrees, and the Person of the most high God, in the modern Arian Style.

THAT tho' we should grant the Son to be intirely of the same Nature and Essence with the Father; yet he hath not the same kind of Existence,

istence, nor Independency, nor Supremacy, nor Dominion or Authority; tho' these are Necessarily inherent in that Nature, and Inseparable from it even by the most exquisite Abstraction of the Mind.

THAT tho' the Pre-existent Nature of Christ be truly Divine, yet it could not be in Heaven and Earth at the same time; altho' no Being can be truly Divine without Ubiquity and Omnipresence: Nor otherwise be Supreme at all over all created Beings; as Christ is allow'd to be by those who make the former Affertion.

THAT the Pre-existent divine Nature of Christ was in as much Truth and Reality Exalted to his mediatorial Kingdom and Glory, as his Human Nature, and Together with it at the fame time; tho' it is downright Contradiction that a Nature Truly Divine ihould admit of any Exaltation; because it implies the being exalted above Divinity.

THAT tho' the Son be a Divine, Intelligent, Free Agent, yet the Father alone is the Sole Principle and Author of whatever is done by the Son; and confequently that the Son did not properly redeem us, but the Father only.

THAT a True Son may Not be originaly of the Same Nature and Essence with his own True Father, by whom he was actualy begotten. THAT

THAT by the Name God, we must mean the Person of God in the Literal and common Meaning affixed to that Term; tho' it cannot be attributed to Father, Son, or Holy Ghost in a literal or proper Acceptation, any more than the Word Man.

THAT by the Term Trinity we must, in Propriety of Speech, mean a Trinity of Two Gods, and One Divine Person who is No God; tho' that Term was ever used in the Church to express such a real and incomprehensible Unity of Nature, as well as a Distinction of Divine Persons, that it is absurd and prophane to call Michael, Gabriel, and Raphael a Trinity of Angels; or Peter, and James, and John a Trinity of Men.

THESE Positions, and many such like, are either in Express Words, or by plain Implication and immediate necessary Consequence, contain'd in some of our Modern Systems of Religion: And in particular, they are but a light Taste of the Poison still latent in the late samous Fifty five Propositions: Which are a Body of Clandestine Arianism; and the most artful Disguise and subtle Resinement of this Heresy, that ever appear'd since the thirty six Hypothetical Propositions of Aëtius, down to this Day; or perhaps ever will be published to the end of the World. These Positions are mentioned

tioned here, only as they are a bold and arbitrary Imposition upon the common Sence and Reason of Mankind; and not as they are a total Subversion of the whole Faith of Christians.

CHAP. VIII.

Of Revealed Relations intirely new.

As the Relation we bear to this first Cause of all Created Beings, becomes more Strict by intirely removing all false Deities, and the fully establishing a belief of One God only; so it is rendered Nearer yet, and more dear and engaging, by that Distinction in the Divine Nature so fully and expressly revealed to us under the Names and different Characters of Father, Son, and Spirit; and by the several unspeakable Blessings derived upon Mankind from them, by their several Operations and Offices.

This is a Distinction which could not have been the Invention of Man, because it is altogether incomprehensible; and accordingly could never have entered into the Head or Heart of Man to conceive, if it had not been revealed to us. Nor were we capable of Any Notion or Conception of that Distinction, if it had not been discovered to us under the Semblance and Analogy of such Relations as are Familiar among Men; as that of a Father, and a Son, and the Spirit

Spirit of a Man that is in him. If we admit the Distinction at all, we must hold it not to be fuch only as, in our way of conceiving God; we make between three Attributes; as between his Power, and Wisdom, and Goodness; but to have fuch a real Foundation in the divine Nature itself, that we can think and speak of it no otherwise than as Personal. For the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost are, in respect of one another, distinguished thro' the whole Language of Revelation, after the same manner, and in the fame Style in which we speak of three Men or three Angels: And in respect of Mankind, they are ever expresly distinguished by fuch different Operations and Offices, as we distinguish human Persons among us. But the Divine Attributes are never so distinguished in the Style and Language of Revelation, either in respect of one another; or in respect of Man: So that whatever is denoted by that Distinction of Father, Son, and Spirit, it is plain we must either slatly reject the Scripture; or else for ever think and speak of those three, after the same manner and in the same Style we do of three Human Persons.

THAT Christ the second Person had a Being before he was born of the Virgin Mary, is so e-vident from Revelation, that we can make no Sence or Coherence of Scripture; nor find any Confistency in the whole Gospel Difpensation without allowing it. The flatly denying

nying of this by the Socinians, and evading it by that hardy and shameless Invention of his ascending into Heaven and returning to Earth again before his Death, on which their whole Religion and intire Scheme of Divinity is built, will (as a great Man said of Transubstantiation in respect of Popery) prove a Milstone about the Neck of their whole Hypothesis, which must Sink it at length.

THAT we can form no other true Notion of Christ from Revelation but that he is God Equal with the Father, is plain; if it be confider'd that he is every where represented unto us under the Semblance or Analogy of a Son, A beloved Son, and the Only Begotten Son of God. Which Words are apply'd to Christ, not only as he was Miraculously born of the Virgin Mary; but in regard to his Pre-existent State; and in respect of the incomprehensible Communication of the Divine Essence to him; as, inflead of many Arguments, appears irrefragably from Coloss. i. 13, 15. where he is called the Son of his Father's love, the Image of the invisible God, and the first-born of every Creature; that is born Before the Creation of any thing in Heaven or Earth. For the true rendering of the Words Πρωτότοκος πάσης κτίσεως is, Born before all Creation, the Genitive Case being governed of Mparos in Composition, instead of Πρότερος (as will fully appear hereafter) And the Import of these Words is explained by those paralel

parallel Words in Verse 17, Και ἀυτός ἐστιπρὸ πάντων, And he is before all things. In which likewife we should observe that it is said, he Is, not he Was before all things; to denote his Eternity: And withal that Πρωτότομος here in the 15th Verse, is apply'd to the eternal Generation of the Divine Nature, in plain Distinction from Mouriroxos in the 18th Verse, where it is apply'd to the Human Nature's rising from the dead, and being the First Fruits of the Resurrection. From whence it appears that the Communication of the Divine Effence to the Pre-existent Nature of Christ was not made After he came into Being; so as from not being Originaly Divine, to become fuch afterwards: But that the Communication was made Together with his Derivation from the Father; as a Son in the way of Nature hath all the Essence and Attributes of Humanity communicated to him from the Instant he can be call'd a Son.

Now these Words and Expressions of Son, and Born, and Image as a Man is the Image of his Father who begat him; as also the Word Begotten, being applied to Christ in respect of his Preexistent State, Necessarily leads us into a Conception of his Equality with the Father in all essential Persections. For that those Words are not to be understood in their strictly Proper and Literal Sense must be allowed; it were the height of Impiety to imagine it; nor are they

a mere Figure and nothing more, without any farther real Correspondent Import or Signification: But they are to be understood Analogicaly; That as a Person among Men is the Son of his Father by Natural Generation; fo Christ is the Son of God (not by any transcendent Act of Creation, or by Adoption, in each of which there may be mere Metaphor but no Analogy; but) by a Supernatural Generation, or ineffable Derivation of him from the very Substance and Essence of the Father.

THERE can be no other Scope or Purpose, in revealing all things relating to Christ under the Characters and Semblances of a Son, an Only Son, and Begotten of the Father, and Born before the Creation of any thing, but to imprint in us this Conception of him; that he hath all the natural and Effential Perfections of the Father, who begat him; and that as an Human Son possesses the complete Intire human Nature, fo did Christ receive the intire Divine Nature. It can import nothing short of fuch a complete *Identity* of *Essence*; and we could neither think nor speak of him with any Truth as the Only Begotten Son of God, if he wanted any essential Perfection of the Divinity. So that they who oppose the Son's partaking of the divine Nature with the Father, of whom he was begotten, and his Equality with him; must find out some other Analogy for representing the Person of the Son, than

than what the Wisdom of God hath made choice of: Unless they will allow him to be a Son by Nature, and Begotten of God; and then fay that this leads us into a Notion that he is intirely Different from the Father who begat him; and fure nothing is fo monstrous and contradictory to our common Sentiments and manner of speaking, than that the Divine Nature should thus Beget a mere Creature or Man. That the Son was thus fupernaturaly Derived from the Father, doth not in the least hinder the necessary Conception we have of his Equality with him, in all the Effential Perfections of the Divinity; for it is no more than we fee every Day among Men; the Son is derived from his Father and begotten by him, and yet is as truly Man; and equal to his Father in all the Essentials of human Nature.

THAT we must understand those Terms Son, Begotten, Born in this very Acceptation is evident; because the Mind of Man cannot posfibly without Force affix any other real Idea or Conception to them. They cannot, as I observed before, be understood in a strictly Proper and Literal Sense, as they are first apply'd to human Nature; for this is altogether unworthy of God. Nor can they be taken in a purely Metaphorical Acceptation; for that is turning them into mere Allusion and Figure, without any real or folid Correspondent Import in respect of the Father or the Son; and is an X 2 Opinion

Opinion full of Imputation on the Goodness and Veracity of God, and the Justness of those Terms he makes use of in this Revelation; which neceffarily convey a Meaning totaly different from that of other Terms us'd to express Creation, or any Other Operation of the Father. So that there is no other reasonable Way lest of understanding those Scripture Terms, but by Analogy with what they fignify in common Speech among Men: That is, with the Derivation of a Son from his Father in the way of Nature; so as by means of that Derivation, originaly to partake of all the Effential Attributes of a Man, and to be upon an intire Equality with his Father in all the Perfections of human Nature. This is the only Method remaining to the Intellect, of forming a Judgment upon the Sence and Acceptation of those Terms; it must either understand them thus, or affix no Correspondent determin'd Meaning at all to them: And it is plain we reduce the Faith of Christians to Nothing, unless we conceive the Divine Generation of the Son to differ as Essentialy from Making or Creation; as a Man's Begetting a Son, differs from his Making a Statue or Building an House.

THAT the Holy Spirit which we find in Scripture distinguished from the Father and the Son, is a Distinct and different Person from them both, is plain from the Commission given the Apostles which runs in the Name of the

the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Ghoft; and from that folemn Form of Bleifing, which is pronounced in the Name of Christ, and of God, and of the Holy Ghost. For if the Spirit be not a Distinct Person, as well as the Father and the Son; it must be own'd, that these Forms sufficiently tend to puzzle and confound Mankind; by leading them neceffarily into the Opinion of a Personal Distinction where there is realy None: And then the Sence would be thus, Go teach and baptize in the Name of the Father and of the Son who are Distinct Persons, and of the Holy Ghost who is No distinct Person; and it will amount to this, Baptize in the Name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Father again. Therefore to argue the third Person mentioned to be a mere Name, and nothing more; and to import only the Power or Energy of the Father, is not only charging God with laying a Snare for deceiving us; but it is perverting the received Use of Words and Language; and abusing the common Sence and Understanding of Men: Who are naturaly led into the Interpretation of this Commission, and of that Form of Blesfing, by a Comparison and Analogy with Commissions from Princes for listing Men into their Service, or for conferring their Grace and Favours upon them. If one of their Commissions ran in the Names of Three Men jointly and feveraly, it would be playing upon our Reason and even ridiculous to argue, that the Third Name was X 3 only

only a Word for the *Power* and Authority of the *Prince*; so that if we will make even common Sence of that divine Commission and Form of Blessing, we must understand the Holy Ghost to be a spiritual intelligent Being, *Perfonaly* distinct from the Father and the Son.

THAT this Spirit is God or partaker of the Divine Nature, is evident from Revelation; because he is every where distinguished by the peculiar Character of Holy. Absolute consummate Holiness is the peculiar inteparable Attribute of the Self-Existent, Unoriginated, Independent, absolutely Supreme God. Of him it is faid, Thou only art Holy; and upon the High Priest's Mitre was written Holiness to Jehovah, that is to him Only. Now the Spirit being every where called Holy, as his peculiar diftinguishing Character; and accordingly the Words not capable of being rendered An Holy Spirit, but The Holy Spirit, by way of Excellency and Distinction from all Created Spirits (the greatest of which cannot without Blaspheming be called The Holy Spirit absolutely) that Epithet must mean an Intrinsic original and Esperial Holiness in him; and not barely the Spirit which fanctifies or Makes Holy; especialy fince even This could not be supposed of him, unless he had effential Holiness in himfelf. This way of Thinking of the Spirit is unavoidable, if we observe that Holiness is his constant distinguishing Character, not only where he

he is mentioned in the Relation he hath to Us; but that he is called Holy even where he is named together with, and in respect to the Father and to the Son: As In the Name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost. And in the Form of Blessing; and where it is said, The Holy Ghost, whom the Father will send, in my Name; and in many other Places: So that he is characterized as Holy, not only in respect of Us who are sanctified by him; but in respect of the Father and the Son; insomuch that he Alone is stilled Holy wherever the three Persons are expressly named together in Scripture.

THE Word Holy in those Places cannot be added in Opposition to the Father and the Son; nor as Exclusive of the Father and the Son; because They are both absolutely Holy as well as the Spirit; nor is it the Less but the Greater Holiness for his being expresly mentioned in Conjunction with them: So that the Words of those Places naturaly lead us into an Opinion that His must be the same Holiness with that of the Father and of the Son, who are both called The Most Holy; that is, the very intrinsic Esfential Holiness of Jehovah the most high su-preme God. To which if we add, that he is called The Spirit of Holiness, the Spirit of Glory, the eternal Spirit, and very often The Spirit of God; and particularly at the Baptism of Christ, where he was Personaly distinguished from the Father, even in a Visible Appearance; we must have X 4 our our Reason amused by Subtilty and Criticism, and be quite turned out of the plain and common Way of Thinking; before we can underftand the Revelations made of the Holy Ghost in any other Sence, than as of God Equal with the Father.

But that which puts this Matter out of all doubt is, that the Term Spirit is taken originally for the Breath of Man; from thence it came afterwards to be used for the Immaterial Principle of our Composition, which in common Speech is call'd the Soul: And from thence again it came to be transfer'd to the Divine Nature; and accordingly hath been apply'd by the Wisdom of God in Scripture, to express the third Divine Person, or Holy Spirit of God. Hence it is plain, that we must not understand that Term Literaly and in its strict Propriety, as it is used to express an human Spirit; let this be far from us: Nor can it mean a purely Figurative and Metaphorical Spirit only; for that is no Spirit at all. Nor can it be a mere Figure for God the Father; for that would be a Delufive Tautology running thro' the whole Style and Language of Revelation, sufficient to confound the Reason and Understanding of Men; who are under a Necessity from thence to suppose them Personaly Distinct; and especialy where they are named Together as expresly distinguished from each other. So that there is no way left to the Mind of Man to affix any Fust, Real,

and Solid Meaning to that Scripture Term, but by Analogy with the Spirit of Man that is in him; which is an Effential Part of his Composition, and yet in Truth and Reality capable of being actualy Distinguished and separately considered from the other Part of the Compound.

This personal Distinction hath very aptly in the Church been termed the Trinity; as the necessary conceiving of it to be in one and the same Divine Nature, is called the Unity: And tho' neither of these Terms are found in Scripture applied to the Divine Nature; yet all the Scoss and Sarcasms by which Men ridicule and expose them, are no other than Blaspheming that Distinction, and that Sameness and Identity of the Divine Nature, whereof the Revelations of God are full and expressive; and exploding the whole Christian Faith, which is founded upon the Reality of them; and which must all fall to the Ground upon the denying or rejecting the true Meaning of either.

Now fince both Reason and Revelation shew us there can be but One God, we can own and worship but one; that one God alone who Only hath Immortality, and Life in himself; who is the Most High, above all, Incorruptible, Invisible; or to speak in Words of Human Invention, who is Unoriginated, Independent, Absolutely Supreme. And since the Books of Scrip-

ture are full of a Personal Distinction in the Divine Nature, beyond our Discovery any where but in them; and fince we find that One God set forth to us under three distinct and different Relations, which the three Persons bear both to One another, and to Us; and accordingly diffinguished by different personal Names, and Characters, and Operations, and Offices; therefore we worship that one God with this Distinction of his Own making, and not of Ours.

As we cannot conceive any Intermediate Being between that absolutely Supreme God, and a mere Creature; fo neither is there, nor can there be any Medium between Worship absolutely Divine, and Civil Worship, or rather Honour to be paid to a Creature as fuch. And therefore if the Son and Holy Ghost are to be properly and realy worshiped at all, as all Christians allow; the Same Worship must be paid Them which we pay the most High or absolutely Supreme God; that Worship which consists in addressing our felves in any Religious Act of the Mind, or Posture of the Body, to an Invisible Being: Which is that very Supreme and Ultimate Worfhip due to the Supreme, the absolutely Supreme Deity alone; and therefore can admit of no Degrees, fo as to be paid to any other Inferior invisible Being whatsoever; That Worthip which is Truly Divine, which is Absolutely · fo, and which without Idolatry cannot be paid

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to any Creature whatsoever. All our Prayers and Praises must be first and last, Primarily and Ultimately directed to the Honour and Glory of that One absolutely Supreme God; and no degree of Divine Worship, if it Could admit of such, ought to be directed to the Honour or Glory of any other invisible Being whatsoever, but of him alone. The Holy Scriptures leave no room for us to imagine any such degrees in Divine Worship; or for any Medium between that Worship which is absolutely Divine, and to be paid to the absolutely supreme God; and that which is a purely Civil Respect or Honour, and to be paid to a mere Creature.

It is faid, Thou shalt worship the Lord thy God, and him only shalt thou serve; the one only independent Absolutely supreme God; so that all Divine Worship is, by that Precept, absolutely Excluded from the Son and Holy Ghost, and they must have no other Kind of Honour than we might pay an invisible Angel or departed Saint, unless they are incomprehensibly One in Nature and all Perfections with that absolutely supreme invisible God. Again, The Lord our God is one Lord, whom we are to Love with All our Heart, with All our Soul, with All our Mind, and with All our Strength; and if so, there is no room lest for the Divine Love of Son or Holy Ghost, unless we suppose them that One Lord our God; who is represented as a Jealous God, and will not in the

least share with any other in Divine Worship, which is altogether to be paid to him alone: And if the Son and Holy Ghost are not some way or other Truly that One God and Lord, it would be as far from Idolatry to address our Prayers and Praises to an Angel, as to Them; so that those Prayers and Praises be Primarily and Ultimately directed still to that One God.

ACCORDING to this plain and natural Way of Thinking, as we are first jointly and facramentaly Baptized, by one and the same folemn Act of Worship, In the Name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost; so we ever after unite them in our Worship, and adore them without any Degrees or Inequality in that Worship; which being truly Divine can admit of no Degrees or Inequality. Whereas they who argue for an Inequality in the Divine Persons; and for an Inferiority of Nature, and a Subjection in the Son and Holy Ghoft to the Father; necessarily involve themselves, and all who adhere to their Principles, in endless Uncertainty and Confusion. Because they can never fix and fettle the different Kinds and Degrees of that Lower Divine Worship (a Contradiction in the very Terms) which is to be paid to the Son and to the Holy Ghost; nor distinguish it with such Exactness and Nicety, that it shall neither be the Worship due to the Unoriginated absolutely Supreme God; nor that mere Honour and Respect only which

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is to be paid to *Creatures*, and varied according to their feveral *Ranks* and Dignities.

But to make it yet more clear, that the Mind of Man cannot without Absurdity have any other Notion or Conception of the Son and Holy Ghost, than as their being incomprehensibly One absolutely Supreme Deity with the Father, without a Figure; and One joint and ultimate Object of all Christian Worship; let us collect the two seemingly inconsistent Doctrines into opposite Propositions thus.

There is no other God but one.

Thou Shalt worship the Lord thy God, and him only shalt thou serve.

On this Side the Precepts are express and positive for the believing in One God alone; and for paying Divine Worship to him Only. They are full and peremptory against addressing our selves religiously in

Let all the Angels of God worship him.

Go ---- baptize all Nations in the Name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost.

THE Precepts on this Side in Scripture, are no less plain and positive and peremptory; that the whole intelligent Creation is to pay DivineWorship to the Son; and Mankind in particular, by express Precept and Exam-

Body or Mind to any other invisible Deity, than to that one only and absolutely Supreme Deity; who is a jealous God, and will not fuffer any Kind or Degree of Divine Honour or Worship, to be directed to any other Deity whatfoever, Equal or Inferior to him. The Mind of Man can understand these Precepts no otherwise; nor can it frame any other Notion of Idolatry, than the addresfing our felves either in Body or Mind, by way of ReligiousWorfhip, to any other Being, especialy Invisible, than to the Most High and absolutely Supreme Deity alone.

Example. The Son is called God absolutely; and the constant Style for the Holy Ghost is the Spirit of God himfelf, and not One of God's Spirits.

THE Precept is express for performing one of our most Solemn Sacramental Acts of Divine Worship Fointly to the Father, Son and Holy Ghoft. As we are first initiated into the Christian Religion by one Act of Worship paid to them jointly; so are we ever after bleffed jointly in the Name of all the Three: And all this without the least direct or indirect Mention or Intimation of any Inequality; or of any Difference of Nature or Degree; or of any Distinction of Worship.

And what is yet more fully decifive to the plainest Reason is, that thro' the whole Tenor of Revelation such Essentially Divine Attributes are given to the Son and Holy Ghost; as cannot, without Blaspheming, be spoke of any Being Inferior to the Most High Supreme Deity.

Now both these Precepts here oppos'd, are express Scripture; they are both from God, and both true; both are therefore equaly the Objects of our Knowledge and Faith; and both of them to be observed and obeyed. Since it is evident that there is no Contradiction in Terms here, and no more can be pretended than an Appearing Opposition and Inconsistency; and that too in Relation to an Unity and Distinction, for the direct Apprehension of which there is no Capacity in the Mind of Man; therefore the Wisdom of God hath left it to us, to believe them Both true, and to reconcile them according to the best of our Understanding. Not by taking upon us to shew How the Divine Nature is One, and how it is Three; by labouring after abstracted Metaphysical Solutions Iutions of the Real true Nature and Manner of that Unity, or Distinction; or by any aukward and unfeemly Illustrations of them, and mean unworthy Comparisons of our Own with any Unity or Distinction whereof we can posfibly have a Proper Direct Notion or Idea. But by folving the feeming Opposition in a way most easy and obvious to the plainest Understanding; that is, by concluding, that fince there is but One God who alone is to be Worshiped and served; and since the Son and Holy Spirit are each of them Called God; and are expresly commanded to be worshiped likewise with Sacramental, and confequently with Supreme and Ultimate Worship: Therefore they must certainly be incomprehensibly One with the Most High God in Reality, and not in Figure alone; and for that Reason only are declar'd to be, together with the Father, the Joint and Supreme Object of all truly divine and ultimate Worship.

THUS all Absurdity and Contradiction, which can possibly be urged against the Doctrine of the Three Divine Persons, and One only Most High Supreme Deity, are resolved into this; that we know not How to reconcile this to the intrinsic Nature and Essence of God; which we freely acknowledge, as we do every thing in the Nature of God to be Inconceivable and ineffable. The Mind of Man can Rest in this; and acquiesce intirely in believ-

ing the Distinction between Father, Son, and Holy Ghost to be as Real and True as if it were Literaly Personal; and their Unity to be fo Strict that it renders them One Joint and Supreme Object of all truly Divine and Christian Worship: Thus we receive and embrace the glorious Revelation as we find it in the Scriptures; and leave the real Incomprehensible Ground and Foundation of it in the Nature of God, to his own Veracity; with this full Perfuafion, that he would never lead us by any invincible Temptation into groß and inevitable Idolatry.

ALL this is obvious and easy, falling in with common Sence and Reason; and hath a Plainess worthy of God, as it is a Doctrine calculated for the Knowledge and Faith of all Mankind both learned and unlearned: But according to the Modern Scheme of Religion in the aforemention'd fifty five Propositions, the Case will stand thus.

There is no other God but one.

Thou Shalt worship bim only shalt thou serve.

THERE are More Gods than One.

THOU shalt Worthe Lord thy God, and Ship and serve Another God, Besides the Lord thy God. And thou shalt pay Divine Honour to a third Divine Per-

Person, who is not even to be Called God.

On this Side, in Pursuance of that Scheme, you must understand these Precepts thus. There is no other but one Person of God. Thou shalt Worship that one Person of God, and that one Person Only shalt thou serve.

HERE you must believe Another separate Person of a God. You must serve and Worship that distinct and separate Person. And you must Honour a third separate Person, not expressly own'd for either God or a Creature.

HERE there is no Seeming Opposition only and Inconsistency, but downright Flat Contradiction in express Terms; rendred still more flagrant, by supposing the Most High God or Supreme Deity to be but One Person.

The Method that Author prescribes to Mankind for evading this monstrous Contradiction is, an Advice to add Cause, Origin, Author, Principle, Monarchy, Self-Existence, Independency, Absolute Supremacy to the Person on One Side: And to the Persons on the other; Effect or Efficiency, Separate Existence, Inferiority, Dependency, and Subjection. Now if you use these Terms of human Language either in their first Propriety and strictly Literal Acceptation (as he all along doth) or even Analogically,

logically, but to no other Purpose than that Author uses them, namely to distinguish the Divine Persons from Each other, and not from the Creatures only; both the Terms themselves, and all the Consequences deduced from them, are so far from helping Christians to any way of Reconciling the palpable Contradiction either to their Understanding or Consciences; that they serve only to establish and confirm it, and if possible to render it more glaring and insuperable than it first appeared in the contradictory Propositions themselves.

THE Use and Application of all those Unscriptural Terms is to argue the Persons on both Sides to be not only Distinct, but intirely disjoin'd and Separate from each other, as human Persons are; nay more, to be of a quite Different Nature and Degree: So that the whole Scope and Tendency of the fifty five Propofitions must center at last in the utter Exclufion of the Son and Holy Ghost from all Divine Worship and Honour; the Understanding is here quite baffled and Confounded; and no evafive Subtilty can ever reconcile this Contradiction to the Mind of Man; you shall Worship and serve the Person of the Most High God alone; and yet you shall Worship two other Persons besides him.

To do the Author justice, he doth not Attempt any Reconciliation of it; he contends

only for the Difunion and Separation of the Divine Persons thro' all his Propositions; and intirely destroys all Real Unity, allowing only that of the Person of God In himself; a Figurative Unity of Power with the Son; and no Unity At all with the Holy Ghost. The Foundation of the whole is laid in this Criticism; Person or Intelligent Agent is always in Latin and Greek expressed by the Masculine Adjective; therefore when God is in Scripture said to be Eig, it means, not only that he is one God, but likewife that he is one Person: From whence the Conclusion is, that he cannot be distinguished into Three Persons; so that the Son and Holy Ghost cannot be, even in any Incomprehensible Real Manner, One and the same Supreme Deity with the Father. But the Argument rightly formed should stand thus.

IF the Word Eis is always used to fignify one individual Man; then it must likewise signify one God, when apply'd to the Divine Nature.

But the Word Eis is always used to signify one individual Man. Ergo,

THIS is a fair way of Arguing, and the Confequence intirely true; for this is the very Purport of the Masculine Adjective, and of Eîs in particular, when it is apply'd to express the Unity of God in Scripture. But this will

not serve the Author's turn; his Consequence is, Therefore Eig must signify one Person of God; it must express just such another Numerical individual Unity, as we conceive in one fingle Man; but not as he is made up of Spirit and Soul and Body, which is a faint and distant Emblem of the Trinity; and therefore such an Unity is no way agreeable to this Author's grand Principle: Who every where argues the Father to be a separate Substance from the Son and Holy Ghost; which directly leads Men into a Notion, that we must conceive the Unity of the Father by that of one human System of Matter. According to him, at best you must imagine God to be One, as a Man is One; which cannot be, unless you conceive him to be such another Person or intelligent Agent, as one of us.

IF to obviate this gross Notion, we observe that the Terms Person and Intelligent Agent cannot be supposed applicable to the Divine Nature in that Literal and strict Propriety, but in a Divine Sence and by Analogy only; then by Clofing with the Analogy, that Author's Argument will be carried to the utmost thus.

As the masculine Adjective Eis in its first and Literal Propriety fignifies One human Perfon; so when it is transferred to God (even Analogicaly) it must signify One Divine Person only, Whatever that incomprehensible Person

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is in his real Nature. Now if you do but word this likewife right, you will extricate it intirely from the Fallacy; and the Consequence will he very good and clear.

As the masculine Adjective Eis in its sirst and Literal Propriety signifies the Unity of one individual Man; so when it is transferred to God, it must signify the Unity of one absolutely supreme Deity; of whatever Kind that incomprehensible Unity is. Thus by the Natural Unity of one individual Man, of which we have some Idea or Conception; we conceive as well as we can the Unity of one God, which is altogether Supernatural and Otherwise inconceivable.

So that to the Argument as it stands in full Force, I answer. That the Word Eis according to that Author signifies both the Number One, and Person; both which being jumbled together into one Word in the Greek, are plainly distinguished in the English, which hath a different Word for each of those Conceptions, and so lays open the Fallacy. For the Word Eis when transferred to God, realy denotes the Number or Unity only; and not the Personality.

But granting, what is grofly abfurd, that it denoted the *Person* of God; yet the most which can be made of it is, that it then denotes a Person

a Person Incomprehensibly One; a Person whose Unity is as incomprehensible as his Essence, or as any of his Other Attributes, and of the manner of which we can have no proper Idea or Conception; tho' thus much we are sure of, that it cannot be the same with that of one individual Man. Wherefore the Word Person adds nothing to our Knowledge of that Divine Unity; and consequently all the Inserences drawn from that Term are utterly vain and groundless: And nothing will serve the Ends of this Author, but proving that both the Terms, One and Person, when transferred to God must be taken as Literaly, and in the same meaning, and with the same Conception or Idea as when they are applied to the Person of a Man.

Tho' the Application of the Word Eis to God as it denotes his incomprehensible Unity only, is clear and easy; agreeable to the common Sence of Mankind; and answers all the the Ends of Christian Faith: Yet it will not serve the Ends of that Author, unless you add the very Conception of Human Unity to that Term, and call it Person or Intelligent Agent; and then transfer it to the Divine Nature; which you must suppose to have literally the very same individual Numerical Unity that you conceive in One Human Person. Then he hurries you away, with that gross Notion in your Head, thro' a Labyrinth of abstracted metaphysical Heresies; out of which you can never fully extricate your

felf by any other Clue, than that which leads you directly back again; to the plain and open manner of conceiving both the Unity of the Divine Nature, and the Distinction of the Divine Persons, by Semblance and Analogy only with that Unity and Distinction familiar to us in the Individuals of our own Species.

WE freely grant that God, thro' the whole Scripture, is spoke of in the very same Style and Language wherein we always speak of one human Person; as in the singular Persons of Verbs, and in masculine Adjectives, whereof Eig is but one instance of a thousand: And the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost are likewise every where spoke of in the same Style and Language by which we diffinguish three human persons; and yet this doth not argue that God is Literaly one Person, any more than it concludes all the Persons to be Three strictly proper and Literal Persons. The Term Persons. fon is not a scriptural one, either for God, or for the three Divine Persons; so that in truth no Inferences ought to be made from it concerning either the Real Unity of God as he is in his own Nature, or the real true Distinction of the Divine Persons. Whence it will be evident to every plain Understanding, that not only Eic, but any other masculine Adjectives and Perfons of Verbs may, nay Must necessarily be used indifferently when we speak of God; or of Father, Son, or Holy Ghost: And that to make

make any Inferences from thence concerning the Real Nature, or Degree, or Manner, or Strictness of that Divine Unity; or concerning the Greatness of the Distinction, is no other than shameful trifling with the facred Oracles, and with the Faith and Consciences of Men.

As trifling and even profane as that manner of Proceeding now appears to be; and the very same as if the Author had inferr'd from the Term Eig, that the absolutely supreme Deity must be of the Masculine Gender; yet it is the fingle Point upon which the whole Scheme of Religion contain'd in his fifty five Propositions is erected. Wherein a Multitude of unorthodox Notions, Abfurdities, and Contradictions are with fingular Dexterity and Slight piled up together upon it, as it were into a bulky Cone inverted: Which for a time ferved for a pleafing Amusement to Deists, and Freethinkers, and Unbelievers of all Ranks and Degrees; till the mock Foundation being touch'd, it tumbles all at once into Dirt, and Stench, and Rubbish.

CHAP. IX.

Of the Improvement of Morality by Revelation.

Rom what hath been faid concerning those several Nearer Relations we bear to the First Cause of all Things, intirely New and undiscoverable by Reason, and which we could have only from Revelation; we may plainly and distinctly discern wherein consists the Enlargement, and Exaltation, and Improvement of Morality by the Gospel Dispensation. The Revelation of that personal Distinction in the Deity, opens to our Understanding a large Field of divine Knowledge; the Knowledge of many Blessings, and Advantages, and Privileges of Mankind relating more immediately to another World, which were intirely unknown by the Light of Nature; and clears up many Particulars, of which mere Reason gave Men but a very dubious and uncertain View.

1. As to the Person of the Father, the very particular Manner of God's being a Father to us is fully and clearly described; as that he made the Body of Man of the Dust of the Ground; Breathed into it a Spiritual Principle immediately from himself; and that from the Union of both these Man became a Living Soul.

That our first Parents were created in persect Innocence; in the Image and Likeness of God; to which is added the true Cause and exact Manner of the miferable Corruption and Degeneracy of human Nature; which all Mankind were conscious of and sadly lamented, but none could account for. That we were to be restored to the Favour of God by the Seed of the Woman; which Prophecy was, in succeeding Ages, gradualy difcovered to be spoken of a divine Person coming into the World, and taking Our Nature upon him: And the Substance and Import of it in due time appeared to be this, That God so loved the world that he gave his only begotten Son, that whosoever believeth in him should not perish, but have everlasting life. And that which renders this Relation yet nearer and more intimate and engaging is, that we have Received the Adoption of Sons; of which the Apostle speaks with this Solemnity, Behold what manner of love the Father hath bestowed up-on us, that we should be called the Sons of God; having received the Spirit of Adoption, that in-estimable Privilege of crying Abba Father; and of addressing our selves to him as to our Father, with the Affection of legitimate Children, in full Trust and Assurance That The Father himfelf loveth us; That He hath prepared a Kingdom for us before the Foundation of the World; and that he sends the Comforter, that Promise of the Futher to guide, and strengthen, and fupfupport us under all the Infirmities of Nature,

2. In the Person of Christ, we have it revealed, that he is the Only Begotten Son of God. That is, if we will understand the Words in any Real Sence or Meaning they will bear, The only Son of his own Nature and Effence; the intire Perfection and Transcript of Himself, that is of his Divinity; fo as to come up to the Brightness of his Father's Glory, of his Divine Glory; and the express Image of his Person, that is of his Divine Person: The Words Son, and Begotten, and Brightness, and Image being spoken by way of Analogy with human Generation (in which the Son is the Brightness and Image of his Father, by receiving the whole intire human Nature) must import all this, or else have no fix'd Application or determinate Meaning at all.

CONCERNING this one only begotten Son we learn, that having it in his Own Power and Election to take upon him either the Nature of Angels, or of Men, he took on him the Seed of Abraham; and came into the World to be a Sacrifice for our Sin; to give his Life a Ranfom, and his Blood a Price and Purchase of Redemption for us; to redeem us to God by his Blood, since without Blood, and without His Blood there was no Remission of Sins. That he came to teach us the Will of God; to set us an Example of Virtue and Holiness in the greatest

est Height and Persection of them; and to work eternal Salvation for us by his Mediation and Intercession. We learn farther that as he being the only hegotten Son of God, became Heir of all Things; so we by virtue of the Relation we bear to him are made Heirs of God, and Foint Heirs with him; infomuch that he styles us Friends and Brethren; and declares us One with him, as he is with the Father. That thro' Means of this inconceivable Union we have with him, we shall be Raifed at the last Day by the Power and Efficacy of his Refurrection. That when he shall appear to Judgment we shall be Like him; and that our Bodies shall be fashioned like unto his Glorious Body; that the Good shall be caught up into the Air to meet the Lord, and shall go in with him to Posses the Kingdom.

3. ANOTHER great Improvement of our Knowledge are the Revelations made to us concerning the Holy Ghost. Who being every where spoke of in Scripture as of a Distinct Person; and no where represented as a Creature, we must, in our plain and obvious way of Thinking, necessarily conceive him as a Person Truly and Essentialy divine: Especialy since any Medium between a Person truly Divine, and a made or Created Person, is directly contrary to plain Reason and our natural Sentiments, to which all Revelation is adapted. The particulars revealed concerning him as fuch a divine Person, do greatly improve the Relation

we bear to God; namely the miraculous Conception of our Saviour Christ by the Power of of the Holy Ghost, or of the Most High, or of God, all which he is called in one Verse of Scripture, Luke i. 35. That he inspired the Apostles with the Gift of Tongues and Miracles, for the Proof and Propagation of the Gospel; That he brought all Things to their Remembrance; That he gives us Wisdom, and Knowledge, and leads us into all Truth; That we are the Temples of the Holy Ghost, and that he Dwells in us; That by him the Love of God is shed abroad in our Hearts; That he helps our Infirmities; enables us to Mortify the Deeds of the Body; and that he fills us with Righteousness, and Peace, and Foy.

Now all these things are the Riches both of the Wisdom and Knowledge of God; and tho' the depth of them be unfathomable, yet their being thus far opened to our View doth give us great Conceptions of the Dignity of human Nature; the Renovation of which by Pardon of Sin, the washing us from Guilt, and the Sanctification of the whole Man in Body and Soul, is as great, if not a more amazing Instance of the Power, and Wisdom, and Goodness of God, than our first Creation out of nothing. All this, (notwithstanding its being thought by some to be fruitless Speculation, and to have little or no Influence on the Practical Part of Life) not only greatly enlarges our Intellect,

tellect, and gives an immense Scope to human Understanding: But hath a direct and immediate Tendency to engage us powerfully in the highest Acts of Duty to God, our Neighbour, and our selves; to the Exaltation of Morality; to the increase of all Virtue and Holiness; and to the Restoration and Healing a corrupt Nature, in fuch a degree as we were utterly incapable of without these Revelations.

1. For first, we are by this means led into the Knowledge and Practice of some Virtues intirely New and unknown before; fuch as Evangelical Faith. Without Revelation there could be no fuch thing; for that Faith is an Affent to a reveal'd and express Proposition upon the Testimony of God; and till something was so revealed by him there could be no Assent given by us to any such Proposition; we could not believe his express Word before he spoke to us by the Prophets, and his Son. And now that all these things concerning himfelf and us are delivered to Mankind, Men still have it in their own natural Election whether they will either Confider them, or give any Asfent to them; but we are told he that Believeth them shall be Saved, and he that believeth Not shall be Damned. And concerning those who have been once Enlightened with this Knowledge, who have Tasted the good Word of God, and been Partakers of these Revelations of the Holy Ghost; if they shall fall away from it, we are told

told it is impossible to Renew them again to Repentance by any other Means or Method in Nature or Grace. So again Hope for Mercy and Remission of Sins; for the Resurrection of the Body in the Likeness of Christ; and for a glorious Immortality in the Presence of God for Soul and Body united, is a Grace purely evangelical and new under the Gospel. The Love of God likewise as of a Father by Adoption, is new under the Gospel; that is the grateful Affection we ought to have for him on account of those several Reveal'd Relations we bear to him; and of those manifold Bleffings derived upon us under that Distinction of the Persons in the divine Nature. And fo is the Loving our Neighbour As our felves, and the Love of our Fellow Christians as our Brethren in Adoption, and joint Heirs with Christ, a New Commandment, as it is called in Scripture.

2. All that were merely Moral Virtues before, are by those Revelations heightened and exalted into evangelical Graces. And this is done by transferring the Merit of all Instances of Virtue and Goodness, from the Outward Actions and Deportment only; to the Inward Disposition of the Mind and Conscience form'd and regulated by an evangelical Faith.

NEITHER Jew nor Heathen had any true and proper Notion of Internal Holiness.

As for the Heathen particularly, their most elevated Moralists esteemed the inward virtuous Temper of the Mind, in Proportion only either to the Influence it had on Mens Outward Actions; or its Tendency to the Ease, and Complacence, and Happiness of Mankind in This Life: And not as having any Intrinsick Excellency in Itself; nor as it is a Recovery of the Divine Image and Similitude to which we were originaly formed; not as universal Holiness is an inditpensable Qualification for the beatifick Vision or Seeing of God; nor as everlasting Happiness in Another World, is the Natural neceffary Confequence of an inward Frame and Disposition of Soul altogether regenerate and fanctified. And as to the future Rewards themfelves, they never entertained a Thought of their being consequent to inward Virtue and Holiness, any further than it was reduced into outward Practice and Behaviour.

As to the Jews, the whole Style of their moral Law ran intirely upon the Outward Act. Nay, they interpreted even the Tenth Commandment after such a Manner as to conclude, that if this external Obedience was paid, the Law was fully and completely answer'd: So that how violent soever the habitual Inclinations of the Soul were to Covetousness or Lust, or Injustice, to Cruelty, Malice, or Revenge; if they did but effectualy restrain these Tendencies from breaking out into an open Violation

lation of the Law, they deem'd themselves perfectly innocent; and acquiefc'd as Perfons who had fulfill'd all Righteousness. In short they never imagin'd there was any Punishment for evil Habits or mere Intentions of the Mind, either here or hereafter. The Jewish Doctors are full and express in this Point; and the Inference they make from that Text in Pfal. lxvi. If I regard Iniquity in my Heart, the Lord will not hear me, is this; that God does not in the least regard the Wickedness of our Thoughts. Nay their celebrated Kimchi fays upon this Text, Altho' I should defign Iniquity in my heart, and were just ready to execute it --- Yet God will not hear it; for God never esteems an evil Design for the Deed. This was the very Hypocrity of the Pharifees, who valued no Instance of Religious Duty, but as it was Seen of Men; nor have the Jews at this Day any Opinion of the Necessity of Internal Holinets.

the true and real Excellency and Perfection of all moral Religion is Within us, and feated in the Heart; and accordingly the whole Substance of it is made to confist not only in the outward Deportment and external Discharge of all Duties; but chiefly in the inward Rectitude and Sanctification of the Mind and Conscience. This is the main Scope and Tendency of our Saviour's whole Sermon on the Mount, as is obvivious to any one who will look over those Particulars

ticulars there mentioned and infifted on: And the true Meaning and Application of that faying, Be ye perfect as your Father in Heaven is perfeet, is that we should imitate the Divine Perfections in the Internal Holiness and Sanctification of our Nature; in bringing our felves to an Habitual State, and Temper, and Inclination of the whole Heart and Mind to all Virtue and Goodness; which is not only the curbing and Restraining, but the Renewing and Healing a corfupt Nature. We are to be Holy as He is Holy; that is in the Internal Frame of our Mind, in the Sanctification of our whole Nature; not only in the external Observance of those Laws which are made for this World alone: But in ordering and composing our Souls according to such Rules and Measures of Purity and Holiness as are for Eternity, and of everlasting Force and Obligation; which truly perfect our Nature, and give us a near Resemblance of the Divinity.

This is the Import of these new Phrases in the Style of the Gospel, That of Regeneration and being Born again, apply'd to the whole Man; because of the intire Change of the Bent and Tendency of all his Passions, and Affections, and Desires, from what they were by corrupt Nature; even to the restraining and mortifying of all his bodily Appetites, and bringing them under the Conduct and Direction of Reason and Religion. That of the New Man,

Man, and the Inward Man; because the change of all a Man's Inclinations and Affections from Vice to Virtue makes him more truly Another Man, than any Alteration in his Body could do. That of being Renewed in the Spirit of our Minds, which plainly alludes to that Distinction of the Apostles of Spirit, and Soul, and Body; and fignifies the freeing and difengaging our purely spiritual and immortal Part, to the utmost of our Power, from those irregular Passions and Appetites of the inferior Soul, in which it is involved by its Union with the Body.

THIS is the great Glory of the Gospel prophefy'd of fo long before and thus described, I will put my Law in their inward Parts, and write it in their Hearts, which before confifted in external Ordinances, calculated only for outward Performances; and provided no express Punishment or Reward for the secret Frame and Disposition of the Soul. But now the full Purpose of the Mind to commit a Sin is, in the fight of God, as high a degree of Guilt as the Actual Commission of it; and we learn that Evil Thoughts, Murders, Adulteries, Fornications, Thefts, False Witness, Blasphemies defile a Man in Proportion to the Corruption of the Heart from whence they come forth. And so on the other hand, if there be a fincere Resolution and Intention in the Mind for the Practice of Virtue and Goodness in any Instance, it is as valuable in the Sight of God as if there were frequent OpporOpportunities of exerting it in outward Actions: These are no otherwise esteemed by him than as they are sure and sull Indications of the inward Temper and habitual Disposition of the Mind, which alone is of the very Essence of Virtue and Holiness; whereas its displaying itself in outward Performances is often but Accidental to it.

Thus we see what an unspeakable Treasure of Knowledge the Gospel is, which till Christ came lay buried under the Ruins of human Nature; and what a Turn was thereby given, all at once, to the whole Religion of the World. By this we see how it is that our Saviour came not to Destroy one Jot or Tittle of the Law of Nature, but to Fulfil it; by enlarging our narrow Conceptions concerning it, and removing our Thoughts from those outward Performances, which confider'd by themfelves, are in truth but as the Carcase of Virtue and Goodness, to that wherein the true Life and Spirit of it consists; to that regular and harmonious Frame and Disposition of the Mind and Conscience, where it was at first; and should have continued, were it not for the miserable Corruption and Degeneracy of Man. So that Evangelical Holiness is Morality refined and exalted; genuine Morality is of the very Effence of Christianity, and nothing ceases to be fuch by the Gospel which was truly so before. The Law of Nature, the Moral Law of the 7ews. Z_3

Jews, and the Gospel are all one and the same eternal immutable Law of God; divulged after a different Manner, in different Degrees, and at different Times as Mankind could bear it; and the Purity and Perfection of the Gofpel is that very State of Innocence in which our first Parents were created, and which they were originaly formed to, when they came out of the Hand of God. Thus the Gospel differs from the Law of Nature since the Fall, as a Man at his Full Stature differs from himself when he was a Child: The Gospel continues all the Lineaments and Proportions, and only gives the Law of Nature a greater Increase of all its Parts; fo that if you cut off any one Instance of genuine Morality, you so far render Christianity maimed and deformed.

As therefore the main Scope of the Gospel is the whole change of the Man into an internal habitual Holiness; so also it introduceth a way of Worship intirely new, and calculated for the Increase and Improvement of that inward Sanctification of Mind, which shall ever dispose us to the Performance of all Instances of Virtue and Goodness outwardly, when Opportunity offers. Before, there were few or no express Directions for any but External Ordinances and visible Ceremonies of Worship; which being once performed, the whole Law of God was thought fulfilled in this Point; and the Consciences of Men were supposed to

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be cleared and discharged from all Penalty, whatever Temper and Disposition of the Mind they were performed with.

But, fays the Gospel, the Hour cometh, and now is, that the true Worshipers shall worship the Father in Spirit and in Truth; in the Inward Disposition of the Soul to all Virtue and Holiness; and in the lifting up a Pure Mind in devout addresses immediately to God alone. This is worshiping God In the Spirit, and having No confidence in the Flesh, that is in any outward Ordinances only. Worshiping him In Truth is, not only ferving him in the Substance of all that was Shadowed in Types and Ceremonies; but in the Purity and Holiness of the Mind and Conscience. This is worshiping in Truth and Sincerity; and this is oppos'd also to that outward discharge even of Moral Duties which proceeds only from Fear, or any undue Motive; but is still against the habitual Bent and Inclination of the Soul, and is therefore fo far infincere and hypocritical. This is that inward Law Written not with Ink, but with the Spirit of the living God; not in Tables of Stone, as the Moral Law was, But in fleshly Tables of the Heart; our Sufficiency for which is Of God, and from the inward Affiftanceof his Holy Spirit.

Thus it is that Grace and Truth came by Fesus Christ; that true Worship of God which alone can intitle us to his Grace and Favour.

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Thus

Thus it is that instead of a multiplicity of Sacrifices and legal Cleanfings, we are to cleanse our felves From all Filthiness of Flesh and Spirit, perfecting Holiness in the Fear of God: And hence it is that we have but two Sacraments, one of them expressive of our Dying to all Sin in the inward Man, and Rifing again to internal Holiness; the other Representative of Washing away the Guilt and Pollution of the Soul by the Blood of Christ, and of giving it inward Strength and spiritual Nourishment. Nor is the Discharge even of these any farther acceptable to God, than as they have the Concurrence of the inward Devotion of the Heart; as they are performed with a filial Reverence and Love, and by Persons endued with a real Sanctification of the Mind and Conscience.

To which I shall add, that whereas before the Revelation of the Gospel Men hoped to be accepted, to reconcile themselves to God, and compensate for many other wilful Failings by some Particular shining Virtues; now we learn, That whosever shall keep the whole Law, and yet offend in one Point, he is guilty of all; which was never supposed before that Assertion: Nothing will suffice now except the becoming intirely A new Creature, as far as our sincere and hearty Endeavours can carry us in the universal Change of the whole State, and Temper, and Disposition of the Soul.

3. As the Religion and Worship of Men, before Christ, was all external; so there was no Express Reward promised, or Punishment threatned but what related to This World: But now that the whole Substance of them is become internal, the Rewards and Punishments are such as relate chiefly to another Life. First,

As to the Rewards, these several Particulars are new by the Revelation of the Gospel.

I. WHEREAS it never entered into the Mind of Man to imagine or expect in another World any other than Senfual Pleasures for the Body, and delightful Contemplation for the Mind; now we learn the Joys of Heaven to be of fuch a Nature that they cannot enter into the Heart of Man, and that we cannot now have the least direct Conception or Idea of their Real Nature. And therefore they are reveal'd to us under the Ideas or Conceptions of Light, a Kingdom, a Crown of Life and of Righteoufness; an eternal Weight of Glory, by way of Allusion to the Weight of Gold and Jewels in a Temporal Crown; and an Inheritance incor-ruptible and undefiled, reserved in the Heavens. Tho' these are no more than symbolical Reprefentations of the Joys of Heaven in a future State, yet they are so refined and exalted that they transcend the utmost Stretch of mere human

human Invention; and nothing but Revelation could raise our Knowledge and Contemplation of them so high. Nor are those Joys the less Real, because we have no such Direct and immediate Conceptions of them, as we have of the Pleasures of Sense; but on the contrary they are in Truth a much more Powerful Motive to all Virtue and Holiness, than if we esteemed the Nature of them such, as could in any degree be now directly and immediately conceived or apprehended by us.

2. THE Resurrection of the Same Body is a Revelation intirely new, of which we are affured by the Rifing again of Christ's Body which was individualy the fame; and who was The first Fruits of the Refurrection. Indeed to own the Resurrection, and yet to deny it to be of the Same body, is no other than faying the Body Shall, and shall Not rise again; for the Word Refurrection can have no other meaning but the rifing again of the same Body. That this Body will be Changed (which must be a Change of the Same, or the Proposition will have no Truth in it) is likewise intirely new; that this Change shall be effected In a Moment, in the Twinkling of an Eye; that the Dead in Christ Shall rise first; that their Change shall be into the Likeness of Christ's glorious Body: And that the Comprehension of this Likeness is out of the Reach of all our Capacities and utterly Inconceivable; is that which heightens the Value and

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and Dignity of the Reward, and elevates our Hope beyond all that could have been suggested by the mere Reason and Understanding of Man.

3. Another Instance of Revelation intirely new with respect to those Rewards in another World is, that of Living for ever in the more immediate Presence of God, who is the Fountain of all Happiness. We are now informed that Christ is gone To prepare a Place for us, where we shall see God as he is, Face to Face, in whose Presence is the Fulness of Joy; that we shall be where he is to Behold his Glory, and that The Righteous shall shine forth as the Sun in the Kingdom of their Father. This is a Strain no Imagination merely Human could reach or aspire to; and the Happiness and Bliss brought down to the Level of our Understanding by those Resemblances is so immense and ineffable, that the True Nature of it can never be known till it is enjoyed: But it will furely be worthy the infinite Perfection of the Divine Nature; and of the Nature of Man when he is transformed into the Likeness of Christ. All things ever thought of or spoken concerning the Happiness of Men in another Life, before this Revelation, must appear jejune and insipid if compared with it; and were fuch feeble Motives to Virtue and Holiness, and to the furmounting Temptations, as are not worth the naming in Comparifon with it: Especialy if to all this we add, that whatwhatever Knowledge the greatest Men among the Heathen had of the Rewards of a suture State, it was the Result only of their own Reasonings and Argument, and proved at best no more than probable *Conjecture*, and surmises of their own Mind; but now we have the plain, and *Express*, and repeated Promise and Word of *God* for them.

2. As to the Punishments, these likewise are by the Gospel all adapted chiefly to Inward Defilement and Transgression, and transferred from this, to another World; infomuch that all the Breaches of the Divine Laws are not cognizable till after our Departure out of this Life, and no Sentence of Condemnation for them is to be pronounced before the Day of Judgment; and in the ordinary Dispensation of the Gospel, there is not the least positive Temporal Punishment for the greatest Sin. Because, of the Transgressions of this Law none can be judge but he who is the Searcher of Hearts; who discerns from what inward Principle all outward Commissions of Sin do slow, and from whence they receive a greater or less Degree of Guilt: So that even Murders, Adulteries, Fornications, and all other outward Transgressions defile the Man as they come From within, and are punishable in Proportion to the Corruption of the Heart out of which they proceed. Of these Punishments we learn from Revelation only,

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- I. That they are both for Soul and Body, which are distinguished in Scripture by the Worm that dieth not, and the Fire which shall never be quenched; and accordingly we are bid to fear him who is able To destroy both Body and Soul in Hell. Upon which I shall only make this Remark, that whereas we find by Experience in this Life, that Body and Mind are not capable of suffering the Extremity of Pain and Anguish at the same time; insomuch that the greatest Anxiety and most fierce distracting Anguish in the Mind, is lost and diverted by acute and pungent Pain in the Body: Yet we now learn that in Hell the Wicked will be subject to extreme and exquisite Torments of both together.
- 2. That they will confift in Everlasting Destruction from the Presence of the Lord, and from the Glory of his Power. That the chief Cause of all Misery in another Life, will be an eternal Exclusion from the beatistic Vision of God, was never thought of by the Wisest of the Heathen Philosophers; who placed all Happiness within Themselves, and generaly held Virtue to be its Own Reward. This exclusion seems to be the only Punishment to which we can now conceive a Pure Spirit liable; and accordingly, as all intelligent Beings are at a Less, or Greater Distance from this Fountain of all Happiness, so they must necessarily be more or less Miserable or Happy.

3. THAT one Part of those Punishments will be by Fire, than which we have not any Revelation more express and positive. They are described by the being Cast alive into a Lake of Fire burning with Brimstone, by the Fire that is not quenched; by a Furnace of Fire, where there is Wailing and Gnashing of Teeth; by Everlasting Burnings; and Everlasting Fire prepared for the Devil and his Angels. If Burning be a Word merely Metaphorical, as it seems to be in respect of Pure Spirits, then it is a Word and Idea substituted instead of a Punishment fo great that it cannot be otherwise described to us; because we are no otherwise able to conceive it, than under a Semblance of the most exquisite Torture we are subject to in this Life. But if the Word is to be taken in its Brickly Proper and Literal Sence, as it seems to be with respect to the Body; for tho' it is an instance of great Goodness in God that the Joys of Heaven are represented to us under the figurative Images of Light, and Glory, and a Kingdom, and that the Substance and Reality shall exceed the utmost of all our Conceptions; yet it seems to be an Argument of the Strict-ness of his Justice, that the Punishments in an-other Life should be more Literaly the same they are threatned and forefold. If it be thus I fay, then that is a very needless Question, How material Fire can affect an human Soul? Since we are told there is a Worm which never dies,

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dies, as well as a Fire which is not quenched; and when we find by Experience how much the Mind regrets and bemoans every Pain in the Body here; and how insupportably miserable the whole Man is render'd by the Share it bears in the exquisite Torture of any one of our bodily Members.

- 4. THE Eternity of these Punishments is revealed as plainly as Words can express it; and the Difficulty in that Question, What Proportion endless Torments can bear to momentary Sins? is quite removed, by confidering that the Pu-nishments denounced and threatned are not in themselves Sanctions intirely Arbitrary, as it is in Punishments annex'd to Human Laws: But they are withal fo many previous Warnings or Declarations of the Inevitable Confequence and Natural Tendency of Sin in itself to render us miserable in another World. So that a hardned and unrepenting Sinner cannot be otherwise than miserable in another Life by a Necessity of Nature; and therefore not capable of Mercy; since there never can be any Alteration of his State and Condition, without fuch a Change of the whole Man, as would put the natural and fettled Order of the Creation out of course.
 - 5. To all this we may add, that in respect to those Rewards and Punishments we have these farther Revelations. That the very particulars

ticular Day is appointed by God in which He will judge the World in Righteousness, by that Man whom he hath ordained; that he hath Committed all Judgment to the Son; and that all Mankind must come upon their Tryal at Once. The glorious Pomp and Majesty of his Appearance, the awful Solemnity of the whole Procedure; nay the very Words of the Sentence are described; and it is foretold that in this Day of God, the Heavens being on Fire shall be dissolved, and the Elements shall melt with fervent Heat. These are The Terrors of the Lord which are fufficient to overwhelm the Mind; and fuch Motives to all holy Conversation as nothing but Infidelity or want of Confideration can render ineffectual. Concerning which I shall farther observe, that all the Doubtful Opinions, and uncertain Reasonings; all the Imaginations and boding Surmises of Men before are now by the Gospel, cleared up into a Full, Distinct Knowledge and Certainty: And how far soever the Understandings of Men proceeded in the Nature of these Punishments before, yet they are all now become Express Positive Sanctions of the Laws of the Gospel; as it regulates not only our outward Deportment, but also the inward Frame and Disposition of our Souls.

CHAP.

CHAP. X.

Of Spirit, and Soul, and Body; and the great Usefulness of this Distinction in Religion.

Ow in order to promote and carry on this inward Holiness of the Mind, that Opinion of Man's being τριμερης υπόστασις A Person composed of three distinct constituent Parts, not altogether unknown before to some heathen Philosophers, is now cleared up and expresly established by the Apostle in 1 Thess. v. 23. which according to the Original is thus, And the very God of Peace sanctify you δλοτελείς intirely in every Part: And may δλόκληρον υμών the whole of you; to write the Spirit, and Jozh the Soul, and to owner the Body, be preserved blameless unto the coming of our Lord Jesus Christ. Which Text is a plain Comment upon Genesis ii. 7. and an Explanation of those Words concerning our Creation, which expresly distinguish between The Dust of the Ground, which is the Body; that Principle which was breathed immediately from God, which is the Immaterial Part of us; and that Living Soul which refulted from the Union of Body and Spirit: And these are in that Text of the Apostle's named according to their Order and Dignity, Spirit, and Soul, and Body. Accordingly Aa I. IT

I. IT is of the purely spiritual Part of our Frame that these Texts are spoke, The Word of God--- is sharper than a two edged Sword, piercing even to the dividing afunder of Soul and Spirit; of the Inferior Soul, the Seat of all our irregular Passions and Affections, and the purely Spiritual and immaterial Part of us: Teaching us to distinguish them so exactly as to discern all the Thoughts and Intents of the Heart; all their fecret and Contrary moral Tendencies and Inclinations; all the Struggles and Contentions between those two Principles within us; and to make a right Judgment of them, as they tend either to the Healing and Preservation, or the Corruption and Ruin of our whole Nature. Be ye renewed in the Spirit of your Mind; how? By putting on the New Man, in which that purely spiritual Part of us hath a great degree of the same Dominion and Sway over the inferior Soul, which it had when it was first Created in Righteousness after the Image and Likeness Of God. Again, The Spirit itself beareth witness with our Spirit that we are the Children of God; that is the miraculous Operation of the Holy Spirit immediately upon the purely spiritual and rational part of us, and so endowing us with Knowledge and the Gift of Tongues, is an undoubted full Conviction of our Adoption. Again, The Grace of our Lord Jesus Christ be with your spirit; because the secret Influences of the Holy Spirit in the

the work of Grace, are directly and immediately upon Our Spirit; by a Communication of Strength and Affiftance, in order to difentangle it from the Allurements of the inferior Soul and fensitive Appetite. To which we may subjoin the last dying Words of our Saviour, Father, into thy hands I commend my spirit. The God of the spirits of all flesh. And, The Father of Spirits.

To the preceding Passages I shall add two Places more, wherein the Spirit is plainly ta-ken in Distinction from the other constituent Parts of our Frame, and in direct Opposition to the Body.

Eccles. xii. 7. And the Dust shall return unto the Earth as it was; and the Spirit shall return to God who gave it. The Word Return here, and the Repetition of it to both fides of the Opposition, renders it very expressive and emphatical; for this shews that the Spirit is in its Own Nature disposed to Ascend upward (whenever disengaged from the Body) without the Interposition of any immediate particular Act of almighty Power: And that the Body, which is furely All of it denoted by Duft (otherwife the Opposition would be imperfect and misleadus) hath an Innate Gravity or Natural Tendency Downward to its congenial Earth. Now if the Body is fuch in the Whole, every Particle of it must have the same natural Tendency; A a 2 and and if the Spirit were Dust or Matter, or any Part of it such, All that is material in our Composition would necessarily descend together; and nothing of it could be said with any Truth to leave the Body and ascend upward.

What makes this yet plainer is, that the Word which is translated Gave it, is here opposed to the Word which imports, According to what it was before. It is sure God gave Both; but this shews that the Spirit was given in a Sence totaly Different from that wherein the Dust was given; that is, as it is here said, Immediately from himself: And it is as sure, that All the Dust was given in one and the same Sence; and the Intire Spirit in a quite different Sence; whereas if the Spirit or any part of it were material, it could not be said by way of Opposition that it Returned to God who gave it.

If my means According to what it was just before its Separation from the Spirit; then it must have been a quite Different Substance from it; for otherwise there could have been no other Separation but of Dust from Dust, or of one Part of Matter from another; which is contrary to the express Opposition in the Text; to which upon that Supposition it will be impossible to affix any determinate Sence or Meaning. But if that Word means, According to what it was before, when first taken

ken out of the Earth, then it is plain that one part of our Frame was taken from the Earth, or Dust, or Matter, and that the other was not; that is, one Part of us is Material, the other Immaterial, given by God; or in other Words, a Substance or Being Superadded to the Dust or earthy Part of us.

Eccless. iii. 21. Who knoweth the Spirit of a Man that goeth upward, and the Spirit of a Beast that goeth downward to the earth? The Inference made by too many from this Text is, that the Same Word and being used here to express the Spirit both of Man and Beast, they must Both be material, or both immaterial. But tho' the Word is the same, yet that it signifies Two things here not only of a Different, but even of a quite Contrary Nature, is most evident from the Context; and from the Words of the Original.

THE Context is thus; One Instance among many of the Vanities in human Life given by Solomon is, that Men are subject to Death as well as Beasts; All go to one Place, all are of the Dust, and all turn to Dust again. So that in this respect Man is truly upon the same level with the Beasts; and therefore to the generality of Mankind he is in Appearance upon the same Level as to his Spirit, as well as his Body which moulders into Dust. Then immediately sollows, For Who knoweth or considers; or according to the Hebrew Idiom, How sew are A a 3 there

there who consider or distinguish between the Spirit of a Man that goeth upward, and the Spirit of a Beast that goeth downward to the earth?

THE Opposition in the Original is abundantly more full and emphatical, which rendered more literaly is thus. Who knoweth the Spirit of the Sons of Men, that is of Mankind; which ascendeth itself, or of itself, up on high; and the Spirit of a Beast, which descendeth, itself, down below to the earth? That this is the true rendering is evident; and not Who knoweth whether the Spirit of a Man goeth upward? &c. for, as some learned Men have justly observed, הו in the two Participles הַּטָלָה and הַּבֶּבֶּה is not Interrogative, but Emphatical. To which I shall add that there is no small Emphasis even in the לְמְשָׁר and לִמְעָלָה and לְמִשְלָה; לְמְשָׁר מוֹ prefix'd in the Words And that the greatest Emphasis of all is in the Word Nord Itfelf immediately following the two Participles, which evidently confirms the 7 prefixed to them both to be Emphatical. The Sence would not only have been perfect without any of these Emphases; but they would all furely have been omitted, if no more was defigned to be spoken but barely that the Spirit of one goes Upward, and the Spirit of the other Downward. From hence therefore these three things are plain.

t. THAT the Spirit of Man, and the Spirit Spirit of Brutes go two Contrary ways at their Dissolution. The Mind of Man cannot surmise otherwise, than that whatever is Material in him must naturally go one and the same way, all together; and that whatever is separated from it, so as to go a Contrary way, must be a Substance of a quite Different Nature, or else it could never admit of such a Separation; since it was before Equaly Essential to the Man as the Dust or other earthy Part of his Composition.

- 2. That whereas the Spirit and Body of a Man go two quite Contrary ways upon their Separation, the Spirit and Body of a Brute are never Separated but perish Together at once. The Spirit of a Brute hath the same natural Tendency downward with the Body; it hath the Gravity of a material Substance, and cannot therefore have any other Being or Existence, than in the exquisite Frame and Contexture of those Particles of Matter which go to the Constitution of the Animal: And nothing is more sure, than that if there was any thing in the Spirit of a Man common with that of Brutes, it would Descend downward with the Body as theirs does.
- 3. That the Spirit of Man goes upward, and that of a Beast downward, by an Innate Natural Propension. This is plain from the Original, which expresses the Opposition thus;

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the Spirit which is Ascending, and The Spirit which is Descending, that is, in their own Intrinsic Nature; otherwise those Participles would be here a mere Impropriety of Speech. But even in the Common rendering, one is faid to go Upward, that is to God; the other to go Downward, that is from God. And so in Eccles. xii. 7. it is said the Spirit Returns, as we are faid to move Of our felves; or as the Body itself when it is spiritualized will move to meet the Lord in the Air. If it is objected that Fire is material, and yet goes upward; I answer, that supposing this to be true (which it is not, fince the Particles of Fire move upward only in Appearance and for a while, but do realy Descend again by their Gravity to the Earth) yet it would be nothing to the Purpose; for if the Spirit of a Beast were a spark of such Fire, and went upward likewise, there could be no Truth or Opposition in the Text upon that Supposition. Here it is said the Spirit of Man only goes upward, and both Body and Spirit of a Beast go downward together; this shews that the Opposition in the Text respects the very Substance and whole Effence of the things opposed, and not any more Refin'd, or more Gross Parts only of either the one or the other.

To fuch as do not differn the Emphatical Opposition in the Original, nor the Force of these Consequences drawn from thence; it will be

be fufficient to observe, that no or Spirit cannot denote the Same thing when apply'd to Man and Beast in the Text. Because the Term originaly fignifies Wind or Breath; and from thence it came to fignify the Animal Life both in Man and Beast: So Juxn or Anima, or Soul is indifferently used for the Animal Life in both. From thence again it was used to fignify The Spirit of a Man that is in him, or the immaterial part of our Frame; of which we have no direct and immediate Idea, and therefore have no Term more frictly literal and proper for expressing the immateriality of it: So that by a mere Necessity it is in com-mon apply'd to Man and Beast. Lastly, from signifying the Spirit of Man, that Term was transfer'd to the Divine Nature; and ever used, thro' the Scriptures of the old Testament, to express the incomprehensible Spirit of God: And That by a more absolute Necessity than in the foregoing Case; because we can have neither a proper Idea or Term, to represent and express truly what is altogether inconceivable and ineffable as it is in itself. Now tho' is ever used to fignify the Spirit of Man, as well as the Spirit of God; yet no body can juftly argue from thence that these two must both be the Same in Kind. Why then will fome Men argue that the Spirit of Man and Beast must needs be of the Same Kind, merely because the Same Word is used for Both; when there is no other Reason for this, but the want of Immediate Conceptions

Conceptions and Proper Terms whereby to distinguish their Different Natures.

THESE two Texts of Ecclesiastes are a plain and express Revelation of the Immateriality of the Human Soul; and of the Materiality of that in Brutes. Of the Separate Existence of the human Soul after Death. Nay and of the Eternity of its Existence likewise, by plain Implication; for if it were ever to be dissolved and perish, nothing is more reasonable than to conclude, that this would most naturaly happen at the time of its Separation from the Body, to the Dissolution of which it is here opposed: And if it subsists to the Day of Judgment, and so carries its Existence into Eternity, we cannot imagine how it should naturaly ever have an End.

Bur the too common Objection here is, that all this doth not amount to a Demonstration for the Immateriality of the Soul of Man. I grant it does not; but it is a most express and emphatical Revelation of it, in Opposition to the Soul of Brutes, which is as expresly declared Material: It contains as much plain and genuine Truth as could possibly be expressed in fo few Words; and is likewife founded on the highest Moral Certainty; and you have no more for the Truth of any Point either of natural or revealed Religion. Tho' it is fuch Evidence as doth not Compel the Affent; yet it is fufficient

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fufficient to render the with-holding of it Inexcufable to God and our own Consciences.

AFTER all I must observe, that tho' the Letter 7 should be taken Interrogatively, it alters not the main Scope and Import of the Text; tho' the Expression were less Emphatical, yet the Doctrine is equaly True, as well as the Confequences drawn from the Text. For Who knows or considers The Spirit of the Sons of Men, whether Ascending itself up on high; and the Spi-rit of a Beast, whether Descending itself down below to the Earth; imports the very same with, Who knows or considers the Spirit of a Man ascending itself, &c. And if it were not so in Fact, that one did actualy Ascend, and the other Descend, it would never have been made a Question by the Wisdom of God, and Solomon whether it were fo or not? Because this would be no other than making Men surmise that to be true, which is absolutely false. Only I must take Notice, that the literal Translation of the Original upon this Last Supposition, is abrupt and imperfect; and I appeal to any Person skill'd in the Hebrew, whether taking the 7 Interrogatively he is able to perfect and complete the Sence of that Text?

I SHALL only add, that no Thought can be more natural and obvious to our Mind, than that fince the Spirit of Brutes goes Downward to the Earth, they can have no Degree of Reafon;

fon; and that if they had any Degree of Reafon, they would have a proportionable Degree of the Knowledge of Moral Good and Evil, and of Freedom of Will; they would have fomething of a Natural Religion, and be liable to a proportionable Measure of Reward and Punishment here, or in another Life: In order to which, Their Spirit, as well as that which is Human, must have Survived their Bodies; and have ascended Upwards likewise for Judgment, and a Sentence of Absolution or Condemnation.

It having so plainly appeared that the pure Spirit is a Distinct constituent Part of our Frame, I shall now proceed to a Farther Confideration of that Distinction of Spirit, and Soul, and Body; and of the great Advantage and Usefulness of this important Point of Revelation. This Spirit of a Man which is in him knoweth the things of a Man, and is compared with the Spirit of God which knoweth the things of God; and of which St. Paul speaks when he says Rom. i. 9. God is my witness whom I serve in my Spirit, that is in the inflexible bent of his Will, and firm Purpose and Steadiness of his Purely Spiritual Part: So strengthned and confirmed as never to be led away, with the most violent Inticements of the animal Soul in Combination with the Body, into any de-liberate Transgression; tho' the Frailties and Infirmities of Nature arising from their restless continual Struggle against the Spirit, can never

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be totaly overcome in this Life. So that here in the Beginning of this Epiftle, he lays a Foundation for a clear and easy Exposition of those Passages in the 7 and 8 Chapters, which have been so much mistaken, and fataly misapply'd to the quieting People's Consciences under wilful and deliberate Sins. For there the Opposition is all along between the Flesh and Carnal Mind (as he calls the Animal Soul) on the one hand; and the Spirit on the other; which by the Antithesis plainly appears to be a constituent Part of the Man, as well as the slesh and carnal Mind: And in this Sence Living after the Spirit, is opposed to living After the Flesh; as the being Spiritualy minded, is opposed to being Carnaly minded.

Now, there the Apostle instances in his own Person, and speaks of the pure Spirit or Mind as of the Man Himself, that being the most excellent and superior Part; in opposition to the Flesh, which includes the Animal Soul or Carnal Mind, with all its corrupt Tendencies and Inclinations. He serv'd God in his Spirit; with the Mind he serv'd the Law of God, and Delighted in it in the Inward Man; but sound a Law in his Members warring against the Law of his Mind; and from thence he proves his Afsertion, That the Law and the Commandment is Holy, and Just, and Good; because it is so apparently agreeable to the genuine Sentiments of the Pure Spirit within us, and accord-

accordingly fo readily approved of and affented to by unprejudiced Reason. And that this Law is no otherwise the Cause and Occasion of Sin and Death to us, than as it is directly Contrary to the Law we find in our Members; and as it is enacted against all those Inclinations and Tendencies of the slesh and carnal Mind which we Our selves (that is, the Spiritual and purely intellectual Part of us) judge and pronounce to be sinful and wicked.

I KNOW the Spirit here, and in other parallel Places, is usually expounded of the Motions of the Holy Spirit within us; which is so far true, but is not All the Truth; for it fignifies the wredua or Spirit of a Man excited and affifted by the Spirit of God: Which Acceptation of it is unavoidable in some Places; and renders others easy and intelligible; and without including this Spirit of a Man, it will be very difficult to find out the Scope and Coherence of those Passages where it is mentioned. Besides that the Sence and Context of those Places require this, it is Natural to understand it of Both; because inward Grace, or the Influences of the Holy Spirit, are immediately applied to the spiritual immaterial Part of us, to prepare and strengthen it for a Combat with the Flesh and inferior Soul; and enable it to recover that original Purity and Holiness which is innate to it, and in which it was first created.

THIS is that Part of our Frame which is Immaterial, and consequently hath Immortality in its Natural Frame and Essence; whereas the Inserior Soul, which owes its Being to the Union of the Body and Spirit, is dissipated and dissolved upon their being separated again from one another. In this Spirit confifts the Dignity of our Nature; it is that by which we are, not only little lower than Angels; but whereby we have a remote Resemblance of the Divinity, and bear the Image and Likeness of him from whom it was originaly breathed into Man. It is, considered Abstractedly and in Itself, pure, unpolluted, and uncorrupt; its first and Innate Tendencies are all to good; all its native Defires and Inclinations are to Virtue; and it is originaly so framed for the Beauty of Holiness, as to be ever carried towards it by an incessant strong Propension. It is the chief Seat of the Intellect and Will; and would In itself have an inflexible Inclination to Truth and Goodness, and an undiffurbed Complacence in a freedom from all Vice and Error. And were it to reside In the Body only as in a Seat or Throne, so as to be disengaged and act Of itself, without the necessary Conjunction and Co-operation of the fenfitive Soul, by which fome hold it to be united to the Body; then to use the Similitude of a Philosopher, It would, Like the Top of Olympus, enjoy an uninterrupted Serenity; and from thence look down upon all the Commotions

motions and Perturbations in the irrational Soul, as on so many Clouds, and Storms, and Thunders in an inferior Region under its Feet.

IF it be objected here, that supposing what I have faid of the Spirit to be true, and that it is in its own Nature a Pure and uncorrupt Principle; then it can have no share in the Guilt of Sin, nor be liable to any Moral Corruption but by Force, and contrary to its native Inclinations; and confequently ought not to be punished merely for being in bad Company, to which it was Necessarily confined. answer that the Objection proceeds upon a mistake, in supposing that because the Spirit is thus pure and uncorrupt, confider'd separately and in its Own Nature; therefore it continues to Preserve itself unpolluted in the midst of Heaps of Filth and Corruption that lie all about it during its Union with the Body; In which the Objection supposes it to reside as in a Prison.

WHEREAS it is now so effentially united to the Body, that during the Union neither of them can act alone; it is the Compound Nature that acts; the pure Spirit cannot exercise the most abstracted Act of Volition or Thought any otherwise than in Concurrence with Matter; It exercises all its Operations as a Part only of the whole Person, and not as a Separate and Independent Spectator. From this strict Union

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it is, that the Spirit of Man became at first Liable to be drawn into any Moral Corruption at all, at the Fall; and that ever fince, it is vastly more liable to be Seduced, tho' not Forced into a Compliance with the Sollicitations of corrupt Passion and Appetite, and all the singular Tendencies which insected our inserior Soul and Body from eating the sorbidden Fruit. For our unruly Passions and Appetites then gained such an Addition of Strength, as Proportionably abated the native Power and Insuence of the pure Spirit, and consequently rendered it more liable to an Abuse of its Liberty.

But you will say the Objection is not quite removed; for where is the Justice of adding a Principle pure in itself, to another which is impure, in Conjunction with which it must neceffarily be corrupted? If it must Necessarily be corrupted, the Objection would hold; but on the contrary, it is still indued with Freedom of Choice, which it can and ought to exert effectualy in its Union with the Body. During which Union, notwithstanding the Disadvantages it is under from the Strength of Passion and Appetite, it still remains the Directing Principle, and should always affert its right; constantly and vigorously support its Native Title to Dominion; and not permit the Flesh or inferior Soul by any Importunity to prevail for its Compliance with their unreasonable Demands; Bb or or ever to become the concurring Instrument of their finful Lusts and Passions.

WHAT I affert is no more than that the Spirit is Originaly and in its own Nature, separately confider'd, pure and uncorrupt; as the whole Compound Nature was at first. But still it may become Partner in all the Guilt, Partaker of all the Defilements of the Flesh and inferior Soul, and Sharer in their Pollution by its own Default or free Consent, tho' not by Force. And for want of exerting its proper Authority, it becomes itself actualy defiled, and together with them justly liable to Condemnation and Punishment: According as it proves supine and unactive; as it yields to Temptation; and fuffers itself to be led away Captive by those Passions and Appetites, which is cannot move one Step further into Act, than w they have its full Confent and Permission. And what renders it truly Criminal in fuch finful Compliances is, a Consciousness of their being all directly contrary to its own pure native Sentiments and Tendencies; and that it could have acted otherwise. So that its Moral Imperfections are no way necessary; but a strictly imputable to it by its own failure, and i abuse of its innate Liberty of Choice.

Now in order to prevent farther Mistake and Objection here; it must be considered, that tho' all the Operations of Man are realy and truly

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truly Joint Acts of the three Parts of the Compound in effential Union; yet each Operation, confidered Singly and by itself, may proceed in a Greater Degree from any One Part, than from the rest. Tho' all our Operations proceed from the whole Compound Nature, yet they do not Equaly proceed from Each Part of it. For instance, Thinking and Willing are Acts of all the Parts in effential Union, or Acts of the compound Nature; and yet they are principaly and Chiefly the Operations of the pure Spirit; in a lesser Degree the Operations of the Animal Soul; and least of all of the Body. So in the Reverse, the Appetites in Man are Operations of the compound Nature, but much more Acts of the Animal Soul and Body than of the Spirit: And yet were they not in some degree Acts of that Spirit, which Informs the whole, they could be no way Governed or regulated by it; nor could any Appetite become Sinful in us any more than in Brutes. So again, every human Passion, as Anger for instance, is the Act or Motion of the compound Nature, but chiefly and in a greater Meafure of the Inferior Soul: And as all the Passions are of a Middle Nature, they are jointly, tho' in a less degree, the Operations of Body and Spirit likewise.

For this Reason only it is, that such of our Operations are called *Bodily* by way of Distinction, in which the Body bears the Bb₂ Greatest

Greatest Share; those are called Animal which proceed most from the Inferior Soul; and those Spiritual which proceed principaly from the Spirit: And not because, according to a vulgar Error, they proceed intirely and Totaly from any One of the Parts Separately; nothing being plainer than that while all the Parts of the Compound continue Essentialy united, our Operations must proceed jointly from them all; unless we could suppose them capable of being Essentialy United, and yet To act separately at the same time. And hence it comes, that tho' the Spirit does not Act In the Body, as an Independent Principle; yet there may be a natural Opposition and Struggle between those Motions and Tendencie's which proceed Chiefly from the Body or Inferior Soul, and those which proceed Principaly from the Spirit. But then as the Spirit is made the Governing Principle of the Compound, and is accordingly indued with Reason and Liberty of Choice; so it may permit any One of the Tendencies, more Peculiar to each particular Part, to become fo strong as to sway and carry with it all the rest, even to the Preservation or Destruction of the whole compound Nature. Whereas its proper Office is, so to adjust all the Particular Tendencies and Operations, as to make them combine together in a beautiful Union towards obtaining the most commendable common End; and not to fuffer any One to prevent or obstruct the most Rational, and what should always

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always be the most Prevailing Inclination, from being gratistied. Thus ought our Little World to be govern'd after the Model of the great System about us; where the heavenly Bodies, notwithstanding very Different and Opposite Tendencies, are made to conspire harmoniously towards the glorious End of the Whole.

Now the Understanding and Will being Principaly the Operations of this pure Spirit, tho' they are necessarily transacted in Concurrence with material Organs; we may observe from what passeth within us, that they remain the fame, and unaltered in Approbation and Defire, even when they are most violently opposed and contradicted by the Inclinations and Appetites of the animal Soul; nay even when the Spirit is prevailed on to Comply with them. So that we shall in Spirit approve and Desire or Will, that very instance of Virtue and Goodness, which upon the vehement Reluctance of the Flesh and inferior Soul we choose to decline: And we shall Condemn that very Vice or Wickedness which we Choose to commit, and to which we bear in Spirit the greatest Hatred and Aversation; or in the Apostle's Phrase, That which I do, I allow not; for what I would, that do I not; but what I hate, that do I. The pure Intellect and Will are rarely or never so brought over to the Enemies Side, as to fall in with them intirely, or to abet and maintain their Cause with Pleasure and Approbation; B b 3

tho' they may be carried into Captivity by our own Default; and into fuch a State of Bondage and Subjection as to be past all Hope or Prospect of any Release. But still in the midst of Chains and Fetters, the Spirit, like a royal Captive awful even in Diffress, will asfert its native right of Dominion, and upbraid its Betrayer with unjust and treacherous Usurpation. From thence come Remorfe of Confcience, and boding Expectation of inconceivable Misery in a future State, occasioned by going out of the World with our whole Frame voluntarily Inverted; and by the Pure Spirit's being probably configned over by Death to the endless Tyranny of the Inferior Soul, upon the Re-union of Body and Spirit at the Refurrection.

II. THE Word used in Scripture to denote the fecond Principle in Man is Juxn which hath various Acceptations. In 1 Pet. ii. 11. it is taken for avevium or the pure Spirit of Man, Beware of fleshly Lusts which war against the Soul; and thus it is to be interpreted whereever it is apply'd to a pure Spirit in a State of Separation. Sometimes it is taken for both these, Spirit and Soul together, as Thou Fool, this Night shall thy Soul be required of thee; as likewise in all Places where mention is made of Saving the Soul, or of loving God with All the Soul. Very often it is taken for the whole Man, let Every Soul be subject to the higher Powers.

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Powers. And lastly, it is ever included in the Word Flesh when it is set in Opposition to wre was or the pure Spirit; as where it is said, The Spirit indeed is willing, but the Flesh is weak. The Flesh lusteth against the Spirit, and the Spirit against the Flesh. I know that in me, that is in my Flesh, dwelleth no good thing.

THIS Part of us is Mortal, subject both to Moral and Natural Corruption; and as it owes its Being to the Conjunction of the pure Spirit with the Body; so it ceaseth and is dissolved again immediately upon their Separation: This is the Seat of all our irregular Inclinations and Defires; and as it is Nearer ally'd to the Body than the Spirit, so it is greatly taken up in the Conservation of its being, and providing for the full Gratification of all its Appetites. For which Reason it is by the Heathen Philosophers branded with fuch Names of Contempt as these; the Horse, because it is headftrong and runs away with the Man, or rather with the Spirit which ought to have the governing of the Reins. The Beaft in us, because the animal or sensitive Soul is supposed common to us with Brutes. The Woman or Child in us, because the Passions and Affections of Women and Children are commonly stronger, and their Reason weaker than in Men. So that, as I have met it well observed, Mun is an amphibious Creature, of a middle Order and Nature between Angels and Brutes: With these he par-B b 4 takes

takes of a corporeal Soul, vital Blood, and a Mass of animal Spirits; with the former he partakes of an intelligent, immaterial, immortal Spirit.

Now whether we suppose this inferior Soul an Original, Distinct, Constituent Part of our Frame, answerable to the same in Brutes; or fome third Principle necessarily arising from the effential Union of an immaterial Substance with Matter; yet if confidered abstractedly from that pure Spirit, it is best conceived and spoke of in this Abstracted Sence, by the Soul of a Brute; which of itself could give no more than Life, and Mation, and bodily Appetites; and perhaps fome superior Degree of natural Infinet, as is most observed in those Beasts which approach nearest to human Shape: And were the Body of a Man to grow up with that Alone, without the addition of an Immaterial Substance, he would be no more than a Beast in human Shape. When the pure Spirit was breathed into the Body, Man became a Reasonable, as well as a Living Soul; and thence, what would otherwife have risen no higher than Bodily Appetite, Sense, and Instinct; is improved, not only into Understanding and Will, but into all the Passions and Affections of a reasonable human Nature.

THESE Affections were all regular in our first Creation; but by the Fall our bodily Appetites got the upper hand of our Reason, and became so headstrong and violent as to draw off all the Passions and Affections of the Mind from God, and Goodness, and the things of another Life; and ingage them too much on the present Objects of Sense, which were adapted to the more immediate Pleasure and Gratisication of those Appetites common to us with Brutes. These in a State of corrupt Nature being craving and impetuous, do with Clamour and Fury in a tumultuous manner, hurry away all those Affections of the Mind; in Contradiction to the still Voice, and calm tho constant Advice and Tendency of the pure Understanding and Will; and bring them over to the Flesh. Thus it is that these Affections, from being the Instruments of all Virtue and Holiness; become corrupt and degenerate, and are subservient to all manner of Vice and Wickedness: And thus at last is the pure Spirit itself importun'd into a Consent to their finful Motions, tho' not to an intire Approbation of them.

AND now we see what a spacious Scene of Knowledge the clearing up this Distinction of Spirit, and Soul, and Body in Man, hath opened to the Mind with respect to the whole System of Moral and Practical Religion; by pointing out to us wherein our Strength lies, and where our Weakness; and discovering to us the true Seat of all our Corruption, and the means and method of our Cure,

Our Strength lies in the Immaterial part of us affisted by the Grace of God, which is the fecret and ineffable Communication of the holy Spirit to the Spirit of a Man which is in him; to enable it to refift and overcome all the Al-Iurements and Temptations of the fenfitive Soul; and recover its native right of Dominion over all the Faculties of the inferior Man. This purely spiritual Part of us may be enticed and Allured, but never overcome by Force; for it is a noble Principle, whose Ruin must proceed from itself; it can lie under no Compulsion or Absolute Constraint from any thing without it, but from that only which is Almighty. As there is nothing more Feeble than the Mind of Man, when it refigns itself up to irregular Passion and Appetite; so there is nothing in Nature fo Strong and invincible, whenever it is truly and steadily resolved to be so: When by divine Affistance it exerts itself to the utmost, the World and the Flesh are not able to Cope with it, nor the Devil to stand before it.

In a mere state of corrupt Nature indeed, this Godlike Part of us is without a sufficient Power of Direction and Government; it is so overcome and obstructed, that of itself it is utterly unable to restrain any one irregular Inclination or Appetite in the sensitive Soul, or Body: To which tho' it be essentially United, yet it can

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not diffuse its own native Inclinations and Defires thro' the unwieldy Mass; which sets up a great Variety of Lusts and Appetites of its own in direct Opposition to it; so that it cannot when Unassisted, commendably and effectualy exert itself to the Performance of any Virtue or Goodness in Thought, Word, or Deed. This made the fecret Influence of the Spirit of God upon our Spirit necessary for us; that the fame Breath of God which first gave it Being, might supply it with new Life and Vigour: Stirring up its original Inclinations and Tendencies; awakening and reviving those native Defires of Virtue and Holiness, which lay dormant and unactive under the Ruins of human Nature; and this is the Beginning of a Christian Life. When by God's Preventing Grace the Spirit is rouzed out of its Lethargy, then comes on the Struggle; the Principles of Reason and Grace, against the corrupt Appetites and Propensions of Nature. If it cherishes and encourages these First Motions of the Holy Spirit, and holds out refolutely and with firm Perseverance, it gains Ground every Day; and goes on gradualy from Strength to Strength: Till at last, like a glorious Monarch restored and confirmed, it rules the rebel Affections and Passions of the sensitive Soul, and the Appetites of the Body, with a Rod of Iron, and sways them all with its Nod. It may then approve or reject; suppress or excite; check or encourage all our Inclinations at will; it may Still

Still the raging and swelling of our Passions, and say to each of them, Hitherto shalt thou come and no further; and in short nothing shall be transacted in the little World without its Permission or Command.

Our Weakness lies in the Sensitive Soul, the immediate Seat of all our Paffions and Affections; which being as it were in the Middle between the Pure Spirit and the Body, is folicited on both fides, and must incline to one or the other: If it join with the Spirit, it will itself become spiritualized in all its Tendencies; but as it more or less inclines to the Flesh, so far it becomes carnal and degenerate. Now because all the Motions and Affections of this inferior Soul are more immediately conversant with the Objects of our bodily Appetites; and more ftrongly importuned by their constant and intimate Presence; they are in their own Nature apt to close with these, and Dwell upon them: And it is not without great Difficulty and Resolution that they can be weaned and drawn off from them; so as to be chiefly imployed upon the invisible Things of another World, and fuch Things here as have a more immediate Relation to them. For this Reason both the Inferior Soul and Body go under the Denomination of Flesh; and accordingly of this it is said, that the Flesh lusteth against the spirit, and the spirit against the flesh; and these are contrary the one to the other. THESE

THESE are the two Enemies which must engage; Implacable irreconcilable Enemies, ever since the Fall; and the short fierce Combat is for Eternity. The secret Insluences of the Holy Spirit of God come into the Assistance of the purely Spiritual Part of us; the Devil on the other side is a constant Auxiliary to the Flesh; the struggle is for no less than Life or Death everlasting; and the one or the other must obtain a complete Victory.



BOOK III.

ASUMMARY

of

The NATURAL ORDER,

and

WHOLE PROCEDURE

of

The INTELLECT.

CHAP. I.

The Mind at First a Tabula Rasa.

THAT Maxim of the Logicians is to be taken for a fure and fundamental Truth, Nihil est in Intellectu quod non fuit prius in sensu; the true Meaning of which is, that the Ideas of Sense are the First Foundation on which we raise our whole Superstructure of Knowledge; and that all the Discoveries we can make in things Temporal and Spiritual, together with the most Refined and Abstracted Notions of them in the Mind of Man, take their Rise originaly from Sensation.

At our Birth the Imagination is intirely a Tabula Rasa or perfect Blank, without any Materials either for a Simple View or any Other Operation

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peration of the Intellect. We are not furnished with any Innate Ideas of things material or immaterial; nor are we endued with a Faculty or Disposition of forming Purely Intellectual Ideas or Conceptions independent of all Sensation: Much less has the human Soul a Power of raising up to itself Ideas out of Nothing, which is a kind of Creation; or of attaining any First Principles exclusive of all Illation or consequential Deduction from Ideas of Material Objects; without which the Mind of Man, during its Union with the Body, could never have arrived even to a Consciousness of its own Operations or Existence.

DAILY Experience shews us that as far as Persons are from their first Infancy deprived of any of their Senses, they are so far imperfect in their Intellectuals. What a vast degree of Knowledge do we find cut off together with that one Sense of Hearing? Take away the Sight likewife, and then confider how limited and confin'd the Operations of the Intellect must be? If after this you remove from a Man all Tafte and Smelling, and if he hath no Ideas left for the Mind to work upon but those of his Feeling; how far would he differ from the sensitive Plant? The Mind in fuch case would not be able to infer the bare Existence of any thing external to it but what was Felt; and if it were possible for the Man to have Animal Life without Feeling, Feeling, he would be as utterly void of Know-ledge as one in a Swoon or Apoplectick Fit.

Now this is so far from being a just rea-fon to think the Soul of Man Material, that it is an Argument of the quite Contrary. For let us restore that Man to all his Senses again, in the greatest degree of Acuteness he is capable of, infomuch that he shall have his Imagination furnished with the Ideas of all Sensible Objests; yet you have not restored him to any use of his Reason and Under standing; not even to that of a Simple View or Apprehension of those Ideas. With respect to the simple Perception of Mere Sense he is still upon the same Level with Brutes; he is altogether Passive; he retains all the Signatures and Impressions of outward Objects, but in the very Order only in which they are stamped; without Transposing or Altering, Dividing or Compounding, or even Comparing them one with another: And they would always continue so in the Imagination, if there were not a Principle Above Matter, first to contemplate or view them; and then to work up those rude and gross Materials into a great Variety of curious Arts and Sciences.

C H A P. II.

Ideas of Sensation.

HE First step therefore made towards Knowledge is Antecedent to any Operation of the Pure Mind, and without any Concurrence of the Intellect; and that is, the Attainment of Ideas, or some Likeness and Representation of external Objects which may remain in their Absence; and (since all Sensation is of Particulars only, and Successively of one Object after another) which may bring them all together, as it were into one Place, for the more convenient View and Observation of the Mind. Whether this is perform'd by any actual Impression of the Object upon the Organ of Sensation; or by some Operation of the Sense upon the Object? And whether the Idea is always an Emblem of the Real True Nature of the Object; or of its external Appearance alone; or only Occasion'd by it? are Questions perhaps never to be Thoroughly decided; and therefore we leave them to be for ever debated by the Curious. These several Remarks following, which are within the Compass of our Knowledge, are more material to be observed.

1. That these Ideas of Sensation are all Simple Perceptions, and of Particulars only; which C c is

is evident enough with respect to Four of our Senses; and will appear to be so likewise of the Sight, if it is considered that tho' the Eye can take in a Confused Prospect of a great Variety of Objects at Once, yet it can take a Dissinct View of them no otherwise than Successively one after another: And tho' the same external Object may make Impressions upon More of our Senses than one at the same time, yet Each of those Impressions are of a Different kind, and each a Simple Idea in itself; tho' the Mind may afterwards put them together to make up one Compound Idea of that Object.

- 2. That this simple Perception of Objects by their Ideas, which is common to us with Brutes, is to be well distinguished from the simple Apprehension of those Ideas by the Intellect after they are lodged in the Imagination; which is an Operation never to be performed by mere Matter, without the Concurrence of an immaterial Principle.
- 3. That these simple Ideas of Sensation only are, in the strict and truly proper Sence of the Word, to be called *Ideas*; and that tho' this Term may improperly be extended to signify any of *These* consider'd in Conjunction with the *Operations* of the Mind upon them, yet it then serves only to darken the Subject and consound the Understanding.

4. That these are the Materials and Ground-work of all our Knowledge. And if any one hath a Doubt whether they are fo, let him instance in some one Simple original Idea, which we are not beholden to the Senses for; one that the Intellect can call altogether its own; and which it acquired intirely Independent of them. The very Idea of Existence, which is the most direct and immediate one we have with respect to Immaterial Beings, is from the Senses; in the Knowledge of which the Intellect proceeds thus: As from the Existence of one thing Material actualy perceived, I infer the possible and even probable Existence of other things Material which were never the Objects of any of my Senses; so from the known Existence of things Material I draw this Consequence, That other things may and must exist which are Not Matter. Were it not for our Actual sensible Perception of Bodily Substance, we should not know what it was to have a Reing, nor could we be conscious of even our Own Existence.

So likewise all the Idea or Notion we have of *Power*, is from the Operations we observe in things purely Material one upon another; or from the Operation of the *Mind* upon its *Ideas*, and its voluntary moving of the *Body*: And therefore because we can have no *Proper Notion* or *Direct Idea* of the Power of *Creation*,

or of producing a Thing into Being no Part of which existed before; we Endeavour to conceive it after the best manner we can, by the Power of a Man in making fomething out of Pre-existent Materials. Thus we form a Conception even of Eternity itself from Time, which is measured by the Motion of the Heavenly Bodies; and from the Duration of things material. So likewise by enlarging the Idea we have of Space and Extension, the Mind forms to itself the best positive Conception of Infinity it is capable of; and all the Notion of it we have beyond this, is only a Negation of any Stop or Boundary. Nay when we attempt to form any Simple Idea of God himself, it is by no other than that of Light, or the Glory of the Sun. For this Reason we naturaly fall into that way of speaking of things immaterial, and whereof we can have no direct Perception or proper Idea, in the very same Style and Language we speak of Ourselves and other things of this World; or else express them in Terms purely Negative, fuch as Infinite, Immaterial, Immortal, Incomprehensible, and fuch like.

For the same Reason it is, as I have met it well observed, that we express the purest Operations of the Intellect by Terms borrowed from Sensation, Animi ipsius Functiones vocibus quæ a rebus corporeis sunt translatæ designamus; quod nimirum res apprehendat, quod discurrat, &c. As we fay in English, that the Mind Apprehends

hends or Takes a thing, that it Runs over it, and fuch like: Because we have no Ideas of those Operations; and therefore when we form the most Abstracted Conceptions we can of them, it is not to be done exclusively of those Objects which are Thought of or Willed; in the most refined Composition of which Objects, there will always be found a Mixture of sensitive Ideas or a Dependence upon them. And thus likewife all the Conceptions we have of the particular Affections and Passions of the Soul of Man, are in some Measure made up out of Ideas of Sensation. We cannot form any Notions of them exclusive of the Objects which occasion them, and of their different Manner of affecting the Body, by which they become Vifible in the Lineaments of the Face, or the outward Deportment of the Person: And by joining such Ideas to a Consciousness of Pleasure and Pain in the Mind, we form a Complex Notion of each Passion. Thus we partly conceive Joy and Gladness by the sparkling of the Eyes and dilating of the Countenance; Sorrow by a down Look and a Contraction of all our Features; and Anger by the Diftortion of them. There is a peculiar Look of Envy, another of Shame, and another of Despair. Let any Man try to form an Idea or Conception of any particular Passion abstractedly from all External Things which are its Objects, and from all Effects of it on the Body; and he will foon perceive what a Dependence it has on Ideas of Sense, and what a Portion Cc3

a Portion of them must be taken into the Account. In short whilst the Spirit is in Conjunction with the Body, if you remove from it all Ideas of Sensation, the whole Superstructure of Knowledge Human and Divine salls to the Ground; the Intellect could then have no Thought, having nothing left to think of: Nay tho' at the same time we should suppose the Existence of Myriads of Immaterial Beings; since nothing is plainer, than that it could have no direct and proper Idea of them.

WHEN these Impressions which we are by God and Nature disposed to receive from outward Objects, are imperceptibly conveyed thro' the Organs of Seniation inwardly to the Imagination; to be there reposited and stored up as the Groundwork and gross unwrought Materials of all Knowledge, whether of things Material or Immaterial; then it is that they obtain the Name of Ideas: Which are ever more clear, and diffinct, and permanent according to the present Disposition of the Organ of Sensation; the just Distance of the Object; the Strength of the Impression made upon the Sense; the frequent Repetition of that Impression; and the Disposition of the Medium. It is called the Imagination from the Images of external Objects lodged in it, in the fame confused and disorderly manner they are transmitted from the Senses; and Sensus Communis, because it is the inward common Receptacle of all the outward Impressions

Impressions made upon them. This is a Faculty in Man, as well as Brutes, purely Pasfive; and differs from Memory in that it is, more distinctly speaking, the Storehouse or Repository; but Memory regards rather the Fur-niture or vast Variety of Ideas themselves, lodged there for the use of the pure Intellect; and is not a Distinct Faculty from the Intellect, as the Imagination realy is; but an Ability in it to Revive again and bring into View any Ideas or Notions wherewith the Imagination has been once impregnated, without the repeated Presence of the Objects or Occasions which first excited them. When we fay a Man hath a lively or working Imagination, it is but a mistaken and vulgar way of expressing the more dextrous and sprightly Operations of the Intellect upon the Ideas That is stored with: And confifts particularly in a quick and ready Comparison of them with one another; and placing them together in such a Light, as that they shall mutualy reflect a Beauty and Lustre from one to the other, and by that means produce a Surprise and Pleasure in the Mind.

Tho' all hitherto is not properly Knowledge, but only what is common to us with Brutes; yet it is an immense Fund of Materials laid in for the Imployment of the Mind. The Ideas which the Imagination is capable of containing are not within the Power of Number; especialy fince the great increase of Cc4

them by Telescopes and magnifying Glasses: It is a Faculty wide and extensive as that System including the fix'd Stars; and is of Capacity enough to take in Ideas from all the Objects of the whole visible Creation.

CHAP. III.

The simple Apprehension of the Intellect, or its View of those Ideas.

THE next Advance in the Order of Nature is to what is truly and properly Knowledge; and that is a bare Contemplation or Simple View by the pure Intellect of those Ideas lodged in the Storehouse of the Imagination; in the very fame Order and Condition they were transmitted from the Senses: Without any Transposition or Disturbance of their Situation, and without any Comparison, Composition or Division, Enlargement or Diminution; without any Change or Alteration of them whatfoever; and without any Judgment, or Remark, or Observation, which may be formed into an affirmative or negative Proposition. By the Pure Intellect I do not mean the Pure Spirit or immaterial Principle in our Composition, in Distinction from all that is Material in us: But the Spirit in effential Union with the Body; and particularly with those animal Spirits, and imperceptible exquisite Fibres of the Brain, which are the more

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more immediate Instruments of Reason and Understanding.

THIS first Operation of the Intellect is by the Logicians very aptly call'd Apprehenfio Simplex. But then it hath been confounded with Sensation or the simple Perception of the Senses, to which it is subsequent; whereas This pre-supposes all Simple Ideas of Sensation Already formed and lodged in the Imagination, and actualy prepared for the Operations of the Intellect: I do not fay of the Mind, because this is a more complex Term, and includes not only the Intellect, but the Will; together with the Memory, and all the Passions and Affections of that inferior Soul which refults from the Union of the pure Spirit with the Body. This is the only Intuitive Knowledge we have, properly speaking; and is the first Degree of Knowledge, as it is rightly distinguished from that fimple Perception of outward Objects which is common to us with Brutes: And it is a peculiar Privilege of Man to be capable of this Contemplation or View of his own Ideas, by having an Immaterial Principle in his Composition.

THAT Brutes cannot have even this Simple View or Contemplation of their own Ideas, not having an immaterial Principle in their Nature, is evident; for all external fensible Objects, and the Organs of Sensation which are disposed

disposed to receive their Signatures or Impresfions; and the Imagination likewise in Brutes which receives and retains those Impressions, are all purely Material: So that what a Figure in the Wax is, to the Seal; that an Idea is, in respect of the Object of which it is a Similitude and Representation. It is no more than the Impression of one thing material upon another; and let this be ever so Strong, or ever so often Repeated; and let the Number of Ideas be ever so Many, still the Imagination is in this case but purely Passive: And therefore these Ideas cannot exert any Operation upon Each other; nor can any One of them take a View of the Rest, or exercise any Power whatsoever beyond that of a material Impulse.

THE simple Perception of Brutes is properly speaking a Perception of the Object by the Idea; and not of the Idea itself, or any View or Contemplation of it in Distinction from the Object. Which simple Perception of Sense they have, from their all-wise Creator, often to a greater Perfection than Man; because the Ideas of Sense in the Imagination of Brutes are the whole Sum and Substance of their Knowledge (to speak by way of Analogy) which in Man are but a Foundation for it, and Materials only for a great and glorious Superstructure: And because these are their sole Principle of Action; infomuch that they are wholy and Passively conducted in all their Pursuits by the Force

Force and Impulse of those Ideas of Sensation alone (which is Natural Instinct) and not by any separate View or Contemplation of them; which is the Beginning of Reason or Knowledge.

BRUTES are under a natural Necessity of always following the Force and Impulse of those sensible Impressions, which alone set them a going; they continue to operate as long as there are any Remains of that Impulse, and in Proportion to the Strength or Weakness of it: And are ever disposed to take a different Turn and Propension from every Renewal or Change of those sensible Impressions; which they can never Revive or renew when impair'd, by any Power in Themselves, without the repeated Presence of the Objects. It may give us a tolerable Image of their Proceeding in all their Operations, as they are prompted and urged on by Impressions of outward Objects upon their Senses; to observe how one Globe or Ball striking upon another, gives a very Different Determination to its Motion according to the Force which is communicated, and the Point which it happens to touch upon: That which receives the Stroke hath no Power Within it either to divert its Course, or to abate or stop the Motion, which is necessarily continued whilst there are any Remains of the first Impression; but fails gradualy, and wears away till it ends in Rest; and so it continues till the same Stroke

is Repeated, or that it happen to receive some New and different Determination of its Motion.

How great the Number of our Simple Ideas is, will not eafily be conceived, otherwise than by confidering that our Imagination, from being at first a perfect Blank, doth in our Infancy receive some Obscure and Confused Delineations of external Objects of Sensation; together with a Dead and Lifeless Colouring only: All which are cleared up gradualy by frequent Impressions, as with the repeated touches of a Pencil, and grow every Day more Conspicuous and Distinct; till at length they become a delightful Representation and Lively Picture of all Nature.

THIS comprehensive Intellectual View of universal Nature in Miniature, must give no fmall Pleasure to the Mind of Man; when it thus fees the vast extent of human Understanding, and that it hath no Limits on this Side the fix'd Stars. It must be transported to find it can look Inward for a Prospect of all things Without it, as far as the Eye, the most extenfive Organ of Senfation can reach, or Optic Glasses can carry it: And in short that the Man can behold a Little World within his own Brain, in its Ideas; which are all his own proper Goods, and which he is intire Master of, so as to manage and dispose them at his arbitrary Will and

and Pleasure. Whereas Brutes carry their Ideas about with them, as Passively as they do their Burdens; at least for no other Purpose properly of their own, except for a Necessary Direction and Guidance in all their Motions.

However, these original Simple Ideas are still in Reality but a numberless Variety of choice and excellent Materials of all Kinds for the Intellect to work upon; and for the Exercise of all its Operations in respect of Human and Divine, Speculative and Practical Knowledge. These are the only Foundation of it all, laid by God and Nature; but the Workmanship out of them is various, according to the different Temper, and Disposition, and Application of Men's Minds: And the Superstructure raised upon this Foundation is either Gold, Silver, and Precious Stones which will abide the Trial; or on the contrary Wood, Hay, and Stubble which are fit only to be burnt.

But to be a little more Particular. The generality of Men are so indolently Incurious and unobserving, as to make little farther Improvement of Knowledge from these simple Ideas, than what they are daily prompted to by their Appetites and Passions; and so of course make the nearest Approaches to those irrational Animals, which are altogether under the Power and Conduct of Sensible Impressions.

OTHERS there are who may be faid only to Play with these Ideas, as Children do with their Trifles. Who by arriving, with long Practice, to a great Dexterity in Rattling them one against another by Strained and unnatural Comparisons, which are mostly expressed in a Style Inverted and perplex'd, together with a Gingle of Words; do tickle the Ears of the Superficial and Lazy. Thus under the plaufible Titles of Wit, and Fancy, and Humour, they Strike out of their Ideas a false and flashy Light, to Amuse and surprise; but not Instruct or improve the Understanding. The Performances of this fort either in Writing or Conversation, for the most part please by their Odness only; by their Author's straying not only out of the Common, but out of the Natural and Useful way of Thinking: They are calculated chiefly for the use of such as consult nothing but Ease and Pleasure of Body and Mind; and who have not Capacity or Refolution for the Attainment of any Knowledge that is Solid and *Useful*; they serve only for filling up that Time which is not employ'd in other Diverfions; and then grow flat and infipid, when they have for Once gratified an Itch of the Mind. As the former supine Carelesness of the Vulgar is properly to be ranged under the Denomination of Folly; fo this is no other than a fort of voluntary Frenzy, as the Men of this Strain themselves are pleas'd to describe it; Great Wits to Madness sure are near ally'd. A

A VERY different or rather opposite fort of Men there is, who having a Solid natural Genius, cultivated by a sober and happy Education, do work up those simple and gross Materials into Lasting and Stately Superstructures, for the real Use and Ornament of Human Life. This is performed by a nice and curious Observation of all their mutual Relations and Connections; by finding out the real Likeneffes of those that are different, and the real Differences of those that are like; by Sorting and ranging them all into proper Classes, under peculiar and distinct Heads and Denominations; by refolving them into a Series of Causes and Effects; and by pursuing them thro' many Consequences and Deductions, till they are at last form'd into regular Schemes of Arts and Sciences, and into rational Systems of natural Religion and Morality.

AND here I must observe, that Men of the most Solid Judgment never decline what is Truly Wit, but cultivate and intermix it in their most serious Performances. I mean that kind of Wit which animates the Works of the celebrated ancient Authors, like the agreeable Life and Spirit proper to fine Gentlemen; without any mixture of the Antick Quickness and Preternatural Agility of Dancers, and Eufscons, and Posture-men; not to say even of Apes, and Reptiles. It is this which makes them outlive

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all their Descendents; which renders them very hardly imitable, and the Standards of good Sence and Expression thro' all Ages and Languages; because they never lose fight of Nature, but ever keep close to her in all her Windings and Labyrinths. This is a Felicity and Excellence so peculiar to them, and some few others, that it is as difficult in the Description as in the Imitation; but thus much we may venture to fay, that their Wit is ever Free, and Easy, and such as flows of itself. It is truly an Imitation of Nature, and not a miserable wresting and Distortion of it; by either representing her Swoln and Bloated, and Larger than the Life, which is Monstrous: Or Less than her own just Size and Stature; cramping and diminishing her Features in low and Homely Comparisons; which is to make her appear Dwarfish and despicable. Wit is ever truly valuable whilst it is an Handmaid to Reason; and not a proud, and freakish, and domineering Mistress. When it ferves to all the Purposes of Brightening and Polishing, without Defacing our Images; and of giving Light, and Illustration, and even Splendor to things in themselves Dark, and Obscure, and Difficult to be apprehended; instead of Glaring, and so Dazling the Eye of the Mind, that it cannot have a Distinct useful Perception even of the plainest Object. In short, when it is such a Description and Picture of Nature, as keeps strictly to all her just Proportions and Lineaments; in which she may be seen and admired by the Beholders

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Beholders in her own Genuine Simplicity and Native Modesty: And which doth not deck her out in a Tinsel and Gawdy Dress; or expose her to publick View in Loose and Wanton Apparel.

THIS great and commendable Progress, in raising such losty Superstructures out of Materials fo mean in Appearance, is often attended with no small Danger and Hazard; as the sad Experience of too many hath shewn us. For when they have carried them on to the greatest Height of Knowledge attainable in things merely Natural and human; and do find that from thence they cannot look Strait into Heaven, or have such a Prospect of things Spiritual and Immaterial as they have of the Objects of Sense; and that their Minds cannot be furnished with such Clear and Distinct Ideas of them, as are also Direct and Immediate: Then they intirely acquiesce and seek no farther; setting up here their Marks of the utmost Boundaries to human Understanding, engraven and distinguished with this celebrated Motto, Quæ supra nos, nihil ad nos. From these imaginary Altitudes of theirs they look down, with a contemptuous Air, upon all the Advocates of Revelation and Mystery; perpetualy calling upon them for Ideas, nay even Simple Original Ideas of things altogether imperceptible and inconceivable by any Proper and Direct Ideas; and ever upbraiding them with their having Faith FART Dd withwithout Reason; with Believing without Knowledge; and with having Knowledge without Ideas.

Thus these Men continue to live and die in a polite and learned Infidelity, for want of this plain and obvious Confideration; that upon their grand Principle of allowing no Knowledge farther than they have Direct and Proper Ideas, there could be no fuch thing even as Natural Religion: Nay they must not acknowledge the Existence of an Angel or Spirit; or of God himself, since it is plain that they can have no Direct Perception or Proper Idea of him; and that for want of any fuch Idea, we are obliged to form to our felves a very Complex and Analogous Notion or Conception of him, out of the best Ideas the Mind is supplied with from the visible Creation, consider'd together with its own Operations upon those Ideas. And this Notion or Conception of him (for it is no *Idea*) is so very *Complicated*, that perhaps it is not exactly the same in any two Men what-soever: Yet however *Complex* it is, and collected from all the Excellencies we can discover in the visible Creation (but more especialy from the greatest Persections observable in Man) and however Analogous only; yet it is a Solid Ground and Foundation for all the Precepts of natural Religion, and the practical Duties of Morality.

CHAP. IV.

Compound Ideas of Sensation.

ROM this fimple Apprehension or Intui-tive Contemplation of Ideas in the Imagination, the Intellect proceeds not only to make its own manifold Remarks and Observations upon them, in the same Situation and Condition they appear there: But intirely to Invert their whole Order and Disposition at Will; and to fit and prepare them by numberless Changes or Alterations in whole or in part, for any Use or Purposes of its own. For tho' the pure Intellect cannot Add one Simple original Idea to the Number already in the Imagination, yet it hath an arbitrary and despotick Power over all that it finds there; and exerts itself to the utmost in a great Variety of Operations upon them. It Enlarges or Diminisheth them at Pleasure in any Proportion; as for instance, the Idea of a Mite may be increased to the bigness of an Elephant, and that of the Sun may dwindle into the Size of a Spark of Fire. It Compounds or Divides them; as the Idea of a Man and Horse may be put together into one; and when the Compositions are thus Against Nature, they are stiled Chimeras: So again the Idea of a Man's Body may be divided into its integral Parts, or bodily Members. It Unites or Separates them; Dd 2

as it can bring a multitude of particular Ideas of Men together to make up the compound Idea of an Army; so it can Separately consider things Inseparable in Nature, as the Pure Intellect from the Will and Affections, for the more Distinct View and Reasoning of the Mind, and this is truly Abstraction. It Improves or Debases any of its Ideas; as the Idea of Light may be carried on beyond that of the brightest Sun Beams, which Men do when they attempt to form any Simple Idea of God's Glory; so again a Shadow may be aggravated till it ends in thick and palpable Darkness. It Compares them infinitely to find out their Relations, and Similitudes, and Oppositions; and then by forting, and transposing, and bringing them together, it forms to itself an endless Variety of Compound Ideas. It places one Idea to Stand for many or all others of the fame kind, and thus renders it Universal in its Signification. It substitutes the Idea or Conception of one thing for another whereof it has even an Imaginary Resemblance, as in Metaphor; or of which it has a Real and Known Similitude, which is Human Analogy. And lastly it substitutes our Conceptions of Things human and Directly known, for the Representation of Immaterial Objects whereof we have no Direct Idea or Conception; and this, not on account of any Known, but an Unknown tho' Real Similitude, or Proportion, or Correspondency which is Divine Analogy. HERE

HERE again is a New Enlargement of the Mind of Man, and an Advance towards Knowledge which Brutes are not capable of: For as they have not even that simple Apprehension of the Intellect, which is diffinct from the Perception of Sense; fo are they much less capable of any of these Operations that are all Subfequent to this simple Apprehension. They have not the least Power over their Ideas, either to Enlarge or Diminish them; to Compound or Divide them; to Unite or Separate them; to Improve or Debase them; but above all to Compare them with one another, to Substitute Ideas or Notions for the Representation of others, on account of any Real or Imaginary, Known or Unknown Proportion or Similitude. In short Brutes can neither Transpose nor Alter any one Idea in their Imagination; but are on the contrary altogether under the Power of their Ideas or sensible Impressions, as to their whole Direction and Conduct.

How great a Privilege of a rational and human Mind this is, and what a vaft Scope it gives to the Understanding, will immediately appear when it is considered; that the very same Power the Intellect hath over its Simple Ideas, it hath also over all its own various Alterations of them, and endless Compositions out of them. The very Same Operations of the Intellect are renewed and exerted to the D d 3 utmost

utmost Over again upon these likewise; so as to transpose, and alter, and combine them with the fame despotick Power: And as those Operations are all thus repeated upon this New Sett of compounded Ideas; so it may proceed to operate after the same Manner upon those that are Doubly compounded, as we may fay; and so on according to the working or dexterity of the Mind. If our store of Simple Ideas only are Innumerable, as we have feen they are; furely the Alterations and Combinations of them by the Intellect, together with its own Observations upon their several Qualities and Relations must be more so: And if the Intellect can exercife the fame Operations over again upon its own Further voluntary Compositions out of them; then our Compounded Ideas can hardly come within the Power of Arithmetick to number. As I have met it expressed with Hyperbole enough, The Truths and Resolutions of the Intellect from thence, must be prodigiously more than have yet been discover'd by the Sons of Men: And perhaps they contain more than would ever be discovered, were the present Frame of things to continue as it is for Millions of succeeding Ages. And again, If a few Letters are capable of infinite Combinations and Alterations, what endless Variety must the Combinations and Alterations of the Ideas we are furnished with from all the Objects of the visible Creation, afford?

IT is of no small Consequence to our Progreis

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gress in Knowledge to observe here, that the Term Idea is attributed to those Alterations and Combinations of the Intellect in a Less proper Sense; and not in the same Strict Propriety in which it is attributed to the Simple and Original Perceptions of the Senses, when conveyed to the Imagination. However as these are the Primary, so the other are a Secondary Sett of Ideas: But then we must intirely drop the Term here, and carry it with us no farther; for all Beyond these are either Notion, or Conception, or Apprehension; or what you may more properly call by any other Denomination, than that of Idea.

The want of distinguishing rightly between the Simple Perceptions of Sense, and the Simple Apprehension of the Intellect; between the Primary and Simple Ideas of Sensation which are Independent of the pure Intellect, and those Secondary compound Ideas which are its Creatures; between all those, and the Complex Notions and Conceptions of the Mind: But above all, the want of distinguishing between the Conceptions of things human, when they are Direct and Immediate; and when they are transferr'd to things spiritual and immaterial by Semblance only and Analogy. For want, I say, of observing these fundamental Distinctions thro' our modern Systems of Logic and Metaphysics; their Authors, instead of Helping the Understanding and enabling it to clear up things obscure and difficult; Ddd 4

have on the contrary rendered the plainest Truths Mysterious and Unintelligible: To such I mean who will strictly keep within their Method and Rules of resolving even all that Knowledge which consists in Complex Notions and Conceptions, indifferently and promiscuously into Ideas of Sensation and Reflection, as equaly Simple and Original.

TAKE an Instance of this truth in one Point of Knowledge; God is to be worshipped by Man. In this Proposition there are three Complex Notions or Conceptions express'd; that of God, which is a Conception or Notion not only very Complex, but made up of the utmost Perfections of our own Nature Analogicaly attributed to an infinite Being who is Incomprehensible, that is, of whom we have no Proper or Direct Idea; and this is a Conception the plainest Man is capable of forming to himself, according to the Measure of his Understanding. Divine Worship is a complex Notion, formed by putting together the outward Posture of the Body, the Intention of the Mind, all those Passions and Affections which are the Ingredients of Devotion in the Soul; together with the Invisible Object to which all these are directed. Man is likewife a very complex Notion or Conception, including the outward Figure of the Body, the immaterial Spirit with the pure Intellect and Will, and all the Passions and Affections of the inferior Soul; and every one puts as many of

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these together as he can to make up his Notion of a Man. Thus that Proposition is Plain and Intelligible to every Capacity; and if this Point of Knowledge should come to be Refolved Analyticaly, it would be found to have taken its first Rise from our simple original Ideas of Sensation, particularly that of an human Body: From whence the Intellect, proceeding gradualy thro' all its own Observations and Deductions, came at length to form that Proposition which is of fo much Consequence in Religion. So that it evidently appears this Affertion may very well be granted to our Freethinkers as true, That we can have no Knowledge without Ideas, nay even without Ideas of Sensation; and yet be very false in Their Sence of it, which is That we can have no Knowledge of things, whereof we have no Ideas.

But according to the modern Affectation of resolving all our Knowledge into Ideas, nay Original Simple Ideas, tho' Not of Sensation; see what a long Chain of Ideas must be Drawn out before you can arrive at a true Knowledge of this Proposition. You must have an Idea of God, of whom you can have no Idea; and of all his Attributes, every one of which are Incomprehensible. You must have an Idea of Worship, whereof you can have no Idea farther than of the bodily Posture, or of the Elements and outward Materials used in Worship; all the other main Ingredients of Divine Worship added

added to these make up a Complex Notion, not an Idea of it. Nay you must have distinct and separate Ideas of all the Operations of the Intellect; and of all those Passions and Affections which are the Ingredients of Devotion in the Mind, by Reflection: And by joining all those Ideas of Reflection, to the Ideas of Sensation which you have from the bodily Posture and outward Materials, you make up, in their way, a very Clear and Distinct Idea of Divine Worship. You must have the Idea of an human and Rational Creature or intelligent Agent, of whom you can have no other Idea but that of his outward Bodily Figure and Motion. Nay before you can lay down that Proposition for a fundamental Principle of Religion, you must have an Idea of Thinking, of Reasoning, and Deduction; the Idea of a Law; the Idea of Sanction; the Idea of Obedience and of Transgression; the Idea of Pleasure and Reward; the Idea of Punishment and Pain; the Idea of Power to give Reward, and to inflict Punishment; and all these must be Simple Original Ideas either of Sensation or Reflection. And thus if you go about to resolve any other Instance of plain and obvious Knowledge into its first Originals according to this New Method, it will be intirely loft in a confused Jumble and Rout of Ideas.

Thus far are our tedious modern Systems, which run altogether upon the Doctrine of Ideas,

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Ideas, from contributing any Real Help and Improvement to the Understanding; insomuch that when you have read them over with the greatest Attention, your Head only Chimes and Tingles with a continued incessant Repetition of the Word Idea: And you are so far from any true Advancement of Knowledge, that you have been fo long wandering out of your way; and can make no Progress till you come into the plain and open Road again. But what is yet worse, you are, by that consused and indistinct Method of proceeding, infensibly drawn into an Opinion, That you can have no Knowledge of any thing but what you have a direct and immediate Idea of; which is a Proposition fataly false, and the great fundamental Principle of all those, who set up for Reason and Evidence in Opposition to Revelation and Mystery.

CHAP. V.

The Intellect's Consciousness of its own Operations. Its complex Notions and Conceptions.

WHEN the Imagination is stored with such an immense Fund of Simple Ideas, and with its own manifold Compositions out of them; the Intellect naturaly proceeds to a Confideration of those several Operations of its own which it exerts and exercises upon them; but not to a View of any Ideas we have of them either

either Direct, or by Reflection: Andtherefore I would choose to say, it begins to mark and observe its own Operations from an inward and immediate Consciousness it hath of them; and not by the Mediation of any Ideas.

An Idea of Reflection is an empty Sound, without any intelligible and determinate Meaning. It hath been used in Opposition to our Direct Perception of sensible Objects, from whence we have Ideas of Sensation; and the Mind is prepofteroufly fupposed to come by Ideas of its own Operations, from a Reflex Act or looking back upon itself. But as the Eye is incapable of surveying its Internal Frame by any Direct or Reflex Act; fo is the Mind utterly unable to know its own Operations by any Direct or Reflex Ideas: Or to have any other Knowledge of them than an immediate Self-Consciousness, obtained while it is employed on the Ideas of External Objects. It is by those Operations upon such Ideas, that the Intellect comes to the Knowledge even of a Power within itself of exerting such a Variety of Operations. It would not perceive that it had even an Existence, or a Faculty of Thinking or Willing, were it not for some Idea or Notion of the Object which it actualy thinks upon, or desires and chooses. The Intellect first operates either upon some original Ideas of Sensation; or upon some Compositions and Combinations made out of them; or upon some Complex

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plex Notions and Conceptions of its own forming (which three take in all the Objects of human Understanding) and then it observes as exactly as it can the Nature and Manner of those Operations; and so forms to itself the best Complex Conceptions of them it is able.

THAT there can be no fuch thing as Ideas of the Operations of the Mind by Reflection, is most evident; for granting (what we have feen is evidently false) that the Mind could take a View of its Operations by Turning in upon itself, then there would be no want of Ideas to discern them by. An Idea is some Representation of an External Object in the Mind; it stands For the Object, and supplies its absence; and there would be no Need of any Representation, if the Object itself were there: But the Operations of the Mind are all Within it felf; and in order to prove Ideas of Reflection, you must suppose either that these Operations are their Own Ideas; or that the Objects themselves are overlooked, and their Ideas only made the Objects of the Intellect.

To fay that the Operations Themselves, and the Ideas of those Operations are in the Mind Together at the same time, is most absurd; as being Superfluous, and altogether without any Necessity in Nature, which doth nothing in vain. Upon this Supposition it would be utterly impossible for the most acute Logician

to

of our Understanding; and the best Resolution of the Case would be, that either one or the other may be so Indisferently; for that it would be impossible to distinguish between them. But if any one yet thinks that he hath a Simple, Original, and purely Intellectual Idea of any Operation of the Intellect, or of the Will, or of any Passion or Affection of the Mind; let him shut his Eyes, and abstract intirely from the Idea of the Object known or desired, or upon which the Passion is bent; from all Commotions in the Body; and from all the Effects and Consequences of the Passion which are External to the Mind, and then he will find nothing left to be equaly the Original Foundation of his Knowledge with Ideas of Sensation; as some would have Ideas of Resection to be.

HAVING as I hope intirely removed that flumbling Block out of the way, upon which those who have had the missortune to fall, have Halted ever after; and having left the Term Idea behind us, we may now go on to observe how the Mind proceeds to raise up to itself, out of those Ideas of Sensation consider'd together with its own Operations upon them, an endless Variety of Complex Notions or Conceptions of all those things, for which it can have no Ideas simple or compounded. How we come to have no other than complex Notions or Conceptions of God, and of Man as a rational Animal,

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mal, of the Mind, and of Divine Worship we have already feen. We have no other of the Intellect, and of all its Operations, or of any Paffion or Affection of the Soul, or of things Immaterial and spiritual; or in short of Any thing, excepting only of Sensible Material Objects. The Notion we have even of the Intellect is, that it is made up of Spirit and Matter acting in effential Union; and exerting itself in all those Operations we observe it exercise upon external Objects or their Ideas. Thus likewise it is in all our Conceptions of the Pasfions and Affections, as we observ'd before: And so we form a Complex Conception of an Angel, by substituting all the Operations of an human Mind to Stand for its Perfections; which we conclude must subsist in a Substance or Being whereof we can have No Idea, unless that which we attempt to form from the most refined and spirituous Parts of Matter.

The complex Notions or Conceptions of the Operations of the Mind are wrought up so gradualy, and obtain'd so Insensibly from one act of the Intellect to another upon the simple Ideas of Sensation, that we are at length apt to mistake them for Originals; which hath been the Occasion of that pernicious Error of calling them, and those of Sensation, promiscuously by the common Name of Ideas, and treating both as Equaly the First Ground of Knowledge. Whereas not only these, but All the

the most abstracted of our complex Notions and Conceptions are, at best but a curious Piece of intellectual Workmanship; and the Materials are no other than the Ideas of Sensation for the first Groundwork, considered together with all the Subsequent Operations of the Intellect upon them. Infomuch that the most refined and exalted Knowledge, when we come to refolve it analyticaly into Simple Ideas, will be found to end ultimately in that Sensation from whence it took its Rise: So true is that Saying of a modern Philosopher, Nulla sunt in Cerebro Vestigia, nullæ in ipsa mente Species insculptæ, quæ res ab omni sensu remotas exhibeant; atque adeo semper buc est redeundum.

HAD we Simple Original Ideas of other Objects beyond those of Sensation, we should all indifferently and readily acquiesce in our Opinions about them; a Peasant would have as Clear and Distinct Ideas of them, of the Intellect for Instance and of all its Operations; of all the Passions and Affections of the Mind; and of all things Immaterial and spiritual, as the most acute and learned Head. Our Knowledge of all these things would then be as Intuitive, as our present simple View of Sensitive Ideas in the Imagination is; there would be as rare a Difference of Sentiments, as little Variety of Judgments, and we should as seldom Dispute about them, as we do now about the common Objects of Sense.

THIS

THIS opens to the View of the Understanding a new, and immense Field of what goes properly under the Name of Knowledge and Learning in the World: For the Intellect is under a Necessity of Supplying the Want of original fimple Ideas of all things beyond fensible Objects, by the best Compositions it can, which are its Notions or Conceptions of them. These Notions or Conceptions are infinitely varied according to the different Natural Sagacity, and Acquired Improvement of the Intellect, and the Diligence and Sincerity of Men's Minds in the Pursuit of Knowledge; and they are ever more or less True, as they approach the Real Nature and Truth of things. Some Men's Notions come Short of this; and others go too far Beyoud it; fome have their Notions of things More complex, some Less; some have all the Ingredients of these complex Notions ranged more Closely and firmly and Methodicaly together, fo that they become clear, and eafy, and distinct; others by leaving them Loose and ill compacted, and not rightly Ranged, have all their Notions confused and perplex'd, dubious and uncertain. There is no end of these Complex Notions or Conceptions of things, nor of their Differences and Agreements in the Mind; besides that it is not easy to find two Men who have made up to themselves Exactly the fame complex Notion of any thing: And from hence mostly ariseth that infinite Variety of Opi-Ee nions

nions and Sentiments which occasions so many Debates and Controversies, and fills the World with Strife and Contention.

IT should be observed here, that all comprehended under this and the foregoing Head, may be aptly enough called by the Name of Judicium or Judgment; and when the Mind pronounces upon any of those Ideas simple or compounded, or upon any of these complex Notions or Conceptions by express Affirmation or Negation, then it becomes a Proposition; the Nature of which is varied according to the different Quantity or Quality of it, as the Schools term it. We are to observe likewise that the Imagination, being the Storehouse where all the original Materials are Reposited for the Exercise and Employment of the Intellect; may be conceived as if it were the Place of Acting, and the Scene of all its Operations: And it is from the close and intimate Union of the Imagination with the Spiritual Part of Man, that it is so impregnated with these Complex Notions, as to retain them there in that common Repository, together with the Ideas of external Objects obtained at the first. When this is done, the Intellect hath the same absolute despotic Power over Them, which it had over the Ideas of Sensation; it can Transpose and Separate, or Combine and Alter them at Will; It can call for them When and in What order it pleases, which is Memory: If any of these complex Notions tions are mislay'd or hid among Heaps, it can fearch it out; when any one of them is Defaced and even in appearance obliterated, it can Revive it again; after it has become dark and Confused by time, it can Brighten it up anew, render it clear and distinct, and lay it up again at hand for more ready Use on suture Occafions.

Now tho' what I have described here will to an attentive and unprejudiced Mind appear to be true, and the Real Progress of the Un-derstanding in its Attainment of Knowledge; yet perhaps by way of Answer to all this I may be asked; But may not a Man of Name and Character in the World especially for a Voluminous System of Logic and Metaphysics, justly call all these Complex Notions and Conceptions by the Denomination of Ideas, if he pleases? I answer, No; because a Man is inexcusable who always uses One and the same Term, to express indifferently Two things the most different in Nature that possibly can be; and who confounds two things which ought to be most carefully and exactly distinguished; the Ideas of Senfation, and those Complex Notions or Conceptions which arise from the Operations of the Intellect upon them: Especially when the laying down Ideas of Sensation and Respection as Equaly original, and equally the Ground of all our Knowledge, doth shamefuly mislead and Confound the Understanding; under a Pre-E e 2

tence and folemn Profession of Helping it forward, of fetting out its true Bounds and Limits, and describing its Progress. No Man should take a Liberty so evidently injurious not only to Knowledge in General, but to that of Religion in particular; and which leads Men directly into Scepticism and Infidelity, by tending to fix them in this Opinion, That they can have no Knowledge of things whereof they have no Ideas. When a Man fets out with an Error fo Fundamental, as the blending together into One, two things so totaly and intirely Opposite in Nature; his Treatise must necessarily carry along with it many Infinuations against the divine revealed Truths and Mysteries of Christianity; of which it is fure we have, properly speaking, no Ideas; tho' we have distinct Notions and Conceptions of them in their Symbols and Representatives.

CHAP. VI.

Illation or Inference, or Reason strictly so call'd.

HERE being such a wonderful Increase of Knowledge in the Mind from the Addition of our complex Notions and Conceptions, the Intellect naturaly proceeds from thence to the highest Operation of it, which is *Illation* or *Inference*. This in the more strict

ftrict and limited Sense of the Word is called Reason; which is not so much employed upon our Simple Ideas, or even those which are Compounded out of them; as upon our Complex Notions and Conceptions. For as the Perception of Sensation, with the after-View of our simple original Ideas is a kind of Intuitive Knowledge; so is that of the Agreement or Disagreement of them likewise for the most Part intuitive; it is mostly discerned at One View by a Juxta-Position; and they feldom require the Application of any Common Measure, to find out their Differences or Agreements. So fundamentaly false is that celebrated Maxim, that Reason fails us where there are no IDEAS; and that all our Knowledge consists in a Perception of the Agreement or Disagreement of our Ideas. Which Maxim evidently excludes,

of Sensation, and their Compounds. There could, according to this, be no Reasoning or Argumentation upon any of our Complex Notions or Conceptions of things; tho' upon them Chiefly our reasoning Faculty is most truly and properly employed: For the Obscurity, and Confusion, and Impersection, together with the endless Variety and Opposition of Men's Complex Notions and Conceptions, is the very Cause and true Occasion of almost all our Reasoning and Argumentation; whereas the Simple Apprehension of Ideas is much the same in all Men, and E e 3

this occasions almost a general Consent and Acquiescence in their Agreements and Disagreements.

- 2. SECONDLY, it utterly excludes all Degrees of Knowledge in things Spiritual and Immaterial, of which we have No Ideas; and which are therefore conceived by Substitution only and Analogy, and by making up the best Complex Notions we can out of things Material and Human to Represent them: Nor is it possible for us to have any Intermediate Idea or a common Meafure between things utterly Imperceptible, and Inconceivable to us as they are in their Own Nature; that is in other Words, for which we have No Ideas. We cannot difcern the Agreement or Disagreement of Ideas where there are None; and confequently according to that Maxim we could have no Knowledge of fuch things.
- 3. THIRDLY, It intirely excludes all true Illation, or the Actual infering one thing from another; and in effect all Knowledge whatfoever that is not Intuitive. Instead of Syllogism the Author of that Maxim lays down a mere naked Juxta-Position of Ideas, ranged in this Order for the more ready and convenient View of the Intellect. You must in your Mind place the two Extremes on each side; and the common Measure, or intermediate Idea or Ideas Between them, all in a Row: And then the Intellect

at one Glance will discern, first how far the Extremes agree with the Intermediate Ideas; and then how they agree or disagree with Each other, without any Express, or even Mental Deduction or Illation. For says he, Every Man hath a native Faculty to perceive the Coherence or Incoherence of his Ideas. And These are to be seen by the Eye and perceptive Faculty of the Mind.

But if every Man hath a Native, that is a Natural Faculty of perceiving the Coherence or Incoherence of his Ideas, he would with that native Eye equaly differn the Coherence or Incoherence of All, or of Any of his Ideas Alike; and there would be no Occasion for any Intermediate Ideas: For perceiving the Coherence or Incoherence between the Extremes, would be as Natural to him; as perceiving those between Them, and any Intermediate Ideas.

However, to give this intellectual Form of Seeing without Argumentation, all the Play imaginable; let us suppose that the Mind hath a native Faculty or Eye, for that kind of Perception in respect of the Coherence or Incoherence of Some of its Ideas, and not of Others. In this Case you must, according to him, place some of those Ideas, for which you Have that native Faculty of Perception, between the Extremes, for the Perception of whose Coherence or Incoherence you have No such Faculty: And then the Eye of the Mind will perceive E e 4

the Difference or Agreement between the Extremes Themselves; and all Astual Deduction or Inserence either in the Mind, or in express Words is Needless and trifling. For that supposes the native Eye of the Mind to be very Dim and Weak, and that the Man wants Spectacles; if he hath common Sence he would see Without them, and leave it to the Ignorant to draw Astual Consequences.

BUT what is all this unless a Maimed and Defective Syllogism; a laying down Premises, and forbidding the Conclusion? In Syllogism you actualy make either a Mental only, or Express Application of the Medius Terminus, alternately to the two Extremes. No, fays that Author, you shall only place the intermediate Idea or common Measure Between the Extremes; and then the Eye of the Mind naturaly perceives the Coherence or Incoherence between Them, without any fuch Alternate Application either in Thought or in Words; and the drawing any Actual Consequence in either is Superfluous. But I hope it must be allow'd, that the Actual Application of a Measure to the Extremes must render the Coherence or Incoherence more Clear and Distinct to our Selves; and that the noting and marking them down by an Actual Consequence, must render them more evident and perspicuous to Others. In both Cases the Procedure is Syllogistic; in this it is full, and express, and Complete; whereas that

that Juxta-Position is but an half formed Embrio of Syllogism: And it can have no other Tendency but to render the plain, and natural, and receiv'd way of Argumentation by Syllogism, infinitely more perplexed and Intricate; under a specious Colour of introducing a Form intirely New; or rather a way of clearing up Knowledge without any Perfect way of Reasoning or Argumentation at all.

Tho' this is abundantly sufficient; yet to shew the profound Trifling of all that hath been faid in Defence of this Juxta-Position, let us suppose it to be the best Method of proceeding in respect of all that are properly call'd Ideas: And then ask, what will become of it, when it is to be apply'd to any of our Complex Notions and Conceptions (especially when they are transferr'd to things supernatural and spiritual by Analogy) which make up the Greatest Part of our Knowledge; and upon which the Most of all our Reasoning or Argumentation is employ'd? In Simple Ideas Men generaly Agree, because they have a Native Faculty of perceiving their Coherence or Incoherence, Without such Intermediate Ideas as are required either in complete Syllogism or in Juxta-Position. But Mens Complex Notions and Conceptions are infinitely Varied; they are much less certain and determinate; so that their Coherence or Incoherence cannot be eafily discerned by the Naked Eye of the Mind: And therefore it is that

that they so often require, not a Loose and shambling, but a persect and Complete Form of Syllogism; not a consused and indistinct way of measuring, but such as is performed with more unerring Exactness and Nicety; such as shall render the Coherence or Incoherence Very perspicuous and distinguishable to our selves, and undeniable by others.

In pursuance of this fingular Notion he utterly decries and rejects Syllogism, as not only Useless but Pernicious to Knowledge; he says that Men have a sull Use of their reasoning Faculties Without it; and he allows it only to those who are Dimsighted, and cannot without Spectacles see that Agreement or Disagreement of Ideas by the Naked Eye of the Mind, which he all along glories in. His two chief Objections against it are these.

I. That it is not an Instrument of attaining Knowledge, but comes after it. Word it thus and you see the Trisling clearly; It is not an Instrument of attaining All Knowledge, but comes after Some Knowledge. For no doubt our Simple Ideas and their Compounds must be supposed Known, before we attempt any Farther Knowledge by Inserence; and these, together with their Agreements and Disagreements are for the most part indeed Intuitively discernible by the naked Eye of the Mind without Spectacles, only by a Juxta-Position of them. And thus like-wise

wife are many of our Complex Notions and Con-ceptions fo plain and eafy, that there is a general Consent about them in the Main; or at least their material Agreements and Disagreements are either so Apparent of themselves, or so Small and of no Consequence, or depend fo much on Experience, that the Mind need not be at the trouble of a continual Application of any Intermediate Notions to find out their Differences or Agreements: And therefore there is no want of Syllogism in Form in the common Affairs of Life; or in the Councils of Princes; or in Matters merely practical and experimental. And yet it must be observed, that even in These no Reasoning is just, which will not easily fall into the Syllogistic Form; and which will not appear with More Strength and Clearness in That Form than in any Other; which shews it to be the Form of Nature as well as Art. But if by this Objection he means, that Syllogism is Useless, because it comes after the Knowledge of that very Particular Point about which we are reasoning Syllogisticaly; even thus the Affertion is false: For it is no small Advantage and Use of this Form, that it throws those Arguments on which our Knowledge of That Point is built, into fuch a Short and Clear Light, as will best shew their Force both to our felves; and others who want a Conviction in the Case.

Bur tho' it should not thus far be of any great

great Use; yet it is in some Measure Necessary in Matters of Theory and Speculation, wherein our Notions and Conceptions of things are more Complex and Accumulate, and consequently our View of them more Confused and indistinct: And wherein the true Size and Proportion of Ingredients, in each Notion to be compared, must first be ascertained and determined; as well as in that of the Medius Terminus or Common Measure; before any Agreement or Disagreement can appear from an Application of it to the Extremes. And where the carefully removing from them all Ambiguity either in the Conceptions, or in the Terms by which they are expressed; and paring off every thing Superfluous and foreign, is absolutely necessary. Here I say Syllogism is an excellent Instrument of attaining true Knowledge, by pulling off the Mask from Error, and exposing it in its own naked Deformity; or as the aforementioned Author words it, By discovering a Fallacy bid in a Rhetorical Flourish, or cunningly wrap'd in a smooth Period; and by stripping the Absurdity of the Cover of Wit, and good Language; and again By detecting Fallacies concealed in florid, witty, or involved Difcourfes. To which if we add that it prevents all Circumlocution in Disputes, and wandering in a multitude of Words; that it keeps Men Close to the Subject; and helps to reduce all abstruse and intricate Matters of Controversy to one fingle Point of Decision; I think nothing more need be faid to prove it

an excellent Instrument of Reason and Knowledge: And furely till some form of Argumentation or Illation is found out which may more effectualy answer all these Ends, Syllogism must be allowed to be better than no Form at all.

2. THE fecond and indeed the most plaufible Objection is, that the Form of Argumentation by Syllogism is intricate and perplex'd; that there is much Difficulty in knowing how many ways three Propositions may be put together; and which of them conclude right, and which wrong. To which I answer, that in order to argue Syllogisticaly it is not necessary for a Man to be acquainted with All those several ways. The better he is acquainted indeed with those Modes and Figures which conclude rightly, the more acute Reasoner he will make. But a plain Man of good natural Sence, may with much ease be brought to argue Syllogisti-caly with great Readiness: Only by first making him understand what a Proposition is, and how it is varied according to the different Quality and Quantity of it; and then by acquainting him (instead of the many obscure and intricate Rules in Logick for finding it out) that a Medius Terminus is nothing but the Proof or Reason you give for any Assertion. As for instance; if one were to find out a Medius Terminus to prove that God should be worshiped by Man; he need only to think of a Reason why he ought to be worshipped by Man. When

this Reason offers itself, the whole salls naturally into a Syllogism, the Major only where-of is Hypothetic and the Conclusion Categoric, thus.

If God be infinitely powerful, wife, and good; then Man ought to worship God.

But God is infinitely powerful, wife, and

good.

Therefore, &c.

A Person who never looks farther for a Medius Terminus, than the best Reason he can give for the Truth or Falshood of any Proposition to be proved; and throws it immediately into that Hypothetic Form, which offers of itself as readily as if it were natural; and useth himself to do this in a few Instances, will come to argue Syllogisticaly with great Readiness.

Is Hall observe, here that as this Form of Syllogism which has the major Hypothetic is the most Easy, and Natural, and Clear; so it is the Best: And it hath the Advantage of an Enthymem or that which hath only an Antecedent and Consequent, because the Consequence is in this last Imply'd and Presumed only; but is actualy Expressed in the Major of the Hypothetic Syllogism; which is ever the strongest and clearest way of arguing, if it be but so form'd that the Consequence of the Major is too clear to be denied; and if it is not so, it is no Fault of Syllogism, but of him who makes it.

I SHALL give two Instances of the Usefulness of Syllogism, in detecting two fundamental Fallacies cunningly wrap'd up in a long Series of smooth Periods, and which have lain concealed in florid, witty, and involved Discourses; and in reducing two Matters in Controversy, of no small Importance, to a single Point of Decision. The first lies concealed in this Proposition, We have Ideas of the Operations of our Minds by Reflection. The Falsity of which Proposition will appear by these two Syllogisms.

If the Operations themselves, and the Ideas of those Operations, be not within us at the Same time; then there are no fuch Ideas of Reflection.

Bur the Operations themselves, and the Ideas of them, are not within us at the same

time.

Therefore, &c.

THE Minor is proved thus.

If there is no Occasion or Necessity in Nature for Both being together within us at Once, then the Minor is true.

But there is no Occasion or Necessity in Nature for both being within us at once.

Therefore, &c.

This Minor can never be evaded, 'till it be **fhewn** fhewn that there is some Occasion or Necessity in Nature for both the Operations Themselves, and their Ideas being together within us at the Same time: And if it were possible to shew that Nature acted so much in Vain; yet it must be afterwards shewn, why the Mind views the Ideas only by a reslex Act, and not the Operations Themselves; which are surely As much, if not More conspicuous and discernible than any Idea of them can be.

But that the Force of this Argument may appear to the Admirers of the Juxta-Position Method, it must stand thus. Operations of the Mind--- Ideas of those Operations--- Within us at the same time-- No Necessity-- Ideas of Respection--And now I hope they see clearly By the Eye and perceptive Faculty of the Mind, without any help of Spectacles, that it is as ridiculous to suppose both the Operations and their Ideas to be within us at the same time; as to suppose an Horse, and the Idea of an Horse to be placed together in the Imagination.

THE second fundamental Fallacy lies hidden in this Maxim, All our Knowledge consists in the Perception of the Agreement or Disagreement of our Ideas. Against which I argue thus.

If we have *Knowledge* of things, whereof we have no *Ideas*; then that Maxim is false.

Bur

But we have Knowledge of things, whereof we have no Ideas.

Therefore &c.

The Minor is proved thus.

IF we have Knowledge of things Spiritual and Immaterial; we have Knowledge of things whereof we have no Ideas.

But we have Knowledge of things spiritual and immaterial.

Therefore &c.

THE Minor cannot be denied, without denying all Natural as well as Revealed Religion. Nor can the Consequence of the Major ever be evaded, except by shewing that we have Ideas of things Imperceptible and Incomprehensible, which is flat Contradiction in Terms. Nor can it be faid that we have Complex Ideas of them, for that is not Sence; tho' Compound Ideas is good Sence, and a proper way of speaking. We can have no Knowledge of things Immaterial (whose very Existence we infer from the Existence of things Material) otherwise than by Complex Notions and Conceptions, form'd by the Mind from its own various Operations upon the Ideas of things material and human: And these are so far from giving us any Idea of them properly speaking, that they are all merely Analogical Representatives of them.

Thus I hope these two grand Maxims are fully overthrown; which are the main Pillars upon which that whole Metaphy fical Castle in the Air was crected, that hath been so much the vain and empty Boast of this sceptical and unbelieving Age: And furely till these Syllogisms are clearly answered, it must be allow'd, by all Men, to be the greatest Trisle that ever gained a Reputation in the World.

I ought not to close this Head without observing, that as Brutes have neither a simple Apprehension and Intellectual View of their Ideas; nor a Power of Compounding or Altering them; nor of raising up to themselves Complex Notions or Conceptions, out of any Intellectual Operations exercised upon those Ideas; so much less have they any Power of Illation or Consequence, that can be call'd Reason in any Degree. For in order to this, they must first have, not only a Power to perform what I have already mentioned; but also a Faculty of Internal Judgment, with regard to the Differences and Agreements of Ideas and Conceptions. And if this be granted them, why should we exclude them from a Power of Expressing those Judgments Externaly, in Propositions of some kind or other; which tho' very obscure and unintelligible to Us, yet may be very clear and well understood among Themselves? And surely those Men who contend for Brutes having de-

grees

grees of Reason, can't forbear fancying that they hear the Oxen Bellowing Propositions; the Sheep foftly Bleating Propositions; and Lyons Roaring them out imperiously. But without a Jest, it is very fure that if Brutes had any degree of Reason, their Sounds would be Articulate in Proportion to that degree: They would be the Voice and Speech, and not the Noise only of a Beaft; and every Species of Brutes would speak a Language of its own, tho' not so refin'd and articulate as Greek and Latin. This can never be denied by those, who use it as one Argument of their being rational, that they have Organs fitted for articulate Sounds: When at the fame time nothing can conclude more strongly against them; for if Brutes have Organs fitted for articulate Sounds, then there is nothing to hinder them from Speaking, but the want of fome degree of Reafon within them.

IF Brutes had an Internal Perception of the Agreement or Disagreement of their Ideas, either by a Juxta-Position of them, according to the new way of Reasoning; or by the Application of some Common Measure to them one after another, where the Agreement or Disagreement is not visible to the Eye of their natural Instinct by a mere Juxta-Position: Then it is not unlikely that they would reduce their dim imperfect Affirmations and Negations into some Form of Argumentation very like our Syllogism (which I hope might in such a Case be of Sentral Control of the Sentral Control of the Sentral Control of the Sentral Control of the Sentral Office of Sentral Control of the Sentral Office of Sentral Control of the Sentral Office of Se

vice to Brutes, tho' not allow'd so to Men) As it hath been argued to the great Credit and Reputation of Hounds, that in full Pursuit of the Game they Syllogize, when they are at a Loss by the meeting of three different ways. As extravagant as this is, it doth not come up to that of a Man's infinuating, that Brutes must have fome degree of Reafon, from a long Converfation of an old experienced Parrot upon the Subject of feeding Poultry. To this height of Reason not much less than human, have the partial Advocates for Birds and Beafts advanced them; unmercifuly excluding from this Privilege the whole race of Fishes; which furely ought to be prefumed as truly rational in their way, tho' less able to Speak for themselves: When at the same time they are such profesfed Enemies of Mankind, that they bring Us down to the level of Brutes; by maintaining that mere Matter may be endued with a Power of Thinking.

It is very observable that those who will not allow Reason (not even that degree of it which consists in Illation and Inference) to be the Distinguishing Character between Men and Brutes; do however place it in Abstraction or the Power of forming General Ideas: As if Deduction of Consequences were not a more Elevated Work of Reason, than that of making the clearest and most distinct Idea or Conception we have of any one Individual, stand in

our Mind to Represent the whole Kind; which after all metaphysical Nicety is the true Meaning of that hard Word. Tho' Brutes for want of Reason cannot do this Inwardly, so as to have thus an Universal Idea of the Kind; yet the Idea of One Man or One Dog impressed upon their Imagination, serves them to distinguish all the Individuals of the whole Species Outwardly, one after another, as the Impressions of them are made successively upon their Senses: So that these Men have unluckily placed the Distinguishing Character in that particular Instance of Reason, wherein Brutes make the Nearest Approaches to Man.

We have now brought the Mind of Man to the utmost extent of that Knowledge, it can have of Things merely Temporal. It had by Nature the simple original Ideas of Sensation only, for a Groundwork of all its Knowledge; it hath made various Transpositions, Alterations, and Combinations of them without Number. From observing the Manner of exerting its own Operations upon those Ideas, it is come to a very distinct Consciousness of all those Operations. Out of These, in Conjunction with those Ideas upon which they operate, it has raised up to itself Complex Notions and Conceptions without End; and laid them all up in the common Store-house the Imagination; either to remain there as they are, or to undergo any Farther Alterations or Combinations, at the arbitrary

bitrary Will and Pleasure of the Intellect. And laftly, it hath increased all this into an immense Fund of Knowledge, by that noble Operation of Deduction and Consequence; which in our Condition of Infirmity supplies the place of Intuition, by fathoming with a Line those Depths where the Naked Eye of the Mind cannot fee to the Bottom; and by the Application of a common Measure to such Heights and Distances, as it cannot bring Together for a single View by any Immediate and near Comparison.

THE Mind having thus proceeded to the utmost Bounds of things merely Natural, let us ftop a while here, to behold it at this Stage of its Progress; and to observe all our Idea-Mongers daily loading it with Fetters and Shackles, lest it should make any Attempt to move one Step Farther. And yet nothing is plainer than that all hitherto is no more than Secular Knowledge; and that tho' within this Compass men may arrive to the greatest Infight attainable into all things on This Side Heaven; nay tho' they could fee thro' the whole Series and Chain of fecond Caufes and their Effects, fo that one Link of it did not escape their Observation: And could calculate all the Motions of the heavenly Bodies to an Instant, yet all this is but Secular Knowledge still; and if the Mind of Man could exert itself no Farther, there would not be the least room left for any Knowledge of Religion natural or ACCORrevealed.

According to their fundamental Principle, That if our Words do not stand for I DE As, they are Sounds and nothing else; that the Mind neither doth nor can extend itself further than THEY do; and that where we have no IDEAS our Reasoning Stops, and we are at an end of our Reckoning; it is plain that the Mind is tied down altogether to Objects of Sensation; of which only, as we have feen, it can properly fpeaking have Direct and Immediate Ideas; and that it can never carry one Thought beyond the fix'd Stars, any more than if all without them were an empty Void. Nay this Consequence from those Principles would be nevertheless true, tho' we should allow our selves to have Simple original Ideas of the Operations of our own Minds; and tho' we should most absurdly call our Complex Notions and Conceptions of things here below, by the Name of Ideas: For all these are still within our scanty limited System; and will not give us the least Direct View over its Bounds; from whence we might form any one fuch Idea, or even Complex Notion or Conception, not only of the real True Nature, but even of the Existence of any thing in another World, as we have of things Here which are within the Immediate Reach and Compass of Sense and Reason. But much less can they help us to any Direct Idea or Notion either of the Existence of God, or of his real True Ff4 4 -Nature

Nature and Attributes; which is the Foundation of all Religion natural and revealed.

THO' the Men, who lay down these Positions, do not Expre/ly or in Profession renounce all Natural Religion at least; yet they plainly destroy even This by immediate necessary Confequence; whilst under Colour of adhering to the strictest Sense, and Reason, and Evidence they lay an Injurious and Unnatural Restraint upon the Understanding, and tye it down to the Objects or Ideas of Sensation only. Infomuch that the unavoidable Effect of that Doctrine in which they would be thought to excel, is plainly the precluding us from all Knowledge of any thing beyond this visible Frame, which must therefore be to us the Universe: And upon Their Principles, our Case must be much the same with that of those homebred ignorant Peasants, who cannot be perfuaded to Know or Believe there is any Earth or Sky beyond the Tops of the neighbouring Mountains.

CHAP. VII.

We have Knowledge of things, whereof we have no Ideas.

HO' these Men make an open and vain Prosession of their Progress even to the Utmost Limits of human Understanding; we must

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must however leave them far behind us, and proceed to shew how the Mind comes by the Knowledge of things whereof it neither hath, nor can have any Ideas.

THE Intellect by the foregoing Operation of Deduction or Inference, doth from the Existence of things Material and sensible, infer not only the Possible, but the Probable Existence of things Immaterial and imperceptible in General; that is, of things whose very Existence would have been utterly unknown to the Mind otherwise than by this Consequence; and which will always remain unknown otherwise than by Analogy whilst we are in this World, both as to their whole Nature, and Manner of Existence. Wherefore as we neither have, nor can have any fuch Perception or Idea of them in any degree as we have of things Material and Human; fo neither is it possible to express them in any Language so peculiar to them, that it shall not be First more applicable to things whereof we have a Direct Perception and Idea, or an Immediate Consciousness. We can find out no Proter Terms for diftinguishing, and expressing things utterly Inconceivable to us by any Proper Ideas or Direct Conceptions, as all Spiritual Beings are: So that we are under an absolute Necessity of Conceiving them by fuch Ideas and Notions as are Already in the Mind; and of Expressing all our Knowledge of them in fuch Words and Language, as were Familiar to us before any InteInference at all was made in relation to their Existence.

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IF we had as Clear and Distinct an Idea of the Substance or Properties of Spirit, as we have of Bodily Substance or its Properties; the Existence of Spirits would be known to us by their Ideas, as the Existence of Matter is known; and not by any Reasoning or Deduction only from the Existence of things Material: But this is fo far from being true, that we have no Idea at all of the Substance or Properties of Spirit. We; can discern one and the same Bodily Substance with all our five Senses; but we cannot discern a pure Spirit by any one of them, or by all of them together. Wilespend person your large person like

But why have we as Clear and Distinct an Idea of Spiritual Substance, as we have of Corporeal Substance? Because we are equaly Ignorant of Both, and can have no Idea at all of Either; this is a new Method indeed of Arguing. But fays the celebrated Author of that grand Solæcism, We have equaly clear and distinct Ideas of their Qualities. Suppose this were true, how doth it prove that we have Equaly clear and Distinct Ideas of their Substances; or that we are Equaly ignorant of them? But this happens to be as false as the other, nay doubly false; for we have not as clear and distinct Ideas of the Operations of the Mind, as we have of the sensible Qualities of Corporeal Substance.

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Ideas of the Qualities of corporeal Substance, by Impression from outward Objects; but there are No Ideas within us of the Operations of the Mind; so that the Operations Themselves are discerned, and not any Ideas instead of them: And that too no otherwise than by a Conscious-ness of the Mind's operating from the first upon Ideas of Sensation; and afterwards upon those Compound Ideas and Complex Notions which it raises up to itself out of them.

But what is yet more abfurd, granting that we had As clear and Distinct Ideas of the Qualities or Operations of our Mind, fuch as Thinking, Knowing, Doubting, and Power of Moving, as of Corporeal Qualities; yet this would give us no Idea either of the Qualities or Substance of a Spirit: For in Man these are all the joint Operations of Spirit and Matter in effential Union and Conjunction; which can give us no Ideas of the Qualities and Operations of a Substance Purely immaterial, and intirely Independent of Matter. And what is yet worst of all is, that if mere Matter is capable of having the Powers of Thinking, Willing, Knowing, Doubting, as the aforesaid Author contends; then These Properties can give us no Ideas or diftinguishing Marks of things which are Not Matter; and which must consequently be endued with Knowledge without that Thinking, which (upon this Supposition of his) must either be a Quality Essential to Matter, or else Change

Change the very Essence of Matter, whenever it is Superinduced.

I SHALL take this Opportunity of remarking here, that I suppose what led the Author abovementioned into this profound Error of a Possibility that Thinking may be superadded to Matter; was his not rightly distinguishing between our being capable of Abstractedly considering the Properties of a Substance, without considering or regarding at the same time the Substance Itself, which is very possible: And the having an Actual Perception or Idea of any Essential Properties separately and Abstractedly from the Substance itself, which is impossible; because they cannot in Their Nature exist separately from it. We cannot discern, or form an Actual Idea of the effential Properties Without the Substance; but according to common Sence we are faid to discern those Properties In the Substance, or a Substance With such Properties: This is so evident that a plain Man would laugh at you, if you should tell him that he did neither taste nor feel the Substance of the Morfel of Bread he was eating; and that for ought he knew he was chewing only a parcel of Properties, or Qualities. This absurd Notion, I fay, of an Abstraction utterly Impossible (of which this Author is every where full) led him into an Opinion of the Possibility of an Actual Separation of an Essential Property, from the Essence or Substance itself; and into a Belief that Thinking

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Thinking could become a Superadded Property of Matter, without superadding at the same time the spiritual or thinking Substance.

It is for want of any Clear and Distinct, or even Obscure and Confused Idea of Spirit, that we are forced to conceive it by framing to our felves the best Complex Notion we can of an human Mind, and then transferring it by Analogy to an unknown Being. We do not, as the aforesaid Author describes it, form an Idea of Spirit by putting together many Simple Ideas of the Operations of our Mind, fuch as Thinking, Willing, Knowing, and Power of beginning Motion, and then by joining these in their First and Original Acceptation, and as differing in Degrees of Persection only, to a Substance of which we have as Clear and Distinct an Idea as we have of Body: But we first frame to our felves the best and most perfect Complex Notion we have of an human Mind, from a Confciousness of its various Operations upon material Objects or their Ideas; and then we Substitute this Notion to represent Analogicaly a Being whose Substance and Properties are of a quite Different Kind from ours; and utterly imperceptible and inconceivable, as they are in their Own Nature. The very Reason of which proceeding of the Understanding is, because it is Necessary; for we can have no Idea either of the Real Properties or True Substance of Angel or Spirit; and if it were not for this way of Process

Process we could neither Think nor Speak of them.

For this same Reason it is, that when Men Attempt to conceive an Angel by any Simple Idea, they do it by that of the most Spirituous Parts of Matter, or more vulgarly by that of a Flying Boy, or a Winged Head; to which they add the best Conception they have of the Properties of an human Mind: And this they do for want of any Idea either of its Substance, or of its inconceivable Manner of Knowledge without any necessary Concurrence of material Organs; which is therefore no more performed by Thinking, than it is expressed or communicated by Speaking. And accordingly the Language of Revelation often falls in with this more Vulgar way of conceiving Angels and Spirits; and speaks of the Tongue, and Voice, and Food, and Mouth, and Face, and Hand of an Angel; and the very Denomination itself is taken from the manner of one Man's Sending another about Business, and originaly denotes a Messenger.

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CHAP. VIII.

From the Existence of Things material and human, is infer'd the necessary Existence of God.

ROM thus inferring the Probable Existence of immaterial Beings in General, which we call Substances from our gross Idea of Matter; the Intellect by a natural Gradation proceeds to infer the Necessary Existence of one immaterial Supreme Being, the First Cause of all things. Because the Mind perceives it to be a flat Contradiction that the Beings which have been Produced, taken all together or singly, should produce Themselves; or that they should possibly be produced or preserved as they are, otherwise than by the infinite Power and Wisdom of an Intelligent Agent: Which first Cause must be Without Beginning; since it is likewise flat Contradiction that he should have made himself.

WITH this plain, and necessary, and obvious Inference it is, that after the utmost Reach of the Understanding in the Knowledge of things Natural and merely Human, the Mind enters upon a glorious Scene of Action intirely New; and upon a very Different manner of exerting and exercising all its Operations over again.

Not by employing itself Here as it did Before, upon any Direct and Immediate Ideas, such as it had of things Natural and Senfible; nor upon any Obscure Glimmering and Impersect Ideas of things Supernatural and Imperceptible; or then raising up to itself Complex Notions and Conceptions from observing its own various ways of Operating upon Such Ideas; or lastly by making any Inferences and Deductions, in relation to Such Notions and Conceptions. No, but by choosing out the Clearest and most distinct Notions and Conceptions we have Already formed, Originaly for the Operations and Persections of our own Mind; and when they are put together into one complex Notion or Conception, properly and Immediately for the Mind of Man; then by Substituting that very Notion or Conception or Conception of Conceptions. ry Notion or Conception fo formed for the Su-preme Being; and what was a *Direct* and *Immediate* Conception before, becomes thus afterwards a Mediate, Indirect, and Analogical Representation of that incomprehensible Being, for whom we can have no Direct Conception or Idea. Thus it is that, as the fimple Ideas of Senfation only are the whole Foundation and first Materials of all Knowledge merely Natural and Human; so some of those Complex Notions and Conceptions raised up from the immediate Operations of the Mind upon Them, do become a New Foundation, and Secondary Set of Materials for the whole Superstructure of all Religion, as well Natural as Reveal'd.

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Author says we frame a Complex Idea of God, is by putting together the Simple Ideas we have from Reflection, of those Qualities and Powers which we find it better to Have than to be Without, such as the Idea we have of Knowledge (which is perform'd by Thinking) together with the Ideas of all the other most perfect Operations and Properties of an human Intellect and Will; as also the Ideas of all the commendable Affections of the Mind; and then Enlarging all these without Bounds, in their Original Acceptation, and in Degree only, by adding the Idea of Infinity to each of them: And likewise by adding Ideas even of Sensation, such as those of Existence, Duration, and Extension; and Enlarging them also to that Vastness to which Infinity can extend them.

In which Doctrine, befides the false and groundless Supposition of our having Ideas of Reflection, as Simple and Original as those of Sensation; and the Absurdity of calling it one Complex, instead of one Compounded Idea of many simple Ideas put together, which is a consused and indistinct way of speaking: And also his supposing us here to have an Idea of Instinity, which we express by a Negative because we have No Idea of it; to pass these over I say, which ought not to be passed over; there are two fundamental Errors in that Doctrine.

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THE first consists in surnishing out this Idea of God as he calls it, by Enlarging those Operations and Affections of our Mind, in Conjunction with the Ideas of Sensation beforementioned, even to Infinity: Which is in truth and reality no other than extending and aggravating fo many Infirmities (even at the best) of our human Nature, and carrying them on to a boundless Degree, till they are Monstrous beyond all Imagination. The Best and most perfect, and indeed the Only Proper Conception we have of Knowledge, is that which is perform'd by Thinking and the various Modes of it; which is the Action of Matter as well as Spirit operating together in effential Union: It is a Gradual and Successive Operation, and all the Modes of it express their own Essential Impersection; such as Reasoning, Inserring, Doubting, Deliberating, Judging. So that when we apply to God Instinite Knowledge, we ought to be so far from attributing it to him as improved in Degree only, that to render it worthy of him, we must necessarily abstract from the whole Kind, and Nature, and Manner of our Knowing; and remove from him all Thinking with the various Modes of it, as an effential Imperfection of our compounded Humanity. When we apply the Word Knowledge to God, it imports an infinite Inconceivable Perfection; Answerable to our impersect manner of Knowledge by Thinking: And yet when we say God knows, we speak as much Solid Truth, as when we say Man knows; only with this Difference, that by the Former we mean an infinite inconceivable Perfection of the Divinity; by the Latter we express the infirm State and Condition of our Humanity. And thus it is for want of Any Idea of that divine Perfection, and of any more Proper Term to express it, that we use the Words Knowledge and Thinking in common both for God and Man.

Again, the best Idea or Conception we have of Power, is from Strength of Body, or a Mighty Arm; from a Multitude of Men difciplined for War; or the moving our Body by Willing it. The best Conception we have of Goodness, is that which consists in the Informing our Understandings in Matters of Duty; rectifying our Wills; restraining and regulating our Passions and Affections; and in Benevolence from one Man towards Another. The only Idea or Conception we have of Existence, is of that of Corporeal Substance, as of a Pebble or of a Fly; or at best of Matter and Spirit in essential Union. Nor can this any way be Enlarged or improved, but by enlarging the Object which exists to an immense and boundless Size; or by Multiplying the Beings of the same Kind which do exist. If it is said, that the Idea of Existence may be enlarged by our Idea of Duration, or by the Continuance of that Existence; this itself necessarily implying Succession, is ano-Gg 2

worthy of God. Our Idea of Extension, which we have from Space or Body; and our Only Perception of Pleasure and Happiness, which we have from a Consciousness of the Gratification of our Appetites, and Passions, and Desires, are likewise altogether Unworthy of God.

Thus we see what an Unnatural hideous Composition is made up for our Notion of God, by enlarging or improving even our Best Ideas and Choicest Conceptions, in Degree alone, as far as we can extend them towards Infinity; and how it is highly *Injurious* to his Majesty and Excellency to apply any of those Words, with their *Proper* and *Original* Ideas or Conceptions, to his Incomprehensible Persections. This is plainly no other than putting together so many Infinite Imperfections of the Creature, to make up our complex Notion of the infinitely Perfect Creator. Nay tho' we could suppose all those preceding Instances to be real Perfections in us, and So far not unworthy of God; yet the very Addition of Infinity to each of them, would intirely alter their Nature, and render them Perfections of quite another Kind; for nothing that is Finite, can be of the same Kind with that which is Infinite.

The fecond Error yet more gross, and more *Pernicious* in its Consequences, consists in his supposing, that by putting together the Simple

Simple Ideas, we are faid to have, of the Operations and Affections of our own Mind; and those Ideas of Sensation beforementioned, we come by as Direct and Immediate a Conception, or Idea as he calls it, of God, as we have of the Mind itself; nay by as clear and distinct an Idea of his very Substance, as we have of the Substance of a Fly or a Pebble. This is in Pursuance of that detestably false Maxim, That we have no Knowledge beyond our simple Ideas: But the truth is perfectly the Reverse, for by that means we come by a Mediate only and Indirect Notion or Conception of God; and fuch as exhibits to us nothing of the Reality of his True Nature, Substance, or Attributes as they are In themselves; in the Attainment of which Conception, the Intellect proceeds thus. It first frames to itself as clear and distinct a Complex Notion as it can of the Mind of Man, by uniting and combining all its own most perfect Operations into one: This Notion or Conception, already formed, and Originaly apply'd to Our selves, is attributed in the whole, as well as in every part of it, to a Being or Substance Incomprehensible; and then becomes an Analogical Representation only, of the Real, internal and infinite Perfections of the divine Nature; of which we have not the least Imperfect, Obscure, or glimmering Perception or Idea.

We are so far from having any Direct and Immediate Ideas of the Existence, and Properties or Attributes of God; or any Clear and Di-Gg3 sinct

finet Idea of his Substance, that we have no Idea at all of them: For His manner of Existence we conceive as well as we can by our Own; and we come to the Knowledge of it, not by any such immediate Consciousness as we have of our own; but by Consequence and Deduction sirst, and afterwards by Revelation. His Attributes we conceive by the Operations, and Properties, and Affections of our Mind; and the only Idea we can form of his Immaterial Substance, is from that of the most spirituous Corporeal Substance, tho' these two are directly Opposite and incompatible.

Thus we see, as I observed before, that our immediate conscious Conceptions of the Mind, and all its Operations; together with all Ideas of Sensation; and the Terms expresfing them, in their First and Proper Acceptation, must be Removed from the divine Nature as so many Imperfections, not only of the Creature, but of a Creature of a very low and Inferior Degree: And whenever they are transfer'd to the Divinity, it must be by Analogy only. Infomuch that the same Operations which being put together in the Strict and Profer Acceptation of the Terms expressing them, make up the complex Notion of Our Mind; when transfer'd to the divine Nature, do denote fo many infinite Unknown Perfections; and are the very Ingredients which make up our Complex Notion of God. Now because

the Intellect fo Naturaly and infensibly falls into this way of conceiving him, we may reasonably from thence conclude, that there must be such a secret Parity of Reason, and Correspondent Analogy between the Operations of our Mind, and the infinite Persections of God; that it renders all our Conceptions and Moral Reasonings concerning him, as Solid and True, as if they did Directly and Immediately exhibit to us the Reality of his internal Nature.

THUS it is that the Intellect infers and concludes that this fupreme Being, whom it calls by the Name God, the first Cause of all things, must have all Absolute and Consummate Perfections in himfelf; but fuch as are altogether Incomprehensible, and infinitely beyond any Conception of ours: Which it therefore describes mostly by Negative Terms; and those of them which are express'd in Positive Terms, being no other than the natural Perfections of the Creature, it concludes must be Imperfections when attributed in their Literal and Proper Acceptation to him who is altogether Supernatural, and the Creator of them all. So that none of those Perfections, even the Greatest of an human Mind, can be spoken of him, so as to express his infinitely perfect Nature and Attributes: Nor indeed any otherwise than as they are transfer'd to him by way of Representation only, and Analogy; and as they denote and Symbolize some real Correspondent Per-Gg 4

Perfections of the Divinity, whereof ours are but so many distant, impersect, and transient Images.

As God is realy and intirely of another Kind, in Essence and Substance, from all his Creatures; so likewise the Intellect concludes that his manner of Existence, together with his Attributes, must be not only different in Degree of Perfection, but necessarily of quite another Kind from those of the most glorious Beings of the Creation; and much more from those of our human Nature, who are perhaps in the lowest Rank of intelligent Agents. But since there can be no Perfection in the Creature, any otherwise than as it bears Some Resemblance or Similitude of him, who is the Fountain of it all; then all Intelligent Creatures especialy must be more or less perfect, as they bear a greater or less Semblance and Analogy with his infinite incomprehensible Perfections: And consequently all their Notions and Conceptions of the Divine Being must be more or less sublime, exalted, and exact; in Proportion to that Resemblance which their Own effential Perfections bear to his, who is the Standard of all Perfection.

CHAP. IX.

From the Existence of God, and the several Relations he bears to Mankind, the speculative Knowledge of natural Religion is infer'd.

ROM thus inferring the necessary Existence, and infinite Persection of God, as he is Absolutely in himself; the Intellect naturally proceeds to the more particular Consideration of the several Relations he bears to us, and we to him: And as we think and speak of all his essential Persections when more Absolutely consider'd, by Correspondence and Analogy with those Persections, which are natural or acquired in Our selves; so we conceive all those Relations likewise under the Semblance and Analogy of such as we bear to One another.

FIRST we conceive him as our Maker; and because we have no Idea of producing a thing into Being no part of which existed before; therefore we conceive it by that of a Man's making a Statue, or any other Work of Art: And to this Inconceivable Operation of infinite Power we affix the peculiar Name Creation, to distinguish it from the Literal Sence of the Word Making, which is forming any Work of Art out of Pre-existent Materials, of which we have

have a clear and distinct Idea. It is in this General Sence only that God was stiled Father, both by Jews and Heathen.

AGAIN we conceive him as our Governor. In which Conception both the Idea and the Word by which it is expressed, are borrowed from those of an earthly Monarch: As our Notion of the Manner of his governing the Universe is, from the Conceptions we have formed to our selves of the best Human Polity, and the manner of ruling a Temporal Kingdom, of which we have a clear and diffinct Conception; but how God governs the Universe we know not. His Providence is originaly conceived, from the previous Notion we have of that commendable Care, and Forecast, and Contrivance we observe among Men for providing all things convenient, and good, and necessary for the Publick. Thus again we conceive God as our Defender, and call him so, from the Notion we have first formed of one Man's defending another from any Affault or impending Danger, by. his Wisdom, or Strength of Body, or military Force. We stile and conceive Him our Deliverer from the secret Malice of evil Men, and the invisible Power of the Spirits of Darkness; from that Visible Help, and Assistance, and Kindness whereby one Man rescues another out of the Hands of his inveterate Enemy. And we conceive him the invisible Disposer of all things, from the Vifible Distribution of Worldly

Happiness, or Riches, and Honours, and Preferments in the State. So likewise it is by the fame Analogy that he is stilled our King and Lord, from that Conception we have in the Mind of a Temporal Prince, furrounded with all the Infigns of Power, and Majesty, and royal Grandeur.

THE last Relation of the Supreme Deity to Mankind I shall mention is, that of our Judge. This Term, together with the Notion annexed to it, is taken originaly from that we have of a Man's fitting upon a Bench for the Tryal of Criminals, and pronouncing an Impartial Sentence of Absolution or Condemnation according to the Forms in our Courts of Judicature: Or from a just Prince's Examination and Inquiry into the Inclinations and Behaviour of his Subjects, and his Equal Distribution of Rewards and Punishments according to their Merits or Demerits.

FROM this last mentioned Relation of the Supreme Cause to us, as his Creatures endued with that Freedom of Will, and Liberty of Acting in every instance of Duty, this way or directly the contrary, and that Power of Disobeying which we experience in our selves; the Intellect infers the Necessity of a future State of Rewards and Punishments in another World. This it doth by a plain and natural Confequence from the unequal Distribution of Providence

vidence so visible in This Life; even to that Degree that the most immoral Men are often the most Prosperous; perhaps that they may have all the Reward of a partial Obedience, and of a Mix'd and Imperfect Virtue here: And that the strictest Observers of the Light of Nature are Sufferers by it in their Fortune especialy, and too often in Reputation and Character; that they may have a more full Compensation and Reward of a Sincere Virtue and Obedience hereafter. Nay and from ob-ferving that temporal Prosperity hath an Apt-ness and Tendency to make Men Transgressors; and that Adversity on the contrary is apt to make corrupt and wicked Men reflect and Refarm; which cannot be supposed of any true and Genuine Rewards and Punishments for Virtue or Vice from the Supreme Being.

FROM the Confideration of those several Relations of God to Mankind, naturaly follow the several mutual and correspondent Relations of Us towards Him; as being his peculiar Property, and Creatures, and Subjects, and Children, in the same wide and extensive Acceptation of that Term, in which God is stiled Father by the Light of Nature only. Hence again immediately arise all the Duties of Natural or Moral Religion; for a Foundation of which we are to possess our Minds with the highest Opinion, and Veneration, and Love of God we are capable of doing from the Operations

tions of our own Minds, and from all the Perfections in the visible Part of the Creation. We are to conceive him as a Being altogether fo Incomprehensible, that we come by the Know-ledge of his very Existence by Deduction only and Consequence; and not from any Direct Conception or Idea we can have of his real Nature itself; and are therefore obliged, for want of better, to think and speak of him in the most exalted Conceptions and Expressions, whereby we think and speak of our selves, or of the most glorious Objects in Nature. As we necessarily infer in General that he must have all confummate and infinite Perfection; and yet find we can have no direct Conception or Idea of any Particular Perfections as they subfift in his Real Nature; fo we necessarily ascribe to him all the particular Perfections of our own rational Nature: These we call his Attributes, because they are only Attributed to him; that is transfer'd from Man to God, and from Earth to Heaven; and do by Semblance and Analogy only represent and express the inconceivable, but Real however, and Correspondent Persections of the Divinity.

HERE it is worth while to stop a little, and observe how great an Ingredient Faith is, even in a merely Moral Religion; I mean that Faith which necessarily includes an Assent of the Mind to the Truth and Reality of things utterly Incomprehensible, and of the Nature whereof

whereof we can have no Conception or Idea, otherwise than by Semblance and Analogy with the things of this World; whether we come to the Knowledge of their Existence by Reason or Revelation. It is of this Faith the Apostle fays, that without it It is impossible to please God; and he instances in a Point of Natural Religion, For he that cometh to God must believe that he is; and that he is a Rewarder of them that diligently seek him. Which Character of a Rewarder is founded upon his Power, and Wisdom, and Goodness; and upon the rest of his Divine Attributes that are Themselves all Objects of Faith according to the Apostle's Definition of it, Faith is the Substance of things hoped for: Which Substance is in this Life represented in Types and Images; fo that we Hope for things in another World whereof we have here no Direst Perception or Idea. The Evidence of things not seen, that is either by the Direct Eye of Body or Mind; but Clearly and Distinctly conceived and understood in their Types and Representatives: In which we have a full Proof and Evidence of the true Substance and Real Existence of the Antitypes, tho', as they are in themselves, they be now utterly inconceivable. Thus the Sum and Import of this Definition of the Apostle's is, that the things of another World are now the Immediate Objects of our Knowledge and Faith, only in their Types and Representatives; and the Mediate Objects of Both, as to their True Nature and Substance and Reality.

Reality. So far is Faith from being confined to the Mysteries of the Gospel, that it was of the very Essence of Religion from the Days of Abel; and the most noble Acts of Faith were exerted by Him, and by Enoch, and Noah, and Abraham, and the succeeding Patriarchs, and Moses, before any of the inspired Writings appeared in the World.

CHAP. X.

The Practical Duties of Natural Religion, infer'd from that Speculative Knowledge.

ROM Matters of Faith, the Intellect proceeds to infer all those Practical Duties of Natural Religion founded on the inconceivable Perfections of the Divine Nature, and the feveral Relations it bears to Mankind; all which require from us fuitable Returns of Fear and Love, of Honour and Gratitude; and of Obedience to all the Dictates of Right Reason: Which are the Laws of Nature, that is of God who hath endued us with that Reason, and with Freedom of Will, and Power for the Observance of those These Laws of Nature are unavoidably Laws. divided first, into Religious Worship both of Body and Mind to be paid to God alone, as to the only Object of Worship among Invisible. Beings. Secondly, into a becoming and equi-

table Treatment of our Fellow Creatures, in all Instances of Behaviour; which Branch of Duty, from the manifold Corruption and Obscurity in which it was involved under uninlightned Reason among Jews and Heathens, is now reduced with Clearness and Certainty to one universal Rule of Action, What soever ye would that Men should do unto you, do ye also unto them: So that upon an imaginary Change of Condition and Circumstances with any other Person, it is almost impossible to err in Judgment unless thro' Perversness and Partiality. And lastly into the feveral Duties owing to Our felves, with regard to our Private Happiness and Persection; the Sum of which confifts in the Restraining our Appetites, and the Regulation of our Pajfions according to Reason.

THE Intellect having, in the Series and Order before described, attain'd at length to a commendable Knowledge of the Existence of God, and of his Attributes; and of the several Relations which he bears to Mankind; which are the Foundations of Faith in him, and of Divine Worship; together with that of all other Practical Duties in Religion merely Moral, has gone the whole length of its Chain, and cannot by its own Natural Powers take one Step farther. Here then we are arrived at the Utmost Limits of human Understanding, set out by God and Nature; such as are utterly Impassable; and never to be surmounted by the

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ACCORDINGLY here it is, that all the Opposers of Revelation set up their Standard; where they labour with all their Force and Artifice, to guard and defend these Frontiers of theirs; by hindering all Attempts of the Mind to obtain any Degree of Supernatural Knowledge, which might be Conveyed from Heaven over those scanty Bounds, to the Side of Nature. They will not suppose any Knowledge necesfary to Religion, beyond the Immediate Reach of those Faculties interwoven with our Frame; or which cannot be attained by the same Unassisted and uninterrupted Method of Proceeding, and continued Chain of Consequences, by which the Mind of Man attains to any Other kind of Knowledge merely Temporal and Human. Their Persuasion is, that neither the Mind nor Conscience has any thing to do with things, whereof Men, without any immediate Light from Heaven, cannot form to themselves fome Direct Idea or Conception: Such reveal'd Truths they call a Knowledge without any Kind of Ideas; and a Faith without Knowledge; both which they esteem Unreasonable in God to require, and altogether Impracticable and unnecessary in respect of Man.

This would have been a very just way of Arguing, if Man had continued in that Frame Hh and

and Temper of Body and Mind wherein he was first made: But we are now, not as the Hypothesis of those Men most absurdly supposes, in an original Healthy State of Nature; but in one which is new and superinduc'd, and altogether Preternatural. We find by fad Experience that we labour under a broken and crazy Constitution, with great Dimness of Sight in our Understanding; Crookedness in our Will; Distortion in all the Passions and Affections of the inferior Soul; together with Corruption and Pollution in all the Appetites of the Body. In this Condition our mere Moralists would have the Purblind fickly Mind of Man judge for itself; and work out a Cure intirely upon the Strength of its Own Judgment, without the least Advice or Help from Heaven.

THEIR fatal Error is, that they infift wholly on the Light of Nature alone, in this Unnatural State of Mind; and will choose to fee with no other than this obscure, uncertain, expiring Light; which was fo near being Extinguish'd, that it could never have recover'd without being Kindled anew from Above. So that all their Boasts of Natural Religion only, exclusive of Revelation, is but glorying in their Shame: And vainly magnifying that Weakness of the Understanding, by which it is in the very Condition of the Man in the Gospel, Who saw Men as Trees walking when his Eyes were but half open'd; and which render'd it utterly unable

able of itself to contribute any thing to its own Cure; and therefore necessarily required Discipline, and Regimen, and a Physician of Souls. We were so far from being able of Our Selves to form any true Judgment upon the fufficient Means and Method of our Recovery, by the Light of Nature; that it could not have helped us even to any account of the true Cause of our Distemper; and of that fatal Step by which we were plunged into this deplorable State of Blindness and Corruption: Which all Men have ever bewail'd, but could never account for without Revelation; from whence alone we learn that it was not our Original Frame, as we first came out of the Hands of God. Here therefore we are to fix our Foot, for evincing the absolute Necessity of some immediate express Revelation from Heaven; and must lay it down as a certain Truth, in Opposition to what is Suppos'd and Insinuated by the Magnifiers of Mere Reason. That Mankind, in its Present State of Degeneracy, is to be consider'd; not in Possession of the Divine Laws Fair and Legible, as they were originaly written on the Tables of our Heart by the Finger of God; and still remaining Whole and Intire: But as they are Broken to Pieces, and Shatter'd; like those lively Emblems of them which Moses, fill'd with just Indignation, dashed against the Stones. So that the whole Sum of all our Knowledge in Religion merely Natural, is nothing more Now, than the Poor Remains of the First Tran-Hh 2 fcript;

fcript; and only some Few, Impersect, and Uncertain Hints recover'd by the laborious Gathering up, and Piecing of the Fragments.

CHAP. XI.

The Necessity, and Manner of Revelation.

ERE we are come at length to the Ut-most Advancement of human Understanding, and the highest Elevation of the Mind of Man by Divine Revelation; whereby it is raised above itself, and above all things in this World, to take a Clear and Delightful Prospect of another; whereof it had but a very Obscure uncertain View before. This opens to the Mind, all at once, a New and immense Scope, and spacious Scene of folid and substantial Knowledge: From which all the Adversaries of Reveal'd Religion unhappily preclude themselves, as from a kind of Utopia or Fairy Land, wherein all is mere Dream and Vision; where Men must leave their Reason behind them at their first Entrance; and give a Loose to the groundless and extravagant Amusements of a warm Imagination. In this they are fo fix'd and pofitive, that they ever infinuate the Term REVELATION to import nothing more than Ignorance and Supersition. But their not dif-cerning the absolute Necessity of Revelation, is a fad Effect and Consequence of that Blindness of their Understanding, which it was intended

to Heal and inlighten: And Men are never in a more Deplorable Condition, than when they remain altogether Insensible in a Mortal Distemper; and cannot be persuaded they stand in need of any Cure or Remedy.

THAT the native Powers and Faculties of the whole Man were all out of Order and miferably broken and corrupted, the wifest of the Heathens were thoroughly fensible, and fadly lamented: And that all this proceeded from a Voluntary Act of his own, and not from any Fatal Necessity, or Positive Decree and immediate Interpolition of Almighty Power, we are informed by Scripture. Now, after Man had funk into fuch a Condition of Infirmity and Corruption, as to be utterly unable to extricate himself; or to make any Effectual Attempt towards the Recovery of his original Frame and Temper of true Wisdom and Innocence: That unnatural Change and Degeneracy must necessarily have either always Continued, and have been unavoidably Increased by Custom and Habit thro' every Generation; or there must have been some Help or Remedy from Without. There could be no Alteration for the better of this daily declining State, and languishing Condition of the Soul, from Within; Nature had no Strength left to Work off the Diftemper, which proceeded from a mortal and deadly Poison, greedily swallowed by our first Parents thro' a fatal Disobedience and In-Hh3 advertency; advertency; being treacherously handed out to them for the highest Cordial, by the common Enemy of their whole Race. The Antidote or Remedy was past all Human Art or Prescription; and that it could be administred by Infinite Wisdom alone is plain, since the Operation must have been according to the Nature and Disposition of a Free Agent: The Healing, as well as the Corruption must have been intirely Voluntary; and the Means of our Recovery must have been altogether adapted to that perfect Freedom of Will with which we were created, and without which we could not be either truly Virtuous or Holy; and consequently without our Own voluntary Concurrence, we could never be Restor'd in any Degree to our primitive Frame and Constitution.

was to be continued whole and Inviolable, thro' all the Dispensations of God towards Mankind for our Recovery; there was no reasonable or Conceivable Way of effecting this, but by Application of proper Help and Assistance to the Natural Powers and Faculties of the Mind: And particularly to the Understanding, before there could be any room for the secret Operation of the Spirit of God upon that of Man, for influencing the Will. This was to be performed, not by any Sudden actual Illumination of it All at once; as Blindness is cur'd in the Body, when it is the immediate Result of Almighty

mighty Power (for we might as well suppose God, after the Fall, to have first reduced Man to Nothing, and then to have made him over again a New Creature in a Literal Sence) But by Information or Revelation from Without, of fuch Instances of Knowledge as were necessary to enable us to become New Creatures in a truly Evangelical Sence; and which it was impossible for us to attain by any Inward Light or Strength of Reason. And accordingly this Divine Information was begun in the first Promise of the Seed of the Woman which was to Break the Serpent's Head; and this was continualy Enlarged and clear'd up farther in succeeding Ages by New Revelations, as the Gradual Corruption and Exigencies of Mankind requir'd.

Thus our Understanding is affisted, and inlightned with the Knowledge of things Supernatural and Spiritual; after the same Manner it is with that of things Temporal and Human. The Knowledge and Experience of Other Men convey'd to us by Information, makes up the greatest Part of our Secular Knowledge; which we do not take up Implicitly, but render it properly Our own by the Exercise of our Reafon, in judging and determining upon the Credibility of every thing we give our Assent to upon the Testimony of others. And we have the same Full and Free Use of our Reason, in judging and determining concerning the Credibility of every thing which comes to us by Di-H h 4

vine Information; which goes by the Name of Revelation, to distinguish it from that which is Human. So that nothing can be more groundless and absurd, than the general and firm Perfuasion of all our modern Infidels and Freethinkers; That no Information hath or can come to us from God, as well as from Man; and that such as we hold to come from Him, requires a blind and Implicit Assention of the Mind, without a thorough Examination and Conviction of Reason.

As it is thus evident that the Understanding may be, and is enlightened by External Information in Matters of Religion; so it appears to the plainest Reason, that all such Informations or Revelations must be convey'd in the Language of Men, who are made the Instruments of them all; and by the Mediation and Substitution of fuch natural and Human Ideas and Conceptions, for the expressing of which the Words and Terms of that Language were. Originaly accommodated. It is not reasonable to iinagine that this should be performed by giving us any Faculties intirely New; or by any total Alteration of those we Already have; for this would be a kind of Second Creation, and not any Information or Revelation. And it is as unreasonable to think, that this should be performed by exhibiting Internaly to the Mind of Man any Obscure, or Faint, or Glimmering Ideas of things Supernatural, as they are In themselves:

themselves; for we are by Nature as unqualify'd for any, even the least Degree of Such a Perception of them, as we are for Clear and Distinct Ideas of that Real Escence: Besides that upon Such a Supposition, all that Knowledge and Faith which is founded on Revelation, must of Necessity be Equaly confused, and Dubious, and Obscure.

No, Divine Information gives us no New Faculties of Perception, but is adapted to those we Already have; nor doth it exhibit to the Immediate View of the Intellect Any, the Least glimmering Idea of things purely spiritual, intirely abstracted from all Sensation or any Dependence upon it: But it is altogether performed by the Intervention and Use of those Ideas which are Already in the Mind; first conveyed to the Imagination from the Impression of external Objects upon the Organs of Sensation; then variously Alter'd and diversify'd by the Intellect; and afterwards by its Operations of Judgment and Illation, wrought up into an endless Variety of Complex Notions and Conceptions; which takes in the whole Compass of our merely temporal and Secular Knowledge. Now, all this is transfer'd from Earth to Heaven, by way of Semblance and Analogy: So that the Ideas simple and compound; the Complex Notions and Conceptions; the Thoughts and Reafonings; the Sentiments and Apprehensions; the Imaginations, and Passions, and Affections of an Human Mind; together with the Language and

Terms by which we express them, become Subfervient to all the real Ends and Purposes of Revelation ... The Terms together with the Conceptions apply'd to things Supernatural and Spiritual, are the Same which are in common Use for things Temporal and Human; but the Application is New and Holy; they are only confecrated to a Divine Use and Signification: They are so far sanctifyed and to be reverenced as they are thus appropriated to Religion; to the Representation of the intrinsick Nature and Attributes of God; and to the glorious, and O-therwise inestable Mysteries of the Gospel.

THIS Operation of Substituting those Ideas and complex Notions which are Natural and Familiar to us, for the Representation of things Supernatural and in themselves Incomprehensible (which we fall into fo infenfibly, that we do not easily distinguish between the Literal, and Analogical Acceptation of those Terms by which we express them) is the highest and most valuable Privilege of the Intellect. It is this which gives it full Scope for the Contemplation of heavenly Objects; which extends its Dimenfions; and fo dilates all the Powers and Faculties of the Mind, that it takes in the immense Creation with all its glorious Inhabitants; and even God himself, and all his Attributes. By this it comes to a folid and Real Knowledge of things, whereof it can have no Direct Conception or Idea; and is enabled to judge and deter-

determine, to discuss and argue, to make sure and certain Deductions and Conclusions; and form to itself Axioms, and Rules, and Precepts concerning things far removed out of the Immediate Reach of all its natural Capacities; and by this they become the Objects of our Fear and Love, Faith and Hope, and of all the Passions and Affections of a human Soul. In short this is the very way by which all Intercourse is kept up between God and Man; and whereby he lets himself Down to our present Condition of Insirmity, in all his Revelations.

Thus we contemplate things Supernatural and Spiritual, not by looking directly Upward for any Immediate View of them; but as we behold the heavenly Bodies, by casting our Eyes Downward to the Water. Which tho' it exhibits to us nothing of the Real Nature and True Substance of the Firmament, with all its Furniture of radiant and delightful Objects; yet affords us fuch a Goodly Appearance and Lively Representation of them, that a Person (suppofed never to have feen those celestial Luminaties Themselves; but convinced that there May be a true Similitude, and Proportion, and Correspondency between the Resemblances and the Reality) would have Notions and Conceptions of the things unseen, not only Just and True: But so Clear likewise and Distinct, that he wou'd from thence infer their Necessary Existence; admire their Splendor, and Beauty, and Use; and

and reason upon them, to all Moral Intents and Purposes, with as much solid Truth and Reality as he could upon those things whereof he had either Direct Ideas, or an Immediate Conficious sin him, than to draw any Exact Parallel between the Real Nature and essential Properties of the Types and Antitypes.

THO' this kind of Knowledge is by Semblance only and Analogy, yet we have a firm Dependence upon the Wisdom and Veracity of God (who formed us to his own Image and Likeness) for such a just Resemblance, and Proportion, and Correspondency between those Types which are natural, and the supernatural Antitypes, as renders that Knowledge Solid and Real; the Faith that is built upon it, Certain and Firm; and our Hope well grounded and Sure. And then only we are in danger of running into Error and Delufion, and may be Fataly deceived, when we either turn it into mere Metaphor and Allusion only; or when we Strain that Analogy, by which we conceive things spiritual, to an Undue and Literal Comparison with things natural and human, and in fuch Instances as never were Intended by the Wisdom of God; or lastly, when we begin to imagine, that we have in any degree a Direct or Immediate Perception of things Supernatural.

THE Mind of Man, while it keeps within its own proper Sphere, acts with Freedom and Security; but when it strives to exert itself beyond its Native Powers and Faculties, then it finks into Weakness and Infirmity; and is ever liable to endless Mistake and Error. It hath no Direct Perception, or Immediate Consciousness beyond things sensible and human. So that in all its noblest Efforts and most lofty Flights, it must ever have a steady Eye to the Earth from whence it took its Rife; and always confider that it mounts upward with Borrowed Wings: For when once it presumes upon their being of its own Natural growth, and attempts a Direct Flight to the heavenly Regions; then it falls Headlong to the Ground, where it lies Groveling in Superstition, or Infidelity.

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